Common Law Claims for Wrongful Interference with Intangible Assets

Abstract

Intangible assets have created challenges for private law; their proprietary status and the appropriate response to their wrongful interference are contentious issues. We might expect the property status of an asset to affect the availability and strength of common law claims. However, the property status of an intangible asset has a more marginal influence on a common law claim. The thesis advances two main arguments to support this.

The first is that wrongful interference (in the property sense) has a restrictive application to intangibles. This is due to the characteristics of the corresponding rights and duties. Ownership of an intangible does not give the right to possess it. The duty of non-interference with an intangible operates differently compared to an analogous duty towards a tangible. The way that duty can be breached varies depending on the type of intangible asset, but is ultimately different to the corresponding duty applying to tangibles.

The second argument explores wrongful interference more widely. Appraising a range of common law causes of action reveals that whether an intangible asset is property usually makes a minimal difference to the overall outcome. Either the common law action prioritises some other attribute (such as possession) over ownership, or the property justifications for the claim do not affect the overall remedy. Where property does affect the outcome of the claim, it is limited to relatively narrow circumstances.

The effect is that possession, not property, is more useful when establishing a common law claim for wrongful interference with intangibles. It also means that claimants need not demonstrate that the asset is property to get an adequate remedy.

Date of Award	30 Sept 2025
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of Bristol
Supervisor	James A C Davey (Supervisor) & Aurora Plomer (Supervisor)