The Eastern Partnership and its strategic objectives: a Polish–German compromise?

The strategic objectives of the European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership (EaP) can be considered a result of Polish–German compromise-building. According to the model of Europeanisation through cross-loading, member states can reach a compromise between each other’s initiatives, even if they pursue divergent interests. They can, thus, seek a broader European consensus around their initiatives by coordinating each other’s complementary coalition-building skills (in relation to different strategic allies). For example, Poland promoted the EaP among Germany’s Russian-orientated EU foreign policy allies. Therefore, Poland responded to German expectations: it presented the EaP as a ‘non-anti-Russian’ initiative and, by doing so, abandoned an EU enlargement option. In turn, Germany sought to avoid accusations from Poland and its Russo-sceptical allies that Berlin was prioritising EU–Russian cooperation. Therefore, Germany backed the EaP. It also accepted Polish proposals to acknowledge the ‘European aspirations’ of the EU’s Eastern neighbours and to develop a more unconditional association with Ukraine. However, the Polish–German compromise only concealed the countries’ strategic-interest divergences. The EaP proceeded, but without a finalité. Moreover, Germany’s (partly) individual responses to the recent Russia–Ukraine crisis, and Poland’s broader Euroscepticism, have highlighted again Polish–German interest divergences and constrained their potential for bilateral compromises.