THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF MULTI-AGENT REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES

Research output: Contribution to conferenceConference Abstractpeer-review

Abstract

The rising focus on employing multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in coalition bargaining games (CBG) has exposed a need for robust theoretical principles linking the two. To address this, we explore the relationship between CBG and MARL within the context of stochastic games, and show that under some
assumptions, CBG are a subclass of sequential stochastic games. Out work is a step forward in the reproducibility and generalization of MARL results to CBG.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 31 May 2023
EventInternational Conference on Learning Representations - Kigali Convention Center. Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda
Duration: 1 May 20235 May 2023
Conference number: 11
https://iclr.cc/

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Learning Representations
Abbreviated titleICLR
Country/TerritoryRwanda
CityKigali
Period1/05/235/05/23
Internet address

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