The generality problem for intellectualism

Josh Habgood-Coote

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
340 Downloads (Pure)


According to intellectualism, knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V-ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions that intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists face a version of the generality problem—familiar from discussions of reliabilism—as not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various responses to this problem and argue that none are satisfactory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)242-262
Number of pages21
JournalMind and Language
Issue number3
Early online date6 Mar 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2018


  • anti-intellectualism
  • generality problem
  • intellectualism
  • knowledge-how
  • reliabilism


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