The Humean pragmatic turn and the case for revisionary best systems accounts

Lewis's original Best Systems Account of laws was not motivated much by pragmatics. But recent commentary on his general approach to laws has taken a `pragmatic turn'. This was initiated by Hall's defence against the charge of `ratbag idealism' which maintained that best systems accounts should be admired rather than criticised for the inherent pragmatism behind their choice of desiderata for what counts as `best'. Emboldened by Hall's pragmatic turn, recent commentators have proposed the addition of pragmatically motivated desiderata to complement or replace the canonical desiderata of \textit{strength} and \textit{simplicity}. This, they hope, will allow their revisionary BSAs to respond better to various counterexamples against the original account. While the pragmatic turn itself is well taken, here I problematise these revisionary approaches. First, there are reasonable responses to the counterexamples from within the canonical BSA. Second, while actual laws may satisfy the newly proposed desiderata, there are reasons to think these desiderata cannot be constitutive of laws. By comparison, the canonical desiderata appear to be relevant to explaining why and when the revisionary desiderata will reflect pragmatic features of the laws and better reflect the motives behind practitioners of fundamental physics.