Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring

Gerard J. van den Berg*, Bas van der Klaauw

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
21 Downloads (Pure)


To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)879-903
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Economic Review
Issue number2
Early online date14 Dec 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2019

Structured keywords

  • ECON Macroeconomics
  • ECON Applied Economics
  • ECON CEPS Welfare


  • Unemployment duration
  • Search effort
  • Randomized social experiment
  • Multi-tasking
  • Search channels
  • Treatment
  • Job mobility
  • Job duration
  • Wage
  • Active labor market policy

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