The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean Supervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are examined especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability to explain that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their strongest form, can be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are metaphysically contingent. Some reasons for thinking that such variation in the modal status of laws exists will be presented with reference to physics. This drives us towards a fourth, hybrid view, according to which there are both necessary and contingent laws. The prospects for such a view are studied.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)509-528
Number of pages19
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Volume65
Issue number260
Early online date25 Jun 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2015

Keywords

  • Metaphysics
  • Laws of Nature
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Modality

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this