The e-mail game phenomenon

Yi-Chun Chen; Siyang Xiong

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

The e-mail game phenomenon

Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis types in finite or common-prior models display strategic discontinuity in simple games. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	147-156
Number of pages	10
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	80
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
Publication status	Published - Jul 2013

Keywords

E-mail game
Games with incomplete information
Higher-order beliefs
Common knowledge
Critical types
FULL SURPLUS EXTRACTION
COMMON KNOWLEDGE

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10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000328

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title = "The e-mail game phenomenon",

abstract = "The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis types in finite or common-prior models display strategic discontinuity in simple games. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "E-mail game, Games with incomplete information, Higher-order beliefs, Common knowledge, Critical types, FULL SURPLUS EXTRACTION, COMMON KNOWLEDGE",

author = "Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong",

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journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

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AU - Chen, Yi-Chun

AU - Xiong, Siyang

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N2 - The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis types in finite or common-prior models display strategic discontinuity in simple games. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis types in finite or common-prior models display strategic discontinuity in simple games. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - E-mail game

KW - Games with incomplete information

KW - Higher-order beliefs

KW - Common knowledge

KW - Critical types

KW - FULL SURPLUS EXTRACTION

KW - COMMON KNOWLEDGE

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84875801305

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 80

SP - 147

EP - 156

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

The e-mail game phenomenon

Abstract

Keywords

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