Ethnic and religious differences in the attitudes of people towards being ‘British’.

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Abstract

Negative rhetoric and policy regarding Muslims has been justified according to a perceived lack of integration into British society. However, this lack of integration has not been empirically established and remains poorly described. This paper explores whether there are variations in levels of ‘Britishness’ and perceptions of the compatibility between Britishness and other cultural/religious identities among different minoritised groups in England and Wales. It examines the impact of racialisation and other forms of social and economic exclusion on ideas of Britishness, focussing on similarities and differences in a sense of access to forms of Britishness among migrant groups. Descriptive and multivariate analyses of Citizenship Survey data showed that 90% of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians felt part of Britain. Muslims were more likely than Caribbean Christians to report a strong British identification and (along with Hindus and Sikhs) to recognise potential compatibility between this and other aspects of national identity. The strength of this feeling was associated with age, gender, generation and, importantly, risk of racist victimisation. Greater recognition must be given to the impact of social exclusion on the ability of ethnic and religious minority groups to feel part of British society, and also to the strong claim to Britishness made by Muslim people in England.

Keywords: Britishness, Muslim, ethnicity, religion, racialization, exclusion, identity, generation, migration, racism
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Introduction

“We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which [young Muslim men] feel they want to belong…And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And [this]… can lead…[to]… a process of radicalisation…. [A] genuinely liberal country…says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in those things…. At stake are not just lives, it is our way of life” (Cameron 2011)

Discussions regarding the problematic ‘loyalty’ of Muslims living in Britain to ‘British’ ways of life –as evidenced by the above quotation from David Cameron, the British Prime Minister at the time of writing, but present in many other government and media discourses (Cantle 2001, DCLG 2012, Nash 2012, Uheroi et al 2011) – surfaced during the ‘Rushdie Affair’ in 1989, but have gained considerable force since the riots in northern England and the terrorist incidents on and since 2001 and the associated ‘war(s) on terror’. The emergency legislation introduced since this time has served to define an entire population of Muslims in Britain as illiberal, ignorant and fanatical, perpetual semi-citizens unable and unwilling to resolve the (assumed) inherent contradictions of their commitments to Islamic and British lifestyles (McGhee 2008, Parekh 2006). These policies and associated debates have been argued to ‘decivilise’ Muslim lifestyles and identities, in contrast to the secular and civilised lifestyles of the ‘majority’ (Vertigans 2010, Mennell 2007, Runnymede Trust 1997, Meer and Modood 2009). These discussions have also sought to lay the blame for these incidents entirely on these apparent cultural inadequacies, ignoring the role that other factors might play:

“Now, I’m not saying that these issues of poverty and grievance about foreign policy are not important…[but these] are just contributory factors. Even if we sorted [them] out… there would still be this terrorism” (Cameron 2011)
However this is a conclusion based on extremely limited empirical evidence, a situation which is only beginning to be rectified (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010, 2013, Maxwell 2006, 2009, Nandi and Platt 2013, Reeskens and Wright 2013). This paper adds to this growing evidence base by quantitatively examining the extent to which there are ethnic/religious differences in a sense of Britishness and the possible drivers of these variations.

It also explores the relationships between perceived access to forms of Britishness and perceptions of racist victimisation, socioeconomic exclusion and migration effects, to help provide a better understanding of the potential impact of social processes of exclusion on access to national identities. A unique contribution to these debates offered by this work is the investigation of the extent to which people with minority backgrounds believe it possible to belong to Britain whilst maintaining separate cultural and religious identities, the presence of ethnic/religious differences in this belief, and the extent to which this belief is affected by forms of social and economic exclusion.

Religious affiliation has been found to be an important aspect of personal identity for many people: when asked about their ethnic background, many respondents choose to label themselves as a member of a religiously identified group (Modood et al 1994, Thomas and Sanderson 2011). Religion may operate in a number of disparate ways to motivate group identity and cohesion, and social and political mobilisation (Kinnvall 2001; Ecklund 2005), and may be associated with lifestyles or beliefs that can contradict or enable co-existence with national or other identities. The assumption, which can be identified in media and political rhetoric, that the presence of particular religious lifestyles necessarily prohibits access to other forms of social identity therefore appears overly simplistic. That said, the negotiation inherent in identity development may act to restrict as well as open access to any particular label (Jenkins 2008).
Work exploring processes of social identification emphasises the importance of both internal and external processes of affiliation (Bourdieu 1977, Weber 1978, Jenkins 1997, Karlsen 2004, 2006, Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). So while religious customs may offer particular opportunities for the maintenance of internal ties, the social and economic exclusion experienced by Muslims (Peach 2006, Khattab 2009, Karlsen and Nazroo 2010), and debates such as those outlined above, may also have a significant impact on their perception of the extent to which particular affiliations and labels, such as ‘British’, may be open to and appropriate for them. Indeed, rather than current debates simply seeking to clarify a pre-existing Britishness accessible to all, there is evidence that ‘Britishness’ has in fact been reinvented in direct response to this perceived ‘Muslim threat’ leading to an exaggeration of the sense of incompatibility between Islamic and British identities (McGhee 2008).

Hussain and Bagguley discuss the ways in which British Muslims have been “‘securitized’, becoming increasingly viewed as a threat by politicians, the media and many non-Muslims” (2012:715). Nickels et al (2010) argue that this securitization is based on a construction of Muslims as constituting an existential threat to Britishness. As a consequence, their identities (and, where necessary, Britishness) have been reconstructed by governments, the media and subsequently the wider public to emphasise this disjuncture (Hussain and Bagguley 2012, McGhee 2008). Attention is drawn to the cultural idiosyncrasies of and danger inherent in Islam, and the refusal of Muslims in Britain to ‘integrate’ to British morals and lifestyles, which in turn contributes to a sense of othering and exclusion among Muslims in Britain (Hussain and Bagguley 2012, McGhee 2008). So while consecutive British governments have demanded the adherence of, particularly Muslim, communities to a rebranded Britishness (Parekh 2006), and supposedly “fundamental British values” (DCLG 2012:17), “life … and principles” (DCLG 2012:11) ‘Britishness’ may actually have become something which can no longer be claimed by British Muslims in the same ways as it may for other religious groups.

Possibly as a direct consequence of this negative rhetoric from politicians and the media
(Kundnani 2008) there have been shifts in the patterning of experiences of racial harassment and discrimination. There are variations in the experience of harassment and discrimination between religious groups, over and above that which might be ‘explained’ by ethnic affiliation (Weller et al 2001; Ferguson et al 2009), with Muslims repeatedly described as the social group most frequently discriminated against. Karlsen and Nazroo (2014) found that Muslims were more likely to report experience of racially or religiously motivated victimization than Caribbean Christians in 2009, despite being less likely to do so in 2000. Opinion poll evidence suggests that anti-Muslim sentiment was higher at the time these data were collected (2009) than in the 1980s (Bleich 2009). Around a quarter of respondents to an ICM (2008) poll, reported in Hussain and Bagguley (2012), felt ‘hostile’ towards Muslims. Moreover, a third of respondents felt that Islamic and British values were incompatible, while over half felt that Islam was at least partly to blame for the bombings in London in July 2005. There is also evidence that prejudice against Muslims (as well as Gay and Lesbian people) is considered more socially acceptable than that against any other group (Abrams and Houston 2006), although other groups, such as refugees and asylum seekers may also be a particular focus of racism (Garner 2010, McGhee 2005).

The ‘Prevent’ strategy (one of the four principle strands of the CONTEST strategy (HM Government 2009)), Terrorism Act (2006) and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) have been singled out as creating a climate of fear among Muslims in Britain (McGhee 2010, Downard and Hinsliff 2004), “construct[ing] all Muslims as potential extremist/enemies unless proven differently and .. render[ing] their human rights, citizenship and right to remain in Britain conditional” (McGhee 2008:49). Whilst there is also some evidence for capacity building stemming from these policies (see for example, O’Toole et al 2013), this situation, combined with the failure to respond in any significant way to the links between extremism and victimisation, social exclusion, poverty and British foreign policy, has encouraged a perception among Muslim groups that they are being unfairly treated, stereotyped and socially excluded (McGhee 2008). This, in turn contributes to a sense of persecution, alienation and
victimisation. Individuals for whom religion previously bore no relevance, then, may find it an important source of social as well as personal identity as their identities become racialised. While it may be argued that the presence and meaning of Britishness has always been quietly assumed (Billig 1995), the existence and nature of Britishness has only recently acquired a more prominent place in the nation’s imagining, at least among the ethnic majority, as might be implied by Cameron’s comments above. And despite this rhetoric, it has been argued that it remains “too contested as an identity to be a source of unity” (Sales 2012:49). Definitions are complicated both by the lack of a clear sense of what it means to be a British citizen – with markers typically located in simplistic allusions to landscape or previous successes in industry, colonialism/imperialism, military action or football (Karlsen 2006, Clarke and Garner 2010) – and by the presence of its multiple nations, whose populations relate to the label in differing ways. Solutions to the ‘Britishness’ question have tended to appropriate an ‘English’ model (Bechhofer and McCrone 2007, CMEB 2000) and in the past ‘the English’ held sufficient economic and political power to prevent more explicit acknowledgement of this becoming necessary. Indeed even mention of ‘Britishness’ may be considered racist and essentially ‘unBritish’ (Clarke and Garner 2010), as was noted by Michael Gove MP in 2007¹. It is interesting that, even with the recent rebranding described above, white British people are less likely to describe themselves as British than those living in Britain with ethnic minority backgrounds (Nandi and Platt 2013, Jivraj 2013).

Devolution, globalization, European integration and immigration have all recently drawn attention to the ambiguous nature of definitions of Britishness – and to the obsolete nature of many of the definitional markers previously ascribed to (Sales 2012). Discussions regarding the meaning of ‘Britishness’ gained momentum under the New Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, but the “promotion of Britishness [during and since this time] has been ambivalent and contradictory” (Sales 2012:49). Brown, who Nairn (2006) describes as the

¹ http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/insearchofbritishvalues1#.U5bqfigVWM_
“bard of Britishness”, proposed a Britishness which offered opportunities for social cohesion around common values. Cameron, however, has sought to revert to ideas of Britishness based on particular representations of history, including a celebration of “institutions that define Britishness such as our monarchy, our armed forces, and our parliament” (Cameron 2009), which reasserts a picture of Britain as superior, successful and dominating. For example, the “fundamental British values” articulated in the Prevent strategy and feeding into other aspects of policy, include “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs” (DfE 2012:5) Interestingly, the values which have been appropriated by various governments and at various times to be inherently British – patriotism, tolerance, fairness, liberalism and support for equality and democratic and legal processes.² – are universal “ideals to which anyone could aspire” (Winder 2007:32). Indeed, evidence from the Citizenship Survey suggests that, with the exception of patriotism, people with ethnic minority backgrounds, including Muslims, largely share these civic values and are more likely to subscribe to values of equality than the ethnic majority in Britain (Heath et al 2010).

Evidence from a survey conducted in 2000 and early 2001 (prior to the terrorist bombings bombings in the US in that year and the change in rhetoric relating to Muslims occurring after this incident), suggested that at least two-thirds of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs thought of themselves as in some way ‘British’ (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010), and were no less likely to think of themselves as British than Caribbean Christians. For these respondents, this ‘Britishness’ did not imply a need to adopt a particular lifestyle to reflect this, nor did it seem to conflict with a sense of the importance of maintaining a cultural way of life that reflected other social identities. However, those who were exposed to forms of social and economic marginalisation – particularly those who were not employed nor studying, or who reported a perception of an inherent racism in British society –

were less likely to report identifying with a sense of Britishness than others (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010).

In this paper we seek to investigate whether the proportions of people reporting a sense of belonging to Britain changed in the ten years following this first study and to examine in more detail influences on this sense of belonging. It could be hypothesised that the tension inherent in the current situation may encourage many Muslims to draw greater distinction between themselves and any Britishness than those involved in the earlier study. However, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue that, in fact, the current political mobilisation of young Pakistani Muslims in Britain is in response to their awareness that their social and economic exclusion and negative treatment violates their rights as British citizens, rather than a result of their links with a ‘fanatical’ Islam:

For the younger generation, their British citizenship is central to their self-understandings and assertions of who they are … They are expressing and defending a British multicultural, multi-ethnic citizenship identity. (Hussain and Bagguley 2005:411, authors’ italics).

Similarly, the ‘Britishness’ of Geaves’ group of young Bangladeshi women “rose to the fore only in the context of their feeling that their nation of birth provided them with a right to be Muslims and publicly express their democratic right to oppose government policy” (Geaves 2005:75).

The starting point for this work is necessarily that the relationships between respondents and their Britishness (and therefore the meaning of that Britishness) varies. We do not, therefore, assume a particular definition of Britishness to which all respondents subscribe, although this work does require that respondents recognise that ‘Britishness’ is a form of identity accessible to some people. Indeed, part of the value of the paper lies in its ability to examine and explicitly identify particular dimensions of minoritised ethnic/religious group membership that are influential in the context of recognition of this Britishness, using a set of quantitatively-identifiable indicators drawn from wider quantitative and qualitative literature describing processes of ethnic and other identity construction. Importantly, this enables us to explore heterogeneity in the broad ethnic/religious
categories we study, rather than homogenising them, enabling us to see beyond the boundaries of broad essentialising ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ categories. This work does not assume that ethnic/religious variations exist, nor that any that do are driven by factors that might be considered inherently ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’. While we recognise that the meaning of any British, or other, social identity – and indeed several of the other terms used in the questions which form the focus of these analyses – will vary across individuals and groups, the focus of this work is on people’s ability to claim a Britishness, and what influences this. Importantly, this work does not adopt a ‘Moreno’-style approach, which could be considered to pit one identity against another (Bechhofer and McCrone 2010, Moreno 2006). There is no requirement, therefore, for an individual’s ‘British’ affiliations (as far as they may exist) to be at the expense of any other.
Methods

This paper explores influences on thinking of yourself as ‘British’ and attitudes towards cultural integration among people with different ethnicities and religions in England and Wales. It involves secondary analysis of quantitative data collected using face-to-face interviews, as part of the 2008/2009 Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS) (Lloyd 2010). The HOCS survey consists of a core sample of 10,000 adults living in England and Wales and a boosted sample of 4,000 people with ethnic minority backgrounds and is designed to be representative of the wider population living in England and Wales at that time. Multistage probability sampling is used to select for inclusion: primary sampling units (PSUs), addresses, up to three households per address and one adult (aged 16 or older) per household. Census Area Statistics wards were used as PSUs. For the core sample, 663 PSUs were randomly selected and stratified by: government office regions; the proportion of the population from each ethnic minority group; and households headed by people in non-manual and manual occupations and those including unemployed males. For the ethnic minority boost sample, 699 PSUs were randomly selected for screening. These included the same high and medium ethnic density PSUs as for the core sample, plus an additional 150 PSUs of high ethnic density. If any household member at a screened address was from an ethnic minority group, one was randomly selected for inclusion. Data are weighted to allow for the complex sampling strategy employed.

The unweighted samples for these analyses are: Caribbean (N=888), African (N=816) and Asian Christian (N=212); Indian Hindu (N=794); Indian Sikh (N=339); Indian (N=254), Pakistani (N=968), Bangladeshi (N=345) and African Muslim (N=204). 41% (87) of people in the Asian Christian group described themselves as having ‘Indian’ ethnicity, 38% (81) described themselves as have an ‘other Asian or Asian British background’, 18% (38) had a mixed white and Asian ethnic background and 3% (6) reported a Pakistani ethnicity. There were too few respondents with no religious affiliation for this group to be included. Place of birth information has been
dichotomised to reflect those born in the UK and those not. Economic activity is classified: ‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, ‘unemployed due to sickness’, ‘retired’ and ‘looking after the home’.

Respondents were asked whether they felt they would experience discrimination in their interactions with 16 organisations associated with the provision of services relating to health (a local doctors’ surgery, a local hospital, the health service in general), housing (a council housing department or housing association, a private landlord), education (a local school, the education system in general), criminal justice (the magistrates or crown courts, the crown prosecution service, the local police, the police in general, the prison service and the probation service), a local council and immigration authorities. Between 24% and 36% of people in these ethnic/religious groups reported a sense of risk of being treated worse than people of other races by at least one institution.

Analysis

We conducted multivariate analyses to investigate the impact of ethnicity/religion, age, gender, place of birth and different markers of social and economic exclusion on whether respondents said they ‘very strongly belong to Britain’ and whether they strongly agreed that:

- I personally feel a part of British society
- It is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity

Logistic regression analyses were used to investigate associations between the likelihood of giving a positive response to the different indicators of Britishness and age, gender, ethnic/religious group, economic activity, place of birth and perceived risk of institutional racism. This method calculates the risk of a positive response associated with each outcome category for each measure, after taking account of the effects associated with the other variables included in the model. The findings are presented in table 2, using odds ratios. For each variable, the odds of each category are calculated relative to those of a ‘comparison’ category, whose risk is set at 1.00, with the exception of the measure of age where, as a continuous variable, the odds refer to the risk associated with
being a particular age compared with those a year younger. The comparison category can be identified in table 2.

Additional analyses were conducted to explore variations between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. This approach involved repeating the logistic regression analyses twice: once (only) on the sample defining themselves as Muslim (regardless of ethnic background) and again for those who did not. The ethnicity/religion variable was not included in these models. Additional analyses were also conducted to explore the impact of household income (rather than economic activity) and alternative indicators of experience or perceptions of risk of racist victimisation.

The statistically significant nature of each variation is established using the 95% confidence interval, presented in table 2 in brackets after each odds ratio, which allows for the sampling effects operating on the analysis. Assuming a normally distributed sample, we can assume that 95% of the population would have odds within the range provided by the confidence interval. A statistically significant variation is one where the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval do not incorporate 1.00 (and therefore do not include the odds of the comparison category). These models only include those who responded to each of the questions included. The slight variation in the bases – the number of people included in each analysis – is explained by variations in the numbers of people answering the questions on aspects of British identity.
Findings

Table 1 shows the distribution of the variables included in the logistic regression models, by ethnic/religious group. Only a small minority of respondents did not agree with the statements exploring feeling part of Britain, having a very strong sense of belonging to Britain and the compatibility of this Britishness with other cultural or religious identities (table 1). Fewer than one in eight respondents in each of the ethnic/religious groups explored tended to, or strongly, disagree(d) with the statement that they personally felt part of Britain, and between four and zero per cent strongly disagreed in each ethnic/religious group. Similarly, between five and zero per cent of respondents in each ethnic/religious group reported that they felt they did ‘not at all strongly’ belong to Britain. 18% of Asian Christians, 16% of African Christians and 11% or fewer respondents in the other ethnic/religious groups explored said they felt they belonged to Britain, but ‘not very strongly’. 12% of Bangladeshi Muslims, 11% of Caribbean Christians, 7% of African Christians and three per cent of or fewer respondents in other groups strongly disagreed that it was possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity. 21% of Caribbean Christians, 14% of Asian Christians, 12% of Bangladeshi and African Muslims, 11% of Indian Hindus and fewer than one in ten Pakistani and Indian Muslims and Indian Sikhs ‘tended to disagree’ with this statement.

Table 2 shows results from the logistic regression models predicting responses to the three outcomes and enables us to identify the effects of specific variables after adjusting for the effects of the other variables included in the models. Once the effects of age, gender, generation, economic activity and perceived risk of institutional discrimination had been taken into account, Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims were significantly more likely to strongly agree that they personally felt part of Britain than Caribbean Christians, with odds ratios of 1.72 and 1.33 respectively, and confidence intervals which did not include 1.00. There were no statistically significant variations between Caribbean Christians and any of the other ethnic/religious groups included, in terms of their likelihood of agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain. However, the odds of Indian
Muslims agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain was the same as that for Pakistani Muslims, suggesting that it was the small numbers of Indian Muslims in the sample which prevented this variation reaching statistical significance.

Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims were also significantly more likely than Caribbean Christians to feel that they very strongly belonged to Britain (with odds ratios of 1.72 and 1.57 respectively and confidence intervals which did not include 1.00). There were no statistically significant differences in responses to this statement between Caribbean Christians and any of the other ethnic/religious groups included after adjusting for variations in age, gender, generation, economic activity and perceived risk of institutional discrimination between the groups, although, again, additional sample power may have revealed significant variations between Indian Muslim and Sikh, and Caribbean Christian, respondents. African Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Indian and African Muslims were all significantly more likely than Caribbean Christians to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity. Indian Muslims were 3.5 times (Odds Ratios (OR) 3.53: 95% confidence interval (CI) 2.36-5.26) and Pakistani Muslims were 2.5 times (OR 2.57: 95% CI 1.96-3.37) as likely as Caribbean Christians to strongly agree with this statement.

Older people were significantly more likely to report that they very strongly belonged to Britain and to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity than younger people. The lower limit of the confidence interval for agreeing that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity is 1.00, however, indicating that the variation in the odds between consecutive ages has borderline statistical significance, but that the small number of people at any particular age prevents these variations reaching statistical significance. Additional analysis suggested this variation was driven by variations in the attitudes of older and younger Muslims. While older Muslims were significantly more likely than younger Muslims to report that they strongly belonged to Britain (OR 1.05: 95% CI 1.01-1.10) and to agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain
separate cultural and religious identities (OR 1.06: 95% CI 1.01-1.11), the association for non-Muslim groups was not significant (OR 1.01: 95% CI 0.97-1.04 and OR 1.03: 95% CI 0.99-1.07, respectively.) Women were less likely to strongly feel part of Britain than men (OR 0.80: 95% CI 0.68-0.94). This variation was significant for both Muslim (OR 0.75, 95% CI 0.57-1.00) and non-Muslim (OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.66-0.97) groups.

There was some variation in economic activity/inactivity by ethnic/religious group (table 1). However, these did not translate into statistically significant variation in response to any of the ‘Britishness’ measures examined between people in different forms of economic inactivity and those who were employed (table 2). We also investigated the effects of respondent income on these associations (details not shown). Models identified no significant income effect on any of the indicators of Britishness explored here. Those who were unemployed due to sickness were more likely to strongly agree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity compared with those who were employed (OR 1.42: 95% CI 1.01-1.99).

Fewer than half (47%) of Caribbean Christians had not been born in the UK, compared with 56% of Indian Sikhs, 60% of Pakistani Muslims, 74% of Indian Muslims, 75% of Bangladeshi Muslims, 76% of Indian Hindus, 81% of African Christians, 84% of Asian Christians and 91% of African Muslims (table 1). The odds (and confidence intervals) of strongly agreeing both that they personally felt part of Britain (OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.66,0.96) and that they very strongly belonged to Britain (OR 0.75, 95% CI 0.62,0.91) were below 1.00 for those not born in the UK, indicating that they were significantly less likely to agree with these statements, compared with those who had been born in the UK (table 2). The confidence interval for the variation in the likelihood of strongly agreeing that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity between those born in or outside of the UK did include 1.00, however, and therefore this variation is not statistically significant. But, additional analysis indicated an overlap between the effects of age and generation in this model. The odds of strongly agreeing that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity were significantly higher
among those not born in the UK (OR 1.23: 95% CI 1.02, 1.48) compared with those who were, when age was excluded from the model. The effects on age of excluding country of birth from this model were marginal (OR 1.03: 95% CI 1.00-1.05). Further analysis also suggested that the impact of place of birth on these markers varied between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Among those who were born outside of the UK, non-Muslim were:

- significantly less likely to personally feel part of Britain (Non-Muslim OR 0.70: 95% CI 0.56-0.88; Muslim OR 0.89: 95% CI 0.66-1.21); and
- significantly more likely to report that it is possible to belong to Britain and maintain separate cultural and religious identities (Non-Muslim OR 1.33: 95% CI 1.05-1.68; Muslim OR 0.94: 95% CI 0.69-1.28) than Muslims.

Non-Muslims born outside of the UK were also significantly less likely to feel that they strongly belonged to Britain than Muslims born outside of the UK (Non-Muslim OR 0.73: 95% CI 0.58-0.91; Muslim OR 0.77: 95% CI 0.57-1.04). However, the similarity in the odd ratios between these groups suggest that the lack of significance amongst the Muslim groups may be driven by small numbers of people in this group, rather than real differences between these Muslim and non-Muslim populations.

Almost half (49%) of Caribbean Christians reported perceiving themselves to be at risk of institutional racism, compared with 40% of African Christians, between 32% and 35% of Muslims, and between 24% and 29% of Indian Hindus, Indian Sikhs and Asian Christians (table 1). Those who perceived themselves to be at risk of institutional discrimination were significantly less likely to strongly agree that they personally felt part of Britain (OR 0.63: 95% CI 0.53,0.74) and that they very strongly belonged to Britain (OR 0.58: 95% CI 0.49,0.68), compared with those who did not (table 2). There was no significant variation between those who did or did not perceive a risk of institutional discrimination in terms of the likelihood of them strongly agreeing that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity, as the confidence interval includes 1.00 (OR 0.90: 95% CI 0.76-1.07). We also investigated the effects of additional
measures of victimisation on these associations. Responses to a question asking whether respondents had experienced verbal harassment and threats, physical attacks or property damage ‘because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion in the last two years’ also had no significant association with any of the indicators of Britishness explored here. However, those reporting racism to be a ‘very or fairly big’ problem in their local area were significantly less likely to report feeling that they very strongly belonged to Britain (OR 0.66: 95% CI 0.54,0.82) compared with those who did not.
Discussion

The paper seeks to explore whether there are variations in levels of ‘Britishness’ and perceptions of the compatibility between Britishness and other cultural/religious identities among different minoritised groups, and statistical ‘explanations’ for these, and offers novel insight into the drivers of variations in these sentiments. It examines the impact of racism and other forms of social and economic exclusion on ideas of Britishness, focussing on similarities and differences in a sense of access to forms of Britishness among groups that have what would appear to be similar relationships to their country of residence.

This work suggests that there are, indeed, differences in the attitudes of people with different ethnicities and religions towards their lives in Britain. However, the picture we present contrasts sharply with that painted by current media and policy debates in the UK, Europe and elsewhere. Rather than exposing Muslim communities in Britain as a hotbed of anti-British radicalism and separatism, this work shows that not only do a large majority of people from the minority groups explored consider themselves part of Britain – with almost everyone in each of the ethnic/religious groups explored agreeing that they personally felt part of Britain – this sense of belonging is stronger among some Muslim groups than those with other religious backgrounds. Such findings expose the straw men manufactured by Governments and policy commentators to justify related policies and the impact such policies have had on the lives of Muslim populations in the UK and elsewhere.

Moreover, many Muslims, and those with other minority ethnicities and religions, do not see a contradiction between being British and maintaining a separate cultural or religious identity. These findings are supported by other work which has identified a positive association between Muslim affiliation and positive national identities (Thomas and Sanderson 2011) and also between British identification and higher religiosity (Güveli and Platt 2011, Foner and Alba 2008, Manning and Roy 2010). Indeed, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue that the young Muslims interviewed in their study used a concept of British national identity to expressly accommodate a potential for
multiple identities as a form of hybridised ethnic and religious expression, which enabled the juxtaposition of strong identities as British citizens and the celebration of ethnic, cultural and religious difference. Our findings therefore contradict the belief held more widely in Britain, and elsewhere, that religious, especially Islamic, traditions are necessarily anti-British, such that greater integration can only be achieved with the loss of minority traditions (Dunn et al 2007; Khiabany and Williamson 2008; Miles and Brown 2003; Richardson 2004). The potential for hybridisation and flexibility that is present in these forms of Britishness (a potential which is not similarly perceived in ‘Englishness’ by the way (Thomas and Sanderson 2011)) may not be recognised in the rebranded ‘Britishness’ that has been the focus of Government rhetoric more recently (Cameron 2011, DCLG 2012, Parekh 2006).

The “politicization of Muslim disloyalty” (McGhee 2008:30), described earlier, does not then appear to have impacted significantly on the attitudes of Muslims in Britain towards their sense of Britishness. They are not less likely to report feeling ‘British’ than those with other religions, nor compared with British Muslims surveyed by us in 2000/early 2001. Then 75% of Indian, 71% of Bangladeshi and 70% of Pakistani Muslims and 65% of Hindus and Sikhs said that they felt themselves to be in some way British (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010). Over 80% of respondents in these groups also felt it important that their cultural way of life be preserved. While Bangladeshi Muslims and Indian Sikhs in 2000/01 were less likely than Caribbean Christians to think of themselves as British, this was explained by generational variations between the groups. If anything, this sense of being part of Britain appears to have strengthened since this time: with around 90% of people in different Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Christian groups reporting feeling part of Britain and at least 78% reporting this sense of belonging to be fairly or very strong. The strong sense of the compatibility between religious/cultural identities reflecting heritage and British identities also persists.

These findings support other work that highlights the importance of considering the heterogeneity underlying ‘ethnic’ background (Brown 2000), and the need to avoid assumptions regarding the
suitability of ‘ethnicity’ as an adequate proxy for socio-demographic, socioeconomic, religious and other influences on individual lives. It is unclear why on average women may not feel part of Britain as strongly as men. It could be argued that the lower rates of economic activity (and greater likelihood of ‘looking after the home’) among women in certain ethnic/religious groups may act to prevent a sense of inclusion in British society, particularly if combined with ethnically/religiously specific residence patterns. However, the models control for this, and additional analyses suggested that despite particularly high rates of non-employment among Muslim women, this variation is significant for both non-Muslim and Muslim groups, which does not support such assertions. Instead it is worth considering the particular positions in which societal perceptions of ethnic and religious minorities place women, where they are cast as the living embodiment of the peculiarities and pathologies of their ‘group’: for example, as Black Caribbean lone mothers, the Asian/Muslim hijab-wearing helpless victims of forced marriage, domestic violence and repression (Brah 1992, Rattansi 1992, Ray 2005), or, perhaps, stubborn cultural outsiders (Meer et al 2010, Ryan 2012), or African victims of female genital mutilation. While research has exposed the varying political motives underlying, for example, hijab wearing/non-wearing, it also describes the on-going justification these decisions require (see, for example, Ryan 2012). Definitional flexibility and consequent access to a claim to Britishness may be particularly problematic for those considered, and reacted to as, representatives of particular minoritised identities, where women and their behaviour become ‘policed’ as symbolic boundary markers of ethnic, racial or religious collectivities (see e.g. Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, SBS 1990, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992, Ray 2005).

Once country of birth had been accounted for, older people were more likely to consider themselves to very strongly belong to Britain, and that Britishness could be compatible with other cultural and religious identities. Additional analyses of the data used here suggested that the significant relationships between age and indicators of Britishness were apparent only among Muslim groups. This shift may highlight the particular impact that exclusionary dialogues and actions have had on younger people, and draws attention to the implications of the specific gaze
that has focused on young Muslims more recently (Alexander 2004; Hussain and Bagguley 2005; McGhee 2008). This finding is also supported by work, based on the 2003 HOCS, which suggests that there has been a growth in the number of young people who identify as Muslim who do not have practising Muslim family backgrounds (Scourfield et al 2012) and may reflect the role of religion as a focus for political organisation among the socially and economically excluded.

Place of birth had a significant influence on perceived access to British identities in our analysis of 2000/2001 data and remains so here. But, in contrast to other work (Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013), additional analyses suggested that for some indicators these associations varied between Muslims and non-Muslim groups, with non-Muslims born outside of the UK less likely to personally feel part of Britain and more likely to report the potential for a sense of British belonging to coexist alongside other cultural and religious identities. These findings might support a simple integration hypothesis, whereby longer residence encourages higher levels of positive national identification (Manning and Roy 2010). It may also be tied to the opportunities offered, for some, by citizenship (Karlsen and Nazroo 2013). A European birthplace may enable those with minority religions and ethnicities to distance themselves from their (geographically defined) ‘ethnic’ identities and assert their right to British (and other European) labels (Jacobson 1992, Parekh 2006). One explanation for any Muslim/non-Muslim variation in the findings may be that Muslims do not perceive birthplace as producing the same restrictions on social integration, as a consequence of a perception of their place in a global Muslim community, or Ummah. Interestingly, given the rhetoric which singles Muslims out as particularly insular, such explanations could suggest that Muslim identities may be considered as integrating rather than excluding, and more so than non-Muslim ones. Alternatively, it may be that the access to British identities offered by a British birthplace to non-Muslim groups is not similarly conveyed to Muslims, as suggested above.

We have also explored whether markers of different aspects of racist victimisation – to the extent that they may be disentangled – may vary in their impact on a sense of Britishness. Perceptions of
institutional racism and of the scale of victimisation in the local area had a strong and significant
association with a sense of Britishness, although reported recent, direct and personal experience of
racist verbal or physical assault did not. Discrimination has been shown to occur in almost every
facet of public and private life – from the ‘daily hassles’ experienced when going about one’s
normal life to major events, such as being the victim of a racist, or religiously motivated, physical
attack (Williams et al 2003, Karlsen and Nazroo 2006, 2014). Importantly, studies have also
suggested that racism need not be experienced personally for it to produce a sense of threat,
interpersonal incidents being viewed as “an attack on the community as a whole” (Virdee
1995:284) and that such a sense of fear impacts on wellbeing (Karlsen and Nazroo 2004). The
significance of perceptions of institutional racism in these models speaks to the importance of
including more general measures in investigations of national, ethnic and religious identity. These
findings support other empirical evidence identifying the impact of racist victimisation on a sense
of positive attachment to British identity (Maxwell 2009) and other national European identities
(Karlsen and Nazroo 2013) and offer a notable addition to the evidence exploring the impact that
racist victimisation has on people’s lives, and sense of who they are (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002;

It is important to recognise that the HOCS is a policy survey, and designed in an attempt to
contribute to particular political debates. One of the many strengths of the survey is in its non-
prescriptive approach, which offers to respondents an undefined notion of ‘Britishness’ that they
can interpret however they choose. The question regarding the perceived compatibility of
Britishness and other cultural or religious identities, for example, is posed in the abstract. It does
not ask respondents about their personal position, nor of the inter-relationships between their own
particular social identities, but whether they can perceive a potential for Britishness to conflict with
other cultural and religious identities. It is this flexibility that makes this analysis valuable,
interesting, and even possible. However, with these data we cannot directly interrogate the ways in
which people construct and use British, and other, identities and how this varies across (sub-
)groups and contexts.
Importantly, we explore similarities and differences in a sense of access to forms of Britishness among groups with (what would on the surface appear to be) similar relationships to their country of residence. This offers novel insight into the drivers of variations in these sentiments, recognising that “what it means to be British for a White person may be radically different from the ‘Britishness’ experienced by someone who belongs to a minority group” (Hussain and Bagguley 2005:415). This sample offers us the opportunity to explore both religious commonalities and differences within ethnicities and ethnic commonalities, and differences within religions, examining Caribbean, African and Asian Christians, Indian Hindus, Indian Sikhs, and Muslims with African, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani heritage and moving us towards an improved understanding of the position and attitudes of different ethnic and religious groups in Britain. It also allows us to identify commonalities in the impact of experiences of social and economic exclusion and migration effects across these ethnic/religious categories.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify explicitly the drivers of any ethnic/religious difference in attitudes to Britishness: such as whether any reduced sense of Britishness among Muslims in England, for example, is caused by the cultural separation that concerns our politicians/media, or by political/media reactions to these concerns. But a key finding of this work, which supports other work in this limited area (Nandi and Platt 2013, Jivraj 2013, Heath and Demireva 2014), is a lack of the ethnic/religious difference assumed by these debates. We can only explore the presence of statistical associations between the particular measures included in the analysis, and cannot state definitively from this the processes underpinning the associations we find. But we are able to provide conclusive empirical evidence that contradicts the discourses which deny the potential compatibility between different cultural/religious identities and Britishness and that shows the impact of forms of social exclusion on access to a British identity. As well as making a novel contribution to this limited field, the value offered by this quantitative nationally-representative data lies in its ability to identify the extent to which this work might be generalised to different ethnic/religious groups in Britain. These findings suggest that these
relationships are robust, and offer the best hope of effectively refuting the position taken by Cameron (2011) and others that Britishness is not a consideration for Muslims, and that poverty and social exclusion can be considered unrelated to considerations of Britishness among people with ethnic/religious minority backgrounds.

Conclusion

The strong sense of affiliation to Britain that was present among people with different ethnicities and religions in 2000/early 2001 remains evident in 2008/2009. It therefore appears that this sense of belonging has not been detrimentally affected by the terrorist incidents occurring since 2001 and the responses to them. However, the next ten years may be crucial in shaping alienation from a British identity. Indeed, we show that the marginalisation faced by some groups, identified here as different forms of racially and religiously motivated victimisation, has a significant association with their ability to access a sense of Britishness and the potential for this Britishness to be maintained alongside other ethnic/cultural/religious. Rather than focussing on possible negative consequences of the maintenance of cultural traditions for social integration, we should be more mindful of the effects of this marginalisation on our local communities. Recent UK government documents appear to be beginning to recognise the need to respond to these effects, though still without taking responsibility for the role of government in the generation of these circumstances (DCLG 2012). It will be interesting to see whether these good intentions go far enough to make a difference.
Bibliography


Cameron, D., (2009), *David Cameron MP: Proud to be British*  


Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), (2012), *Creating the conditions for integration* London: DCLG.


Acknowledgements:

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Table I: Differences in the attitudes towards being ‘British’ and cultural integration among those with different ethnic and religious affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>African</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Christian</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
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To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of Britain?

<table>
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<th>African</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>African</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Tend to disagree</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td><strong>803</strong></td>
<td><strong>211</strong></td>
<td><strong>779</strong></td>
<td><strong>337</strong></td>
<td><strong>251</strong></td>
<td><strong>955</strong></td>
<td><strong>339</strong></td>
<td>195</td>
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</table>

How strongly do you belong to Britain?

<table>
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<th>Asian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>African</th>
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<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>Not very strongly</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Not at all strongly</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unweighted bases</strong></td>
<td><strong>874</strong></td>
<td><strong>809</strong></td>
<td><strong>211</strong></td>
<td><strong>788</strong></td>
<td><strong>337</strong></td>
<td><strong>252</strong></td>
<td><strong>961</strong></td>
<td><strong>345</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To what extent do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>African</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tend to agree</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td><strong>Unweighted bases</strong></td>
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<td><strong>752</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>238</strong></td>
<td><strong>934</strong></td>
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<td>39.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Unweighted bases</em></td>
<td>888</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>345</td>
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**Gender:**

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 3    | 49    | 29   | 24   | 27   | 33    | 33   | 33   | 35   |

**Unweighted bases**

|        | 888  | 816  | 212  | 793  | 339  | 254  | 968  | 345  | 204  |

**Economic activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Unemployed</th>
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<th>Retired</th>
<th>Looking after home</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 883       | 812        | 212  | 793  | 338  | 254  | 964  | 344  | 204  |

**Not born in UK**

|        | 47        | 84         | 76   | 56   | 74   | 60   | 75   | 91   | 202  |

**Unweighted bases**

|        | 885       | 812        | 212  | 794  | 339  | 254  | 967  | 345  | 204  |

Believes they would be the victim of institutional racism

|        | 49        | 40         | 29   | 24   | 27   | 33   | 33   | 35   |

**Unweighted bases**

|        | 888       | 816        | 212  | 794  | 339  | 254  | 968  | 345  | 204  |
Table II: The impact of socio-demographic, socioeconomic and migration characteristics and racist victimisation on the odds of thinking of yourself as British, and your attitudes towards cultural integration among those with different ethnicities and religions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agrees that they feel part of Britain</th>
<th>Feels that they very strongly belong to Britain</th>
<th>Strongly agrees that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.02 (0.99,1.04)</td>
<td>1.04 (1.01,1.06)</td>
<td>1.02 (1.00,1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.80 (0.68,0.94)</td>
<td>0.96 (0.82,1.13)</td>
<td>1.05 (0.89,1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic/religious group:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Christian</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian</td>
<td>0.92 (0.69,1.21)</td>
<td>1.20 (0.90,1.60)</td>
<td>1.44 (1.07,1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Christian</td>
<td>1.02 (0.70,1.49)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.61,1.32)</td>
<td>1.31 (0.87,1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>1.06 (0.91,1.38)</td>
<td>1.03 (0.79,1.34)</td>
<td>1.86 (1.40,2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>1.22 (0.88,1.70)</td>
<td>1.32 (0.95,1.84)</td>
<td>1.69 (1.18,2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Muslim</td>
<td>1.33 (0.91,1.94)</td>
<td>1.31 (0.89,1.92)</td>
<td>3.53 (2.36,5.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi Muslim</td>
<td>1.72 (1.23,2.40)</td>
<td>1.77 (1.26,2.47)</td>
<td>1.72 (1.19,2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Muslim</td>
<td>1.33 (1.04,1.72)</td>
<td>1.57 (1.22,2.03)</td>
<td>2.57 (1.96,3.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Muslim</td>
<td>0.82 (0.53,1.27)</td>
<td>0.89 (0.57,1.38)</td>
<td>1.93 (1.25,2.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic activity:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.98 (0.74,1.29)</td>
<td>1.15 (0.88,1.49)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.73,1.32)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.04 (0.74,1.46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>1.00 (0.68,1.49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Looking after home</td>
<td>0.89 (0.70,1.13)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.79,1.27)</td>
<td>0.97 (0.77,1.23)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Believes they would be the victim of institutional racism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.63 (0.53,0.74)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.49,0.68)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.76,1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unweighted bases*

|     | 4716            | 4750            | 4576            |