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Introduction

1968: the year that rocked whose world?!

Sarah Colvin and Katharina Karcher

There have only been two world revolutions. One took place in 1848. The second took place in 1968. Both were historic failures. Both transformed the world. (Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1989: 97).

To claim that 1848 and 1968 were ‘world revolutions’ is only possible if quite a lot of the world is elided. To say the revolution ‘took place’ in either of the years cited is probably also to overstate the matter. Certain key events that happened in 1848 and 1968 have given those years a status as markers for processes whose beginnings preceded the marker year, and whose after-effects were profound and lasting.

It is often noted that the signification of ‘1968’ chronologically exceeds the marker year in both directions: that *annus mirabilis* ‘marked the climax of protests, capturing almost all Western industrialized countries simultaneously’ and subsequently left ‘the political ground-rules of the worldsystem […] profoundly and irrevocably changed’ (Gilcher Holtey 2014: 2, Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989: 98; see also Bourg 2018 and Reynolds in this volume). It is becoming well established that ‘1968’ also had effects in countries and regions way beyond the industrialised West (e.g. Carey 2005, Marotti 2009, Pierce 2009, Brewster 2010, Fenoglio-Limón 2010, Monaville 2013, Christiansen and Scarlett 2015; and
The ‘global sixties’ describe a decade whose events, even if they were not comprehensively global, did ‘encompass much of the globe, certainly much more than has previously been thought’ (Brown 2013: 3); and they were followed by a ‘global seventies’ and ‘global eighties’, perhaps most evidently in the women’s movements as ‘specific moment[s] in the long history of feminism’ (Schulz 2017: 1). For some women, as Pisoiu (in this volume) and Smith (2018) demonstrate, there is a trajectory that extends into the contemporary world.

We use ‘woman’ here primarily as a political category. The current volume focuses on gender, geopolitics, and the politics of cultural memory. It is one of two companion volumes in the Gender and Global Politics Series interrogating the legacy of 1968, fifty years on, through the lens of gender. Each volume has a distinctive focus and logic. The companion volume, *Gender, Emancipation, and Political Violence: Rethinking the Legacy of 1968* (Colvin and Karcher 2018), presents approaches to the problem of ‘emancipatory violence’ and emancipation, again across disciplines and through the lens of gender. Taken together, the geopolitical range of the two volumes is broad, not global (it would be impossible to cover every country or movement around the world). Rather, this is a collective effort from a set of international experts in different disciplinary areas to come together and build our understanding of the legacy of 1968 through the lens of gender; and in doing so to provide critical insights and analytical tools that might inform thinking beyond the specific contexts they consider. In the companion volume to this one, Charity Scribner, writing on the militancy of the singer Nina Simone, cites Brooks’ (2011: 176) concern that ‘no one critical apparatus can sustain a sufficient reading of Nina Simone’. To understand the complexities of Simone’s life and art, Scribner and Brooks agree, perspectives and approaches from across disciplines are needed. We suggest that the same is true for ‘1968’: no one critical apparatus can sustain a sufficient reading of its complexity. That is why we conceived this from the
beginning as an interdisciplinary project, and set out to garner the expertise of experts in history and cultural studies, politics and international relations, literary and film studies, and art history.

Collectively, the contributors approach ‘1968’ as a marker of particular shifts and processes, and they situate those shifts and processes in contexts that are chronologically and geographically complex. The ‘global protest movements’ that the title of the current volume conjures are global in the sense that they emerged around the world in locations where circumstances permitted or enabled it. They did not, of course, emerge everywhere in the world, nor has it been possible address all the locations where irruptions of protest occurred. The discussions of radical activity and change that are presented here – in Italy, Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, Lebanon, and the ‘Islamic State’ – are not an attempt to provide global coverage, but to interrogate ‘1968’ as a designator of a Western leftist ideal of sociopolitical progress with reference to a variety of geopolitical contexts: as a ‘a date in which the imaginary has nested’, in the words of Hans Magnus Enzensberger (cited in Gilcher-Holtey 2014: 1).

Fifty years on, it seems necessary to ask whose imaginary has settled so comfortably on that date, and whether it has behaved like a cuckoo in the nest, ejecting other possible imaginaries from the story of ’68. Was there a ‘spirit of 68’, as Gerd-Rainer Horn’s (2007) eponymous monograph suggests, and if so, whose?

**Protest movements and the New Left**

Continuing their side-by-side assessment of 1848 and 1968, Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein (1989: 98) note that ‘it was 1848 which institutionalized the old left (using this term broadly). And it was 1968 that institutionalized the new social movements.’ In the Western industrialised countries, the mobilisation of the 1968 movements was preceded by
the rise of an intellectual New Left: a New Left that fundamentally questioned the
effectiveness of the strategies the Old Left had engaged to oppose capitalism (ibid: 101). The
New Left was ‘consciously internationalist’ (Varon 2004: 1), and it sought to distance itself
from both social democratic and socialist reformism, and Stalinist communism. In its self-
narrative at least, the New Left was anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical, and conceived of
itself ‘as a movement, not a party’ (Gilcher-Holtey 2014: 3). In its ‘wildest dreams’, it saw
itself ‘waging a revolution that would overthrow both the U.S.-led imperialism of the West
and the ossified, bureaucratic communism of the East’ (Varon 2004:1).

Social movements can be understood as ‘networks of informal interactions between a
plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts,
on the basis of shared collective identities’ (Diani 1992: 1; compare Gilcher-Holtey 2014: 2-
3; Neidhardt and Rucht 1991: 450). Protests, as Taylor and van Dyke (2004: 268) define
them, are ‘sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices and discourses
are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations’. In the context of
social movement mobilisation, protests have been ‘followed by change in a variety of areas’;
movements have access to ‘transnational opportunities, or, to put it a better way, […] a
multilevel opportunity structure’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 248, 18).

Recent years have seen a growing focus on the transnational and global dynamics of
1968 as a ‘transnational moment of crisis and opportunity’ (Horn 2007: 4). Global dynamics
and transnational opportunities refer not only to geographical but to conceptual space: ideas
circle. We see ‘actors in one local terrain […] coming into contact with, adopting, rejecting,
or otherwise responding to, exogeneous influences’ (Brown 2013: 4; and see in particular
Claudia Derichs’ chapter in this volume). In that sense, ‘1968’ needs to be understood both
on the specific, local level, and as what Clavin has called ‘transnational history’.
Transnational history ‘allows us to reflect on, while at the same time going beyond, the
confines of the nation. It sheds new, comparative light on the strengths and fragilities of the nation-state and underlines the ways in which local history can be understood in relation to world history’ (Clavin 2005: 438). Collectively, the essays in this volume capture both local specificities and transnational tendencies.

Despite the polarised nature of the global political landscape, ideas and people were travelling across political divisions, national borders, and Cold War fronts throughout the 1960s. Thanks to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and other thinkers associated with the New Left, the repressed traditions of Marxism and psychoanalysis experienced a revival. Translations of the writings of the Martinican revolutionary Frantz Fanon, the Argentinian guerrilla leader Che Guevara, and the Brazilian militant Carlos Marighella circulated on university campuses in many Western countries, and a radical minority attempted to establish ‘urban guerrilla’ groups in the First World, in order both to incite local or national revolutions, and to support anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World. Theoretical production from the Third World was also widely received in the popular student movements (Trnka 2003: 316); but recent research has shown that Latin American revolutionary theory was not only received in the West: there were ‘many exchange and cultural transfer phenomena between Latin America and the Soviet Union’ (Rupprecht 2015: 287). News reports on and personal testimonies from the Vietnam War had a similarly global reach and impact, even if television did not have ‘the same widespread dissemination and impact in the Third World as it did in Europe and the United States, where viewers tuned into the nightly news and found on their screens the horrors of the Vietnam War’ (Christiansen and Scarlett 2015: 7). The British-Pakistani student activist Tariq Ali was one of those on the Western Left who visited war-torn Vietnam in the 1960s. Ali described his trip later as ‘a formative experience’ (Ali 2005: 182): ‘The struggle was still approaching its peak, but I had no doubt that what I had seen was the most epic resistance ever witnessed in the sordid annals
of imperialism’; a trip to Vietnam had a similarly powerful impact on the American writer and activist Susan Sontag (Gilcher-Holtey 2018). Student activists internationally shared Ali’s stance on Vietnam. In September 1967, a group of forty activists from the US met up with a North Vietnamese delegation in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. At that meeting, the American student leader Tom Hayden famously declared: ‘we are now all Viet Cong’ (Maraniss 2003: 199). But were they really?

Although the protest movements associated with 1968 shared an interest in education reforms, Christiansen and Scarlett (2015: 7) argue that they need to be situated in their different political contexts:

the Cold War resonated very differently in the Third World than it did in the First and Second. For one, the Cold War was far more than a ‘cold’ battle of ideologies in the Third World. Proxy wars orchestrated on behalf of the superpowers were part of the day-to-day experience of many young Third World nations (and nationalists) in the 1960s, and the reality of assassination, political imprisonment, and outright massacre amounted to much more than an ideological debate.

A global understanding of the 1960s, therefore, requires us to ‘take up the case of the Third World, not as it was in the minds of Western students, but as it exists in history and on the ground’ (Klimke 2015:2). While we agree that it is of critical importance to distinguish between political contexts and to document and analyse experiences on the ground, we consider it equally important critically to assess the projections, dreams, and idealised notions of a revolutionary Third World subject that accompanied and sometimes outlived experiences on the ground. The contributors to this volume explore both imaginary and real transnational links, with a careful eye to similarities and differences between protest cultures in the First, Second, and Third Worlds, and within those different contexts.
The ‘transnational turn’ (see, e.g. Tyrrell 2009) in history has led to a radical rethinking of the relationship between the New Left in the First and the Third Worlds in the 1960s. Slobodian (2012: 10), for example, criticises that many studies have reduced the New Left relationship to an identification with and projection of revolutionary struggles in the Third World:

In the process of inserting the 1960s into a national story of civic maturation, the dominant narrative has conveniently found the sources of error beyond national borders. The Third World has become part of an alibi, explaining why elements of the New Left chose the road to armed militancy in the 1970s and keeping the ‘good ‘68’ available as part of a national narrative of post-fascist recovery. (ibid.: 30)

Women’s accounts and experiences for a long time played a marginal role in the dominant narrative of 1968; but that is beginning to change.

Through the lens of gender

*If the American housewife in her kitchen embodied the American values of individual consumption, her Soviet counterpart embodied communist values of collectivization, communal effort, and shared ownership.* (Laville 2013: 529)

Although the Cold War impacted on the lives of women around the globe, it affected them in different ways. In the US and other Western countries, women had played an active role in the workforce during World War II, but were urged back into the domestic sphere in the 1950s. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, working mothers were the norm rather than the exception; and yet gender equality in the Soviet Union was not as fully realised as its representation often seemed to suggest (Usha 2005; Laville 2013). Zsófia Lóránd’s chapter in this volume describes a similarly mixed picture of gender relations and gender equality in state-socialist Yugoslavia. In other parts of the world, the picture was different again:
Jennifer Eggert’s essay in this volume shows how, for women fighters in the Lebanese civil war, the national cause was a more powerful motivating factor than feminist ideas; and how in some communities religious narratives also played a role.

Within feminist movements in the First World, the former Soviet Union, and the Third World, the idea that the personal is political was widely recognised, and campaigns were launched against hidden and private forms of violence and abuse. Although the slogan ‘the personal is political’ became popular thanks to second-wave feminism in the US, it was already being used in the early 1960s by activists in the civil rights movement and in the New Left (Heberle 2016). In 1962, Tom Hayden had called for a radical ‘reassertion of the personal’ (cited in ibid.: 2). Hayden and others associated with the New Left rejected the bourgeois separation between the public and the private sphere. They argued that issues that were commonly regarded as ‘private troubles’ had to be analysed and tackled as expressions of underlying as political, social, and economic problems. In the late 1960s, women in the New Left began to discuss ‘personal’ issues and responsibilities such as childcare, housework, and contraception as expressions of patriarchal structures, or what Christina Gerhardt in this volume calls ‘slow violence’. Since many of their male comrades were unwilling to make a joint effort to analyse and tackle these issues, women began to organise independently. Consciousness-raising work, which was widely practised by feminist groups in the post-1968 era, is testimony to the importance of the politicisation of the personal sphere. In the US and a range of other countries, women met in small groups to explore personal problems and experiences to heighten their awareness of patriarchal patterns of oppression and to create a sense of solidarity (see e.g. Ruck et al. 2015).

Inevitably, the identity- and solidarity-building notion that women had a shared experience of the personal as political also sparked ‘internal critique and conflict among feminists’ (Heberle 2016: 11). In the 1970s and 1980s, and in the light of their experiences of
violence and exclusion, groups of lesbian, black, disabled, and other women challenged the radical feminist notion of ‘global sisterhood’ (Morgan 1985). bell hooks (2000: 43) has traced the concept of universal sisterhood back to a problematic idea of common oppression, evoked mainly by ‘bourgeois white women, both liberal and radical in perspective’. Chandra Talpade Mohanty comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that the notion of sisterhood ‘erases material and ideological power differences within and among groups of women, especially between First and Third World women’ (Mohanty 2003: 116).

Although the growing focus on the personal sparked controversial debates and criticism within and beyond feminist movements, it provided important impulses for women’s movements around the world. It raised awareness within and beyond feminist movements of hidden forms of violence and abuse, such as domestic violence and spousal rape; topics that are addressed in the chapters that follow particularly by Zsófia Lórand for Yugoslavia, Clare Bielby for Germany, and Claudia Derichs for Indonesia. The chapters fall into three sections.

i. Gender and cultural memory

1968, in Ingo Cornils’ terms, ‘has become a holy grail and a black hole’ (2016: ix); it is ‘the cherished or reviled object of memory, hotly contested’, whereby ‘some feel that its utopian promise has not been fulfilled, while others believe that one must get rid of the utopian ideas to return to moral certainties that existed before’ (Waters 2010: 3). Either way, 1968 is clearly still a powerful signifier, and is increasingly understood to signify something more than the actions of a small group of young men living in the US and central Europe. And still, the stories of Mario Savio, Mark Rudd, Rudi Dutschke, and Dany Cohn-Bendit retain their high profile and popular status. To some extent that reflects the historical reality of 1968: ‘visible female leaders’, as Evans observes, ‘were rare. The narratives of most student revolts (some of which were also allied with large labor uprisings) revolve around a set of key male
actors [...] who quickly became household names. Women participated in large numbers, but they remained in the background’ (2009: 332). At the same time, it reflects a gender-hierarchical discursive norm that persisted even within the New Left and the self-consciously anti-hierarchical social movements associated with it. The same ‘gendered paradigm’ has persisted in the historical narratives that have shaped cultural memory of those movements: embedded in the ethos of the movements themselves that framed the ways they told their own stories, the ways the popular media perceived them, and most subsequent historical accounts as well. The drama of fathers and sons, filled with military metaphor and sometimes-violent conflict, ‘made sense’ to participants and observers alike. [...] In subsequent years, male leaders’ memoirs offered key narratives of the movements. (Evans 2009: 333)

Cultural or collective memory is a term that describes how ‘individuals and groups constitute their identities by recalling a shared past’; it is ‘articulated through technologies and media that shape even as they transmit memory. Acts of memory are thus acts of performance, representation, and interpretation. They require agents and specific contexts’ (Hirsch and Smith 2002: 5-6; see also Reynolds 2011, 2014). Like gender, memory has sociohistorical specificity – and like gender, it has that specific grounding even when it claims the status of a grand or universal narrative. Like gender, cultural memory ‘is always about the distribution of and contested claims to power’ (Hirsch and Smith 2002: 6); and reading through the lens of gender is, therefore, an effective way to expose power relations.

The chapters in the first section of this volume address gender and cultural memory: how and by whom women’s protest, political contributions, and social achievements around 1968 are remembered. They investigate feminist memory politics, collective action, and collective memory, and consider the ‘closed’ or hegemonic narratives of ‘1968’ and how they might be expanded and enriched, in the context of what Kristina Schulz in the opening
chapter identifies as ‘memory contests’ (compare Fuchs, Cosgrove, and Grote, 2006), pointing to the narratives that reject 1968 as a point of origin for second-wave feminism. Andrea Hajek in her assessment of Italy’s stories of ’68 similarly challenges the hegemonic narrative that Italian second-wave feminism ‘arose from the ashes of 1968’, and argues that only a nonlinear and multidirectional narrative of 1968 can give due credit to women’s revolutionary agency. And Chris Reynolds, in his analysis of transnational memories and gender in Northern Ireland, questions any naïvely positive reading of the impetus provided by the ‘spirit of 68’ for women’s liberation. Reynolds concludes the section with an assessment of women’s social and political participation as a marker of Northern Ireland’s place in the grand narrative of ‘1968’; but simultaneously suggests that the events of 1968 might better be understood as a negative than a positive catalyst for the feminist movement. Hajek reaches a similar conclusion for gender dynamics in Italy, where a gendered approach to 1968 needs to consider feminism’s rise ‘despite’ 1968 alongside its much-vaunted ‘debt’ to that year.

ii. Violence and/as counterviolence

Sometimes violence is exceptional, spectacular, and visible, as a number of the essays collected here demonstrate. Reading through the lens of gender, however, sharpens our view of other kinds of violence that are less culturally visible. Structural violence, as conceptualised by Johan Galtung in 1969 and more recently by (among others) Slavoj Žižek (2009) and Etienne Balibar (2015), describes the often nebulous workings of deep-rooted social, economic, environmental, and cultural factors that constrain, circumscribe, and oppress. Structural violence supports the subjugation of some groups by others, and blocks or obscures possibilities for resistance or emancipation (compare Jones 2018).

Feminist activists and scholars have fought for the recognition that ‘gender operates through all forms of violence’; that rape and physical abuse within families, and assaults on
‘personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value’ are different forms of violence, for violence can be in play even where there is no direct physical harm (Schepers-Hughes and Bourgeois 2005: 22,1). In her opening chapter for this section, Gerhardt writes of the ‘slow violence’ of patriarchy, and how a feminist filmmaker in 1968 depicts its operation in different women’s lives and their different strategies for challenging and escaping sexist structures.

Since they had little trust in the existing institutions and forms of justice, feminist activists around the world organised independently to theorise and tackle violence against women. The world’s first shelter for battered women opened its doors in Chiswick, London, in 1971. It was founded by the feminist activist and author Erin Pizzey, whose book Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (1974) became an important inspiration for feminist activists internationally (see also Kristina Schulz’s opening chapter in this volume). By the time Pizzey’s book was published, the number of women’s shelters in the United Kingdom had already grown to twenty, and feminist activists had set up similar projects in the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, and Scotland (Lenz 2010: 291). Zsófia Lóránd’s chapter shows how feminists in Yugoslavia connected with these developments as they set up women’s shelters, phone helplines, consultation centres, and developed new research areas such as feminist victimology. In the context of a growing recognition of women’s structural oppression and of the everyday reality of domestic abuse, some feminists began to view counterviolence as something necessary and legitimate. The militant feminist group Red Zora, as Katharina Karcher (2017, 2018) has demonstrated, developed an explicitly feminist notion of counterviolence that sought to challenge the leftist tendency to romanticise armed struggles. Clare Bielby’s discussion, in the chapter that concludes this section, of the murder trial against Marion Ihns and Judy Andersen, shows how radical groups within the women’s movement framed the killing of an abusive husband as an act of lesbian feminist counterviolence.
In the course of the 1960s, the term *counterviolence* had come to stand alongside (without ever fully replacing) the notion of resistance; both terms signal that the violence described is justified or legitimate, even where it is illegal. Counterviolence particularly describes responses to slow or structural violence. In 1961, Frantz Fanon’s influential account of French colonialism in Algeria, *The Wretched of the Earth* (*Les Damnés de la Terre*; the English translation appeared in 1965), was published with an equally influential preface written by Jean-Paul Sartre. One of Fanon’s observations, which is powerfully supported in Sartre’s preface, is that extreme violence emancipates those trying to escape structural oppression: ‘in the first days of the revolt,’ Sartre summarises, ‘you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man, and a free man’ (Fanon 1965: 19). This is (though it is not yet called) counterviolence: violence that meets and seeks emancipation from extreme structural violence, or the murderous violence of the system (Colvin 2009: 38).

Like Fanon and Sartre, the German-American political philosopher Herbert Marcuse considered violent resistance to colonial exploitation, racist oppression, and other forms of structural violence justified if the actors involved had no other means of challenging the status quo. In his influential essay ‘Repressive Tolerance’ of 1965, Marcuse raised the problem that nonviolence was expected from the weak, while the ruling elites reserved their right to use violence (for example in the form of police violence, institutionalised racism, or prisons). Marcuse’s students in the US included the ‘Youth International Party’ (Yippie) co-founder Abbie Hoffman and the civil rights activist Angela Davis, who in 1969 ‘became the third woman to be place on the F.B.I.’s list of the 10 most-wanted fugitives’ (Charlton 1970). Marcuse was in close contact with Rudi Dutschke and other members of the New Left in Germany. After an unarmed student, Benno Ohnesorg, had been shot by a police officer at a demonstration in Berlin on 2 June 1967, a growing number of student activists argued in the
late 1960s that counterviolence in the form of symbolic attacks against property was a legitimate response to state repression and violence. Simultaneously the student movements in the US and Europe distinguished emphatically between violence against property and violence against other human beings, where the latter was not deemed acceptable.

Violence against other human beings take on a particularly problematic dimension when the violent agent is a woman. The final chapters assess women as violent actors in the light of the cultural complexities, religious worldviews, ideological frameworks, and (gender) political factors that contributed to their radicalisation and reception.

iii. Women as violent actors

In Western political thought, agency has been conceptualised as the capacity of individuals to have an impact on the world around them. In this context, the notion of agency ‘overlaps with a cluster of adjacent concepts – autonomy, free will, intentionality, choice, reflexivity’ (McNay 2016: 3). For feminist IR, Laura Shepherd has proposed a contrasting framework within which agency is not a quality that individuals possess. Rather, it is a complex effect of interactions in specific contexts. Drawing on poststructuralist theory, Shepherd foregrounds ‘the practices of power through which agency materializes in the socio-political world’ (Shepherd 2012: 7). Such practices include ‘resistance to technologies of the body, performances of gender that transgress the boundaries of intelligibility determined by the specific socio-political context, and the compliance with (or rejection of) mechanisms of governance, such as education or medical intervention’ (2012: 7). Although there are different feminist approaches to agency, ‘feminists are in broad agreement that agency needs to be rethought as a situated, embodied and relational phenomenon’ (McNay 2016: 4); not least, this final section of the volume explores, when agency takes the form of participation in armed movements.
A conventional perpetrator/victim dichotomy posits men as perpetrators and women as victims of violence. Female violence – whether it is politically or otherwise motivated – confounds that discursive norm. Of course, there have always been violent women, and there is a growing body of literature showing that they, too, ‘are capturing hostages, engaging in suicide bombings, hijacking airplanes, and abusing prisoners’ (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 1). There is also a significant body of literature that explores how violent women are culturally perceived. By expressing agency through violent practices, women constitute a double threat: they not only harm the victims of their attacks but challenge gender norms. They are, to borrow, Ann Lloyd’s phrase, ‘doubly deviant, doubly damned’ (Lloyd 1995). Drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, Patricia Melzer describes the harm caused as their ‘true violence’, and the challenge to discursive norms as their ‘violent truth’, which ‘assaults the gender regime, the system of meaning that explains and organises gender norms. This truth-regime (in the sense of Foucault) is attacked by their gender transgression, affecting a violence that obliterates any existing naturalized truths about femininity and masculinity’ (Melzer 2018: xxx).

In the 1970s journalists, state authorities, and scholars responded to this double threat by portraying female violence as ‘the flipside or excess of women’s liberation’, as Dominique Grisard argues in the opening chapter of this last section. Drawing on examples from Russia, Switzerland, and Germany, Grisard shows that the terrorism discourse of the 1970s presents the woman terrorist as ‘new, exceptional and foreign/alien’, and as the ‘polar opposite of the docile wife and mother’ (see also Grisard 2010). Thus all women who broke with existing gender norms and/or carried out violent acts might be suspected of terrorism. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that many feminists were adamant in distancing themselves from terrorist violence, and strove for nonviolent modes of resistance and forms of political subjectivity. While it is now widely acknowledged that the violent acts of the
suffragettes in early twentieth-century Britain were part of the feminist struggle for female suffrage, it is still a matter of controversial debate as to what extent female political violence in the 1970s can and should be understood as feminist (see Karcher 2018, Melzer 2018).

Women take up arms in different national, political, and religious contexts, and for a range of reasons which might nonetheless be best understood in the light of the recent scholarship on intersectionality, with attention to the ‘intersecting constellation[s] of power relationships that produce unequal material realities and distinctive social experiences for individuals and groups positioned within them’ (Hill Collins and Chepp 2013: 3). Religion, for example, affects women’s activism quite differently in different geopolitical contexts. Although the percentage of women in was highest in the secular militias of the far Left, there were also female fighters in militias influenced by religious thinking. Jennifer Eggert’s chapter on women fighters in the Lebanese Civil War elucidates that the women who joined armed militias had not only different class backgrounds and different political aims, but – importantly – different religious views. Claudia Derichs then shows how, in Indonesia, the ‘wild women’ of the secular, communist-friendly women’s movement Gerwani suffered gendered stigmatisation very similar to that suffered by violent leftist women activists in Japan and Western Europe; but they also suffered fearsomely brutal physical attacks, which arose in a particular religious-political environment. In the concluding chapter, Daniela Pisoiu shows that female involvement in radical and violent political movements is not necessarily linked to a desire for emancipation or gender equality. Online accounts by women supporters of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (commonly referred to as ISIS or IS) from Western Europe suggest that thousands of women and girls are rejecting the values and rights of the liberal Western democracies in which they live, including those that have been fought for by the movements associated with 1968. And still, like the growing female involvement
in far-right politics in Western Europe (see e.g. Köttig, Bitzan, and Petö 2017), female support for radical Islamist groups can be interpreted as a form of radical violent agency.

Rather than portraying the decades since 1968 as a global history of progress towards gender equality, the essays collected here consciously draw a complex, dynamic, and, at least in part, contradictory picture of women’s involvement in transnational protest movements. The picture is not, of course, complete. We hope that it will be complemented and challenged by future research.

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1 The reference is to Kurlansky 2004.