Stakeholders in bilateral conflict

Paola Manzini*, Clara Ponsatí

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)166-180
Number of pages15
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume50
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2005

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from ESRC grant R000223438 (Manzini), MECD grant SEC2003-01961 and EC grant CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 (Ponsatí). We wish to thank an anonymous referee, Giulio Fella and Marco Mariotti for helpful suggestions. Any errors are our own.

Copyright:
Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Stakeholders
  • War of attrition

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Stakeholders in bilateral conflict'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this