Why political institutions (and institutionalism) matter

This article reflects on the importance of analysing the internal dynamics of political institutions within contemporary public law. It contends that public law analysis would benefit from using institutionalism as a method of analysis to understand and reflect on why political institutions matter. Institutionalism directs us to recognise the ways in which political institutions shape and channel how political actors and ordinary citizens exercise political power within a constitution. The article particularly focuses on how political constitutionalists have largely neglected the study of political institutions, despite their goal of promoting and defending the importance of political institutions within public law. It is argued that this neglect results predominantly from political constitutionalists' historic defensive posture and their lack of methodological tools to explain the self-regulating and self-constituting nature of political institutions. This article argues that institutionalism can help public lawyers in general, and political constitutionalists in particular, better understand and reflect on how political institutions shape and channel political behaviour and the attainment of constitutional goods. The value of institutionalism is illustrated through a case study of the ongoing tensions surrounding the existing institutionalised agenda-setting arrangements within the House of Commons. The case study highlights how these institutionalised arrangements affect the day-to-day operation of the UK's predominantly political constitution.