The fear of fear in political theory

This chapter contrasts the growing acceptance of anger and grief in political theory with the persistent, one-sided pathologization of fear. While anger and grief are now frequently defended as political valuable, fear continues to be dismissed as a primitive, irrational force that endangers public life. Rather than defend fear, however, I criticize a pervasive argument again it that relies on two dubious claims: (1) neuroscientific findings supposedly prove fear is inherently destructive in politics, and (2) entire groups are driven by fear. I dispute the first claim by drawing on the work of LeDoux to show that ‘fear’ in neuroscientific research often differs fundamentally from the subjective experience of fear that critics usually target. I dispute the second claim by arguing that attributions of fear to social groups and populations frequently hinge on weak evidence, such as conflating perceived threat with the emotional state of fear. Finally, I argue that the fear of fear in political theory causes real harm to people, because it fuels unwarranted attributions of fear that oversimplify the complexities of political behaviour and risk compounding the marginalization of socio-economically disadvantaged people.