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Worker turnover and unemployment insurance

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages40
JournalInternational Economic Review
Early online date4 Jun 2018
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 19 Dec 2017
DateE-pub ahead of print (current) - 4 Jun 2018

Abstract

This article studies a competitive search model of the labor market with learning about match‐specific productivity in which risk‐averse workers factor present and future unemployment risks in their search decisions. We examine internally efficient equilibrium allocations in which match termination occurs only if the joint value of a worker–firm pair is negative. Internal efficiency poses a trade‐off between present and future risks. Public insurance provision also affects this trade‐off and, hence, worker turnover and job composition. In addition to unemployment benefits, the implementation of the planner's allocation requires a negative income tax and a 0 layoff tax.

    Structured keywords

  • ECON Macroeconomics

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    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12322 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

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