Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

Paola Manzini

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00924-x

Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

Paola Manzini^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We build a simple alternating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	15-22
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	54
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00924-x
Publication status	Published - Jan 1997

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Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Bargaining
Commitment

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Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

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