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Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-90
Number of pages10
JournalThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume7
Issue number2
Early online date10 Apr 2018
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 10 Dec 2017
DateE-pub ahead of print - 10 Apr 2018
DatePublished (current) - 1 Jun 2018

Abstract

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.

    Research areas

  • Gödel's disjunction, Gödelian arguments against mechanism, incompleteness theorems, intensional paradox, mechanism, theories of truth

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  • Full-text PDF (accepted author manuscript)

    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/tht3.271 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

    Accepted author manuscript, 390 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 10/04/20

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