Thomas, H., & Turnbull, P. J. (2020). From a ‘moral commentator’ to a 'determined actor'? How the International Labour Organization (ILO) orchestrates the field of international industrial relations. British Journal of Industrial Relations. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12578

Peer reviewed version

Link to published version (if available): 10.1111/bjir.12578

Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document

This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12578. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights

This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
From a ‘moral commentator’ to a ‘determined actor’? How the International Labour Organization (ILO) orchestrates the field of international industrial relations

Huw Thomas & Peter Turnbull
School of Management, University of Bristol

Forthcoming in British Journal of Industrial Relations

Abstract

Collective action on the part of the International Labour Organization (ILO) has always been dependent on the ability of the International Labour Office, the permanent secretariat of the ILO, to orchestrate a consensus between the Organization’s tripartite constituents of Government, Employer and Worker representatives. This consensus fell with the Berlin Wall, prompting the Office to bypass states by engaging with external interactants in order to promote international labour standards and decent work. Most recently, in order to shift the emphasis from ‘moral commentary’ to ‘determined action’, the Office has reverted to managing states, albeit in the face of determined Employer counter-framing. Employer opposition, supported by several member States, cannot be underestimated, as any orchestration within the international industrial relations field is contingent on concerted action.

Keywords: International Labour Organization (ILO), orchestration, international labour standards, collective action framing
Introduction

Following the end of World War II, the International Labour Organization (ILO) reaffirmed its position as the focal actor in the (strategic action) field of international industrial relations. This pre-eminent role has been attributed, in no small part, to the staff of the International Labour Office (hereafter ‘the Office’) who displayed ‘a high sense of commitment to building a new world order … united by the tradition of strong executive leadership and by their conviction that they had a right to express social policy’ (Cox 1973: 121). To this end, the Office promoted labour standards that set the bar high (Maupain 2013: 118) and then worked to overcome opposition by brokering a consensus between the ILO’s tripartite constituents (Cox 1973: 119-20). Today, however, it seems that past consensus owed much to the ILO’s origins as a rampart against Communism – a period of détente between capital and labour during the Cold War (La Hovary 2015: 116; Maupain 2013: 29; and Ryder 2015a: 3) – leaving the Organization with ambitious governance goals (decent work for all) but only moderate governance capacity. As Helfer (2006: 652) laments, it seems the ILO’s ‘only tools of influence are the sunshine of public scrutiny and the shame of public censure’. In some eyes, it is precisely because ‘the competing voices in such a diverse chorus [of capital, labour and the state] make it hard to do more than juxtapose each participant’s favourite refrain’ (Maupain 2013: 123) that the ILO has been reduced to the ‘social conscience’ of the international system (Ryder 2012a).

Contrariwise, the ILO can still be, in the words of the current Director-General (D-G) Guy Ryder (2012a), a ‘determined actor’ and not simply a ‘moral commentator’ by orchestrating action on the part of the Organization’s tripartite constituents, providing them with ideational and material support in order to address target actors in pursuit of decent work.

Orchestration is a mode of governance widely used by international organizations, albeit rarely identified and analysed (Abbott et al. 2015a: 3). Orchestration is hard-wired into the tripartite structure of the ILO (Abbott et al. 2015b: 355; and Bacarro 2015) because, unlike
other UN agencies characterised more by principal-agent relationships, the ILO operates on a corporatist basis, enlisting recognised State, Employer and Worker representatives as intermediaries to promote international labour standards. Intermediaries are crucial to orchestration because they possess governance capabilities that the ILO lacks (e.g. technical expertise, material resources, legitimacy, local information, direct access to targets and enforcement capacity). Thus, while it is tempting to see the ILO as an organization ‘frozen’ by its path-dependent past (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 218), history tells us that institutional design is not destiny as all international organizations are ‘open systems’ that are especially open to new ideas espoused by well-positioned policy entrepreneurs (Béland and Orenstein 2013). The latter are those in the epistemic community who display ‘a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the service of these action “frames”’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 7). In the case of the ILO, the D-Gs of the Office have orchestrated bold policy programmes at critical moments in the Organization’s history, each with a very different score (Cox 1973: 112-20; Helfer 2008: 681; Phelan 1936: 248).

International organizations can either seek to manage states by engaging intermediaries to shape state preferences, beliefs and behaviour, or bypass states by enlisting external interactants to influence the conduct of private actors without state intermediation (Abbott et al, 2015a: 11). The ILO’s distinctive tripartite structure creates the possibility of internal orchestration without the need to directly engage external interactants. However, in the years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, both Michel Hansenne (D-G from 1989 to 1999) and Juan Somavía (D-G from 1999 to 2012) sought to bypass states by enlisting the support of external interactants in order to influence the conduct of target actors (Baccaro 2015). Hansenne sought to build bridges with civil society organizations (CSOs) by involving them in the decision-making processes of the ILO (adding new players to the instrumentation) while
his promotion of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998) arguably muted non-fundamental labour standards (akin to removing all but the wind section from the orchestra). Somavía opted to change the sound of the ensemble through the Decent Work Agenda, a more acceptable symphony that other international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF could play along with (albeit rarely in tune). In contrast, Guy Ryder, the current D-G (2012-present), has refocused the ILO on managing states as a way to defend the Organization’s supervisory system, establish a Universal Labour Guarantee (with much stronger protection of workers’ health and safety), and govern the activities of trans-national corporations (TNCs) and their global supply chains (GSCs). In doing so, Ryder is conducting a much louder chorus for workers, although the Employers are determined to play their own tune.

Orchestration in international organizations is elaborated in more detail in the following section, where the focus is on the main challenge for any orchestrator: namely, how to ‘identify or create commonality of purpose, such that the intermediary will follow [the international organization’s] lead’ (Abbott et al. 2015a: 17). Commonality of purpose is typically the result of collective action framing, a jointly constructed group account of an injustice (e.g. indecent work) or common grievance (e.g. the failure of economic benefits to trickle down GSCs) that motivates and proposes a line of political action (Benford and Snow 2000). Indeed, the ideational process of (collective action) framing is the principal means through which international organizations attempt to shape domestic policy (Béland and Orenstein 2013: 127) by enlisting intermediaries (Abbott et al. 2015b: 11). Ideational support, ranging from empathy to endorsement, will enhance the legitimacy of intermediaries’ policy preferences and their social authority vis-à-vis targets (ibid: 14), paving the way for material resources to follow.

The field of international industrial relations, like all strategic action fields (SAFs), is maintained in a politicised social environment by interactants of varied power. Consequently,
longitudinal (ethnographic) data is required to ‘simultaneously track actors’ framing of their interactions and of their perceptions of how the context shifts over time’ (Gray et al. 2015: 138). To this end, the (in)ability of successive ILO D-Gs to orchestrate the tripartite constituents and motivate collective action is explored in a subsequent section. It is evident from this account, as the current D-G has pointed out, that the ILO ‘has entered into perhaps the most difficult period of [its] history’ (Ryder 2015a: 3), where an inability to orchestrate a fundamental change to the field of international industrial relations may yet prove to be the ILO’s requiem.

**Playing along with the ILO**

As the fundamental units of collective action in society, strategic action fields (SAFs) represent a particular social order where actors ‘interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 3). In the SAF of international industrial relations, depicted in Figure 1, the focal interactant (orchestrator) is the Office, but like all international organizations the ILO is constrained by its Constitution, the oversight of member States, and limited financial and administrative resources (Abbott et al. 2015b: 3), especially in respect of the enforcement of international labour standards at the national level. As the current D-G of the ILO has emphasised on numerous occasions, the international industrial relations field is ‘a system which relies purely and solely on country-by-country national obligation [and] horizontal acceptance of responsibility state-by-state’ (Ryder 2015b). This ‘horizontal system’ of international labour standards appears ever more ill-suited to a globalized world economy (Thomas and Turnbull 2018).

Crises in SAFs are more likely to originate ‘from without’ rather than ‘from within’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 8). This is certainly the case for an international industrial
relations field undermined, on the one hand, by the Washington Consensus and a neo-liberal system of international socio-economic governance, and diluted, on the other hand, by the encroachment of new forms of international private labour governance (e.g. corporate codes of conduct). To be sure, there are still political opportunities for new forms of global labour governance, but the ILO’s ability to ensure that different social actors are ‘singing the same tune’ (Maupain 2013: 123) has been muffled by internal wrangling from within, most notably the unwillingness of Employers and some governments to play along with the former international ‘rules of the game’ (ibid: 129). Those rules relied on a degree of cooperation between capital and labour, depicted by the overlap between Employers’ (E) and Workers’ (W) in Figure 1. Labour standards will always be framed in different ways by Employers (e.g. decent and productive work) and Workers (e.g. decent and dignified work) but sufficient cooperation between the social partners during the Cold War era provided the basis for the Office to orchestrate different intermediaries when different labour standards were debated. For example, labour standards that promoted universality were supported by the Soviet bloc and most Western governments, with the notable exception of the USA, while states opposed to the Soviet presence were keen to support standards that promoted freedom of association and the elimination of forced labour (Cox 1973: 119). At the annual International Labour Conference (ILC) – the so-called parliament of labour – Governments hold 50 per cent of the votes while the Employers’ and Workers’ Groups each hold 25 per cent, providing ample scope for different ensembles (i.e. the overlap between G and the Office in Figure 1) to vote in favour of new international labour standards. Crucially, the social partners, and in particular trade unions, were then in a position to seek ratification of the new standard (statutory national employment protection), regardless of whether their government voted for the Convention in question at the ILC. It is precisely because ‘states are principals to [international organizations] as agents, but [international organizations] are orchestrators of intermediaries who (sometimes)
have states as targets’, that international organizations are able to ‘operate in the shadow of member-state control’ (Abbott et al. 2015a: 16 and 26).

*** FIGURE 1 HERE ***

In general, international organizations are more likely to orchestrate when: (i) they lack capabilities to achieve their goals through other governance modes (e.g. direct delegation), (ii) intermediaries with correlated goals (e.g. trade unions) and complementary capabilities (e.g. employer associations) are available, (iii) they are focal within the relevant SAF (the ILO is a specialist agency of the UN with 187 member States), and (iv) their organizational structure and culture encourages policy entrepreneurship. Orchestration is especially likely where there is both goal divergence and weak state oversight (i.e. lax institutional control mechanisms) giving rise to greater autonomy for the officials of international organizations (Abbott et al. 2015a: 25-6 and 2015b: 370-2). Within the ILO, goal divergence, contestation and (occasional) open conflict goes without saying, not only between member States (e.g. North vs. South, liberal vs. coordinated, developed vs. developing) but also between and even within the representative Groups of Workers and Employers. Neither the Workers’ nor the Employers’ Group at the ILO are fully representative of their respective class interests. For example, although most workers in the world are not union members, labour is represented at the ILO through the trade union movement, via national confederation(s) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). The International Organization of Employers (IOE), the secretariat created specifically to speak for the Employers at the ILO, is representative of neither petty capital nor trans-national capital. Not surprisingly, Office officials are more strongly committed to the Organization’s mission than Employer representatives, most Government and even some Worker representatives. This commitment begets autonomy and
autonomy enhances the scope for orchestration. The autonomy of the Office, which is enshrined in the Constitution of the ILO (Cox 1973: 119; Maupain 2013: 188; and Phelan 1936: 38), enables the D-G and his staff to ‘use orchestration to discipline “principal slack”’ (Abbott et al. 2015a: 28).

Orchestration processes range from convening and coordination (bringing actors together and synchronising the activities of intermediaries) to assistance and endorsement (administrative/financial support and formal political and/or legal recognition that empowers intermediaries) (Abbott et al. 2015a: 14-16). For the ILO, convening and coordination is an every-day activity, with a programme of meetings written into the Organization’s Constitution. For example, the ILO’s Governing Body (GB)\(^2\) meets three times a year. Assistance and endorsement are contingent on agreed labour standards and the work programmes that follow (e.g. technical assistance, drafting national legislation, education and training and capacity building). Therefore, if the Office wants to change the mood music of international industrial relations, then it must first set the agenda by mobilizing intermediaries and shaping their goals and policy choices (Abbott et al. 2015b: 14-15). Orchestration theory is relatively quiet on the process of agenda-setting, or more specifically how orchestrators use framing strategies to mobilize intermediaries and other interactants to affect the target in order to achieve the orchestrator’s governance goals. Policymaking in the ILO starts with the GB, which presents a programme (ideational resources) and budget (material resources) for debate and approval by the ILC. Around 80 per cent of the ILC agenda items proposed to the GB originate in the Office compared to 20 per cent from members of the GB (GB.1997/268/3/3),\(^3\) confirming the pre-eminence of orchestration as opposed to principal-agent forms of delegation. As the GB subsequently approves the conclusions of the ILC, the orchestrator (Office) is able to close the loop in the sense that it is almost inconceivable that any conclusions agreed by the ILC will not result in some form of (concerted) action.
The tripartite intermediaries of the ILO (G, E and W in Figure 1) are mobilized through a process of (collective action) framing designed to activate adherents and demobilize detractors. Power relationships in any given policy contest are manifest in cognitive and normative frames that legitimate some groups rather than others (Snow and Benford 1988: 198). As the orchestrator within the field of international industrial relations, the role of the Office is to (re)frame decent work deficits in any policy text ‘in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman 1993: 52). More specifically, the Office seeks to reframe problems to orchestrate a consensus around an agreed text that will then constitute the basis for collective action between the intermediaries at the international, national and local levels. The failure of member States to ratify a majority of ILO Conventions is testament to the fact that intermediaries are unlikely to ever completely abandon their own cognitive frame (how I see the world) no matter how persuasive the framing (how I want you to see the world) of the orchestrator.

Framing is not simply a cognitive process of meaning making but also a determinant of practices and behaviours. Most notably, frame alignment of one form or another is a necessary condition for participation in social action (Snow et al. 1986: 464). Framing is rooted in practice and must therefore resonate with social actors. Interactants who display ‘a symbolic appearance of compliance with external demands while pursuing their own ends in practice’ (Gray et al. 2015: 129) will (eventually) be challenged by the orchestrator, intermediaries or other interactants beyond the institutional field. For example, if Employers depict GSCs as ‘ladders of development’ (ILC.2016/105/14/PV/7), but socio-economic benefits fail to raise up the millions of workers who toil for the sub-contractors of TNCs, then this particular framing of (in)decent work will raise the ire of the Workers and grate with many governments, even some of those who offer accommodating labour standards (Thomas and Turnbull 2018). In this
context, Workers might demand a *contentious reframing* that not only ‘problematises and challenges existing authoritative views and framings of reality’ (Snow 2004: 385), but also seeks to redirect responsibility for decent work and international labour standards. In contrast, the orchestrator or other intermediaries might favour *bridging* (linking two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem) (Benford and Snow 2000: 624-5) or simply *frame plurality* (Grey et al. 2015: 130) (i.e. the toleration of multiple and frequently conflicting frames).

As summarized in Table 1, Michel Hansenne was keen to build bridges with CSOs (the SAF of international private labour governance in Figure 1), Juan Somavía tolerated a plurality of interpretations of decent work in order to persuade other international agencies to embrace the ILO’s new mantra (interactants in the SAF of international socio-economic governance in Figure 1), while Guy Ryder has focused his attention on the SAF of international industrial relations via an *internal reframing* designed to ‘exploit and exaggerate institutional contradictions’ (Gray et al : 125). These contradictions play out between the autonomy of the Office to orchestrate and the power of intermediaries to play a different tune.

*** TABLE 1 HERE ***

**Researching the ILO’s score**

The governance institutions of international industrial relations, by definition, are co-constitutive. In particular, the autonomy and effectiveness of the Office depends crucially on interactions with the tripartite intermediaries. It is evident from Table 1 that interaction not only changes over time but often intensifies during periods of upheaval when Governments, Employers and Workers question previous understandings, meanings and actions. How, then, does the reasoning and rhetoric of the Office within a specific meaning context attract
supporters and nullify the opposition of detractors? This question lends itself to process research methods that incorporate temporal progression and the particulars of time and place that make knowledge actionable. These methods demand prolonged involvement in the processes being studied, drawing on interactional expertise to secure close access to events as they unfold (Langley et al. 2013: 4-6). Researchers cannot assume much about the intent of policy entrepreneurs in international organizations without undertaking a detailed analysis of the expert debates taking place within the organization (Béland and Orenstein 2013: 137). *Ipso facto*, researchers cannot assume to really understand the meanings of ILO text without truly understanding the social institutions or experiences of the social actors.

Our research *for* the ILO dates from 1999 with a report on the (de)regulation of transport services followed by subsequent studies of the employment and social effects of 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis on the civil aviation sector. Projects co-produced *with* the ILO include the development of a guidance manual and training materials for social dialogue in ports, guidelines on competence-based training in the ports sector, and policies to support the employment of women in the transport sector and to address the particular problem of violence towards women transport workers. All these projects coincided with the Directorship of Juan Somavía and all were undertaken through collaboration with the Sectoral Policies Department (SECTOR), including a 3-month period in the Office (Geneva) for one of the authors as a Visiting Academic Fellow with SECTOR (September-December 2011). This Department also played host to a 2-year period of observational research (January 2013-December 2014) for the other author, initially as an ‘observer-as-participant’ (internship) and then ‘participant-as-observer’ (paid employment) (Gold 1958), which coincided with the appointment of Guy Ryder to the Office. Access to events on the inside, as they unfold, made it possible to study local micro-processes of meaning construction as a way of deciphering how actors incorporate and make use of different framing strategies. In particular, insider knowledge is invaluable.
when deciphering the *procès-verbaux* of the ILO (e.g. the ongoing meetings of the GB and ILC) as well as the verbal and written communications of intermediaries.

Research on, for, and with the same organization constitutes different types of ‘ethnographic revisits’ (Burawoy 2003). Long-term field research provides opportunities for what Burawoy calls the ‘punctuated ethnographic revisit’ (Somavia’s Directorship), which involves the researchers returning to the same site (the Office in Geneva) with a view to understanding historical change and continuity (ibid: 669). These visits invariably involve ‘digging up the past’ – the ‘archaeological revisit’ (Hansenne’s Directorship) – as the researcher ‘moves backward in time to excavate the historical terrain that gives rise or gives meaning to the ethnographic present’ (ibid: 671). Participant-as-observer research, in contrast, represents a ‘rolling ethnographic revisit’ (Ryder’s Directorship), a ‘continuous dialogue between observation and theory’ (ibid: 668) as every (daily) entry into the field is followed not just by writing about what happened but also by an analysis in which questions are posed, hypotheses are formulated, and theory is elaborated. Data from the various revisits and follow-up conversations with ILO officials are reported in the text as ‘field notes’. Given the diversity of ILO staff, not simply in terms of nationality but also the interests they represent (e.g. specialist units such as ACTRAV and ACT/EMP, the Bureau for Workers’ and Employers’ Activities respectively), the views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the ILO or the Office.

Process studies designed to illuminate the role of tensions and contradictions in driving patterns of change typically start with a narrative strategy (Langley 1999: 695-7), a detailed chronology based on the raw data that is not simply a thick description but also contextualization with an embedded plot in the story (e.g. how the Office conducts the orchestra and to what effect). Quantification is also a useful contextualization strategy (ibid: 697-8), delineating trends over time (e.g. adoption and ratification of Conventions during
different time periods and the adoption of key Conventions, as noted in Table 1) and establishing patterns of behaviour (e.g. voting on Conventions at the ILC) (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 199 and 211; and Thomas and Turnbull 2018: 541). These data also provide an insight to the framing strategies adopted by D-Gs. One way to amplify a particular frame, for example, is repetition, as indicated by the number of times key words (e.g. ‘CSOs’, ‘decent work’, or ‘global supply chains’) appear in the D-G’s strategic reports to the ILC. Note, however, that our interest in these data is concerned less with the empirical regularities than with the generative mechanisms that drive such regularities.

The visual representation of process data allows for simultaneous depiction of a large number of dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 1, and represents an ‘intermediary step’ between raw (qualitative and quantitative) data and abstract theorizing (Langley 1999: 700-3). Using this visual mapping strategy, Figure 1 is redrawn and reinterpreted in the following section for the current and previous two D-Gs, which covers the entire post-Cold War period up to the ILO’s Centenary year (2019), focusing on how the Office sought to reconstitute internal relationships between intermediaries (G, E and W) and external relationships with interactants in other SAFs. The D-Gs’ term of office is an obvious basis for temporal bracketing, given the autonomy of the Office and the scope for orchestration. This analytical method highlights how change in one period leads to changes in the next. More importantly, the D-Gs’ term of office facilitates the use of alternative templates, which involves reflecting on different interpretations of the same events (our own interpretations and those of other researchers) using a variety of data and a constructed theoretical lens. Thus, the analysis that follows combines organizing strategies (narrative and visual mapping), replicating strategies (quantification and temporal bracketing), and grounding strategies (alternative templates) (Langley 1999: 707). The result is a very different score for each D-G.
Orchestration at the ILO

The inability of the international industrial relations system to ensure decent work in an age of globalization is evidenced by, *inter alia*, modern-day slavery (ILO 2017), child labour (ILO 2016), and the systematic violation of workers’ rights (ITUC 2020). In response to this exploitation of labour, the International Labour Office sought to *bypass states* (Hansenne and Somavía), initially by trying to bring other interactants into the ILO’s SAF (Hansenne) and then by targeting interactants in other SAFs (Somavía). The return to *managing states* (Ryder) harks back to the ILO’s ‘experience of the past century … [which] … confirmed that the continuous and *concerted action* of governments and representatives of employers and workers is essential to the achievement of social justice, democracy and the promotion of universal and lasting peace’ (ILO 2019: 2, emphasis added).

Michel Hansenne (1989-99)

Hansenne was the first D-G of the ILO of the post-Cold War world, which marked the end of the hitherto uneasy ‘cooperation’ between capital and labour at the ILO (La Hovary 2015). ‘From that point forward, continued normative production, even reduced to its symbolic value and logic of international “clout”, seemed a bridge too far’ (Maupain 2013: 43). Strategic counter-framing by the Employers is indicated by the fact that almost 95 per cent of Employer votes were against the Home Work Convention, 1996 (C.177) (ILC.1996/83/PV: 753-6; and Table 1), with the Employers’ Group then mobilizing to kill off the proposed Contract Labour Convention (ILC.1998/86/16/PV/212). This ‘faltering’ of the standard-setting machinery – the ILO’s *raison d’être* – was ‘a rare occurrence’, but as Hansenne noted it ‘reveals a certain malaise [in the Organization]’ (ILC.1998/86/22/PV: 41). The impasse cannot be overstated, as political power in the ILO’s SAF is not simply the power to act, but the power to act *in concert*.

Within an altogether different SAF, most (Western) eyes were focused instead on the
prospect of a social clause in world trade agreements, with CSOs and human rights organizations mobilizing to put pressure on the newly created WTO, as depicted by the solid arrow in Figure 2. With its ‘direct’ and ‘hard’ form of international governance (legally binding dispute settlement) (Abbott et al. 2015a: 9), the WTO was an attractive target, especially for trade unions and CSOs. The proposal for a social clause, whereby labour violations would constitute an *enforceable breach* of WTO agreements, was raised at the first meeting of the WTO in Marrakesh in 1994, the same year that Hansenne and the GB established a Working Party on the Social Dimension of the Liberalization of International Trade (GB.1994/261/WPSDL). Hansenne was invited to the first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore in 1996, but his invitation was quickly withdrawn due to opposition from developing countries who wanted no discussion on labour issues at the Conference (Leary 1997). The main outcome of the Conference for the ILO was the WTO’s renewed ‘commitment to the observance of internationally recognised labour standards’, that ‘the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration’, and the recognition that: ‘The [ILO] is the competent body to set and deal with [labour standards]’ (WTO 1996). Words consistent with the ILO’s ‘master frame’ – labour is not a commodity – are easy to come by, especially as the WTO was well-aware that the ILO has no effective power of enforcement, while the idea that liberalization is the source of improved labour standards, as opposed to a primary source of their degradation, is a rhetorical (re)framing designed to weaken the influence of the ILO’s institutional prescriptions. The reference to ‘existing collaboration’ with the ILO was curious to say the least (cf. Figure 1), given that any cooperation (overlapping fields) between the two organizations ‘had thus far been virtually non-existent’ (Leary 1997: 122).

*** FIGURE 2 HERE ***
Hansenne acknowledged that: ‘The ball is now back in the ILO court’ (quoted by Leary 1997: 121). Not one to be afraid to ‘make innovative and controversial proposals’ (Baccaro, 2015: 278), Hansenne put forward instead the idea of a ‘social label’ whereby the ILO would certify to consumers that the goods produced by countries with the ‘ILO label’ complied with international labour standards (music to the ears of many CSOs) (ILC.1997/85/DG: 30-3). While this idea was framed as a ‘voluntary scheme’ (ibid: 31), bearing ‘absolutely no relation to a social clause’ (ILC.1997/85/PV: 11), this was not how developing countries interpreted the social label. At the ILC in 1997, the Egyptian Minister for Manpower & Immigration described it as ‘nothing but a retroversion … an attempt to raise again the issue of linking labour standards to trade liberalization’ (ILC.1997/85/PV: 84). With the Employers predictably united in their opposition, the social label was ‘killed in the cradle’ (Baccaro 2015: 270).

Hansenne subsequently exacerbated the problems of orchestrating the tripartite intermediaries by reaching out to CSOs and other international private labour governance interactants promoting corporate codes of conduct and other forms of ‘social responsibility’ (ILC.1997/85/DG: 27-8), as indicated by the dashed (one-way) arrow in Figure 2. This frame bridging failed to move the targets (CSOs) ‘from the balcony to the barricades’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 615) – from an interactant to an intermediary – because of concerted opposition from both Employers’ and Workers’ Groups within the ILO’s institutional (battle) field (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 205-6). The dilemma confronting the ILO was that, ‘For enterprises, codes of conduct are an issue of good management, and not a question of standards. By contrast, the ILO’s instruments are not addressed as such to enterprises [rather to member States]’ (GB.1998/273/WPSDL/126). The GB noted that ‘the interest and expectations of the organizations in this field [of international private labour governance] are somewhat marginal’ (GB.1998/273/WPSDL/114). This was indeed a bridge too far.
Fuelled by the failed orchestration of both the social clause and the social label, Hansenne sought to shift the focus of the ILO from minimum standards designed to prevent an international race-to-the-bottom to a guarantee of fundamental human rights for everyone, everywhere (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 204). The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998), Hansenne’s ‘personal creation’ (Standing 2008: 366), led to a tortuous set of negotiations (ILC.1998/86/20/PV/332-83) but eventual endorsement by the tripartite constituents (ILC.1998/86/22/PV: 47-50). The orchestra was once more in tune because the Declaration focused on core human rights – ILO Conventions on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, child labour, forced labour and equality – and simply committed member States to ‘respect, promote and realize’ (ILO 1998) the principles underlying fundamental workers’ rights, even if they have not ratified these Conventions. Most notably, the Declaration was explicit in reassuring developing countries that ‘labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes’, as ‘the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called into question’ by the Declaration (ILO 1998). This paragraph, given its parallels with the Singapore Declaration, ‘seemed to force the ILO to dance to the WTO drum’ (Maupain 2013: 145).

Whether intentional or not, the ILO’s Declaration ‘took the heat out of the debate on standards’ (Standing 2008: 367) because the Declaration would be enforced not by sanctions but through technical assistance and development policies. Consequently, it was ‘invoked’ (but not enforced) by a wide range of interactants ‘seeking to give legitimacy to their own forays into the labour standards area’ (Alston 2005: 470). One (unintended) effect of the Declaration was a muting of other Conventions, ‘making “standards” a misnomer’ (Standing 2008: 376). Instead of a social floor that might raise workers out of poverty and indecent work, the Declaration, in the words of one senior ILO official, created a ‘social ceiling that workers bang their heads on’ (field notes).
Juan Somavía (1999-2012)

Somavía was the first D-G appointed from a Southern hemisphere country. He was well-versed in the UN system (Table 1) and he empathised with the international trading position of developing nations. For example, he framed the social clause as a ‘convenient shelter for both protectionists and for socially retrograde elements in all countries’ (Somavía 2000). Somavía’s embrace of the international trade agenda extended to the specific concerns of Employers – the costs of compliance with international labour standards – and the need to reconcile market competitiveness with social cohesion: ‘We need a new algebra of efficiency and productivity, which views social policy not as a cost but as a sound return ... We need, in short, to develop a concept of “social efficiency”’ (ibid, emphasis added).

This spoke to business interests in the field of international private labour governance, where there was a growing demand for (legitimate) voluntary social auditing of minimum labour standards in GSCs. As the D-G commented in his first Report to the ILC in 1999, ‘A good corporate social image is increasingly essential for business success … It is now necessary to go beyond the small enterprise sector and respond to the needs of transnational corporations’ (ILC.1999/87/DG: 2). In the garment industry, a major target of CSOs, those needs were met by the ILO’s Better Work programme, which occupies the overlap between the two fields of international public and private labour regulation in Figure 3. Better Work is a form of soft regulation funded by private donors, targeted exclusively at first tier suppliers, offering legitimacy and lower monitoring costs (Merk 2012). More importantly, it bypasses states by working directly with national social partners rather than their international representatives (intermediaries G, E and W) within the ILO.

For Somavía, social efficiency would be delivered via the Decent Work Agenda that ‘evoked everything that the ILO stood for’ (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 207). Just as neo-
liberalism can be framed as ‘that which we cannot not want’, the same can be said of ‘decent work’ (Hauf 2015), especially as, in the D-G’s own words: ‘Decent work is not defined in terms of any fixed standard or monetary level. It varies from country to country. But everybody, everywhere, has a sense of what decent work means in terms of their own lives, and in relation to their own society’ (Somavía 2000). As a result, the malleability of the decent work concept, ‘like a kind of normative potluck, allows everyone to take away whatever they themselves bring to the table’ (Maupain 2013: 54). For TNCs facing their ‘own problems of monitoring and supervision because of the growth of supply chains and subcontracting’, there was now ‘a recognized external source of reference’, but not, as the D-G originally articulated, ‘a consistent framework to benchmark individual initiatives’ (ILC.1999/87/DG: 11).

In the absence of any substantive language on ‘what decent work means’, all three intermediaries within the ILO’s SAF were able to ‘subscribe to their own decent work imaginary, while leaving open the question of which practical routes are to be taken towards the realisation of decent work’ (Hauf 2015: 141). Frame plurality, whereby the orchestrator reinforces the coexistence of multiple frames in a field, is depicted in Figure 3 by the absence of any overlap between the tripartite constituents, but with all three intermediaries subscribing to the ILO’s framing of decent work (the overlap between the intermediaries and the Office in Figure 3). For example, Employers could embrace the idea of decent and productive work as employment creation was linked to ‘creating a sustainable institutional and economic environment’ (ILO 2008: 9), while governments could sign up to forms of social protection and the ‘supremely vague’ if not ‘vacuous’ concept of ‘social dialogue’ (Standing 2008: 371-4) because any measures could be adapted to national circumstances as ‘all societies have a notion of decent work, but the quality of employment can mean many things’ (ILC.1999/87/DG: 4). By way of illustration, ‘Decent Work Country Programmes’ (ILC.2005/93/DG: 5) were established in member States where failure to ratify core
Conventions was conveniently ignored in order to promote employment or other, less contentious, pillars of the Decent Work Agenda (Lerche 2012). Decent work resonated with the framing of Workers’ representatives, but their deference owed as much to their weakened position within the SAF of international industrial relations and beyond (field notes). With frame plurality comes ‘frame misfiring’ and inaction, because ‘interactants have different understandings about what is going on, what needs to be done, or how to do it’ (Gray et al. 2015: 130).

*** FIGURE 3 HERE ***

Although the ILO was unable to agree on any specific measures or aggregate index of decent work, other international interactants, such as the World Bank, incorporated various employment indicators into the pros and cons of ‘doing business’ in different countries. Decent work also became one of the Millennium Development Goals, but with everyone now speaking the lingua franca of decent work, the ILO effectively surrendered its expert legitimacy: the Organization was no longer seen as the ‘sole guardian’ (conductor) of international labour standards and found itself ‘in open competition, with regard to labour market governance issues, with institutions pursuing independent, and sometimes conflicting, agendas and objectives’ (Rittich 2015: 85). As one ILO official wryly remarked, ‘The only “decent” in World Bank reports is decentralization’ (field notes).

While the moral legitimacy of the ILO’s master frame was never in doubt, the discourse of decent work (the overlap between the three SAFs depicted in Figure 3) lacked any substantive rational-legal authority (based on the ILO’s Constitution) or delegated legitimacy from member States or the social partners. For targets outside the ILO, and of course intermediaries inside the Organization (G, E and W), it was difficult for interactants to align
themselves against decent work, but concerted (effective) international action for decent work was much thinner on the ground – notwithstanding the long-awaited recognition of ‘people on the periphery of formal systems of employment’ (ILC.1999/87/DG: 39) such as domestic workers (C.189) (see Table 1) – especially as the Employers were determined that nothing concrete would come of the Decent Work Agenda (Baccaro and Mele 2012: 220). With an enlarged communications department, the ILO was well-positioned to amplify its framing of decent work (the solid arrows in Figure 3 reaching out to the UN, G20 and other international forum), as well as through a stream of expensive reports (Standing 2008: 378-9). The most expensive of these, the report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, led to the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (ILO 2008) that neglected to mention either the mobility of capital and labour or the prevalence of GSCs while the ‘internationalization of production’ received just one mention in the text. In contrast, ‘decent work’ was mentioned 169 times in the DG’s report to the ILC in 2001 (ILC.2001/89/DG). The message amplified by the Office projected decent work as the process of mutually reinforcing social and economic upgrading (Selwyn 2013) but repetition of the words (all talk) does not guarantee results (no walk). In the words of Kari Tapiola (2006), former Deputy D-G (1996-2010) of the ILO, ‘It took us some years to realize that the new universal market did not by itself deliver growth and happiness for all’. By the time decent work reached a crescendo, the debate on standards within the ILO’s institutional field had faded ‘into a hazy ether of diffuse, pervasive normativity’ (Maupain 2013: 53).

Guy Ryder (2012-to date)

Diagnostic framing for any orchestrator demands the attribution of blame or at least responsibility, often drawing on an injustice or inequity frame (Benford and Snow 2000: 616) (the reality of win-lose) whereas decent work was premised on the idea of social efficiency
(the promise of win-win). Once a problem has been identified (e.g. labour is not a commodity repackaged as the demand for decent work), this ‘tends to constrain the range of possible “reasonable” solutions and strategies advocated’ (ibid) (e.g. amplifying the frame to other interactants in other institutional fields). The question then is whether these (market) constrained solutions will motivate collective action? As the current D-G pointed out when formerly the General Secretary of the ITUC (Table 1), ‘decent work could perfectly well figure in another eight or ten international statements without getting any closer to being promoted … unless we can effectively translate agreement on its importance into real changes in the actions of governments and international institutions’ (Ryder 2007).

In any international organization, orchestration as a form of strategic (concerted) action demands not only a ‘compelling account’ that will motivate adherents and demobilize detractors (Benford and Snow 2000: 617) but also the institutional wherewithal to convert talk and text into policy and practice. Guy Ryder has made it clear that GSCs are potential causes of indecent work, which demands a cross-border response from the ILO (Ryder 2014 and 2015a). To achieve this, he is determined that orchestrating the tripartite constituents can work, but only ‘if you work at it’ (Ryder 2014: 6). For Ryder, making the ILO work means managing states to work for labour. When Albert Thomas, the ILO’s first D-G (1919-1932), was challenged on his ‘allegiance’ to the Workers, ‘he could, of course, and often did, point to the text of the Constitution and argue that the Organization had been created for the workers and to improve their conditions’ (Phelan 1936: 236). In his first speech as the new D-G (GB.2012/314/PV/3), Ryder acknowledged that ‘my origins and the origins of my candidacy are not those of past Directors-General. And I know that may give rise to concern in some quarters’ (Ryder 2012b). Those ‘quarters’ are, of course, the Employers, who hold 25 per cent of the votes at the ILC (see endnote 1). Ryder is more closely aligned with the other quarter, depicted by the shared frame of the Office and the Workers’ Group in Figure 4. Determined
action is therefore dependent on orchestration through the mobilization of a sufficient number of Governments (the other half) to support the policy proposals of the Office (depicted by the solid arrow in Figure 4).

*** FIGURE 4 HERE ***

The legitimacy of any international organization is based on a combination of: moral authority that comes from its mission; rational-legal authority based on the constitution of the organization; expert legitimacy based on a widely accepted recognition of the organization as the focal interactant in the relevant SAF; and delegated legitimacy from member states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 25) and, in the case of the ILO, Employer and Worker intermediaries. The ILO’s moral authority, based on a master frame that demands social justice, is rarely questioned, at least not in open and formal discussion. If it is, intermediaries are immediately sanctioned (shamed). For example, when Employers refused to discuss the idea of a new standard (international labour Convention) for decent work in GSCs at the ILC in June 2016, the Workers’ Group reminded (and reprimanded) them that not to do so would be to debase the very purpose of the ILO (Thomas and Turnbull 2018: 553).

When discourse leads to dispute, intermediaries will often draw on the ILO’s Constitution (rational-legal authority) to strengthen their position. For example, at the GB in 2017 during a discussion on the Office’s programme on decent work in GSCs and the corresponding ‘roadmap’ for action, Employers objected to GSCs being framed ‘as if they were drivers of decent work deficits’ (GB.2017/331/PV/490). More specifically, the Employers demanded that any reference to ‘living wages’ in the context of GSCs ‘had to stop’ (ibid). The Employers cited the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (C.131), which makes no mention of the ‘cost of living’ (ibid, para. 515). But Conventions are trumped by the ILO’s
Constitution, which as the D-G pointed out in his response makes ‘provision [for] an adequate living wage’ (ibid, para. 517). This text, in turn, ‘had given the Office grounds to employ that term [the living wage]’ (ibid).

Employers are apt to challenge the interpretation of other Conventions, or more precisely to question the expert interpretation (legitimacy) of the Office under its supervisory system. This system of ‘naming, shaming and reforming’ (field notes) combines technical (legal) examination by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) with tripartite (political) review in the Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) at the annual ILC. The legitimacy of CEACR’s interpretation of Conventions had been simmering since the fall of the Berlin Wall, if not before (Bellace 2014), but the issue came to a head at the ILC in June 2012 when the Employers’ Group prevented the CAS adopting a list of cases to be discussed, thereby bringing this aspect of the ILO’s supervisory system to a halt for the first time since it began functioning in 1927 (ILC.2012/101/27/PV: 2-5). Ostensibly, at the heart of the Employers’ disquiet was the ‘right to strike’ and their desire to limit any action to the workplace level (Swepston 2013: 217), thereby weakening the bargaining power of labour (e.g. the ability of workers in GSCs to lawfully engage in secondary action, boycotts and the like). However, on the specific question of whether a right to strike can be read into the Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 (C.87), the answer – in law and in practice – is evidently ‘yes’ (Bellace 2014; and Swepston 2013), which suggests an ulterior motive (alternative template) behind the Employers’ counter-framing.

The timing of the Employers’ action coincided with Ryder’s appointment and his defence of the autonomous role of the Office. The temper was not so much the right to strike as the interpretations of CEACR being framed as the ‘official view’ of the ILO, which the Employers regarded as the role of CAS (ILC.2012/101/27/PV: 2). In practical terms, the
Employers explicitly rejected the ‘right’ and authority of the Office to manage states via the autonomous supervisory system (CEACR) (ILC.2012/101/19/PV: 34) and sought to assert the authority of CAS where Employers have ample opportunity for counter-framing. Legal interpretation by CEACR is often referenced by national and international courts (Bellace 2014: 58-9) – a process of soft law becoming hard law – which the Employers dubbed a ‘one-size-fits-all’ (ILC.2012/101/19/PV: 13) approach because legal interpretation is based on a reading of the Convention and is not, as the Employers wanted, adapted to reflect differences in economic and industrial development (as was the case under Somavía’s Decent Work Agenda). Recall that as freedom of association is a Fundamental Principle and Right at Work, which all member States must respect (ILO 1998), the ILO’s supervisory system represents a potential impediment to regime shopping whereby TNCs search for (spatial-juridical) places of exception along the supply chain where labour rights and the minimum wage are lower. After reaffirming the fundamental independent role of the CEACR at every ILC since the (framing) dispute erupted, and brokering support for the Committee at the GB from the social partners (field notes), the D-G repeated to delegates in 2019 that: ‘the most historic achievements of this Organization have been brought about through … our supervisory system. I can see no future of the ILO where that will be different’ (ILC.2019/108/8J/PV: 12).

The Employers’ Group in the ILO is well-versed in (strategic) counter-framing or, in the words of Albert Thomas, the Organization’s first D-G, ‘applying the brakes’ (quoted by Maupain 2013: 123-4). Employers’ opposition to the conduct of Guy Ryder is demonstrated by their counter-framing of key recommendations in the Centenary Declaration at the ILC 2019 (Table 1). On his appointment in 2012, the D-G established a Future of Work Centenary Initiative, supported in the first stage by tripartite (national) dialogues in 110 member States, which then informed the creation of an autonomous Global Commission on the Future of Work (August 2017) whose findings were ‘transmitted’ (ILC.2019/108/IV/5) by the D-G’s report to
the Centenary ILC (ILC.2019/108/DG) (ideational support). The draft Centenary Declaration prepared by the D-G and the Office proposed three key recommendations (amongst others): (i) a social contract that revived the cooperation of Governments, Employers and Workers, (ii) a Universal Labour Guarantee that would apply to all workers ‘regardless of their contractual arrangements or employment status’, and (iii) the recognition of occupational safety and health (OSH) as a ‘fundamental principle and right at work’ (ILC.2019/108/IV). Employers asserted their right to challenge all three recommendations based on the Commission’s standing as an independent (expert) group as opposed to a tripartite body of the ILO (ILC.2019/108/PV/164), framing the report as focussing ‘solely on human being [sic] and the status of the worker’ rather than the ‘value that the private sector adds to the world of work’ (IOE 2019: 5).

The negotiation of the Centenary Declaration was fractious and it was unclear whether it would be finalised (field notes) with the Office as well as interactants in other SAFs such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) denouncing the Employers’ counter-framing as serving only to ‘derail’ any concerted effort to strengthen the ILO’s role (ILC.2019/108/PV/460). Even the inclusion of collective bargaining as an ‘essential foundation of all ILO action’ was a ‘red line [for the Employers] … that could not be crossed’ (ILC.2019/108/PV/980). Of the three Centenary priorities, the social contract was rejected on the grounds that it ‘belonged more properly to the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau or to trade union manifestos’ (ILC.2019/108/PV/286), even though, to quote Rousseau, ‘force does not create rights’ and the Employers effectively forced the social contract into the ‘long grass’ of the Drafting Group (field notes). Any reference to the Universal Labour Guarantee was refused on the grounds that national legislation defined employment status, with the Employers accusing the Office of simply seeking ‘something unique [to] come out of the centenary celebration … that is utopian and makes no sense’ (ILC.2019/108/PV: 85). In the Employers’ view, as safe and healthy working conditions were only ‘aspirational’ this
disqualified the proposal of elevating OSH to a fundamental principle and right at work (ILC.2019/108/6/PV/993). Whether ‘health and safety should become a human right’, as the D-G has insisted (Ryder 2019), as opposed to simply ‘fundamental to decent work’ (ILO 2019: 5) will depend on the outcome of on-going discussion within the GB (ILC/2019/108/6A).

Employers were able to count on the support (shared frame) of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries, in particular that of Brazil, a permanent member of the GB under investigation for the violation of Convention 98 (the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining) (ILC.2019/108/5A/PV/343) and a member State that had openly expressed its disquiet with the supervisory mechanism (ibid, para. 350). All that survived of any real significance in the Declaration for the Workers was a commitment to decent work in GSCs (ILO 2019: 4) although even this initiative subsequently faltered when an ILO Technical Meeting failed to approve any agreed conclusions. For the Office, the adoption of C.190 on the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work was a ‘major success’ (field notes), not simply because this Convention was championed by leading officials within the Office (field notes) but more importantly because it shifts the emphasis to (ex ante) active prevention rather than (post hoc) prosecution on a case-by-case basis. All told, however, the Centenary ‘parliament of labour’ (ILC.2019/108/8J/PV: 11) was a disappointment for many in the Office. As an ILO official lamented, ‘There’s nothing from the Centenary that you’d want to put on a T-shirt’ (field notes).

Conclusion

For the past 100 years, the International Labour Office has engaged in orchestration in order to maintain a credible institutional role for the ILO in the SAF of international industrial relations. The challenge for the Office, as for all international secretariats, is how to orchestrate intermediaries within the SAF’s existing rules and relationships towards the Organization’s
governance goals. Orchestration is not an uncontentious process, particularly when it is activated through agenda-setting (ideational support) that invariably favours one intermediary (e.g. Workers) over another (e.g. Employers). Thus, while the ILO was formerly blessed with internal intermediaries who found sufficient grounds for consensus during the Cold War years, today the Organization is beleaguered by the multitude of fundamental (frame) differences within and between its tripartite constituents. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Office resorted to bypassing states, engaging with external interactants in order to promote international labour standards and decent work, creating a façade of consensus but only limited determined action within the Organization.

Just as the ILO’s first D-G stressed that the Office had to mener une politique and ‘take the initiative vis-à-vis employers and governments and urge upon them concrete policies’ (Albert Thomas, quoted in Alcock 1971: 50), Guy Ryder has determined to manage states by providing ideational support for the Workers’ Group which, if embraced by a sufficient number of member States, could provide the foundation for material support. However, this is not an easy composition, as member States are both intermediaries and targets – international labour standards agreed at the ILC must then be ratified and enforced by nation States, who can usually count on the support of trade unions but invariably face opposition from employers. There will always be some States determined to enforce a floor on any international race-to-the-bottom but equally there will be others willing to conveniently ignore or openly violate international labour standards. Several member States, and the Employers in particular, are ever more determined in their opposition to any orchestration attempts by the Office, both in terms of long-standing labour standards (e.g. freedom of association and the right to strike) and any new incursions into their business interests (e.g. OSH or decent work in GSCs). As Ryder reflected at the ILC, ‘I learned in the negotiation of this [Centenary] Declaration that what for one person is vision, ambition and necessary is, for another person, unrealistic, utopian and out of reach’
(ILC.2019/108/8J/PV: 12). For all orchestrators, the cooperation of intermediaries is always voluntary (Abbott et al. 2015a: 17). For the ILO, concerted (determined) action, as opposed to the current cacophony, will ultimately depend on whether the Office can mobilize adherents (Workers and a sufficient number of member States) and demobilize detractors (Employers and a smaller number of member States).
Notes

1 Each member State sends two Government representatives to the ILC and Employers and Workers from each member State send one representative.

2 The Governing Body (GB) is comprised of twenty-eight Government members, fourteen Employer members and fourteen Worker members. Ten of the Government seats are held permanently by States of ‘chief industrial importance’, namely: Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the UK and USA. The other Government members are elected by the ILC every 3 years.

3 Reference to the Official Reports of the Governing Body (GB), International Labour Conference (ILC), or the D-G (DG) are identified by the calendar year, Session (e.g. 268), section, document number (e.g. Working Party 1 or WP1) or proceedings (procès-verbaux or PV), and paragraph (e.g. 3) or page (:3).

4 If all 187 member States had ratified all 190 Conventions there would be more than 35,500 ratifications compared to just over 8,000.

5 SECTOR proved to be an ideal site for our research not least because of its focal role within the Organization, especially after Ryder’s restructuring of the Office in 2012/13, but more importantly because trade union and employer interests are directly represented at the multitude of sectoral meetings organized by the Department.
References


WTO. (1996). *Singapore Ministerial Declaration*. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm
TABLE 1  
The Composition of ILO Director-Generals, 1989-to date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Conventions adopted</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of ratifications</strong></td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>413*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Conventions and (number) of ratifications as of October 2020</strong></td>
<td>Home Work Convention, 1996 C.177 (10)</td>
<td>Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 C.182 (187); Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (97); Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 C.189 (30)</td>
<td>Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 C.190 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orchestration</strong></td>
<td>Bypassing states: endorsement of external interactants as legitimate interlocutors</td>
<td>Bypassing states: decent work for cognitive and normative guidance of external international interactants</td>
<td>Managing states: mobilisation of internal intermediaries towards governance goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framing strategy</strong></td>
<td>Bridging</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>Internal reframing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional target(s)</strong></td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>IFIs, WTO and the UN family</td>
<td>Member States and TNCs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number of ratifications as of October 2020
FIGURE 1
Global Governance Fields and Interactants

FIGURE 2
Michel Hansenne (1989-1999)
FIGURE 3
Juan Somavía (1999-2012)

FIGURE 4
Guy Ryder (2012-present)