Metametaethics: On the building of value

Abstract

This thesis, broadly speaking, explores the metametaphysics of normativity. That is, the methodology, presuppositions and epistemological insights of metaphysical theories about normativity. Having the metaphysical study of normativity as my main interest, I engage in the discussion of the aims of metaphysical theories, and about the best ways to understand the disagreements commonly found within metaphysical theories. I argue in favour of a criterion for substantivity to qualify and categorise metaphysical questions and debates, and I test this criterion through a range of examples. I pay special attention to different versions of metanormative realism and their instances in metaethics. I then situate moral realism, via my criterion for substantivity, within the landscape of metaethical disputes. Namely, I go through a number of metaethical disputes with the aim of diagnosing the substantive versions of them. Beyond this, I explore interactions that metanormative realism has with other philosophical theories. First, I introduce a novel thought experiment to show what debates on metanormative realism reveal about metaontological deflationism; and finally, I consider the insights we can raise from metanormative realism for discussions of standpoint epistemology.

Date of Award	9 Dec 2025
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of Bristol
Sponsors	SWW Doctoral Training Partnership Panel
Supervisor	Jonathan Way (Supervisor) & Tuomas Tahko (Supervisor)