Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

Paola Manzini*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We build a simple alternating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-22
Number of pages8
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume54
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1997

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Commitment

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