Multicultural Citizenship and New Migrations

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Introduction

A recognisable multiculturalism as a political idea has been a nation-making or, more precisely, a nation-remaking project. Its primary purpose has been that of including into a reformed national citizenship those who were marked by difference (racial, ethnic, cultural, etc.); and who often have a historical and continuing relationship of exclusion or oppression; and/or the fact of immigration, settlement and citizenship acquisition. Its fundamental question is how to reconcile equal citizenship and a sense of belonging together (a shared, inclusive national identity) with the relevant kind of ‘difference’? While multiculturalism requires reconceiving citizenship and shared identities, it has assumed that a collectivity of citizens in the form of a state/polity has the right and the capacity to control immigration and that migrants want to be and should be accepted as citizens. But what if the nature of immigration (and other relevant circumstances) change such that difference is no longer so salient an issue, citizenship no longer seems to be so normatively prized by migrants; and immigration is less amenable to control? Does multiculturalism still have traction in these new circumstances? What is the relationship between the post-immigration normative project of accommodating citizens-marked-by-origin and the managing of current flows of migrations and mobilities? Is it the case that multiculturalism may continue to be a relevant political perspective in relation to the former but not the latter? If so, how are we to relate the two policy perspectives to each other? This chapter begins the process of considering these questions with some preliminary thoughts. This centres on concerns that multicultural citizenship has relatively little
to contribute to the regulation of immigration and yet the development of any multiculturalism can be (negatively) affected by the pace, scale and nature of immigration that is not popularly supported or at least accepted.

I offer some normative conceptualisation of a national case, Britain, where immigration control and emergent multiculturalism have gone together. The British response, as formed by Labour and Liberal politicians and supported by many Conservatives, combined a policy of equal citizenship and immigration controls; a gradual evolving anti-racist multiculturalism within a national, internally plural citizenship. It was initially more focused on ‘colour’ and was indifferent to the national but in the 1990s evolved to also accommodate ethno-religious communitarianism as well as cultural hybridity within a plural Britishness. Challenged by perceptions that multiculturalism leads to segregation and separatism, at the same time recent migrations have shifted focus from ethno-religious ‘difference’ to freedom of movement and alternative conceptions of multiculturalism that directly challenge the normative basis of immigration control. Hence my question, where does multiculturalism stand on immigration today?

**Multicultural national citizenship**

By multiculturalism or British multiculturalism I do not simply mean laws and policies but a political idea and movement. Grounded in a concept of national citizenship and therefore a concept of equality, multiculturalism extends this concept of equal citizenship from uniformity of rights to recognition of difference; from anti-discrimination, challenging stereotypes to turning the negative into a positive identity rather than into an undifferentiated citizenship. This means that the concept of equality and rights is applied to groups not just individuals, though individual rights remain the bedrock of citizenship. In addition to this qualification of liberal individualism, multiculturalism disavows the ideal of a hands-off neutral state, instead offering political and institutional accommodation to marginalised groups. This does not just take place at a local level or in specific institutions but is followed through at a national level, including at the level of the national identity. Multiculturalism is a critique of assimilative nationalism or nation-building/maintenance in favour of the expanding and remaking of the national identity, remaking the
‘We’ in an inclusive way and faithful to our given yet changing identities (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000/2006, Modood 2007/2013). One of the features of this multiculturalism is that it recognises the right of states to maintain or to intervene in relation to a sense of national belonging; that countries have a right to engage in ‘nation-building’ – within limits. A corollary of this kind of multiculturalism that I have sketched, which is often left unstated, is that multiculturalism does not challenge the right of states to control immigration or ‘mobilities’ – but may place limits on it and require that it goes hand in hand with the multiculturalism of above.

So, if this is what multiculturalism is, this is the basis for judging any policy or development, whether it is an economic or social policy or about the nature of citizenship and countryhood. Of course such a criterion may not by itself give us an answer to a policy question, for example, how many temporary work permits should be issued and after what period should permit holders be required to leave the country, or after what period of residence should they be allowed leave to remain permanently? Issues to do with employment rights, living standards, housing and so on would be in play as well as, say, considerations about fairness in the granting of work permits and the nurturing of a multicultural national citizenship. Here it is important to emphasise that multiculturalism was not originally a response to current migration but to migration of some decades earlier; it was a response to the changes brought about by the presence of settlers and by post-immigration generations. It was not about managing current migration but some challenges associated with citizens-marked-by-origin. Migration was the significant pre-condition but multiculturalism is a politics of post-immigration or settlement, in which ‘difference’ and citizenship is central. The prospect of a public philosophy which was a response to settlement having answers to questions about mobilities, about non-settlement, must be treated with caution, as can be seen by thinking about the British case in detail.

**British migrations and multiculturalism**

Each national multiculturalism has its own distinctive character. This is true of political concepts in general and is important for understanding the possibilities of adapting, extending or abandoning multiculturalism in order to respond to the political and normative
challenges of ‘a mobile world’. The national political culture and the state tradition will play an important part but so will different kinds of migrations, and different compositions of ethnic minorities produce different kinds of multiculturalisms (c.f. the chapters by Kymlicka (6) and Levey (7)). We always, then, need to know something about the relevant migration and its interaction with the political system. My own normative concept of multiculturalism is most related to the British case. In this brief sketch I will highlight five points that I think are important.

1. **Equal Citizens.** The post-war migrations were initially by ‘subjects of the Crown’, namely subjects of the British Empire or a newly independent part of it moving from the periphery to the centre, to what West Indians referred to as ‘the Mother Country’ (Carter and Coussins 1986). As their numbers grew, there was a strong reaction against the migration and their right of free entry was successively curtailed from 1962 onwards. Nevertheless, as native residents of the UK themselves had no formal citizenship status except as subjects of the Crown (citizenship being formalised only in 1981), there was a certain formal civic equality in status between the immigrants and the natives. For example, the immigrants enjoyed the same franchise, access to public services and most welfare benefits as natives regardless of nationality and without being asked their nationality. Some immigrants appealed to the internal British connection by responding to those who said they were alien intruders by retorting: ‘We are over here because you were over there.’

2. **Race.** Beyond legal status and rights, the most salient feature of the immigrants from the point of view of British society was their ‘race’, the fact that they were ‘coloured’ or not white. Their second-class racial status – a legacy of the same Empire that now gave them rights equal to the natives – derived from this.

The implications of 1 and 2 taken together is that the relationship between the immigrants and Britain begins with equal rights in a context of racism which was strong enough to override some of those rights in practice (such as job opportunities) but not in law. The racism was also strong enough to create public pressure upon politicians to regulate the flow of immigration (but not to reverse it). The response to this situation was from quite an early period to create laws to resist racial discrimination
within the country so that the legal equality of subjects of Queen
Elizabeth II could be realised as social equality. This has proved
a long process, with laws getting steadily stronger – contem-
poraneously always stronger than that of any other European
country – and while some progress has been made, it is not yet a
reality. These two linked responses of limiting immigration and
seeking the reality of social equality were famously summarised
in the 1960s by the Labour politician, Roy Hattersley: ‘Without
integration limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integra-
tion is impossible.’ Neither the legal controls on the scale and
pace of immigration, nor even the racial equality activism are
so distinctive to Britain as the fact that citizenship was taken for
granted. It was not thought of as a prize, something to aim for
or to withhold; nor was it the source of ‘otherness’ in the way
that immigration, colour and culture were. This paved the way
for the view that all subjects/citizens were British but not all the
same kind of British or British in the same way. It took some
decades to mature but the seeds of the idea of a plural Britishness
have this historical depth, perhaps ultimately one of imperial leg-
acy and not just on the side of the white British but also on those
who had brought with them concepts such as ‘Mother Country’.
In Britain the politics of post-immigration begins not with issues
about naturalisation and assimilation but with raci al equality
and challenging narrow, islander definitions of Britishness.

3. Religion, As the diversity and distinctive character of different
minority groups began to be recognised, racial equality was
extended to cover ethnicity and religion. These two were not
easily separated, as in the House of Lords decision that banning
the wearing of the religious turban by Sikh men was actually a
form of ethnic discrimination and therefore racial discrimina-
tion in law (Mandala v. Lee, 1982). As ethnic group pride and
assertiveness became an accepted feature of and indeed the vehi-
cle for promoting equal citizenship, South Asian identities began
increasingly to take an ethno-religious character. Non-whiteness
remained a social divide but racism began to be thought of
in terms of racisms and in compound forms such as cultural
racism, anti-Muslim racism and so on. From the time of The
Satanic Verses affair in the late 1980s Muslim political activism
began to loom large in the emergent multiculturalism; and after
9/11 in the US and the 7/7 suicide-bombings in London, it
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became central to a multiculturalism that was being overwhelmed by security concerns and, according to some observers, died (Kepel 2005).

It is a feature of British multiculturalism that while it is built on anti-racism to a greater extent than in most other countries and pioneered ethno-religious identity activism (initially Sikh, later Muslim), the provision of ‘mother-tongue’ teaching or multi-lingualism is relatively quite minor. Languages like Urdu or Hindi are provided within the curriculum by relatively few schools, though more are willing to enter their pupils for them in national exams like GCSEs (usually taken in Year 11), but it is expected that most of the necessary learning will have been acquired from the home and community. Some local authorities and government agencies provide a few of their key public communications (e.g. leaflets) in some minority languages, though the practice is in decline as it is largely regarded as a ‘first generation’ need, and many have come to think that it retards the acquisition of proficiency in English, a goal that no multiculturalist would oppose in itself. The relativities in importance of race, religion and language in British multiculturalism is very much a reflection of the political priorities of the ethnic minority communities and the campaigns they have mounted (Sivanandan 1982; Modood 1992, 2005).

4. Plural Britishness. The ‘nation remaking’ referred to above involved some ‘deconstruction’ and opening-up but, by the same token, it involved more standard forms of nation-building or national culture maintenance. For example, the teaching of the national language and heritage at school; or state support for a dominant religion or differential relationship between the state and religions, given that one of them was ‘established’. So, the kind of ethnocultural criteria that could not be openly or formally used in the selection of immigrants could be used in the management of the public culture.

5. New Migrations. From about the 1990s, migration flows changed considerably. They were no longer primarily of a post-imperial kind (which in any case by this time had been largely restricted to spouses and family unifications). People escaping war-torn areas predominated (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Turkey (Kurds), Iraq stand out). There were others from even more diverse origins, though especially from the Middle East
and Africa, looking for work and a better life (the same motives as earlier migrants). To some extent they could be considered as late additions to the demographic and political multicultural-ism that was emerging, because while they did not necessarily share a historical connection with Britain (though some clearly did, such as those from say Nigeria and Ghana), they mostly shared the two most prominent characteristics that multiculturalism was challenging Britain to accept, non-whiteness and being Muslim. As the British economy, public services, cultural institutions and universities became internationalised the number of work permits offered to high-skilled professionals and business people grew greatly. Finally, one of the most significant new migrations was that of nationals from fellow EU member states, who in a twist of fate came to enjoy the freedom of entry and rights that ‘subjects of the Crown’ enjoyed during 1948–1962. Despite key strands of continuity, especially the elements of cheap labour, ‘colour’ and being Muslim, the post-imperial and therefore British connection and the dimension of ‘race’ was remade. The latter includes both that white (EU) migrants had rights of entry and settlement over non-whites, but also that white migrants too experience some negative ‘othering’ (Fox et al. 2012). A key stabilising condition which British multiculturalism was built on, immigration control, was however – as we now see – put at risk by the UK’s acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty provision of freedom of movement for EU citizens, which in the fullness of time derailed the twin-track approach of immigration control and equality. If it is the case, as cited above, that Muslims killed multiculturalism, then we can say that the EU freedom of movement has also made a contribution. The current EU combination of rejection of national multicultural-ism and prohibition of limiting the entry of EU states’ nationals seems to be a rejection of both parts of the British formula.³

While it is not the case that the reduction of entry for those from the Commonwealth was caused by the opening up to the EU (the former preceded the latter), the de facto effect of this major policy shift has been a preference for white people from relatively prosperous countries. Of course there is nothing in principle to stop the UK being open to people from both prosperous and poor countries, though there is bound to be some competition between the
two types of migrants where a country is trying to reduce the pace and scale of migration and is only able to deny entry to one but not the other kind of migrant. The competition is therefore based on the fact that the UK is only able to regulate non-EU mobilities (while it is a member of the EU).

One of the results of these new migrations is for the government to create new requirements for naturalisation, primarily the introduction of a citizenship test and requiring proficiency in English, and to start celebrating British citizenship through ceremonies for those who have newly acquired it (Brooks 2016). Given the great and continuing expansion of the kind of citizenship and migrant diversity now found in many English cities and towns, a new analytical framework has been offered to capture it as a sociodemographic phenomenon, termed ‘super-diversity’, but it has not produced an alternative policy approach except to point out that it does not and probably will not fit easily into British multiculturalism (Vertovec 2007).

Besides highlighting the specific character of British multiculturalism, the main purpose of this section is to emphasise two points. Firstly, multiculturalism in Britain developed alongside a restrictive immigration policy. Perhaps it was regarded as a price for multiculturalism, but it was in the main not engaged with by most multiculturalists, except in terms of demanding that it be non-discriminatory, and in relation to its most egregious manifestations. Some anti-racists were against the kinds of immigration policies that were pursued (not just by Conservative but also by Labour governments) from 1962 onwards, mainly because they argued that controls implied that immigrants were the problem rather than the general level of racism in the country (Sivanandan 1982). But in the main, as multiculturalism emerged as a distinct political idea it did not radically challenge the bipartisan consensus or itself focus very much on immigration. Political theorists who emerged as advocates of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s in Britain (and, actually, elsewhere too) did not have much to say about immigration policy but focused on the political and ethical challenges in relation to post-immigration inclusion, participation and needs of minorities in relation to equal civic status, national discourses and the public culture. Political theorists of multiculturalism have not written much on immigration and immigration control (Joe Carens 1987 and 2013 being an exception), but in
general their implicit position seems to have been that whilst immigration has been and continues to be of benefit to countries such as those of Western Europe and North America, and immigration controls have been explicitly or implicitly racist and emphatically should not be, a country can have ‘a moral right to its territorial and cultural integrity including the right to limit the entry of outsiders’ (Parekh 2006). Multiculturalists have accepted this fundamental moral right. Just as, analogously, one can accept that foreign investment is of benefit to one’s country without suggesting that it is always of benefit, or the scale of overseas ownership is not important or that overseas investors have a right to invest in our country if the returns earned are higher in our country than their own (or elsewhere).

Secondly, multiculturalism assumed that the immigrants were becoming a settled population and that they either already had citizenship or were on a pathway to full citizenship, and so becoming an integral part of Britain. In relation to these developments, in particular the growing into adulthood of a British-born ‘second generation’, multiculturalism challenged a top-down, static, mononationalism. It promoted ideas of new identities, hyphenated or multiple identities and was accepting of dual nationality but saw the goal as all citizens, including members of settled ethnic minorities, coming to have, as expressed by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain report, ‘a sense of belonging to society as a whole’ (CMEB 2000: 49). For the CMEB report (aka the Parekh Report) this sense of sharing a common fate with fellow citizens and nationals was achieved when people feel ‘that their own flourishing as individuals and as communities is intimately linked with the flourishing of public institutions and public services’ (CMEB 2000: 49). The report insisted that this sense of belonging required two important conditions: the idea that one’s polity should be recognised as a community of communities as well as a community of individuals; and the challenging of all racisms and related structural inequalities (CMEB 2000: 56).

In the more recent period when the scale of immigration/mobilities exceeds that of the 1950s–1980s and where fewer immigration controls are available (none in relation to the EU) or effective, it is a challenge to work out what multiculturalism has got to say about current mobilities or how it needs to be adapted in the light of the latter.
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Multiculturalism and immigration control

If we now bring in other countries we can generalise somewhat the point that there has been no logical or privileged connection between multiculturalism and immigration policy. For example, on the one hand, multiculturalist countries such as Canada and Australia led the way in being choosy between applicants, scoring them on the basis of the needs of the country (see the Kymlicka and Levey chapters (6 and 7 respectively)). On the other hand, countries who declared themselves opposed to multiculturalism could have extensive and less choosy immigration and be very keen on turning immigrants into citizens, like France; or be very generous in relation to asylum seekers and refugees while being heterophobic within a mono-ethnocultural conception of citizenship, such as Germany or Greece. And of course different EU countries could experience different scales of migration from within the EU and have different views on its contribution to the country. Singapore’s version of multiculturalism, ‘multi-racialism’ is closely tied to labour migration policies designed to maintain the existing demographic proportions between the Chinese, Indians and Muslims. The Gulf States are completely dependent on migration but grant residency or equal status in exceptional cases.

So, even though multiculturalism has had little to say about immigration policy, regarding it as a separate policy area to the question of the relations between citizens and the remaking of national citizenship to respectfully include difference (see Lægaard’s chapter (11)), nevertheless there is a connection that has been asserted by the broad centre of British politics since the 1960s, as intimated in the Hattersley quote above. A recent version of aspects of it can be found in this statement by former Prime Minister David Cameron:

People have understandably become frustrated. It boils down to one word: control. People want Government to have control over the number of people coming here and the circumstances in which they come, both from the world and from within the European Union. They want control over who has the right to receive benefits and what is expected of them in return. (Cameron 2014)

It is a sentiment that is not peculiar to Conservatives or to Britain. Of course there is another rising sentiment across Europe and the US that is xenophobic, racist or Islamophobic. The two sentiments
can be linked, with the former leading to or strengthening the latter, as recently expressed by the Australian Minister for Justice, Michael Keenan, at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Combating Antisemitism in Berlin: ‘We know that the public’s tolerance for cultural diversity improves when they are secure in the knowledge that borders are being managed appropriately.’

I think Cameron’s statement captures a genuine sentiment about lack of control in relation to the scale and pace of flows and can be felt by ethnic minorities, just as they feel other effects perceived by white citizens, such as downward pressure on low wages or strain on local services. ‘Genuine’ in two senses: the sentiment is sincere, not contrived, the reasons given are operative; as well as that they are reasonable concerns. In some cases, perhaps even in a lot of cases, there may be mixed motives, and the mixture may include xenophobia, Islamophobia, racial prejudice and so on, but the concern in question is not reducible to these, can and does exist without racism, and so has to be considered in its own right: it may be accepted even where the racism is rejected (Katwala et al. 2014). Moreover, while it is known that the media, especially the tabloid press, can exacerbate the sentiment, it does not mean that the sentiment does not have to be addressed. Some perceptions about the scale and effects of migration are likely to be mistaken and so while they cannot be regarded as self-validating, neither can they be ignored. The situation is similar to when we take perceptions of racial discriminations as an indication but not proof that discrimination is taking place; an indication that there may be a problem that should not be dismissed but requires investigation and discussion.

As noted by Keenan such anxieties can have effects on intolerance, racism and on attitudes needed to make multiculturalism work. Multiculturalists will insist that immigration policy, prospective migrants and migrants are not talked about in ways that undermine the sense of citizenship of ethnic minorities in their own eyes and/or in the eyes of others. Indeed, that all groups of people, including prospective immigrants and more generally, should be spoken of and visually represented respectfully, and that questions of policy should not be in terms of negative discourses about immigrants or groups of people. One will want to attack the anti-immigration rhetoric and the concept of the nation implicit in that discourse; yet, it is important to do so in a way that will not inflame but dampen down that rhetoric and movement by addressing some
of the reasonable concerns of the public. The risks to existing majority–minority relations should be considered not just in relation to discourses but also in relation to the effects of the immigration policies themselves. Restrictions on immigration may be an appropriate policy response. Such policies must not be discriminatory on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion but they could rank by other categories those seeking admissions, e.g. give lesser priority to temporary workers. In the present context of a major humanitarian crisis in relation to Syrian refugees trying to make their way into Europe, it is worth thinking about letting those EU countries who take a large share of refugees being able to temporarily restrict other mobilities, e.g. people looking for work across national borders in the EU (assuming that this could be properly agreed, which perhaps is not very likely at the moment). Whatever restrictions or selections are applied must be consistent with what David Miller calls the ‘weak cosmopolitanism premise’, meaning here that the policy ‘must offer relevant reasons to those excluded’, showing that their claims have been counted but outweighed by other considerations which they can recognise as reasonable considerations even if they would weigh the considerations differently (Miller 2015: 400).

**Cosmopolitanism**

I hope that what I have so far characterised as multiculturalism, especially in its British variant, resonates with a normative political orientation as found in academic political theory, in some activist campaigns and government actions, as well as with wider public discourses and actions within professions such as teachers and social workers and other elements of civil society. Taken together there has not been a perfect alignment of positions but nevertheless I think a distinct body of ideas and claims can be discerned. A multiculturalism consisting of:

- Equality and integration through a shared and remade national citizenship, partly derived from a shared, albeit conflicted history.
- Anti-racism and ethno-religious accommodation as well as individual rights.
- Backdropped by controlling the pace and scale of immigration (while appreciating the benefits of migration to the country).
Yet, I have been not completely straight with you so far. I have called these political ideas ‘multiculturalism’ as a strategy of presentation. What I have kept temporarily suppressed and now bring into play is that in more or less the same period of time that what I have called ‘multiculturalism’ emerged, there also emerged another position which too has some claim to be called multiculturalist and indeed is often referred to as such. Actually, the two positions are often referred to as ‘multiculturalism’ and when this is done many people are unaware that they are referring to two distinct positions. My strategy of presentation is based on avoiding such a confusion.

I will call this version of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism. It is self-consciously offered as a critique and alternative to what I have so far referred to as multiculturalism and will continue to do so and also abbreviate to MC. Some of its key points (I shall be brief, for a longer discussion see Modood 2012 and Modood 2013: chapter 7) are that no minority group can be understood as being homogeneous or having a common ‘essence’ such that all members think alike or engage in all the same cultural practices in the same way. Yet MC speaks, it is claimed, as if they are when it speaks of a group being ‘different’ or ‘recognising’ a group or accommodating its cultural needs (Valluvan 2016). If we really want to understand a multicultural society then we cannot speak about groups in the normative and reified way that MC does but should look at the internal diversity within each group, and how it overlaps with all other groups, so that no group is really as different or distinct as multiculturalist theory and politics assumes. This is evident if we stop speaking at the level of national models and national policies and study cities, localities and everyday experiences and see how urban life manages very well without normative theory (Wise and Velayutham, 2009). People rub along together and negotiate their differences without resort to the rhetorics of group identity politics, which are usually confined to political entrepreneurs who do not represent anybody other than themselves and their cabals (Malik 2015). In everyday multiculturalism people become indifferent to group identities and relate to each other through multiple social roles such as neighbours, colleagues, users of local schools and public services and so on. Through this common multicultural, cross-cultural or mixed relationships become common and new shared, hybridic cultures emerge that may or may not resonate with
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ideas of national identity and normative citizenship (Matejskova and Antonsich 2015; Cantle 2016). Recent and ongoing mobilities have brought people from so many backgrounds to countries like those of Western Europe that differentiated policies and group politics is impossible. Moreover, these more fine-textured, sociological, anthropological and psychological approaches will show that migrants as well as later generations may remain connected to their countries of origins or to certain diasporas and imagined transnational communities such as a black Atlantic diaspora or an ummah, and these transnational networks, ways of living and self-identities are more real than national identities, multiculturalist or otherwise (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

A good way to evaluate the relationship between these two versions of multiculturalism is to deploy the concepts of macro and micro. By their own self-definitions the first multiculturalism is focused on the macro (national citizenship) and the second on the micro (everyday experience). Conceived as such, cosmopolitanism is not a radical critique of political multiculturalism but highlights its limited scope and supplements it where it is silent. It is qualifying rather than replacing MC. If however there is a more radical critique taking place then it can be identified by giving macro–micro an alternative meaning. Not national–local/everyday but, rather, understanding the macro as the intellectual-political frame and the micro as localised empirical accounts. Here the critique is that empirical accounts of a multicultural society cannot be generated within the framework of a national multicultural citizenship, so that has to be replaced by a cosmopolitan framework of analysis. For example, in some studies the discovery of the importance of city identities often too quickly leads to the conclusion that national identities are not or should not be a focus of promoting commonalities amongst diverse groups as the city is the best unit for this purpose. Of course this does not follow as there is no need to work with an either-or model, a truth nicely illustrated by the slogan adopted in the naturalisation campaign work in a German city: ‘Hamburg. My port. Germany. My Home.’

It may be thought that cosmopolitanism may be more suited to some of the new mobilities. It prizes individual freedom regardless of people’s origins or their identity today or group membership (in fact group membership is often perceived as only a constraint not as a source of security for and development of an individual) and
is not normatively wedded to a national citizenship. So, perhaps it is more desirable or suited to conditions today than MC. I do not want to deny that possibility, but note something which does not rest on that claim. Firstly, given the contrast that I have drawn between full-blooded cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism at the macro-frame level, it should be clear that cosmopolitanism cannot take on board most of MC in the sense of encompassing it or creating a synthesis with it. So, it could only replace MC if the problems that MC addresses no longer needed addressing or could be addressed by cosmopolitanism. Yet neither of these is true. The problems of anti-racism, ethno-religious group ‘difference’, assertion and accommodation are live, ongoing issues and despite the progress made they have become larger and more pressing, as collected together under the rubric of ‘integration’. Moreover it is difficult to see how cosmopolitanism could digest a multiculturalism based on concepts of national citizenship and group accommodation, when its take on such concepts is intellectually and normatively negative.

Yet it has to be granted that cosmopolitanism does make a contribution of its own and that this contribution is evident in the light of some recent trends, and which it is fair to say MC has a less good traction with. It seems, then, that we need both MC and cosmopolitanism and should advocate both as complementary (pace some of the advocates of each, who see them in a competitive relation).

This leaves open the question of whether they can be synthesised or brought together as part of a larger intellectual-political framework. I doubt that they can. The point I want to emphasise is that both are important and relevant to our circumstances, that neither is an adequate substitute for the other, and so they are less competitors and more complementary (Modood 1998). If they are rivals, they can be friendly rivals. We should not feel that we have to choose between them, that they are exclusive of each other. Rather, we should exploit the scope for mutual learning (Modood 2016). At least this has been my position to date when I have focused on domestic policy (matters relating to the first two bullet points at the start of this section). Challenged by the theme of this book to think about immigration, perhaps we get to a point where complementarity of the ‘both . . . and . . .’ reaches its limit. If the immigration policy which resonates with cosmopolitanism is something like the
view that given the growing transnational character of life in countries like Britain – and especially so in the context of freedom of movement for citizens of member states within the EU – and given that people who wish to enter, temporarily or permanently, are large in number, and many are escaping conditions of war, persecution, economic underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty, we should, it is argued, have a much more open immigration policy, perhaps extending the freedom of movement pioneered by the EU to people coming from outside the EU too (for a powerful statement that makes a claim like this at its boldest, see Carens 2013). Then it is difficult to see what complementarity could be like on this point. While it is possible to have a multiculturalism that encompasses group accommodation and culturally independent, mixed individuals, it is difficult to see how to compromise between the view that a multicultural society requires control of immigration and the view that it requires freedom of movement across borders.

It is true that freedom of movement in the EU is restricted to nationals of EU states (and so is not consistent with cosmopolitan open borders, though the two seem to be conflated in the minds of some) but this then creates an advantage for one category of migrants at the expense of other categories, which will be more controlled where a state seeks to exercise some control. Where a public believes that immigration is excessive and insufficiently regulated there will be anxiety; it will not be confined to the majority and is likely to manifest itself in hostility to migrants but also ethnic minority citizens, and therefore damage the prospects of multiculturalism.

**Conclusion**

The preliminary answer to the question of what multiculturalism has to say about new migrations and mobilities, at least in the British case, is that it does not sit well with it. British multiculturalism was developed in a context of immigration control and does not challenge the right of the state to control immigration, while insisting that it must not be exercised in ways that are discriminatory in relation to the composite and overlapping criteria of race, ethnicity and religion that are at the heart of post-immigration British multiculturalism. Recent perceptions by a large proportion of the British public that the pace and scale of immigration
has been too high and too unregulated are based on a number of factors, which can include racism and xenophobia, which are damaging to multiculturalism and have to be challenged. A related factor can be cultural identity questions which cannot be simply dismissed as majoritarian, let alone as majoritarian prejudice. Multiculturalism is a national identity remaking project, which may in some circumstances lead to legitimate questions about the identity effects of immigration, including its effects on existing citizens and minority groups, as well as of the possible consequences of large-scale migration flows per se, and of people who are admitted on the understanding that they are not to be thought of as on a pathway to settlement and national citizenship. While a cosmopolitan version of multiculturalism is also present in Britain and is largely compatible with a more political, communitarian multiculturalism, the two seem to have incompatible views on immigration control.

Multiculturalism has to engage with migration at three levels. Firstly, identifying and opposing negative/racist/othering discourses, actions and policies against migrants, no less than citizens (whilst recognising that some citizenship-constituting rights and opportunities will not be available to migrants, e.g. rights of residence or access to full welfare benefits). Secondly, protecting/promoting the policies, forms of governance and understanding that constitute the core of post-immigration multiculturalism, especially in relation to accommodation and civic recognition of ethnic minority citizens and accommodation of ethno-religious groups. Thirdly, protecting/promoting the project of multicultural Britishness, the multicultural nation-building project. Cosmopolitanism is very strong on the first of these but ambivalent on the second and gives up on the third. There is the further post-Brexit task of integrating what may be approximately 3 million new Euro-Brits. In some ways, given their whiteness, this will be relatively easy; in other ways, the white supremacy of some of them (Fox 2013) threatens to re-valorise whiteness in Britishness if they seek to marginalise black and brown Britons and to leapfrog over them as generations of European migrants have done over African-Americans in the US. This may be one of the new ‘frontiers’ of British multiculturalism that will have to be engaged with as British multiculturalism continues to evolve and expand.

My modest theoretical conclusion is that in relation to multicultural citizenship, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are
compatible as long as the latter operates at the micro level, supplementing and qualifying without displacing multiculturalism at the macro level. However, this compatibility may not extend to immigration control, where we are forced to choose between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan drift in general and specifically on immigration may be desirable and may be taking place amongst those who think of themselves as pro-diversity but we need to acknowledge that this is not the multiculturalism of, say, Kymlicka nor Parekh, nor is it mine. In relation to the substantive politics, I cannot help but think that multiculturalism, while continuing to point out the ongoing benefits of immigration, should reaffirm immigration control. Of course, this must be within the context of and within the limits of reaffirming that multiculturalism is a citizenship-based nation-remaking project. Which is another way of saying that I am still committed to the multiculturalism which was discussed at the original EUI conference in 1996, which the 2016 conference was inspired to honour. The incompatibility between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in relation to migration is seriously problematic for progressive politics today but is one to which I cannot yet see a solution.

Notes

1. I am grateful for helpful comments and challenges by Jan Dobbernack, John Denham, Jon Fox, Sunder Katwala, Mike Kenny, Geoffrey Levey, Nasar Meer, Bhikhu Parekh, Jonathan Rutherford, Mark Sivarajah, Terri-Anne Teo, Simon Thompson, Anna Triandafyllidou and Varun Uberoi, and I am aware that I have not met most of the challenges but am encouraged they saw value as well as difficulties in the chapter. I can, however, sincerely say that none can be held responsible for my arguments.

2. Including Welsh in Wales.

3. Which I hasten to add is not a sufficient argument for Britain to leave the EU. Nor is it to say that Brexit will necessarily repair the damage; given how it has emboldened racists of various kinds, the negative effect on multiculturalism may continue and get worse. My point is simply that the EU freedom of movement has had a cost for multiculturalism in the UK.

4. Most notoriously, virginity tests, carried out on eighty prospective brides from the South Asian subcontinent in the 1970s, see https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/may/13/virginity-tests-uk-immigrants-1970s

5. In effect saying to overseas investors: we know we are denying you an equal opportunity to invest but national interest considerations must sometimes trump global equal opportunities to invest.
6. Originally written before the Brexit referendum, it is still unclear what rights of entry to the UK for EU citizens will be negotiated in the Brexit deal.
7. It may however soften the paradox that it is the country with the most developed multiculturalism and the strongest equality laws in Europe which should vote to leave a supranational union. Many Labour politicians have come round to the same view, perhaps including Jeremy Corbyn, who announced on 10 January 2017 that ‘Labour is not wedded to freedom of movement’, see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/10/labour-not-wedded-freedom-movement-jeremy-corbyns-brexit-speech/
8. The kind of multiculturalism I am outlining assumes therefore the continuing right of states to control immigration. Of course it may pool it as per Schengen or as per ‘freedom of movement’ in the EU, but it does not have to be absolute; and pooling also suggests that it is not necessarily permanent, that there is a possibility under certain circumstances of the relevant power being taken back to itself by each of the sovereign states. In the absence of a clear mechanism for asking for some or all of it back, it would seem as if an element of sovereignty has not been pooled but transferred. In any case, even EU member states believe they have the right to restrict the entry of nationals from those outside the EU.

References

PART III: HOW HAVE STATES RESPONDED?


