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Exploring citizen participation in smart city development in Mexico City: an institutional logics approach

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Exploring citizen participation in smart city development in Mexico City: an institutional logics approach

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Abstract

We explore smart city development, with a focus on the modalities of citizen participation, using an institutional logics approach. Taking Mexico City as our case study we describe the presence and dynamics of several logics influencing smart city development. At an organisational level we identify the bureaucratic and technocratic logics underpinning the practices of the governmental agency leading smart city development. Characterised by centralisation and the pursuit of efficiency, and framed by a discourse of austerity and financial control, these logics promote a modality of citizen participation that is limited and unidirectional in nature, with citizens positioned largely as users. At a supra-organisational level, we identify a logic of active citizen participation in urban governance that is formalised in city laws. However, this logic is itself entangled in a logic of clientelism and patronage, manifested through networks of power. These logics work synergistically to limit broader, inclusive citizen participation in, and realisation of benefits from, smart city agendas. We conclude that a richer understanding of institutional logics enhances the analysis of the social construction of the smart city in particular, situated contexts.

Keywords

Smart Cities, Mexico City, participation, institutional logics

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Introduction

The smart city is the dominant framing for current debates and practical policy developments concerning the integration and use of cyber-physical, connected technologies in urban environments (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019a). The concept of the smart city is both plural and contested (Anthopoulos, 2017; Lynch, 2019), being ascribed a range of meanings, both in the
academic literature and in policy and practice debates. The notion of the ‘smart city’ can be considered as an umbrella term for innovative integrated solutions – typically focused on digital infrastructures, software and data – aimed at meeting challenges facing contemporary urban societies. White (2016) argues that this “smart city global imaginary” is a response to resource pressures associated with demographic shifts, global climate change and fiscal austerity. These resource pressures lead to demands for more efficient city management. Smart city innovation has also been framed as a potential driver of local and national economic development and as a means for (re)invigorating local democratic practices and citizen participation in urban governance. While smart city visions and policies are underpinned by these aspirations in varied combinations, reconciling them can be problematic. In particular, there are tensions between smart urbanism, economic growth, inclusion and sustainability (Martin, Evans, & Karvonen, 2018).

Mora, Deakin and Reid (2019) argue that local approaches to smart city development processes can be mapped against four dichotomies, relating to strategy, directionality, nature of intervention and governance: (1) technology-led vs a more holistic strategy; (2) top-down vs bottom-up; (3) mono-dimensional vs integrated approach to smart city interventions; and (4) double vs quadruple-helix governance systems. These dichotomies bring into focus issues of governance, participation and democracy which in turn reflect the centrality of social and political processes to the construction of the smart city (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019b; Kitchin, 2019). The role that citizens play – or should play – in the development and governance of smart cities are contested political questions at the heart of contemporary debates (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019b). This is vividly illustrated by the case of Barcelona where a change in the political complexion of local government in 2015 led to a complete reorientation of smart city strategy: away from a double-helix, private sector-oriented approach towards one that placed greater emphasis upon inclusion, citizen needs and citizen participation (Charnock, March, & Ribera-Fumaz, 2021).
Our aim in this paper is to explore the modalities and dynamics of citizen participation within a contemporary case study of smart city development. We situate our analysis within an institutional logics theoretical framework. Our starting point is that embedded within the imaginaries of and approaches to smart city development are multiple institutional logics i.e. the ‘taken-for-granted rules guiding behaviour of field-level actors’ (Reay & Hinings, 2009, p. 629). These shape and legitimate practices and behaviours relating to the development and operationalisation of the smart city and, within this, the modalities of citizen participation (Shelton & Lodato, 2019). Our central research question is: How is the role played by citizens within smart city development shaped by competing, situated institutional logics?

Our key contribution is to demonstrate that an institutional logics perspective is both analytically fruitful and practically relevant for advancing the understanding of smart city development and the configuration of citizen participation within this. From a theoretical perspective this research contributes to a body of institutional approaches that have been applied to smart urbanism (Raven et al., 2019) and urban planning and innovation (Berglund-Snodgrass & Mukhtar-Landgren, 2020). Approaching the topic from the perspective of institutional logics allows for a richer and more subtle understanding of the dynamics shaping citizen participation in smart city development.

From a practical perspective this paper offers novel insights into the barriers and institutional constraints to implementing effective participatory mechanisms in smart city developments.

Our case study focuses on recent smart city development in Mexico City. We describe the way in which a bureaucratic logic manifested by the public sector organisation leading smart city development serves to limit citizen participation. We analyse how this logic intersects with broader logics at play within the city that shape established processes of democratic citizen participation in urban policy and governance. We show the tensions and outcome of the interplay of these competing logics, which we suggest combine to place significant constraints on meaningful democratic engagement and participation by citizens in smart city development. In doing so, our
work extends earlier work that has examined the way in which the established, incumbent bureaucratic logic of local public sector organisations articulates with a newer logic of collaborative innovation (Agger & Sørensen, 2018).

We take Mexico City as our unit of analysis because, until recently, much of the literature on the social construction of smart cities, and smart city development more generally, has been produced with reference to European and North American contexts. Only latterly has the empirical literature begun to interrogate in detail experiences in the so-called Global South (Datta, 2018), and Latin America more specifically (Gaffney & Robertson, 2018; Irazábal & Jirón, 2021; Jirón, Imilán, Lange, & Mansilla, 2021). As well as reinforcing the situated characteristics of urbanisation (Rossi, 2019), this recent work exemplifies the diverse mix of policy aspirations and socio-political drivers behind the pursuit of the smart city and the diversity of organisational practices that can result. In the next section, we introduce the debate over the nature and development of the smart city and the role and modalities of citizen participation that are evident in this debate. We provide a brief overview of the literature on institutional logics before presenting our analysis of institutional logics in operation in the context of smart city development and citizen participation. Then, we present our methods and data analysis before presenting our results. The subsequent discussion examines the implications of our findings for the analysis of smart city development and for the implementation of more citizen-oriented approaches within this.

**Competing institutional logics and the social construction of the Smart City**

**Urban governance, smart city development and citizen participation**

Delivering a smart city approach as an innovative governance solution to urban problems is typically seen as requiring the involvement of a range of stakeholders. However, the nature of
smart city development and the modalities of stakeholder and citizen participation implicated within this can vary considerably. Early initiatives were typically “double helix” approaches: public bodies building collaborations with private sector organizations which provided the technical expertise to develop novel digital solutions. This early phase in smart city policy and practice drew criticism for its techno-utopianism and its over-reliance on the private sector: there was concern about the implications of the “corporate” smart city (Hollands, 2015). The development of smart cities was criticised as largely being treated as a technical exercise, despite smart city technologies raising pressing social and political questions (Marvin, Luque-Ayala, & McFarlane, 2015).

But not all smart city development occurs in this way. Some takes the form of bottom up, community self-organisation occurring beyond the direct control of local officials and corporate interests. However, projects involving significant changes to city infrastructure or flows (e.g., of traffic or people) will principally be under the control of local politicians. They can have considerable power to decide the scope of smart city development projects and which actors to involve. Public servants may hold resources for smart city projects, which they may also sponsor, manage and lead. They may have considerable influence over how resources held by others (e.g., in the corporate sphere) are deployed in the urban realm. Precisely how much autonomy public servants have to shape such collaborative processes will vary across cases (Mukhtar-Landgren, 2021).

Finally, smart city development is situated in nature and highly context-dependent. While the smart city policy agenda is global, the smart city experience needs to be provincialized (Burns, Fast, Levenda, & Miller, 2021). It is particularly under-researched in the context of urban environments in the Global South. Smart urbanism in the Global South has been reported as being largely driven by privileged middle-class interests, which in turn create forms of socially and physically ‘splintered urbanism’, often enabled by market-driven logics (Datta, 2018). Cities in Latin
America have been relatively slow to embrace the smart city narrative. The academic literature documents a variety of approaches, from elite-driven top-down to mixed bottom-up initiatives (Irazábal & Jirón, 2021; Jirón et al., 2021).

**Institutional logics**

The social construction of the smart city - and the configuration and behaviours of actors such as city councils, citizens and civil society groups within this - can usefully be understood by analysing the variously competing, synergistic or stratifying institutional logics at play in the situated context within which smart city development occurs. Institutional logics are the organizing principles that sit above and around organisations and individuals and which shape, regulate and legitimate behaviours and practices (Ocasio, Thornton, & Lounsbury, 2017; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Institutional logics operate across the organisational level, field level (here within the field of smart city development) and the level of society more broadly. They refer to belief systems, norms and associated practices that serve to construct identities, meanings and fields of action. Institutional logics are particularly relevant to understanding organizational evolution and change because they provide a link between individual agency, organisational behaviour and change, and the institutions (formal, informal) that influence and legitimate them (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).

Institutional change is usually associated with the emergence or reconfiguration of one or more logics (Dacin & Dacin, 2008; Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017; Oliver, 1992; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2015). Institutional change has been explained as a shift from one dominant logic to another (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002), but the situation is often more complex than a binary switch (Dacin & Dacin, 2008), particularly when there are ‘two or more strong, competing or conflicting belief systems’ (Scott, 1995, p. 211). Co-existence of logics can occur: this may be a temporary phenomenon, eventually resolved through competition in which the logic embodied by relatively more powerful actors prevails to the point of becoming hegemonic (Hensmans, 2003; Hoffman, 1999). However, hybrid combinations of competing
logics (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Ocasio et al., 2017) or logics that co-exist as ‘stabilising paradoxes’ (Shields & Watermeyer, 2018), can sometimes persist for extended periods of time (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Thornton et al. (2015) suggest that the interplay of concurrent institutional logics can result in three potential outcomes: dominance by replacement of one logic over another, resistance by incumbents, and co-existence by blending logics to create hybrids. Organisational decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2017) has been identified as one strategy to maintain hybridity, but endogenous organizational dynamics can also set in motion a process of recoupling (Tilcsik, 2010). Hybridity can be sustained not only at the organisational level but also through broader field and societal level (supra-organisational) governance mechanisms, for example, instruments of collaboration and participatory processes through which seemingly disparate actors holding quite different interests, values and beliefs come together (Balestrini et al., 2017; Martin, Evans & Karvonen, 2018). The process of aggregating and managing these interests can impact on the dynamics of institutional logics and the nature of institutional change (Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000). The nature and modality of collaboration and participation – how participants are included and the agency they have – is crucial to this.

**Institutional logics and the smart city**

While an institutional logics perspective has yet to be applied in the smart city context, the literature on smart cities allows us to propose several logics that are directly implicated. In this section we identify three logics directly bearing on the smart city field. This list should not be viewed as exhaustive. These logics will be subject to varying levels of competition, tension and hybridisation in particular contexts.

**The public sector bureaucratic logic**

Public administration is characterised by a bureaucratic logic that emphasizes order, centralised control, hierarchy, standardisation, rule following, and equality of treatment (Arellano-Gault,
Demortain, Rouillard, & Thoenig, 2013). In addition, in many countries decades of public management reform have overlain established bureaucratic concerns with an emphasis upon systems of performance management which prioritise the delivery of results perceived to maximize short-term value-for-money (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Decisions made by public servants therefore also reflect a managerial concern for efficiency and effectiveness. This logic – encompassing both the bureaucratic and managerial – embeds tensions and is itself hybrid. When smart city development processes heavily involve, or are led by, public organisations this logic, drawn from the broader field of public administration, is likely to be mobilised significantly. This bureaucratic logic can in turn be reinforced by discourses operating within the broader socio-political environment. The discourse of austerity, for example, can serve to draw decision-making power closer to the organisational or political centre so as to assert greater top-down control (Schmidt & Groeneveld, 2019). These managerial concerns sit within broader political considerations of legitimacy, equity, justice and representation. Bureaucratic actions derive their legitimacy from the mandate of their political masters and from conformity to the precepts of good governance, including those relating to probity and accountability. Bureaucratic actions thus derive their legitimacy, in Haus, Heinelt and Stewart's (2005) terms, primarily through input and throughput, rather than output, legitimation.

The ‘top-down’ technocratic logic

A significant group of smart city scholars, companies and consulting groups mobilise a technocratic logic underpinned by techno-optimism. Their primary goal is more effective urban management, achieved by procuring and implementing digital solutions to address urban problems. This is often delivered through a strategy involving close collaboration between the private sector, which offers infrastructure, investment and expertise, and local governments, which act as sponsors and serve as legitimate local institutions of governance and democratic representation. This ‘double helix’ – and sometimes triple helix in which universities are
additionally implicated – embeds a market-driven logic of efficiency (Mora et al., 2019). Local or regional governments sanction and procure proprietary technologies from the market which are then deployed on behalf of the city over which they have democratic jurisdiction (Grossi & Pianezzi, 2017; Paroutis, Bennett, & Heracleous, 2014; Pollio, 2016; Söderström, Paasche, & Klauser, 2014). Commercial organisations collaborate with the intention of either tailoring existing off-the-shelf solutions to local circumstances or developing solutions that can subsequently be marketed to other cities.

This type of collaborative innovation process is focused more upon creativity, outputs and impacts than a bureaucratic emphasis upon adherence to correct procedure. Tensions between established bureaucratic logics and this more entrepreneurial logic of technocracy and innovation therefore need to be reconciled (Agger & Sørensen, 2018). Double helix models of innovation, to varying degrees, seek to do so. The various further helical modes of collaboration (triple, quadruple), in contrast, include more stakeholder groups and require more ‘horizontal’ ways of engagement. Nonetheless, the double helix approach to smart city development has predominated to date; it is an approach that is top-down in the sense that it relies upon a strategy originating within local political elites in alliance with corporate interests.

The citizen-led, 'bottom up' logic

Critics of the logics described above argue that they result in an approach to smart city development that combines public administration with privatisation and commodification (of data) that limits citizen participation and risks reliance upon, and lock-in to, the proprietary products, motivations and objectives of big tech firms (Datta, 2018). This, they argue, militates against more polycentric, distributed and inclusive approaches to smart city development. The "quadruple helix" model of smart city development - which includes citizens and communities as the fourth strand - can be seen as an attempt to address this issue (Mora et al., 2019). However, critics have contended
that, despite the veneer of democratic legitimacy this provides, it does little to address the issues presented by the combination of bureaucratic and technocratic logics described above, and in fact paradoxically may have the effect of depoliticising urban governance (Hollands, 2015; Mora, Bolici, & Deakin, 2017; Grossi & Pianezzi, 2017; Cugurullo, 2018).

A second (loose) grouping of scholars and advocates adopt instead a more overtly political stance, one that is prevalent in the urban studies literature more generally. These scholars emphasise the need to foreground the social construction and politics of the smart city and advocate, in particular, for more grassroots approaches, citizen participation and agency through more direct, deliberative forms of intervention (March & Ribera-Fumaz, 2016; Joss, Sengers, Schraven, Caprotti, & Dayot, 2019). This perspective includes advocacy for open-source data, open science approaches, non-proprietary software, and leverage of collective resources via a ‘city commons’ (Balestrini et al., 2017). The smart city is recognized as being as much a political project as a technical one. It does not automatically emancipate, increase equitable access to city services or improve quality of life for all citizens. It also has the potential to entrench difference, established power dynamics, inequality and social division (Townsend, 2013; Marvin et al., 2015; Kitchin, Cardullo, & Di Felicianonio, 2019; Trencher, 2019).

The force of this argument has been widely acknowledged in the rhetoric of smart city development practice. In response the “Smart City 2.0” is one that should be more citizen-focused. The institutional logic embodied in this argument rests on greater substantive citizen participation in the specification, design, development and governance of smart city initiatives. Under this logic, legitimacy does not flow through the institutions of representative democracy but rather rests on more direct forms of deliberative democracy as a basis for interventions, underpinned by principles of equitable development and social justice. It is a logic that is citizen-driven rather than technology-driven and one that is both citizen-oriented and citizen-led (Balestrini et al., 2017). It is a logic that emphasizes, using Haus and colleagues’ (2005) terms, input and throughput
legitimation but, unlike the bureaucratic logic, it demands more active and inclusive mechanisms of engagement for securing legitimacy.

These three logics, which we have derived from the existing smart city literature, we suggest are in operation in smart city development but typically remain hidden from view. Making visible for analysis those logics at play and the dynamics and tensions that exist between them is only possible through empirical observation (Reay & Hinings, 2009). The value of doing this has been demonstrated in related fields. Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner and Höllerer (2017) have for example explored the field of open government data (see also the discussion of smart urbanism in Berlin by Raven et al., 2019). They highlight the way in which desirable characteristics of open government – in particular, crowdsourcing and inputs from outside the public sector – conflict with the established bureaucratic logic underpinning public administration. The authors argue that this bureaucratic logic, which emphasises representative government, centralised control, expertise, secrecy, exclusion, standardisation, equity, and accountability, places limits upon moves to open government in ways that undermine key benefits claimed for it.

We use the institutional logics described above to orient our analysis of key smart city developments and modalities of citizen participation in Mexico City (see Figure 1). Our research explores the extent to which contemporary smart city developments align with the logics described, or hybrids of them, while leaving open the possibility of other logics emerging inductively.

Insert Figure 1 here
Research Design and Methods

Research setting: Mexico City, the City Lab and the Digital Agency for Public Innovation

In order to understand the institutional logics underpinning smart city development and citizen participation in Mexico City we must first contextualise them within the broader socio-political history of the city. This history speaks directly to the question of the extent to which citizens can participate in urban governance. In this regard, Mexico has a long history of political modernization, from the revolution at the beginning of the 20th-century and a one-party regime to a competing democratic alternance by the 21st-century. Yet, at its roots, it has always struggled with authoritarianism as an essential part of the political culture. In Mexico City, the discussion about including direct citizen participation in some of the city’s governance processes can be traced back to the 1990s. The 1998 electoral-political reform promoted by a left-wing party, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática, paved the way for a new Citizen Participation Law. The existing citizen councils were replaced by neighbourhood committees elected by universal vote and citizen representation was organized in geographic spaces called “territorial units” (Vargas Solano & Galván Gómez, 2014). However, it was not until 2010 that the Law of Citizen Participation, the Law of Budget and Efficient Expenditure, and the Call for Citizen Consultations on the Participatory Budget were issued. Citizen organizations then became a key instrument of citizen participation.

The same period that witnessed this ‘participation trend’ in Mexico City also embraced a ‘Smart City narrative’. This trend was started in 2012 by the mayor Mancera, who created a City Lab or Laboratorio de la Ciudad. The Laboratorio’s purpose was to create an experimental space in which citizens, civil society, academia, business, and government could meet to reflect on the problems facing the city, and then take joint actions, including utilizing new technologies for
digital governance. The Laboratorio was expected to offer solutions to urban problems in a systematic and cooperative manner, generating co-production processes between the government and the citizenry. The Laboratorio therefore mobilised a quadruple helix approach to smart city development that actively included citizens and civil society groups. This transformed the Laboratorio into a quasi-experimental, democratic agora. Indeed, at its inception in 2012 the Laboratorio was arguably at the forefront of debates over citizen participation in smart city development in CDMX.

Nevertheless, the Laboratorio’s initiatives were limited in number and remained isolated experiments. Mancera was replaced in 2018 by the new mayor. The new party in power, known as MORENA (National Regeneration Movement), stands on a left-wing ideology that aims to eradicate widespread acts of corruption that have historically been a feature of Mexico City. Under the banner of the 4th transformation (4T) MORENA gained overwhelming victories and majorities in the federal Congress, the Senate and several states of Mexico.¹

The new government considered the Laboratorio to be an expensive experiment with limited impact. In 2018, it was disbanded and replaced by a plan for a new governmental agency for digital transformation of public administration. The idea to develop the Agencia Digital de Innovación Pública (ADIP) (Digital Agency for Public Innovation) aligned with an austerity and efficiency agenda put in practice under the 4T wave. The overall objective of the ADIP is to “build a

¹ The first transformation happened during Mexico’s independence (1810), the second during the reform period (1857-1861), the third was the Mexican Revolution (1910) and the fourth is supposed to happen during the 2018-2024 presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
government free of corruption and at the service of the people of Mexico City through openness and digital governance, primarily for those who need it most” (ADIP, 2020). The legal framework that regulates the ADIP is the La Ley de Ciudadanía Digital (Digital Citizenry Law) of 2019. According to its website (ADIP, 2020) since taking office in December 2018 the ADIP has developed over 65 different projects. The developments range from the new Government of Mexico City website to launching an app called App CDMX, which includes information on public transport, the program of bicycle stations (known as Eco-bici), “my policeman” (to find the nearest policeman available), a Covid19 tracking app, and even a panic button to be pushed in case of emergency.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

The ADIP is a focal point for current smart city development in Mexico City and leads on behalf of the local government. Our project aimed to examine the early operation of the agency, how it configures citizen participation and how this sits within the broader dynamics of citizen participation in Mexico City, as discussed in the previous section. The main source of data comprised 30 audio-recorded semi-structured interviews collected in the field between September 2019 and January 2020, resulting in about 40 hours of interview data. The interviewees comprised public/private actors directly and indirectly involved in developing a smart city agenda in Mexico City (see Table 1). The data were analysed with the aid of NVivo 11 software, which is widely used to analyse heterogeneous, qualitative datasets (Miles & Huberman, 2003), through a process of deductive/inductive iteration, contextualised within an emerging structure of theoretical reasoning (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). We employed pre-selected constructs to direct our coding (i.e., deduction): these constructs described institutional factors that influence participation in Smart City projects e.g. barriers to citizen involvement, formal/informal rules, inclusion/exclusion dynamics. The coding itself employed an inductive logic based on: (i) initial open data coding, maintaining the integrity of 1st-order (informant-centric) terms (210 codes); (ii)
organisation of 1st-order codes into 2nd-order (theory-centric) constructs; (iii) distillation of 2nd-order constructs into overarching aggregate dimensions; (iv) presentation of the data in a narrative fashion. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2, where we report the 3 main theoretical aggregates, and their underlying 2nd-order themes onto which we map the institutional logics identified in the previous section. We illustrate these with representative quotes from the interviews. The full, coded quotes are available in the supplementary material.

Insert Table 1 here

Insert Table 2 here

Research Results

Centralisation, efficiency and control (Bureaucratic and technocratic logics)

The first theoretical aggregate emerging from our data focuses on the logics to smart city development mobilised by the ADIP, which can be summarised as control (over data and software development) through a top-down strategy underpinned by a combination of strong public sector bureaucratic and technocratic logics. These are, at least in part, legitimated by a public discourse of austerity and efficiency and are enacted by acquiring, co-locating and centralising resources and expertise. Compared to its predecessor the Laboratorio, which pursued diverse small-scale and short-lived projects funded by private companies, the ADIP’s approach has been to exert considerable direct control, to the point where the smart city agenda is becoming monopolised by the government agency. One of our respondents highlighted this control by drawing attention to the way the agency cancelled a 10 million MXN contract overnight, securing instead a new
contract for the installation of 13,600 free Wi-Fi posts across the city, as well as increasing the speed of the internet service offered to the city government: transforming it into ‘the free Wi-Fi capital of the world [by] renegotiating one contract’ (ADIP employee interview November 2019).

Most of our interviewees suggested this control was accompanied by a clear strategy to internalise and centralise previously externalised services, such as software development, data management, and sensor infrastructures. From the outset the ADIP attempted to gain control over those diverse sources of data produced within the city. The agency is attempting to introduce a narrative based on the ‘objectivity of data’: working within a technocratic logic, it argues that centralising data as the basis for city-wide applications could be a mechanism of standardisation that could ‘depoliticise’ issues and resource allocations that had previously been subject to high levels of contestation and spatial inequality. In parallel, thanks to the creation of an internal group of developers and software engineers, the ADIP has created a monopoly over digitalised public services offered by the city government, including the development of new software.

Yet, as more than one civic activist noted, this monopoly risks hampering the creation of start-ups with the potential to offer innovative services and risks curtailing bottom-up initiatives promoted by activist-citizens. The curtailing of several citizen-driven initiatives was highlighted. This included a citizen collective-led initiative funded by the local participatory budget mechanism that was stopped - according to a respondent - by the intervention of the ADIP. The project, promoted by a local collective of neighbours of the Colonia Juarez, consisted of an interactive app to improve neighbourhood security. Despite having received the majority of votes in the participatory budgeting process, it was alleged that the project had been cancelled and the budget re-assigned to another initiative. The local authority justified this substitution by claiming that the ADIP was developing a similar project: that is, by appealing to efficiency through avoiding duplication. According to our respondents, although the agency does not have the legal mandate to reallocate
the participatory budget itself, the diversion of funds is achieved by exerting pressure on the municipality. The collective took the matter to the Mexico City Electoral Tribunal.

An overarching public and political discourse of austerity, pursuit of efficiency, and a drive against wastage and corruption serve as an important source of legitimation for these logics. Many contracts signed by the previous administration were perceived to have been overly beneficial to the private sector. The new government halted the hiring of expensive consultancies for smart city development. Instead, smart city solutions would be developed by a centralised, internal team: this was argued to be more cost-effective and reduced the potential for corruption whilst increasing the efficiency of the e-solution. The Agency assembled a team of 40 software developers. ADIP respondents claimed that applications developed internally were between 200 and 500 percent less expensive than similar applications available commercially. Claims of efficiency, improved quality and scalability made by agency respondents were, however, contested by interviewees outside government: several raised concerns relating to the lack of open-source code for smart city applications or an absence of mechanisms to provide feedback about improvements to them.

The strategy of centralisation and internal delivery of smart city solutions, however, encountered a key issue: limited pre-existing technical and organizational capabilities. The ADIP sought to draw in relevant technical (digital) capabilities from civil society groups. Respondents highlighted the lack of formal institutional (including legal) mechanisms to attract and retain highly qualified people in government with the necessary skills. Attracting talent into the ADIP was also hampered, it was claimed, by unattractive salaries and uncertainty about career stability. To compensate for this, the ADIP had recruited young, enthusiastic individuals from a number of civil society organizations.
The dynamics of participation and engagement (Bureaucratic logic in tension with city-wide, citizen-led, bottom-up logic)

The second theoretical aggregate emerging from the data relates directly to participation, urban governance and the distribution of power in Mexico City. Respondents suggested that the current approach to smart city development was creating invisible but tangible barriers to citizen participation. This operated at two levels: one organisational, at the level of the ADIP, and one supra-organisational, at the level of the city.

First, our respondents highlighted that the citizen engagement being undertaken by the ADIP was limited in nature, unidirectional and instrumental in motivation. Rather than engagement being meaningful, it was presented as a ‘simulation of participation’. Respondents from the ADIP exemplified a bureaucratic logic when they mobilised a narrative of efficiency and performance to justify their limited approach, citing a lack of time and the need to speed up the building of a robust and functioning infrastructure as pre-requisites for more participatory forms of engagement. The agency was, according to one respondent, anxious to deliver ‘smart’ applications. The perceived imperative to deliver outputs quickly and efficiently was used to legitimate the Agency’s limited participation approach, while this imperative in turn reflected the influence of the public discourse of austerity and fiduciary integrity discussed in the previous section. Our data suggests that this approach to participation by the ADIP might at face value be in tension with city-wide, formal processes of citizen participation and urban governance that are underpinned by a more bottom-up, citizen-led logic (see Research Setting above). Our respondents noted the great emphasis placed on participation in Mexico City’s laws and in mechanisms such as the participatory budget. However, our respondents also suggested that despite the existence of these laws, in practice these created similar barriers to meaningful participation at a city-wide level as those manifested by the ADIP, with constraints on citizen agency and limits to the redistribution and exercise of power (Arnstein, 1969).
Respondents in this sense drew attention to the legal framework for participation in Mexico City as being both an important influence and, paradoxically, a simultaneous constraint on citizen agency and power. The roots to this paradox can be found in the history of urban governance in Mexico City, which has been dominated by factions, citizen groups (e.g. *colectivos*) and corporatist forms of participation based on patronage networks (De Alba-Ulloa & Arellanes-Arellanes, 2017) (see section below). These, our respondents suggested, serve to limit, and even hijack, more meaningful and inclusive forms of democratic agency by citizens. One interviewee for example suggested that the Citizen Participation Law was written more to legitimise the public administration than to create meaningfully engagement mechanisms. The management of participatory budgets was also felt by some to favour projects supported by politicians, whilst leaving out viable projects proposed by citizens.

In this respect the limited approach to citizen participation mobilised by the ADIP serves to limit the potential disruption to these engrained networks of patronage and clientelism that could be caused by more meaningful forms of participation. The modality of engagement and participation exercised by the ADIP de-risks this by limiting engagement to surveys and formal/informal meetings with the *colectivos*. In this model, citizens are positioned largely as *users* of smart city solutions. Overall, while the ADIP’s limited approach to engagement appears at first to be in tension with the logic of bottom-up citizen participation that frames laws underpinning urban governance, it reinforces how these laws are enacted in practice through networks of power, clientelism and patronage. This privileges the *concentration of power, control and decision making*, whilst leaving little room for more meaningful and inclusive citizen agency in shaping the direction of smart city activities.

**Representation, power, social justice and the logic of clientelism**

The final theoretical aggregate emerging from our data problematises these incumbent *institutions of representation, clientelism and patronage* within the city, institutions that have implications for
social justice and equality of opportunity for citizens to engage with, and benefit from, the smart city agenda. Respondents drew attention to the important role of social collectives (Harguindeguy & Molina, 2009) and how these link to institutions of citizen representation. Social collectives are crucial to understanding the organization of social life in Mexico. Collectives, local assemblies and a variety of informal forms of aggregation and association have been central to political life in the country for two centuries. Over time these have been institutionalised and integrated into public administration and laws. Local citizen assemblies have traditionally been used to raise new generations of politicians, which in turn reproduce local patronage networks. The functional complement of this system has been the logic of clientelism: a logic that emphasises loyalty from people toward the leader that in turn creates an informal system of power and dependency due to the vertical control of public funds. Our respondents suggested these mechanisms inhibit broader citizen voice, participation and agency. This system has led to informal networks of power, which allow access to public funds in exchange for political-electoral support, a practice deeply ingrained in Mexican political culture.

As many interviewees revealed, it is hard to find projects in Mexico City that are not, in some way, a reflection of a patronage network or lie at the intersection of multiple interests backed by multiple networks of power. Some colectivos – such as the collective of street sellers – are powerful and influential in local urban policies. This complex network of patronage, our respondents argued, also infuses the digital agenda of the city. They suggested that, despite a narrative of standardisation and equity, the Agency’s digital agenda, as with that of the predecessor Laboratorio, is a result of a patronage network favoured by the cosmopolitan and richer areas, whilst largely ignoring the city’s peripheral and more disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This issue of social justice and inequity of opportunity was visible in the metaphor of the ‘two velo-cities” (the two-speed city) used by some interviewees. One city is characterised as cosmopolitan, respectful of human rights, with an approach to urban
development that draws on a knowledge economy, with access to services and jobs. The other city was a ‘slow’ one, abandoned and left behind, where services are scarce and basic human rights are uncertain.

Our interviewees also drew on a narrative of *techno-optimism* regarding the capability of smart city technologies to address and resolve the ‘two velo-cities’ by creating a neutral, apolitical space in which the power games played within patronage networks might be overcome. This aligns to some extent with the technocratic logic mobilised by the ADIP. But whilst the approach promulgated by the ADIP might, at face value, offer such a neutral, apolitical space, our respondents suggested that this has not so far been able to engage with or address issues of equality of opportunity or benefits associated with smart city development. Indeed some suggested that it might reinforce such inequalities by favouring wealthy residential neighbourhoods and spaces for the new economy which becomes ‘smart,’ whilst much of the remaining city is left behind (Masucci, Pearsall, & Wiig, 2019).

**Discussion**

In this study we set out to understand how different institutional logics are influencing smart city development, and within this, the nature and modalities of citizen participation in the context of Mexico City. Our results suggest the interplay of several logics that exhibit a complex pattern of co-existence, tension, and synergistic, mutual reinforcement. We discuss these further here with a focus upon the ways in which the key organisational actor in the field (the ADIP) has reconciled these logics during the early months of its existence.

**From the Laboratorio to the ADIP**

The abolition of the *Laboratorio* and the creation of the ADIP was accompanied by a significant shift in logic mobilised by the organisation leading smart city development in Mexico City. The creation of the ADIP represents a reassertion of the bureaucratic and top-down, technocratic logics...
with emphasis placed upon probity, accountability, public management and anti-corruption as well
as the benefits of standardisation of data and centralisation of decision-making. These logics were
strongly present in the early months of the ADIP’s existence, the timeframe during which we
collected our data. The Laboratorio had been abolished by the local government for perceived
performance deficiencies: the creation of the ADIP and the logics that underpin it was a response
to such perceived deficiencies.

Echoing observations by León and Rosen (2019), our results illustrate the way in which a
technocratic logic of smart city development can be used to try to depoliticise urban governance.
A concern about the smart city is that social and political issues are treated as largely technical
ones amenable to technical solutions which are uncontentious. By adopting bureaucratic and
technocratic logics, the ADIP, we suggest, emblemises this concern. It has adopted an
organisational strategy that serves to squeeze politics out of smart city development in the city as,
seemingly, a political strategy in itself.

The implications for the modalities of citizen participation in smart city development are
significant. The quadruple helix model previously mobilised by the Laboratorio engaged citizens,
at least to some degree, as active stakeholders in smart city development processes. In contrast,
the dominant bureaucratic and technocratic logics of the ADIP lever a model of representative
democracy in which citizens are positioned as ‘users’ with little direct involvement or meaningful
agency. This reflects the fact that the ADIP understands itself as a government agency whose
agenda is set by elected politicians, who in turn receive their mandate from the electorate. ‘Input
legitimation’ flows from electoral politics and that is the arena in which citizens shape the smart
city agenda. Direct participation in development processes is largely limited to user feedback and
testing. This pushes against the citizen-led bottom-up logic (which, in the smart city literature, is
viewed in the main as being normatively desirable) and towards the bureaucratic and technocratic
logics. The ADIP does not seek to internally balance or hybridise the bureaucratic and citizen-led
logics, nor does it exhibit any noticeable forms of organisational decoupling in the face of the latter. Figure 2 summarizes our argument and highlights the way informal institutional logics permeate the field.

Rejection of helical models of smart city development

Our review of the smart city literature suggested a progressive desire to move from double helix models towards triple and quadruple helices that involve the engagement of ever wider groups of stakeholders and citizens. Our findings suggest the exact opposite: the move from the Laboratorio to the ADIP is moving not from a double towards a quadruple helix model, but from a double to a single helix model in which the state is the lead and sole actor. In other words, it rejects helical models entirely. It does so by mobilising a hybrid of institutional logics (technocratic, bureaucratic) within a newly formed public sector organisation, rather than reaching out to develop cross-sectorial collaboration. Here it is challenging, on grounds of efficiency, effectiveness and fiscal probity, the rationale that such direct forms of engagement are an effective or desirable governance mechanism. This, in turn, reflects the recent history of Mexico City, where much of the focus has been on corruption and poor value for money. The approach taken by the Laboratorio, which drew in multinational commercial vendors, was perceived as inefficient and not operating to the advantage of citizens. The reassertion of the bureaucratic logic, emphasizing rules, fiscal probity and value for money, seeks to address this and places greater emphasis upon throughput legitimacy.
The success of this strategy, and the logics that underpin it, are yet to be decided, noting our interview data only encompasses the first year of the ADIP’s existence. Although the agency appears to have stabilised a hybridisation of the bureaucratic and the technocratic logics during that period, there were expressions of discontent from stakeholders. For this reason, it is too early to say whether this is a sustainable and durable coupling.

**Participation in institutional context**

While the move from the *Laboratorio* to the ADIP was an attempt by politicians to shift the balance of institutional logics shaping smart city development, the move also highlights significant continuities. These continuities can be seen when we consider how the organisational logics manifested by the ADIP work with and reinforce broader and more deeply embedded institutional logics sustained at a city-wide level. These in total, we argue, have important implications for citizen participation in smart city development, and serve to mutually-reinforce the logics mobilised by the ADIP itself.

In this respect we can locate the logics of the ADIP approach to smart city development - and citizen participation within it - within an understanding of powerful, established norms and institutions of (urban) governance in Mexico City. These are more complex than at first appears. The formal governance structures of Mexico City at face value invoke a logic of bottom-up citizen led participation and place considerable weight upon direct citizen participation in policy decision-making. However, these institutions are themselves located within a broader, engrained logic of *clientelism* supported by informal networks of patronage and power. The result is a form of cognitive dissonance: practices on the ground are rather less citizen-led in practice than those inculcated within formal structures of urban policy. What emerges from our data is the powerful influence of the logic of clientelism across the city, one which serves to configure and limit citizen participation in smart city development.
The quadruple-helix model of the Laboratorio can, we suggest, be seen as an attempt to break from the logic of clientelism by seeking to foster forms of direct citizen participation in smart city development, increasing throughput legitimation. Despite this, our interviewees reported that the projects conducted by the Laboratorio did little to change the familiar logic of clientelism. The creation of the ADIP and its logic of centralised, top-down bureaucracy could, we suggest, be seen as another attempt to break with this city-wide clientelist logic in order to deliver an approach that is more representative of the entire electorate’s needs, albeit deploying a very different set of logics to that of the Laboratorio. However, our interviewees reported scepticism regarding the success of the ADIP’s approach in terms of addressing this influential logic of clientelism, at least in its first year of operation. Some saw the approach of the ADIP not only as not disrupting the incumbent logic of clientelism but in practice reinforcing it.

**Implications for citizen participation in smart city development**

Kornberger et al. (2017) have demonstrated that a dominant bureaucratic logic places constraints on the extent to which public services can embrace the bottom-up logic of open government. The two are fundamentally in tension. Their findings resonate with the experience in Mexico City in terms of the tension between the logics of bureaucracy, technocracy and bottom-up citizen participation. These three field level logics are certainly visible in our case study. However, our findings indicate that restricting analysis to the interplay of these field–level logics risks missing those further logics (in our case study the logic of clientelism) that might exist above and around the field level logics and which may in turn significantly influence them (Greenwood, Magán Diaz, Xiao Li, & Céspedes Lorente, 2010). The implication is that to fully understand smart city development processes it is certainly necessary to analyse those field-level logics that are present, but is important also to locate these within a broader analysis of those situated, societal level logics at play within the particular city under consideration.
At a field level within the smart city community there has been increasing momentum to recognise the politics of the smart city and its implication for citizen participation (Kitchin et al., 2019), often with an explicit concern about the undue influence of ‘big tech’ over the agency of citizens (Hollands, 2015). However, our study suggests this underplays the importance of other locally-situated social and political dynamics that extend beyond the influence of ‘big tech’. In the Mexico City case, we observe a regional government that has turned decisively away from big tech, but, unlike the equivalent political change in Barcelona (Charnock et al., 2021), this did not bring citizens closer to the centre of the process. Rather, the move to dominance for a bureaucratic logic has seen citizens further distanced from the process of smart city development.

Above we noted that in its first year the ADIP stabilized a hybrid of the bureaucratic and technocratic logics geared towards delivering outputs. We now consider whether this position is sustainable and where drivers of change might lie. A key determinant of the sustainability of the current approach by the ADIP is whether local government is satisfied with the ADIP’s delivery and performance. What emerges from our data is that the agency adopted a managerialist attitude that prioritised the delivery of apps over citizen participation and inclusion. Our interviewees suggested these apps did not have the anticipated reach in terms of numbers of users and there was room for improvement in design and functionality. We cannot anticipate whether the ADIP’s delivery and performance will be deemed satisfactory over the longer term. If organisational motivations at senior level are managerialist, then it will require internal or external pressure to induce more inclusive, equitable and citizen-led smart city development. External pressure within the smart city field – a global discourse on the desirability of citizen-led smart city development – already exists but is insufficient to act as a counterweight to the ADIP’s current dominant logics. It is likely that increased local pressure for greater citizen participation would need to manifest itself through the political system in order to gain significant traction. The post-2018 local government sees its left-populist electoral mandate as providing sufficient legitimacy to represent
the needs of citizens: a significant shift in political philosophy will be needed to revise the understanding of input legitimation. Even were that to occur, the embeddedness of the clientelist societal logic suggests limited progress will be possible without much more far-reaching social change. Overall, therefore, it appears the scope for external pressure to shift the balance of dominant logics towards more meaningful citizen participation is limited.

We might however look to endogenous change in the balance of logics within the ADIP itself, as a mechanism for recoupling to the bottom-up citizen participation practices that are normatively preferred in much of the smart city literature (Tilcsik, 2010). The ADIP’s strategy of recruiting staff with the relevant expertise from civil society organisations suggests many of these staff bring with them experience of working with communities in more participative ways. This could set up an internal dynamic with the potential to destabilise the incumbent logics of the ADIP. Whether it will do so will depend in part on the resilience of the currently dominant bureaucratic organisational logic and the resilience of the deeply embedded societal-level logic of clientelism, both of which configure and limit citizen participation. Moreover, we cannot exclude the potential role of the ADIP itself in shaping and influencing those logics, which might include the possibility of creating new forms of patronage and networks of power built around the ADIP and the considerable resources at its disposal. These are questions that can only be addressed in future work.

Conclusions

This paper describes the existence of and dynamics between institutional logics that influence smart city development and, within this, citizen participation. We analysed the tensions that exist between a public sector bureaucratic logic; a technocratic logic; and one that emphasises bottom-up citizen participation and agency. We see elements of these first two logics within current smart city development in Mexico City but show that these in turn refract a broader logic which
configures participation through a logic of clientelism and patronage. *These logics, whilst different, work synergistically.* Broader political discourses serve to hybridise, legitimate and bind these logics of bureaucracy, technocracy and clientelism together, in total configuring and limiting citizen participation. The outcome is centralisation of decision making and control over the objectives for and opportunities afforded by smart city development. While the concern about smart cities is typically that the embrace of a technocratic logic might inadvertently result in political issues being treated as technical and uncontentious, our study shows that the situation can be more nuanced. However, the end result is the same: limits to citizen participation, largely benefiting those who live in more affluent, ‘connected’ areas at the expense of those in less affluent neighbourhoods. While similar findings have been reported elsewhere in the Global South, the example of Mexico City offers insights into the substantial barriers to equitable and inclusive smart city development created by embedded socio-political institutions that shape local, situated institutional logics. A discourse portraying smart city development as undertaken in citizens’ interests is almost universal. But the devil is always in the detail, and the detail we suggest is hidden within the logics underpinning smart city development, and how these interact. These logics, and how they influence the nature and modalities of participation, need to be made visible in particular situated contexts. Without doing so, tokenism and the unequal distribution of the benefits of smart city development are, we suggest, inevitable outcomes.

We close by stressing the situatedness of our case study. As an exploratory, critical case, (Flyvbjerg, 2006) our study is informative, but we caution against making generalisations from our data concerning those logics that might be mobilised within smart city development in other geographically or temporally situated contexts. These we argue must be opened up to empirical study themselves. However, if we consider the ADIP example as a critical case in Flyvbjerg’s (2006) sense then our work can offer a tentative general claim. A shift of political power from a conservative to a more progressive government can be necessary but not sufficient to achieve
functioning and meaningful citizen participation in Smart City projects. If in a case in which a left-wing movement backed by civil society is returned to power, participation is not fully achieved because the dynamics of deeply engrained institutional logics are overpowering then we should expect that genuinely transformative change is not possible through institutionalised forms of participation.

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Figure 1 Institutional Logics at play in Smart City development

- (1) Top-down
- (2) Citizen-led
- (3) Bureaucratic

Global smart city discourse: double- to quadruple-helix

Organizational responses to logics in practice
- dominance
- resistance

Modalities of citizen participation

Transmission between levels
Potential hybrid relationship
Potential antagonistic relationship

Organization Studies
(1) Top-down
(2) Citizen-led
(3) Bureaucratic

Organizational responses to logics in practice
- dominance (3)
- blending (1, 2)

Modality of citizen participation:
Limited, top-down, unidirectional, “user” role only

Transmission between levels
Hybrid relationship
Antagonistic relationship

Informal
Formal institutional logics

Societal level
- Clientelism and patronage; role of colectivos in socio-political order
- Social problems as technical problems; Private sector as repository of innovation, entrepreneurship; Privatisation
- Broader socio-political environment eg. emphasis upon representative democracy (electoral mandate determining priorities), good governance, efficiency, austerity
- Valuing participatory democracy; cocreation and coproduction

Organizational level
- Organizational responses to logics in practice
  - dominance (3)
  - blending (1, 2)

Field level
- Modality of citizen participation: Limited, top-down, unidirectional, “user” role only
Figure 2 Institutional Logics at play in the ADIP and the resulting modalities of citizen participation
Table 1 Data Collected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Data collected</th>
<th>Concepts studied and induced</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Servants</td>
<td>9 Semi-structured</td>
<td>Organizational strategy for the implementation of digital governance, data management, barriers and enablers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interviews</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society members /</td>
<td>15 Semi-structured</td>
<td>Organizational interaction, barriers and enablers for citizen participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>activists</td>
<td>interviews</td>
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<td>Academia</td>
<td>2 Semi-structured</td>
<td>Narratives and discourses about smart city projects,</td>
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<td>interviews</td>
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<td>Politicians</td>
<td>2 Semi-structured</td>
<td>Evolution and approval of the laws of citizenry participation, political barriers and enablers</td>
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<td>interviews</td>
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<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>2 Semi-structured</td>
<td>Institutional interaction, barriers and enablers for private sector participation</td>
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<td>interviews</td>
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<td>Govt</td>
<td>laws, public documents,</td>
<td>Institutional communication, legislative frameworks</td>
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<td>websites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical aggregates &amp; Logics in Operation</td>
<td>2nd order themes</td>
<td>Representative quotes supporting 2nd order themes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Centralisation, efficiency and control</strong></td>
<td>Control over data and software development</td>
<td>“I also think that they are limiting many Start-ups […] We proposed them [a new app], but they had to request permission from the Digital Agency and we know that the Digital Agency said “no, if you want an application, we will do it” (private sector manager)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They are literally monopolizing software development within the government of Mexico City to such an extent that even if a [...] city council wants to develop an application or a website, it must have the approval of the Digital Agency for Public Innovation” (social enterprise employee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucratic and Technocratic logics</strong></td>
<td>Public discourse of austerity and efficiency as legitimising force</td>
<td>“We had always outsourced the acquisition of software, [...] Our product costs are between, between 100 and 500 percent cheaper than a company, [...] I have a team of 40 people who are software developers, I think it is the government factory, the factory of largest software in government across the country” (ADIP employee)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Acquisition, centralisation and co-location of expertise for smart city development</td>
<td>“In past administrations used contractors and paid, I think, 10 million pesos a year for commercial supplier licenses to record citizen reports in Mexico City, [...] the transition came and this government, [...] contracts with commercial suppliers disappeared” (Govt employee)</td>
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<td>“Hiring […] talents is complicated, finding the right talent has been difficult.” (ADIP employee)</td>
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<td>“The majority of executives [working] for the Digital Agency, come from Civil Society, which is hopeful, and you can have conversations, whether formal or informal, because they continue to participate in traditional spaces of civil society” (Social Activist)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Invisible barriers to participation

“[...] authority is afraid of participation because they don’t know it, they don’t control it, the authority encourages corporate clientele participation and that has been in Mexico since the post revolution. The entire post-revolutionary regime was based on a corporate and clientele structure, and now [the new govt] simply reproduces and adapts that system, but they do not transform it” (Govt employee)

Bureaucratic logic in tension with city-wide, citizen-led, bottom-up logic

Hijacked participation mechanisms

“[...] the citizen participation laws are written for the authorities to use, not the citizenship, and that is to have the cart in front of the oxen, it is the other way around, they should think about those laws for the people.” (Social Activist)

“Citizen committees in which they have been politically co-opted and citizens, eh, seeing that a certain group continues to participate, they say “why should I participate, if I already know who is going to win, right?” (Social Activist)

Limited and unidirectional engagement

“we [ADIP] work closely with journalists, with civil organizations, etc. Then all the information we develop, we do by taking into account what they have told us, what they need, and the research they do, but downloading it to the citizen level, we have not done it yet” (ADIP employee)

“we needed to get a lot of things out very fast, and there are things that you need to sacrifice, in this case we had to sacrifice an iterative process of collecting, opinions of citizens, that takes time, effort, resources, […] for next year I hope we can improve these processes, that is, yes, we do not do as much as we would like” (ADIP employee)

Role of collectives and clientelism

“…the neighbourhood assemblies historically were training tables [guidelines] of the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] and it was one of the doors of, in some cases of the entry of leaders and in other cases of clientele relations, so all this of the neighbourhood assembly is actually very flawed, very flawed very controlled” (Social Activist)

“the social analysis of Mexico has always been linked to collectives, […] And also inherited from the revolution, which was historically an analysis of the Soviets that Mexico inherits. So, with 70 years of Institutional Revolutionary Party, thus all these forms were institutionalized” (Academic)
<table>
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<th>Meets technocratic logics</th>
<th>Urban inequality and social justice</th>
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<tr>
<td>Techno-optimism</td>
<td>&quot;The city has two speeds; there is a cosmopolitan city, there is a city of knowledge, access, law, opportunities, work, services, and there is a great city that is not that. So the probability of it being a smart city is high for this city that is already encrypted, that has services, that has traffic lights, to call it that stupidly, smart or self-regulated, that an ambulance has a route with a GPS phone to take, here depending on where you live the emergency services, that help you or not, to die or live; it’s that simple” (Social Activist)</td>
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<td>&quot;Where I live is second in Human Development. Period. Well, I go to an ice cream shop and that person takes 2 hours 40 minutes to get to work there. I tell him “Hey, but this is tough, why don’t you find a job closer? Because there isn’t. Second, why don’t you move closer? No, because where I live, I pay less than $ 100 a month-rent, and then the effect, mobility spending, land rental value, are crossed, and this makes the city work at two speeds.” (Govt employee)</td>
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<td>&quot;To depoliticize also, but as a synonym of neutral cleansing because it would be one thing to depoliticize in terms of entering into political analysis to see who wins and loses and another thing will be is to depoliticize saying no, I don’t get involved in the political analysis, I am neutral and there goes the instrument, and the instrument will decide.” (Academic)</td>
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<td>“Technology arrives, and technology in a more or less clean way, neutral without big fuss and cheap, I imagine, cheap and simple to do, with this cost zero, zero cost I do not know what, I do not remember the word, then reduces costs, they are simple, quick, cheap solutions, that can be used” (Social Activist)</td>
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