Abstract
The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or at least the concreteness of them. The aim of this paper is to show that the causal exclusion problem derives its force from a false dichotomy between Humeanism about causation and a notion of productive or generative causation based on a defunct model of the physical world.
| Translated title of the contribution | Structural Realism and the Relationship Between the Special Sciences and Physics |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Pages (from-to) | 744 - 755 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2008 |
Structured keywords
- Centre for Science and Philosophy
- Centre_for_science_and_philosophy
Keywords
- physics and philosophy
- special sciences
- causal exclusion problem
- structural realism
- naturalism