Abstract
According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V-ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem—familiar from discussions of reliabilism—as not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 242-262 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Mind and Language |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 6 Mar 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2018 |
Keywords
- anti-intellectualism
- generality problem
- intellectualism
- knowledge-how
- reliabilism