The Effect of Pay Disparities within Top Management on Conservative Reporting

Mahmoud Gad, Trang Nguyen, Mariano Scapin*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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    Abstract

    We study the effect of the pay gap between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the next layer of executives in the top management team (TMT)—a proxy for promotion-based tournament incentives—on conditional conservatism in financial reporting. We find that higher levels of tournament incentives are associated with less conservative financial reports. Our results hold in an instrumental variable (IV) analysis and regressions using alternative measures of both pay gap and accounting conservatism. Furthermore, we find that senior executives’ engagement in tournaments for promotion is affected by their perceived probability of success. Specifically, the negative relationship between the pay gap and conservatism is stronger (weaker) when the CEO is more (less) likely to be replaced. Overall, our results indicate that pay disparities within the TMT play an important role in financial reporting.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages50
    JournalAccounting and Business Research
    Early online date27 May 2022
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 27 May 2022

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

    Keywords

    • Conservatism
    • financial reporting
    • pay gap
    • tournament incentives
    • promotion
    • senior management
    • executive compensation
    • corporate governance

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