What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought? I argue that the notion of ‘access-consciousness’ cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we must appeal to phenomenological properties. If this is right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required. Can we give a satisfactory account of what makes an occurrent thought a conscious thought solely by reference to sensory phenomenology—including both verbal and non-verbal imagery? I argue that we cannot, and that we must appeal to ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to be able to say what distinguishes conscious occurrent thought from non-conscious occurrent thought.
|Title of host publication||The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities|
|Editors||Paul Coates Sam Coleman|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Publication status||In preparation - 2014|
- cognitive phenomenology
- sensory pheomenology