Abstract
In this paper, I aim to identify the wrong that is done by the hearer to the testifier in all cases of testimonial injustice. I introduce the concept of testimonial injustice, as well as the existing accounts of this characteristic wrong, and I argue that the latter don't work. Then I present my favoured account, which adapts Rachel Fraser's account of the wrong of aesthetic injustice. I argue that this allows us to see that certain putative stock examples of testimonial injustices in fact do not fall under the concept.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | pqaf034 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1428-1451 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 3 Apr 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 3 Apr 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews.