SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip

Jake Longo, Elke De Mulder, Daniel Page, Mike Tunstall

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

47 Citations (Scopus)
548 Downloads (Pure)


Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above is feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9783662483244
ISBN (Print)9783662483237
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743


  • Side-channel attacks
  • electromagnetic
  • system-on-chip
  • ARM
  • NEON

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