Abstract
In a variety of choice environments, perception is both noisy and coarse. That is, the agent perceives the true ranking of the objects of choice with error; and, in addition, the perceived values can only be discriminated coarsely. Reasons for coarse perception include limitations in sensory perception, memory function, or the communication technology used by expert advisors.
We model these two sources of error in terms of a random utility model with a discrimination threshold. In the limiting case when values are perceived without noise, finer perception is unambiguously beneficial. We show how this ceases to be true when values are perceived with noise. As a practical implication, our results establish conditions where it is counter-productive for an expert to use a finer communication scheme with a decision-maker.
We model these two sources of error in terms of a random utility model with a discrimination threshold. In the limiting case when values are perceived without noise, finer perception is unambiguously beneficial. We show how this ceases to be true when values are perceived with noise. As a practical implication, our results establish conditions where it is counter-productive for an expert to use a finer communication scheme with a decision-maker.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 105445 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 202 |
| Early online date | 16 Mar 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We are grateful to Helios Herrera, Ian Jewitt, Jay Lu, Mathieu Marcoux, Nick Netzer, and Chris Tyson for useful discussions and advice about this project. Horan was financially supported by FRQSC Grant 2013-SE-164442 .
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Inc.
Research Groups and Themes
- ECON Microeconomic Theory
Keywords
- Stochastic choice
- Imperfect perception