What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?

Richard Pettigrew

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y

What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?

Richard Pettigrew

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

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Abstract

Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consideration.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-37
Number of pages	37
Journal	Philosophical Studies
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y
Publication status	Published - 27 Nov 2019

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@article{4e8151690c76463a84bffd750b08789f,

title = "What is Conditionalization, and why should we do it?",

abstract = "Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consideration.",

author = "Richard Pettigrew",

year = "2019",

month = nov,

day = "27",

doi = "10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y",

language = "English",

pages = "1--37",

journal = "Philosophical Studies",