Abstract
In a three-way takeover, a firm bids for a bidder while the bidder’s own acquisition deal is ongoing. The bid creates a three-party fight between the target, bidder, and bidder’s bidder (b-bidder) which is unobservable in typical takeover contests. Examining a sample of three-way takeovers, we find that over half of the deals are clustered in financial, utilities, and communication, where fierce competition for market power drives the three-way bids. Targets and bidders gain from the three-party bargaining at the expense of b-bidders who appear to be more concerned about winning the bids irrespective of the costs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 67-90 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Research |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Mar 2013 |
Research Groups and Themes
- AF Corporate Finance
Keywords
- Mergers
- Acquisitions
- Three-way Takeovers