Abstract
Widening access to higher education remains a significant policy goal. Universities often frame and pursue these goals via access targets (target number of students from disadvantaged backgrounds) as part of their intake targets (target total number of students). However, universities' desire to exercise flexibility in their access and intake targets constitutes a novel challenge in designing a centralised admissions system. We introduce the Flexible Access and Intake Targets mechanism that is strategy-proof for the students and enables the universities to pursue their flexible access and intake targets with the most qualified applicants possible. The mechanism is based on an iterative market clearing procedure whose key element is its systematic adjustment of targets in each step in response to fluctuations in applicant numbers. We formulate a fairness concept for matchings that strikes a balance between widening access and merit-based allocation. Our mechanism finds the unique student-optimal fair matching.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 105973 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 224 |
Early online date | 27 Jan 2025 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2025 The Author(s).