Strategic bargaining with destructive power

Paola Manzini

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3

Strategic bargaining with destructive power

Paola Manzini^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	315-322
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	65
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3
Publication status	Published - Dec 1999

Bibliographical note

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Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Bargaining
Commitment

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abstract = "This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.",

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N2 - This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.

AB - This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Commitment

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U2 - 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3

DO - 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

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VL - 65

SP - 315

EP - 322

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

Strategic bargaining with destructive power

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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