Abstract
I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 111-135 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 73 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2011 |
Keywords
- Voting blocs
- Party formation
- Party discipline
- Coalition formation
- Voting rule
- COALITIONS