Which theory of colour best accounts for variation in colour experiences?

Carla M Forster (Editor), Xingrong Li

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

    7 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Physicalism has been accused of not being compatible with variation in colour experiences. If colours are physical properties of external objects, they should appear the same in everyone’s eyes, just like we agree on the fact that a typical chair has four legs. By combining physicalism with perspectivism, I propose a convincing account that could exist coherently with various colour experiences. At the same time, I argue that this account is the best account among many, for it is more informative, empirically consistent, and scientifically encouraging.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalBristol Institute for Learning and Teaching (BILT) Student Research Journal
    Issue number5
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2024

    Keywords

    • physicalism
    • perspectivism
    • colour experience
    • realism

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Which theory of colour best accounts for variation in colour experiences?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this