Abstract
This thesis develops and defends a Kantian account of our moral duties concerning sex andsexual desiring, as well as a revised account of Kant’s account of gender, an account that I use to
establish our moral duties concerning recognising people’s gender(s). These goals are chosen because
Kant’s significance for these areas of discussion has been mostly overlooked or even criticised, and I
will indicate that much has been lost by a lack of systematic Kantian work on these topics.
My methodological approach is to engage with and evaluate Kant’s textual discussions, where
such discussions exist, and draw from Kant’s broader taxonomy of duties when such discussions do
not. In applying Kantian resources to contemporary issues, I also allow for my own opposition to, and
modification of, some of Kant’s specific conclusions. I revise Kant’s conclusions or reasoning when it
is internally inconsistent or indefensible with respect to the facts.
This thesis finds that a Kantian approach is, however, very attractive in intervening in
contemporary debates around the overarching topics of sexuality and gender. Some key findings are
that we have a duty of virtue, and sometimes duties of right, to respect people’s gender identities, as
well as an imperfect duty to facilitate a better sexual culture and a duty of right to seek affirmative
consent, without requisite enthusiasm, for any sexual act with another.
Furthermore, I find engaging with Kant on such topics helpsshape our understanding of Kant’s
ethics and moral theory. I develop my own interpretation of Kant’s fundamental practical principle of
the Formula of Humanity, an interpretation partially inspired by Kant’s writings about sex and gender,
where he highlights the key role that teleology and contextual facts play for him, a factor overlooked
by many other Kant scholars.
| Date of Award | 18 Mar 2025 |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisor | Martin Sticker (Supervisor) & D S Morgan (Supervisor) |
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