The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment

Jaap H. Abbring, Gerard J. Van Den Berg, Jan C. Van Ours

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

121 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sanctions or punitive benefits reductions arc increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements. This article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. After correction for selectivity in lie imposition of sanctions, we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re-employment rates.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)602-630
Number of pages29
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume115
Issue number505
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2005

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