Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

Jon X. Eguia*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-135
Number of pages25
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume73
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

Keywords

  • Voting blocs
  • Party formation
  • Party discipline
  • Coalition formation
  • Voting rule
  • COALITIONS

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