Abstract
In a survey of six widely used end-to-end encrypted messaging
applications, we consider the post-compromise recovery process from the
perspective of what audit functions, if any, are in place to detect and
recover from attacks. Our investigation reveals audit functions vary in
the extent to which they rely on the end user. We argue developers
should minimize dependence on users and view them as a residual, not
primary, risk mitigation strategy. To provide robust communications
security, E2EE applications need to avoid protocol designs that dump too
much responsibility on naive users and instead make system components
play an appropriate role
applications, we consider the post-compromise recovery process from the
perspective of what audit functions, if any, are in place to detect and
recover from attacks. Our investigation reveals audit functions vary in
the extent to which they rely on the end user. We argue developers
should minimize dependence on users and view them as a residual, not
primary, risk mitigation strategy. To provide robust communications
security, E2EE applications need to avoid protocol designs that dump too
much responsibility on naive users and instead make system components
play an appropriate role
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the International Security Protocols Workshop |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 27 Jan 2023 |