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Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem

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Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem. / Pettigrew, Richard.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 26.03.2019.

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Pettigrew, Richard. / Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem. In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2019.

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@article{36141f1760bb4227984f2ba107d1ee41,
title = "Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem",
abstract = "Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly—that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value (Zagzebski, 2003; Kvanvig, 2003): (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stef´ansson & Bradley (2015) call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.",
keywords = "veritism, swamping problem, risk, reliabilism, epistemic value, justification",
author = "Richard Pettigrew",
year = "2019",
month = "3",
day = "26",
doi = "10.1080/00048402.2018.1563798",
language = "English",
journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "0004-8402",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis Group",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - JOUR

T1 - Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem

AU - Pettigrew, Richard

PY - 2019/3/26

Y1 - 2019/3/26

N2 - Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly—that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value (Zagzebski, 2003; Kvanvig, 2003): (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stef´ansson & Bradley (2015) call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.

AB - Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly—that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value (Zagzebski, 2003; Kvanvig, 2003): (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stef´ansson & Bradley (2015) call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.

KW - veritism

KW - swamping problem

KW - risk

KW - reliabilism

KW - epistemic value

KW - justification

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063482533&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/00048402.2018.1563798

DO - 10.1080/00048402.2018.1563798

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85063482533

JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

SN - 0004-8402

ER -