Abstract
Deference principles specify what it takes for you to consider someone as a trusted expert. Oftentimes, either you or the expert (or both) will have partial or incomplete opinions about some matter. This dissertation gives an account of deference for agents with such opinions.Chapter 1 introduces imprecise probabilities as models of partial or incomplete opinions, and imprecise Probabilism as norm of rationality for agents with such opinions.
Chapter 2 shows that we can give epistemic utility arguments for different versions of Probabilism in different logical settings. In one such setting, we can give an epistemic utility argument for the Dempster-Shafer belief axioms. However, I will argue that this does not provide a satisfactory defense of Imprecise Probabilism.
Chapter 3 gives a first account of deference principles for imprecise probabilities. I show how various principles discussed in the literature relate to one another. Then I argue that these principles correspond to philosophically interesting notions of deference in various contexts, under an assumption called Clarity.
Chapter 4 looks at what happens to our theory of deference when we give up the Clarity assumption, and allow doxastic states to be Opaque. I respond to the objection that our reasons for allowing Opaqueness undermine our reasons for allowing imprecision. I argue that imprecision and Opaqueness are orthogonal features our models, capturing orthogonal features of our doxastic states. Then I introduce deference principles for imprecise and Opaque probabilistic models.
Chapter 5 applies the concepts and formal tools introduced in previous chapters to the epistemological problem of peer disagreement. I defend evidentialism: the view that peer disagreement warrants different kinds of responses depending on your total evidence. Then I use the deference principles introduced in this dissertation to vindicate each kind of response in its appropriate context.
| Date of Award | 10 Dec 2024 |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Awarding Institution |
|
| Supervisor | Jason P Konek (Supervisor) & Catrin Campbell-Moore (Supervisor) |
Cite this
- Standard