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PART I
POST-EFA DISCOURSE IN THE
HISTORICAL, STRUCTURAL,
NORMATIVE, AND
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS
EDUCATION FOR ALL AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE: ISSUES AND TENSIONS

Leon Tikly

ABSTRACT

The chapter traces the genealogy of the Education for All (EFA) Movement understood as a global regime of educational governance between 1990 and 2005. The chapter sets out the achievements of EFA including some success in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals. It will also discuss the key tensions related to the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA; tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and the issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; and the associated tensions between more economistic and rights-based views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be understood in relation to different kinds of power linked to the international political economy and to the impact of other global regimes.
INTRODUCTION

The aim in this chapter is to provide an understanding of Education for All (EFA) as an evolving global regime of educational governance. The chapter will outline key historical events in the period between 1990 and 2005 that have been the key in shaping EFA as a movement. It is hoped that such an analysis will provide a useful context for considering other contributions to this volume that deal with more recent developments in EFA in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development agenda. In developing understanding the chapter will set out the achievements of EFA including the extent to which it has proved successful in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals as well as on the identification of key tensions. These include the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA both in terms of its governance and its underlying norms and values; tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; associated tensions between more economistic and rights-based views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be seen in relation to the exercise of different kinds of power linked to the broader international political economy as well as to the relationship between EFA and other global regimes. The chapter will commence by presenting a conceptual framework for understanding EFA as a global regime of educational governance and in relation to different forms of power. This will provide a basis for a discussion of key events in the development of EFA through which key issues and tensions will be traced.

UNDERSTANDING EFA ARCHITECTURE AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE

In seeking to explain the development of EFA the chapter will build on recent work on global governance in the field of international relations (e.g. Barnett & Duvall, 2014; Digwerth & Pattberg, 2006; Mosse, 2005; Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013; Ruggie, 2014) including a more specialised literature that has sought to apply the concept to education (e.g. Jones, 2005; Mundy & Manion, 2014; Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Mundy & Verger, 2015).
In an oft-quoted passage, the UN-endorsed report on global governance provided the following definition:

Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have either agreed to or perceive to be in their interests .... At a global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental organisations, citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are the global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence. (Commission for Global Governance, 1995 in Mundy & Manion, 2014, p. 41)

The idea of global governance has emerged relatively recently as an alternative to the previous, state-centred way of understanding how global issues such as EFA are governed. Mundy and Manion (2014) explain the emergence of the concept in relation to three phenomena that are deeply implicated in the emergence of the EFA architecture. Firstly, the end of the cold war signalled a shift from bilateral to multilateral support for education and other areas of donor assistance. Secondly, the development of contemporary globalisation which has been associated with the opening up of national boundaries, and the strengthening of regional and multilateral institutions that although influenced by national governments (and in particular powerful national governments and alliances of governments) operate with a degree of relative autonomy. Thirdly, as careful scholarship has shown (e.g. Jones, 2006; Jones & Coleman, 2005; Mundy & Verger, 2015), global issues such as EFA are shaped by tensions and contradictions linked to the peculiarities of organisational structure, purpose, norms and values of these institutions as much as they are by overt national or global interests. Important for our discussion, global governance understood in these terms is contested in that the effects of global flows and networks are mediated and modified at the regional and local levels. Significant here has been the emergence of a global civil society that has at times challenged and modified dominant global agendas, and this has had implications for the way that EFA has been shaped (see also, Tikly, 2001).

At a theoretical level the end of the cold war and the deepening of globalisation processes have increasingly been explained in terms of constructivist theories of international relations in which shared normative and ideational structures and processes – of which EFA is an example – are seen as influencing the actions of actors at different levels including national governments. Extending the above, EFA can best be understood
as an educational example of a ‘governance regime’. Regimes are commonly defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 29). In this sense EFA has involved the convergence of key governmental and non-governmental institutions at the global, regional and national levels around a distinct series of international agreements, framework documents, protocols and reports as will be discussed. Significantly, as Mundy and Manion (2014) explain, EFA has emerged from previous education and development regimes (below). It is also the case that EFA sits alongside other regimes. Of significance here, for example, is the regime around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); around international assessments and educational policy development clustered around the OECD, which continues to have an impact on EFA thinking; regimes concerned with aid effectiveness and regimes in other sectors that have influenced the EFA agenda such as those around the global campaign against HIV/AIDS and those concerning the regulation of global markets. We will return to a consideration of the implications of this in the discussion below.

The work of the international relations theorists (Barnett & Duvall, 2014) has been found particularly valuable in understanding the tensions at the heart of EFA. These scholars argue that much work on global governance has not included a sustained consideration of power and that ‘this is paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked. Governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power. To account for how global activities are guided and how world orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the workings of power’ (p. 2).

The authors define power as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (p. 3). They distinguish between different kinds of power that operate within the sphere of international relations. They are each relatively autonomous, linked to different global structures and causal mechanisms with different loci and have causes and effects at different levels and scales. They define compulsory power as comprising the relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another. In the context of the present discussion this is most obvious that it will be argued in the conditionalities that have been attached to aid.

A second type of power is institutional in which states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to
the disadvantage of others. In relation to the development of EFA it is manifested in the historical dominance of the interests of powerful, Western nations in the governance structures of global financial institutions such as the World Bank (e.g. Jones, 2005, 2006). Similarly, the OECD which has been influential, as we will see in the development of EFA discourse, is made up of an exclusive club of highly industrialised countries. EFA discourses, it will be suggested, are also the outcome of contestation between different institutions and between multilateral organisations and global civil society each wielding different amounts of institutional power.

Barnett and Duval also identify structural power, which concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the working of the global capitalist economy, in producing unequal social relations of production between capital and labour. Class relationships of dominance and subordination in international relationships also intersect in complex ways with those of gender and race (Rupert, 2014). Although less obvious to observe empirically in relation to the development of EFA, an understanding of structural power is nonetheless fundamental for understanding the wider political global economy against which the development of EFA must be understood. Although a detailed discussion of the nature of structural power is beyond the scope of the present chapter, reference will be made to deeper analyses of the relationship between education and the global political economy that have been undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g. Robertson et al., 2007; Tikly, 2003, 2004).

Finally, productive power is the socially diffused production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification including the way that ‘development’ itself is defined and understood. As with structural power the workings of productive power are less obvious than those of compulsory and institutional power but no less important than other kinds of power for understanding how the identities of different actors are constituted and the policies of different institutions are discursively framed. In the sections below, it will be argued that the underlying view of education and development informing EFA has been informed by dominant economistic discourses on the one hand and by rights-based discourses on the other.

Importantly for our analysis the different forms of power do not operate in isolation from each other but interact. Thus, for example, the ability for governments or groups of governments to exercise compulsory power over other governments relies on the extent of institutional power within institutions that preside over global governance regimes and indeed to the relative power exercised by competing institutions in the context of specific
Institutional power is in turn linked to how ruling coalitions within national governments are positioned in relation to global markets. Productive power can be seen to operate in and through different ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) clustered around different disciplinary understandings of education and development that can inform the workings and programmes of different institutions sometimes in contradictory ways.

THE GENEALOGY OF EFA AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The focus of this section is on tracing the genealogy of EFA as a regime of global governance. The section will be organised around discussion of key events including the Jomtien and Dakar conferences on EFA in the so-called decade of conferences which set out the vision of EFA in a series of principles; the DAC/OECD framework and millennium summit which endorsed the use of time-bound targets as a means for holding governments and donors to account for delivering on EFA; the Fast Track Initiative (later to evolve into a Global Partnership for Education) which provided a mechanism for donors to pool resources around key EFA priorities and the Rome and Paris Declarations and protocols which set out a series of principles relating to aid effectiveness. A rich literature describing the key moments in the emergence of the EFA architecture already exists and has been useful for the present discussion. The aim here is not to repeat this rich history in detail. Rather, as suggested in the introduction it is to identify key tensions that have characterised EFA and to relate these to a consideration of the influence of different kinds of power.

Before proceeding to a discussion of events pivotal to the development of EFA it is important to provide some historical context. As many commentators have pointed out, EFA needs to be seen against the backdrop of the wider shift in development thinking between the so-called Washington and post-Washington consensuses. The emergence of EFA needs to be set against the crisis of the so-called Washington consensus and the emergence of the post-Washington consensus. Much has been written about this shift (see e.g. Robertson et al., 2007). The Washington consensus can be seen as a response to the global economic crisis of the 1970s and was influenced by the spread of neo-liberal thinking linked to the rise of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States. At the heart of neoliberalism is the idea of rolling back the state, increasing
the role for the private sector and liberalising trade. More specifically, and in relation to the low-income world, the Washington consensus was linked to the introduction of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) by the World Bank and IMF. SAPS linked lending to low-income countries to conditionalities. In Barnett and Duvall's (2014) terms this equates to the use of compulsory power by the international financial institutions to impose aid conditionalities on low-income countries. In public services including health and education these conditionalities generally amounted to the introduction of user fees, privatisation and decentralisation. The underlying rationale was that these measures would make services more accountable to the public and drive up the quality of services through encouraging diversification and competition between service providers. However, SAPS had disastrous consequences for the poor (Samoff, 1994). The introduction of user fees, for example, led to a decline in enrolments in many low-income countries. As some commentators have argued, the growth in the overall levels of poverty and inequality associated with the imposition of SAPs can be seen as an expression of structural power in the global economy as these policies were seen to work in the interests of global and national elites rather than those of the poor (see Tikly, 2003, p. 4; Robertson et al., 2007; Rupert, 2014).

The period also saw a realignment in the balance of institutional power linked to growing criticisms of the World Bank/IMF Washington Consensus reforms from a variety of sources from the United Nations institutions to civil society organisations and NGOs in the global North and South (Cornia, 2001; Walton & Seddon, 1994). Some of these tensions have their roots in historical differences between a more economist approach to development embraced by the international financial institutions on the one hand and the more rights-based approach adopted by the UN agencies and many NGOs on the other hand. There was also a mounting evidence from cross-national studies as to the failure of SAPs to address poverty. It was argued that structural adjustment polices were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion and to provide for the most vulnerable sections of society. The call for ‘adjustment with a human face’ (Cornia, 2001) represented a challenge to the international financial institutions and the failure of SAPs to either reduce poverty and inequality or to achieve sustained economic growth in low-income countries.

For their part, the global financial institutions blamed the failure of SAPs on poor governance including inefficiency, mismanagement, over-centralised services and corruption. The emerging so-called post-Washington consensus thus emphasised poverty alleviation through providing a safety net for the poorest, a greater emphasis on social cohesion and the need for ‘good
governance’ including great accountability of governments in the use of public funds and decentralisation. At the heart of the realignment of institutional power in the context of the shift to the post-Washington consensus was a closer coming together of the major multilateral agencies including the various UN agencies and the international financial institutions around a common commitment to poverty reduction which came to be seen as synonymous with development itself (Robertson et al., 2007).

There was also a greater recognition of the significance of civil society organisations and NGOs in human development through their role in promoting social capital. From 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) began to replace SAPs as the IMF/World Bank mechanism to develop national policy agreements. PRSPs were supposed to be ‘country-driven’ and thus would promote strong national ownership of development strategies including broad and active involvement of civil society. They were also ‘result orientated’ with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, ‘comprehensive’ in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty, ‘partnership oriented’ involving careful coordination between all the different stakeholders and donors and ‘long term’ with a view to addressing poverty reduction. In educational terms PRSPs were linked to the removal of user fees for basic education to encourage access for the poorest and to a continued emphasis on decentralisation and privatisation and the prioritisation of Universal Primary Education. The post-Washington consensus in education as in other spheres thus provided both a degree of continuity and change on the Washington consensus. It also demonstrated despite the realignment in power the continuing influence/hegemony of the global financial institutions within the field of education and development.

The emergence of EFA needs to be understood against this broader background. Education was seen by the World Bank as central to poverty alleviation through its role in promoting economic growth. In addition, education, particularly for girls, was also perceived to have other benefits including improved health and a reduction in fertility rates (Robertson et al., 2007). There was also an emerging sense of global collective responsibility for access to basic education not just for the purposes of economic development but also as a universal human right. The Bank’s commitment to Universal Primary Education (UPE), which came to lie at the heart of EFA, in fact emerged during the Washington Consensus era. The negative effects of SAPs on enrolments proved to be a source of contradiction with the goals of UPE. From the 1990s, however, and in the context of the post-Washington consensus, funding for UPE began to be represented more as an issue for donors and the international community as much as for
national governments. This shift in thinking from education being seen primarily as a national concern to one that lay at the centre of the international development agenda provided the basis for the emergence of EFA as a global regime of educational governance.

**JOMTIEN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFA VISION**

The origin of the concept of EFA is generally associated with the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in Jomtien in 1990 which resulted in the *World Declaration on Education for All* and a *Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs* (Inter-Agency Commission, 1990). The WCEFA was one of seven World Conferences held during the 1990s, the others being in the areas of children (New York, September 1990); environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992); human rights (Vienna, 1993); population (Cairo, 1994); social development (Copenhagen, 1995); women (Beijing, 1995); human settlements (Istanbul, 1996); food security (Rome, 1996) and climate change (Kyoto, 1997). The conference was attended by some 1,500 participants, representing national and multinational donor agencies, national governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, the education research community as well as specialists in other sectors (Buchert, 1995).

The Declaration stipulated the goal of EFA as attainable by 2000 and listed the strategies by which to reach it. The goal was rooted in the following principles:

- Education as a fundamental right;
- The importance of education for a safer, healthier, more prosperous and environmentally sound world and for social, economic and cultural progress, tolerance and International cooperation;
- The importance of education for personal and social improvement;
- The value and validity of traditional knowledge and indigenous cultural heritage in their own rights and as a promoter of development;
- The deficiency of the current provision of education in terms of quantity, quality and relevance and
- The recognition that sounds basic education is fundamental to the strengthening of higher levels of education and a scientific and technological literacy and capacity and thus to self-reliant development stipulated the goal of EFA as attainable by the year 2000 and listed the strategies by which to reach it.
The framework for action suggested six dimensions rather than specific targets or goals, and these are set out in Table 1. The seeds of many of the tensions at the heart of EFA were present at the outset in the WCEFA. Firstly, in terms of the balance of institutional power within the emerging

Table 1. Jomtien and Dakar Goals Compared.

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<tr>
<td>1. Expansion of early childhood care and development activities, including family and community interventions, especially for poor, disadvantaged and disabled children.</td>
<td>1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Universal access to, and completion of, primary education (or whatever higher level of education is considered as ‘basic’) by the year 2000.</td>
<td>2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improvement in learning achievement such that an agreed percentage of an appropriate age cohort (e.g. 80% 14-year-olds) attains or surpasses a defined level of necessary learning achievement.</td>
<td>3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reduction in the adult illiteracy rate (the appropriate age cohort to be determined in each country) to, say, one-half its 1990 level by the year 2000, with sufficient emphasis on female literacy to significantly reduce the current disparity between the male and female illiteracy rates.</td>
<td>4. Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Expansion of provision of basic education and training in other essential skills required by youth and adults, with programme effectiveness assessed in terms of behavioural changes and impacts on health, employment and productivity.</td>
<td>5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Increased acquisition by individuals and families of the knowledge, skills and values required for better living and sound and sustainable development, made available through all educational channels including the mass media, other forms of modern and traditional communication, and social action, with effectiveness assessed in terms of behavioural change.</td>
<td>6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognised and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

aid architecture, although the Jomtien conference included a wide range of stakeholders from Northern and Southern countries, it was still primarily Northern-led. As King has put it:

If we were to summarize the role of southern governments, researchers and NGOs in affecting substantially the content of the Jomtien Declaration and Framework for Action, it was minor, if not minimal. Of course, key personnel were included in the international steering group, there were regional meetings held in southern capitals to discuss particular drafts, and there were NGO partners and government representatives in most of the official national delegations. But the core drafting personnel were drawn from the multilateral agencies. What national governments actually thought about the excision from the global education agenda of secondary, technical and vocational education and training, and higher education is not recorded in the Declaration or the Framework. The mere fact of its being a World Conference at which 155 national delegations were present is judged to be sufficient to suggest that the Jomtien agenda was widely shared across the world—which it almost certainly was not. (King, 2007, p. 380)

The limited role of Southern governments in formulating the Jomtien EFA agenda has led King to question the extent to which the agenda can be considered to be truly ‘owned’ by Southern countries. Secondly, although Jomtien was jointly sponsored by five multilateral agencies, it was the World Bank that assumed a dominant position in relation to the WCEFA reflected in the appointment of Wadi Haddad, formerly of the World Bank’s central education policy department into the position of chief executive (Jones & Coleman, 2005; King, 2007). The dominance of the World Bank was reflected in its role in the lead up to WCEFA in developing and championing a shared vision drawing on its own work over several decades on the role of basic education as a key to national development.

However, although there was an agreement that EFA should focus on a notion of ‘basic education’ and on ‘basic learning needs’ there were differences in the way that these were interpreted. UNESCO, building on earlier conceptualisations of community education, championed an expanded understanding of basic education to embrace early childhood education, primary education, basic secondary and vocational education as well as adult literacy. For the World Bank and UNICEF the focus was very much on primary education and it was this focus that became increasingly dominant throughout the EFA period, reflected, for example, in the MDGs (below).

The emphasis on primary education as the best way of linking education and development persisted despite the preferences of many low-income country governments and arguments about the importance of post-primary education (see Birdsall, 1996; Hayman, 2005; Palmer, 2006; Post et al.,
One explanation of this continuing emphasis on primary education may be found in the methodologies and associated funding policies of the World Bank. The rates-of-return analyses pioneered by Psacharopoulos (1985) showed that the rates of return to investments in primary education were higher than those from investing in vocational or tertiary education, and these analyses drove Bank lending policy in education increasingly from 1980 onward. The influence of rates-of-return analysis on setting the global education agenda can be seen in Barnett and Duvall’s (2014) terms as a specific example of the exercise of ‘productive power’, that is as the dominance in discursive terms of a particular conception of education and economic growth. In the 1980s lending to the primary sector made up 18.9% of bank funding to education; in the 1990s it made up 35.6% and in 2001, 45%. The corresponding figures for vocational post-secondary education, for instance, were 25.1%, 7.5% and 8.1% for the respective periods (Robertson et al., 2007). The dominance of this kind of analysis and reasoning is recognised both by those in the World Bank who supported and promoted it (see Psacharopoulos, 1994, 2006; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004) and by those who criticised and opposed it (see Heyneman, 2003).

By 1996 and the EFA mid-term conference in Amman it was already clear that EFA would not be achieved by 2000. During the same year the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report entitled ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’ (OECD/DAC, 1996). Its purpose was to synthesise the lessons learned for the first seven world congresses (above). The significance of the report for the emerging EFA regime was that it reinforced the idea of time-bound development targets that pre-figured the MDGs. The ideas of a general time-bound education target to achieve EFA had previously been championed by UNICEF and was reflected in the Jomtien Framework for Action (above). For the most part, however, the six dimensions of EFA were presented more in the form of guidelines rather than measurable targets. In this sense the intervention of the OECD can be seen as a key moment in the development of productive power linked to an
economistic view of education and development. The two targets that related to education were:

- Universal primary education by 2015
- Demonstrated progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.

As with most of the other development targets in the report the date for achieving UPE was set at 2015. The setting of the gender target at 2005 can be seen as a consequence of the development of the gender equity target within a different regime of global governance involving overlapping but different actors and institutions than those involved in EFA concerned with gender equity (King, 2007; Unterhalter, 2013). The targets provide continuity on themes that began to emerge in Jomtien. For example, it reinforces the Northern-led nature of EFA and the use of compulsory power. Thus whilst the report contains much rhetoric about the need for partnership between Northern and Southern countries in achieving human development the report goes on to add that the targets

... represent only a proposal of what we as donors consider to be helpful measures of progress to inspire effective development cooperation. Their achievement will require agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally-owned strategies. (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 9)

As Robertson et al. (2007) argue, the power relations between donors and low-income countries implied here are clear. Whilst the targets are presented as only a proposal of what ‘we as donors consider helpful’, it is difficult to imagine them being resisted by the recipients of aid, whose contribution will be ‘agreement and commitment through their own national goals’ (see also King, 2007).

In terms of the conceptualisation of EFA the report contributed to the narrowing of the EFA agenda to focus on UPE in keeping with the dominant view of EFA within the World Bank. In this sense the report provides an important milestone in the development of productive power linked to an economistic discourse. As King and Rose (2005) have argued, as so often happens in the setting of international policy objectives, the more measurable, quantitative goals take precedence over the other factors that the OECD/DAC Report also sought to emphasise, including the need for a highly context-dependent approach which ‘gives a very different feel from the one-size-fits-all shape of the IDTs’ (p. 364). The report in fact argued that ‘these goals must be pursued country-by-country through individual
approaches that reflect local conditions and locally owned strategies’ (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). It argued that there were a whole series of ‘qualitative factors’ that were ‘essential to the attainment of these measurable goals’ (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). These included capacity development for democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law. These critical qualifications of the quantitative targets get completely side-lined in the presentation of the new ‘global development partnership effort’ around the six ‘realisable’ goals (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2).

THE DAKAR FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

The Dakar Framework for Action and EFA targets were agreed at the World Education Forum, held in Dakar, Senegal in 2000. The event was organised by the International Consultative Forum on Education for All (the EFA Forum), a body created in 1991 to monitor EFA and composed of representatives of the five international agencies that sponsored the initiative – UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank – and of bilateral cooperation agencies, governments and NGOs, as well as by some education specialists. Like Jomtien, over a thousand people, representing governments, civil society and international agencies, attended the Forum. The purpose was to present the global results of the evaluation of the Decade of ‘Education for All’ (EFA) launched in Jomtien and to adopt a new Framework for Action in order to continue the task. As was already evident half way through the decade, the six goals set in Jomtien for the year 2000 had not been met. Thus, the Framework for Action adopted in Dakar basically ‘reaffirmed’ the vision of the goals laid down in Jomtien, but extended them for another 15 years, until 2015 reflecting the time frame for the DAC/OECD targets (once again with the exception of the gender targets). Table 1 compares the Dakar and Jomtien targets). UNESCO was given responsibility by the Forum for monitoring progress towards the Dakar goals. UNESCO has developed a whole infrastructure to monitor progress towards the Dakar Goals and MDGs including the High-Level Group (HLG) on EFA, Working Group (WG) on EFA and International Advisory Panel (IAP) on EFA. It has convened regular meetings of these entities to review EFA progress based on the EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR), which is submitted annually to the Director-general of UNESCO. The report is translated into 11 languages and widely disseminated. It is written to appeal to a range of stakeholders,
although there is some evidence that it is more widely read by members of the donor community than by national governments (King, 2007). Nonetheless, the GMR has played a significant role over the years in the development of a more nuanced view of EFA. Through the use of increasingly sophisticated statistical analysis and the commissioning of numerous background papers by leading experts in the field of education and development, the GMR has played an intellectual leadership role in relation to EFA. Rather than simply reporting development in achieving targets, the GMR has also attempted to set the agenda in key areas through the use of thematised annual publications. As such the reports can be interpreted as an example of the development of productive power linked to a rights-based discourse.

There are several points relating to the composition of the Dakar Forum that are relevant for understanding the structure of the EFA architecture. Firstly, the conference was characterised by in-fighting between the key sponsoring agencies particularly between UNESCO and UNICEF. In terms of institutional power dynamics it reflected open competition between the multilateral organisations over leadership of global education and the EFA regime in particular. Whilst UNICEF resented the fact that governments had endorsed UNESCO’s leadership role over EFA, UNESCO resented that the UN had given UNICEF leadership over education for girls. Each institution was also dismissive of the technical capabilities of the other. The only institution that appeared to not have problems with its identity was the World Bank that maintained its relative position of hegemony within the sponsoring organisations (Jones & Coleman, 2005; Torres, 2001). Like Jomtien, the Forum was also Northern dominated. As Torres argued at the time:

One salient feature (which was noted with displeasure by several national delegations) was the overbearing presence of functionaries from international agencies at the conference as a whole and on the various panels and committees, especially the two most important and most coveted: the Drafting Committee and the ‘Futures Group’. The latter was charged with suggesting mechanisms for following up the commitments made at the Forum up until 2015. (2001, p. 1)

Of the governments and NGOs present from Southern countries, there was a further imbalance in that some regions including Latin America and South Asia were particularly under-represented. Furthermore, as King (2007) has pointed out, only one plenary speech was made by a representative of a low-income country, namely the president of Senegal. All the other
speakers were either from the multilateral agencies, representatives of global civil society or of donor countries.

Interestingly, in terms of the view of global governance presented earlier, the emerging concept of EFA was contested. During the same week as the Dakar conference, an ‘alternative’ EFA event, the International Consultation of NGOs was held immediately before Dakar. The Consultation was organised by the NGOs belonging to the Global Campaign for Education launched in 1999 by two international NGOs, Oxfam and ActionAid and later joined by Education International (EI), the international confederation of teacher organisations. This campaign, was critical of the work done by the EFA movement during the 1990s and put forward its own *Global Action Plan* to achieve EFA. Some of those who took part in the NGO event also participated in the official conference, a number of them fulfilling important functions at it. As Mundy and Murphy’s (2001) research showed at the time, some of the claims were met. Amongst these were inclusion of the wording ‘free’ education; endorsement of the idea of national educational forums and an expanded definition of education that includes commitment to early childhood education and adult literacy and, a commitment to annual high-level EFA review meetings. The campaigners did not wield sufficient compulsory power, however, to realise their more further-reaching goals including a clear commitment of resources by rich country governments including minimum investment targets and a new international funding mechanism for education development under joint International Organisation, government and civil south oversight. Despite its (limited) achievements, the Global Campaign for Education along with the overall role of NGOs in Dakar was subject to criticism by Southern-based NGOs for putting forward a Northern-led agenda. As Mundy and Murphy argued ‘the overall pattern of relationships among NGOs at Dakar tended to mimic the structure of the centre-periphery relations in the world system, in which Northern actors play leadership roles’ (2001, p. 123).

In terms of how EFA was conceptualised as a result of the Dakar process, it is clear from the comparison of goals between Jomtien and Dakar in Table 1 that there was a degree of continuity between the two reflecting some success on the part of UNESCO in (re-) asserting a more holistic view of basic education, a move also supported by many of the NGOs present. Interestingly, the goals also show a subtle shift towards the notion of education quality linked to improved learning outcomes, particularly in literacy and numeracy. As will be discussed in other contributions to the current volume, this is significant in terms of the subsequent move towards
the notion of ‘access plus quality’ at the heart of current debates about 
EFA. Although the increased emphasis on quality was presented as a 
complementary goal to that of achieving increases in access, Dakar also 
foreshadowed a growing tension between access and quality at the heart of 
the MDGs as will be discussed below.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS THE 
DOMINANT MANIFESTATION OF EFA

A key point of reference that has become inextricably associated with EFA 
are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These arose in the con-
text of a different but overlapping global regime of governance, namely 
that associated with the Millennium Declaration that was agreed at the 
Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 which followed five months after 
the Dakar conference. The process by which the actual MDGs were devel-
oped occurred through the Millennium Project, an agency especially set up 
for this purpose. Task forces were created for each of the goals, and they 
issued background papers, interim reports and a summary report a few 
years later for the MDG + 5 UN summit which followed up on progress 
on each of the MDGs.

The two MDGs that relate to education are:

MDG 2: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, 
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

MDG 3: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later 
than 2015.

From our point of view, the way that the MDGs have been developed 
and implemented have had profound implications for the nature of EFA as 
a regime of global educational governance. Firstly, although the MDGs 
arose from the Millennium Declaration and Summit processes they were 
actually developed and refined by working groups within the UN and are 
narrower in scope than the Declaration. Secondly, given that the education 
MDGs in particular represent such a narrowing of scope compared to the 
Dakar Framework, it is easy to conclude that in terms of institutional 
power, UNESCO had less of an influence in their formulation than it 
had on the Dakar and Jomtien goals (King, 2007). Thirdly, as with the 
other events seminal to the development of EFA, although the MDGs
(along with the Dakar Framework) clearly enjoy considerable support across large sections of the international development community including many donors and NGOs, there remain issues of Northern dominance in the process of defining the MDGs and a concomitant lack of Southern ownership. As several commentators have observed, it is often difficult to reconcile the realisation of the specific MDG targets with national development priorities (Hayman, 2007; King, 2004, 2007; King & Rose, 2006). In her study of the Rwandan education sector, for example, Hayman has pointed to the real tensions between investing in basic education to fulfil the MDGs and in other sectors of education including higher education to realise other national development priorities (see also Tikly, 2003). As King (2007) points out, further evidence of the Northern-led nature of the MDG process is that whereas all of the goals relation to low-income countries are time-bound, the one goal relating to commitments from Northern countries is not time-bound.

In terms of how the MDGs as a related but separate global regime of governance have impacted on EFA, it is possible to conclude the following. Firstly, as alluded to above, the education MDGs represent a considerable narrowing of focus compared to the Dakar Framework but yet became the major focal point for how the aspirations of EFA subsequently became interpreted in popular and policy discourse. MDG 2, which relates to access to education is focused on the achievement of UPE which provides continuity on earlier World Bank discourses relating to UPE for the 1980s. Secondly, there has been a very real tension between the rhetoric of the MDGs and the ability of governments to realise them. By 2005 the gender MDG had been the first to be missed. This in turn highlights the often substantial differences in capacity between countries in achieving the MDGs. It was this observation relatively early on in the process which was to lead donors to establish the Fact Track Initiative (below).

More fundamentally the above tension highlights a contradiction between the focus of the MDGs on social indicators of development and the reality that that many low-income countries do not have the economic means of achieving them due to their positioning on the periphery of the global economy. This is linked to inequalities in institutional power between rich and poor countries in terms of their influence on global regimes concerned with the regulation of global trade and finance that have a major impact on the capacity of African governments to implement favourable macroeconomic and fiscal policy (see e.g. Ndikumana, 2014). This has implications for EFA as an educational regime of governance and in particular the need to consider EFA and other social regimes such as the
MDGs as part of a wider ‘regime complex’ (Orsini et al., 2013) that includes regimes linked to global economic regulation. It also draws attention to an aspect of the MDGs and of donor support for education in general that there is a tendency for donor aid linked to the MDGs to foster dependency. In some countries, donor support for education makes up more than 50% of the education budget raising real concerns about the extent to which it fosters local leadership on the one hand and is sustainable in the long term on the other (King, 2007).

A final point relates to the tension implicit in MDG 3 between the realisation of gender parity though equal enrolments and the more far reaching goal of gender equity that Subrahmanian (2005) describes in terms of gender rights to, in and through education. That is to say, that there has been a tension in the EFA project between basic access to education (implicit in the emphasis on UPE) and the experiences of girls once they are in school. That includes forms of discrimination that deny them equal access to parts of the curriculum and sexualised violence (see e.g. Milligan, 2014). Denial of girls access to a good quality education has contributed to unequal educational outcomes between girls and boys. In explaining this phenomenon Unterhalter (2013) draws attention to the historical disconnect between networks dedicated to gender equity within the MDG regime and those associated with education, and this point is also taken up below whilst DeJaeghere draws attention to the differential ability of many country-level NGOs to advance issues of gender justice both at a national and at a global level in relation to the MDGs (Dejaeghere, Parks, & Unterhalter, 2013).

THE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE

The Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) emerged from the commitment made at the Dakar World Education Forum (WEF) in 2000 to a Global Initiative. This was initiated by NGOs and supported by UNESCO, with the aim of holding donors to account with respect to mobilisation of additional technical and financial resources needed to accelerate progress towards the EFA goals. In particular, its aim was to ensure that donors would fulfil their commitment made at the WEF that ‘No countries seriously committed to EFA will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by a lack of resources’. Further motivation was provided by another global regime, this time the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, at which ministers of
finance indicated that they were committed to substantially increasing overseas development assistance (ODA) (Rose, 2005). Concerns that UNESCO lacked the capacity and confidence of key bilateral donors to lead the Global Initiative, resulted in the World Bank taking on a coordinating role, with a shift from a ‘Global’ to a ‘Fast Track’ Initiative (Rose, 2003). As a consequence, an FTI Secretariat was established within the World Bank, with the support of other donors. The FTI was launched in April 2002. Despite strong political commitment, initial pledges to the FTI were limited due to concerns over the perceived centralised nature and lack of clarity about the purpose of the initiative (below). Following changes to the structure and with the adoption of the Framework Agreement in 2004, however, pledges began to rise. In keeping with debates about aid effectiveness, countries were invited to join if they were judged to have in place a robust education sector development plan. In this way the FTI was designed to ‘reward’ countries that prioritised basic education in keeping with the MDGs. The FTI was organised around a ‘Virtual Fund’ which incorporated donor countries existing bilateral arrangements with recipient countries and a ‘Catalytic Fund’ that was intended to benefit ‘donor orphans’, (i.e. countries that had five donors or fewer contributing $1 million per year to the education sector) and was targeted at building capacity within the education sector that would enable them to develop credible education plans.

From the point of view of understanding EFA as a global regime of educational governance, it is quite clear that the initiative provided continuity on previous themes whilst also signalling new directions in the structure of EFA as well as in the norms and values that underpinned it. As with previous initiatives and in terms of the dynamics of institutional power there was considerable in-fighting between the multilateral agencies over initial control of the FTI and as with previous initiatives it was the World Bank that proved hegemonic. The FTI was often perceived by the other agencies as a ‘World Bank Programme’ (Bermingham, 2011; Jones & Coleman, 2005). Indeed, UNESCO only became a member of the FTI steering committee in 2004 but was not formally involved in decision-making processes at the trust fund meetings. UNICEF was only invited to join the steering committee in 2006.

Contests over the nature and direction of FTI were not only horizontal, between multilateral agencies but also involved vertical struggles between the World Bank and individual country donors and with civil society organisations and networks at country and global level. There was from the outset considerable confusion about the purpose of the FTI. Seventeen
countries were invited to join the partnership, but there was no commitment at the time for member countries to commit substantial amounts of money. Part of this confusion revolved around the issue of whether it should become a Global Fund for Education to match the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM) which was being developed at the same time. From the perspective of the present chapter this is another example of how global regimes need to be understood in relation to other global regimes, this time around health. Initially, many leaders were reluctant to support an initiative which remained conceptually vague.

There were also tensions at the outset between the World Bank and some leading donors including DfID who objected to the centralised nature of the initiative that it was claimed would undermine local decision-making. This led eventually to the devolution of country-level endorsement for joining the Fund to the local donor group who would assess the viability of the education sector plan against international benchmarks. In exchange, local donor groups were expected to contribute more to their existing bilateral programmes. There were also concerns that the fund through only providing support to countries with already developed education plans, marginalised those that had traditionally not received donor support and the fact that it did not address the needs of the so-called ‘big five’ countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan) where more than half the children out of school lived. This in turn led to the development of the Virtual Fund which incorporated donors existing bilateral programmes and the World Bank managed Catalytic Fund which provided capacity building support to ‘donor orphan’ countries (see above). The adoption of a common framework in 2004 led to increases in donor support and by 2005 the FTI was judged to be having more of a positive effect at country level. A consensus emerged between donors that the FTI provided a means for increased donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation in keeping with debates about aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration (below). Indeed, the FTI received endorsements by the G8 and the UN Millennium Summit in 2005.

As with previous initiatives, global civil society also played a role in shaping the FTI at key junctures. The Global Campaign for Education played a leading advocacy role in the establishment of the FTI. The Make Poverty History Campaign and the concerted civil society campaigns around the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005 were also influential in re-invigorating donor commitments to the FTI. Also characteristic of earlier events in the development of EFA was the subordinate role played by low-income countries and governments. Even after responsibility for evaluating
country plans had been devolved to country level they continued to be evaluated against global benchmarks that provided a disciplinary mechanism by which largely Northern donors could coerce national governments in the global South towards prioritising global agendas — in this case a narrowed down version of the MDGs — which at times, as we have seen are at odds with national development agendas that may involve investing in a more balanced way across different sub-sectors of education. This can be seen as an example of the use of compulsory power, albeit in more subtle form than was the case with the imposition of SAPs.

THE ROME AND PARIS DECLARATIONS ON AID EFFECTIVENESS

Discussion of the FTI draws attention to a key set of issues and tensions that have characterised EFA since inception, namely those surrounding ‘aid effectiveness’. For example, attempts were made to align the FTI with the principles of aid effectiveness and donor harmonisation that were emerging from the first high-level donor forum in Rome (OECD/DAC, 2003). The Rome Declaration listed the following priority actions:

- that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of the countries receiving it;
- that donor efforts concentrate on delegating cooperation and increasing the flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects;
- and, that good practice be encouraged and monitored, backed by analytic work to help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can take in determining their development path.

The Second High-Level Forum resulted in the Paris Declaration (2005) which was an important landmark in the development of the discourse around aid effectiveness. It presented itself as ‘a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development’. It provided a series of specific implementation measures and established a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris Declaration outlined the following five principles for making aid more effective:

1. **Ownership**: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
2. **Alignment**: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.

3. **Harmonisation**: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

4. **Results**: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.

5. **Mutual accountability**: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.

Although it has been followed up by the more recent Accra and Busan high-level meetings discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is fair to say that the Paris Declaration was pivotal in shaping the current debate on aid effectiveness. In terms of our analysis the principles of aid effectiveness constitute like the MDGs, a parallel regime of global governance that reinforces EFA but also provides potential sources of tension. In terms of institutional power, the Paris Declaration represented a growing consensus amongst donor and recipient countries around underling principles governing aid. There is a tension, however, in that although the Paris Declaration included most of the low-income countries and the BRIC economies, these emerging donors have never been integral to the EFA agenda and indeed, as other contributions to this volume indicate to have increasingly pursued their own agendas. These institutional relationships call into question, the likelihood of achieving a core principle of aid effectiveness, namely that of harmonisation.

In terms of productive power, the way that aid effectiveness has become defined also has implications for how EFA is conceptualised. The aid effectiveness discourse as set out in the Paris Declaration is fundamentally an economic discourse about seeking to achieve maximum return on aid. This is reflected, for instance in the increasing move towards ‘payment by results’ by key donors such as DfID. It feeds into a reductionist view of the relationship between education understood as a narrow set of quantifiable indicators and development understood principally in terms of economic growth. As such it stands in contrast to more expansive, rights-based conceptualisations of education and development (see e.g. Tikly & Barrett, 2011).

Secondly, there is a tension between the concept of aid effectiveness and the way that EFA has up until now been implemented. It has been suggested, for example, that the principle of ‘ownership’ is compromised by the limited choice that low-income national governments have in accepting the conditionalities that go along with aid. For example, through linking
aid to MDGs or other targets that may not in fact coincide with national development priorities and the use of global benchmarks to evaluate education sector plans. The principle of ownership is often related to government ownership rather than to that of civil society organisations that may indeed oppose government policy. In this sense ‘ownership’ is understood principally as a ‘technical’ principle rather than a political and normative one liked to an understanding of the political economy of different countries. As has been suggested, a major obstacle to genuine ownership is the dependency that much educational aid fosters. Finally, ‘accountability’ appears as ‘one way traffic’ in the discourse of aid effectiveness as it is applied to EFA. As we have seen, the only EFA target that is typically not time-bound is that relating to the proportion of GDP that ought to be committed to aid, including educational aid, in wealthy countries. In this respect, discourses of aid effectiveness are separated out from an analysis of global political economy and a broader understanding of the legitimacy role played by aid in a global economy marked by historically rooted structural inequality in wealth and power between nations.

CONCLUSION

In this final section an attempt will be made to draw together the main themes and arguments in the chapter. It is suggested that conceptualising EFA as an example of a global regime of educational governance provides a useful lens through which to critically consider the changing institutional relationships and underling norms and values that comprise the EFA aid architecture. In particular, applying a global governance framework makes it possible to consider the extent to which EFA has shaped through the exercise of different forms of power and through its relationship to other global regimes of governance.

Firstly, in relation to the exercise of institutional power, EFA has been successful in bringing together under its umbrella a diverse range of low-income countries including more recently, post-conflict nations and fragile states and coordinating the activities of a range of bilateral country donors. Nonetheless, there have been on-going contests over the governance of EFA between multilateral organisations. Historically in the period under review the World Bank has proved hegemonic in these struggles despite the continued claims to ownership of EFA by UNESCO and to a lesser extent
UNICEF. Global civil society has had some influence particularly in an advocacy role.

Related to the above has been the Northern-led nature of EFA. Despite the rhetoric of inclusivity both in the context of the World Education Forums and in the governing structures of the institutions most closely associated with EFA, the overall agenda remains Northern- – and indeed – Western-led. This is evidenced in the dominance of Northern interests within the governance structures of the leading institutions that have in turn been reflected in the processes through which key EFA frameworks and protocols have been developed. It is also reflected in the use of compulsory power to ensure that education sector plans adhere to EFA principles in the context, for example, of the FTI Fund. This is in contrast to the use of fewer conditionalities to ensure Northern country compliance with meeting development targets. Whatever compulsory power has been exerted on high-income countries has often been as a consequence of campaigns on the part of global civil society. It has been suggested that here too, however, it has most often been Northern rather than indigenous, Southern-led organisations that have had most ‘voice’ in global debates and forums.

There have also been some discernible shifts in the way that EFA has been conceptualised. The broad vision, based on an expanded notion of EFA and linked to a rights-based agenda has been superseded by a focus on a narrower set of time-bound targets exemplified by the MDGs although there is some evidence that the debate may be broadening out once again in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development debate. Despite the title of ‘Education for All’, the narrowing of targets implied by the MDGs and the way that funding has been channelled, particularly in the early days of the FTI have tended to favour low-income countries that have had the capacity to develop robust education sector development plans. Many, particularly marginalised and disadvantaged groups, were neglected as a consequence of this and of a lack of nuance in the way that funding was targeted within countries. One can see this as an aspect of the effects of a particular form of productive power in which narrow and easily quantifiable targets are favoured over more nuanced quantitative and qualitative targets. The advocacy work of reports such as the GMR and the quantitative and qualitative evidence base on which it draws have provided an alternative source of productive power, linked to a more rights-based emphasis on targeting the most marginalised.

It is also important to consider EFA in relation to other regimes of global governance. It has been suggested that EFA has developed
sometimes in tension with other global regimes, most notably those governing, the MDGs, aid effectiveness and gender. This has provided both a source of strength for EFA in helping to shape its character and a source of tension through providing contrasting rationale for action and in the definition of targets. On the other hand, EFA has also failed to engage with other key areas of global governance including health despite the potential lessons that can be learnt from such an engagement. In order to become more sustainable as an area of social development and in order to tackle the dependency of many low-income countries on donor support, it has been suggested that EFA also needs to be seen in relation to global regimes in the economic sphere including those governing trade and financial markets over which low-income countries also have limited control.

To conclude, EFA as a global regime has proved remarkably resilient in the face of considerable tensions and contradictions. Only time will tell, however, whether it will continue to adapt in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development agenda or, whether it will need to fundamentally transform itself into a new global regime of educational governance if it is to survive. Much of this it has been suggested will depend on the extent to which governmental and non-governmental actors are able to recognise and engage with power imbalances at the heart of EFA and to line EFA up more coherently with other areas of global governance.

NOTE

1. In this regard the chapter is also timely given the on-going reviews of the outcomes and processes of EFA currently being undertaken by UNESCO. See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-all/resources/national-efa-2015-reviews/. Last accessed on August 6, 2015.

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