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SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015
Publisher or commissioning bodySpringer
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-662-48324-4
ISBN (Print)978-3-662-48323-7
DateAccepted/In press - 6 Jun 2015
DatePublished (current) - 1 Sep 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743


Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above is feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.

    Research areas

  • Side-channel attacks, electromagnetic, system-on-chip, ARM, NEON

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  • Author version

    Rights statement: The final publication is available at Springer via

    Accepted author manuscript, 4 MB, PDF document



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