The construction of the embryo and implications for law

The purpose of this chapter is to make the case for the embryo as a constructed concept. I discuss some different constructions of the embryo and show how they carry in them implicit accounts of the values of the embryo. Towards the end of the chapter, I briefly describe the legal implications of different constructions and show how in different contexts the embryo may have different values. I use the recent decision of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice in Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace as a case study to highlight Franklin’s description of the embryo as a legally indeterminate appellation. By examining the way in which the embryo is constructed, we can come to a clearer idea of what aspects of the construction are important to different groups. That is not to say that taking a constructionist approach will overcome the differences in approach to the embryo - rather it will enable us to better understand the disagreements and move policy forward in a way that can better accommodate these differing views.