Why I'm not a Humean

Toby T Friend*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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Abstract

There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non-Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages23
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Dec 2021

Bibliographical note

The research for this paper has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's (EU) Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No 771509 ('MetaScience')

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