What Rationality? A Comment On Levy's 'Is conspiracy theorising irrational?'

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review


Neil Levy (2019) provides several new angles on the long-standing question about the rationality, or lack thereof, of people who accept objectively unwarranted conspiracy theories. Levy's position rests on two arguments. First, accepting conspiracy theories is subjectively rational for many people because they satisfy that person's personal epistemic standards. Second, those personal epistemic standards, while objectively leading the agent astray, are "in some sense rational, perhaps even objectively rational".
Original languageEnglish
JournalSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 13 Feb 2020


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