The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)490-499
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2002

Bibliographical note

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  • Bargaining
  • Disagreement

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