Skip to content

Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages14
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
DateAccepted/In press - 23 Oct 2018
DatePublished (current) - 26 Mar 2019


Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly—that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value (Zagzebski, 2003; Kvanvig, 2003): (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stef´ansson & Bradley (2015) call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.

    Research areas

  • veritism, swamping problem, risk, reliabilism, epistemic value, justification



  • Full-text PDF (accepted author manuscript)

    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Taylor & Francis at . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

    Accepted author manuscript, 151 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 26/09/20

    Request copy


View research connections

Related faculties, schools or groups