Increased complexity in modern embedded systems has presented various important challenges with regard to side-channel attacks. In particular, it is common to deploy SoC-based target devices with high clock frequencies in security-critical scenarios; understanding how such features align with techniques more often deployed against simpler devices is vital from both destructive (i.e., attack) and constructive (i.e., evaluation and/or countermeasure) perspectives. In this paper, we investigate electromagnetic-based leakage from three different means of executing cryptographic workloads (including the general purpose ARM core, an on-chip co-processor, and the NEON core) on the AM335x SoC. Our conclusion is that addressing challenges of the type above is feasible, and that key recovery attacks can be conducted with modest resources.
|Title of host publication||Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015|
|Number of pages||21|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Sep 2015|
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
- Side-channel attacks
Longo, J., De Mulder, E., Page, D., & Tunstall, M. (2015). SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015 (1 ed., Vol. 9293, pp. 620-640). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9293). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48324-4_31