The Regress of Pure Powers?

Alexander Bird

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

45 Citations (Scopus)


Dispositional monism is the view that natural properties and relations are `pure powers'. It is often objected that dispositional monism involves some kind of vicious or otherwise unpalatable regress or circularity. I examine ways of making this objection precise. The most pressing interpretation is that the theory fails to make the identities of powers determinate. I demonstrate that this objection is in error. It does, however, put certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like. I show what a satisfactory structure would be.
Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)513-534
Number of pages22
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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