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The social space, the symbolic space and masculine domination: the gendered correspondence between class and lifestyles in the UK

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Abstract

There have been countless efforts to test and ‘update’ Pierre Bourdieu’s thesis that there is a correspondence between the space of social positions and the space of lifestyles. The best known of these targeting the UK are the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion project and, more recently, the Great British Class Survey, but their conceptual and methodological limitations mean their findings are questionable and hinder closer investigation of an oft-sidelined piece of the puzzle one of the projects specifically highlighted: the significance of gender in structuring taste. Drawing on the 2012 wave of the British Cohort Study, which included a battery of questions on cultural consumption, and deploying a logic and measure of class closer to Bourdieu’s own, I thus seek to offer an alternative examination of not only the nature and degree of correspondence between the social space and lifestyles but its entwinement with masculinity and femininity.

Keywords: Bourdieu, class, cultural capital, gender, lifestyles

Introduction

In the preface to the English-language edition of Distinction, that weighty tome painstakingly documenting the correspondence between class and lifestyles in 1960s and 1970s France, Pierre Bourdieu extended an invitation to scholars outside his country to ‘join in the game’ and ‘search for equivalents’ in their own nations (Bourdieu, 1984: xii). Eventually they took up the call in droves, surely making the thesis presented in Distinction one of the most tested, modified and qualified in recent cultural sociology, if not, indeed, in sociology more widely. Not all of them have been sympathetic by any means, and some have even taken it upon themselves to actively try and disprove Bourdieu’s position, either on the grounds that the particular cultural forms corresponding with class positions are no longer those identified by Bourdieu or on the basis that lifestyles are not associated with class at all. Most of the time, however, these claims rest on conceptions of culture, class, methodology, the nature of theory and ultimately the sociological craft quite different from Bourdieu’s own, and studies deploying a logic and technique closer to that of Distinction tend to be more favourable. From Denmark to Mexico, Norway to Serbia, the particular practices may well be different in
tune with national historical development, but the general principles of differentiation are remarkably consistent (Cveticanin, 2012; Coulangeon and Duval, 2014).

Research on the UK occupies a peculiar position. Notwithstanding some who are plainly sceptical of Bourdieu’s work (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007), a strand of scholarship has claimed to follow Bourdieu’s approach closely and uncover some confirmations and some divergences across the Channel (Bennett et al, 2009; Savage et al, 2013). In actual fact, however, similarities of statistical technique and focus obscure very real differences of logic and methodology, meaning a suitable effort to search for contemporary British equivalents to the cultural practices of France during Les Trente Glorieuses is still somewhat lacking. What makes this all the more unsatisfactory is that this line of research – along with many feminists in Britain – has rightly tried to emphasise the intersection of class with gender in producing symbolic struggle and domination more than others and, indeed, more overtly than Bourdieu himself. An important issue, therefore, is simply not done justice. In what follows, as part of a wider project of clarifying, applying and adding to Bourdieu’s analyses for the UK today (see author, 2017), I seek to remedy the situation. Drawing on the latest wave of the British Cohort Study, remaining close to the logic and methodology of Bourdieu’s sociology and deploying a specially-designed measure of class to approximate the fault lines of the British social space, I offer an analysis of the correspondence between class and culture sensitive to the complicating role of gender. First, however, let me elaborate on the current state of affairs.

**Bourdieu across the Channel**

Bourdieu’s (1984) thesis on the relationship between class and lifestyles is often summarised in terms of ‘homology’, but a trove of nuances specify exactly what that means. First of all, class is not a simple binary relation or vertical stack of categories, as the dominant traditions of thought have it, but a multidimensional social space defined by possession of economic capital (money, wealth), cultural capital (symbolic mastery, measured by education level) and social capital (connections and networks). In later work Bourdieu (2005) also broached the notion of ‘technical capital’, or particular forms of practical and technical mastery, usually measurable through vocational qualifications, securing limited and localised recognition. In any case the primary dimension of the space is volume of capital in all its forms, distinguishing a dominant and a dominated class and an intermediate class in between. The second dimension is capital composition, separating out the fractions of each class richer in
economic capital (e.g. business owners, private sector executives) from those richer in
cultural capital (e.g. teachers, intellectuals), again with more ‘balanced’ fractions nestling in
the middle. The third dimension is time, usually taken to encompass the rise and fall of
specific class fractions as well as individual social mobility.

Capital possession generates certain conditions of existence – specifically, greater or
lesser distance from material necessity – and the experiences and possibilities that go with
them generate distinct class habitus, manifest in tastes for certain forms of music, film, sports,
and so on as well as inclination to visit certain venues and events. In fact these cultural goods
and activities map into a space of their own, the ‘symbolic space’ or space of lifestyles, with
each element being defined against all others within the system – as rare or common, distinct
or vulgar and so on – and, if one maps this onto the social space, one sees a clear
correspondence between certain practices and certain class fractions, or a homology. The
practices and tastes deemed common and vulgar are associated with the dominated class,
their proximity to necessity inclining them toward the economical, the practical and the
accessible, while the practices considered rare and distinct – whether because they are
economically exclusive (i.e. expensive) or culturally exclusive (i.e. dependent on mastery of
specific symbolic systems) – are associated with the dominant class. In fact it is only by
virtue of their possession of capital that the latter are misrecognised as bearers and definers of
‘legitimate’ culture and the dominated cast as tasteless, uncouth and common in opposition.

So many studies have been carried out to test this vision of class and culture, in so
many countries across the globe, that it is impossible to summarise them all. There are,
however, a few broad lines of development, the first being the emergence of the ‘omnivore
thesis’ in the early 1990s. Originating in the US and kick-started by the late Richard Peterson
(1992, 1997), the idea was that dominant, legitimate culture, and therefore cultural capital, is
no longer premised on exclusive, obscure cultural forms or knowledge as opposed to popular
culture, but on engagement, breadth, variety and openness as opposed to disengagement or
narrow interests. In the UK the most high-profile defenders of this thesis are probably Chan
and Goldthorpe (2007), even if, good Weberians that they are, they insist it is a phenomenon
of status rather than class. After a period of being unearthed just about everywhere, however,
the existence of the cultural omnivore is no longer quite as indubitable as it was. Scrupulous
researchers began to realise it may well be little more than a statistical artefact – a product of
extraordinarily broad ‘genre’ categories, measures of class rooted in wholly different
theoretical assumptions to Bourdieu’s and particular statistical techniques (Holt, 1997;
Wuggenig, 2008; Author, 2011). Instead, using Bourdieu’s own favoured technique of multiple correspondence analysis, minimising reliance on genre categories and remaining faithful to his multidimensional and relational view of class, a recent wave of studies, led by Prieur et al (2008) and Rosenlund (2009), has begun to confirm and update Bourdieu’s original model (see Prieur and Savage, 2011, 2013). Practices have certainly changed with the times, they readily admit, but omnivorousness is rather less apparent and the capital composition principle, generally ignored in the pro-omnivore research, is found alive and well.

In the UK this latter current of scholarship could be said to be represented by the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion (CCSE) project undertaken in 2003 (Bennett et al, 2008) – at least that is the impression Prieur and Savage (2011, 2013) have tried to give. It did, after all, seek to construct the space of lifestyles using multiple correspondence analysis, and omnivorousness played a relatively minor role. The conclusions were, however, quite different from Bourdieu’s. For one thing, the major principle of cultural difference corresponding with class was deemed to be that between those who frequently engage in all sorts of cultural activities – from going to rock concerts to attending the opera – and those who are somewhat more disengaged, while the capital composition principle barely figured at all. Yet these divergences were more the result of procedural shortcomings than social change or national specificity. An overreliance on genre categories and measures of frequency of cultural activity; a dearth of survey questions tapping into the tastes of the dominated; a lack of indicators designed to bring out the tastes of the economically rich; and dependence on a slightly modified version of the official UK Office for National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), ultimately derived from the Weberian Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portacarero (EGP) scheme, as a measure of ‘class’, even though it is ill-equipped to pick up homologies with capital composition – all of these problems diluted any claim that the CCSE project constituted a robust test of Bourdieu’s thesis in the UK, and careful re-analysis of their data has shown Britain may be more like the France of Distinction than the team claimed (see further Author, 2011, 2014, 2017).

The CCSE data is now also ageing. True enough, when it comes to studying classed aesthetics (rather than consumption of particular cultural products), ten- or fifteen-year-old data is certainly tolerable, but there is newer data out there. Indeed, many might say the CCSE project has now been superseded by the Great British Class Survey (GBCS), published to great fanfare a few years ago, since it purported to do a similar thing and was led by a key
member of the original CCSE team (Savage et al, 2013). Unfortunately, however, the GBCS repeated the same basic errors of the CCSE project while adding some new ones, the most egregious of which is the decision to define cultural capital, and class fractions, directly in terms of lifestyle practices rather than indicators of symbolic mastery such as education level. Collapsing together the social space and the space of lifestyles – the field and the space of position-takings, in other words, or a social structure and a symbolic structure – ignores the relative autonomy of the two spaces, makes it impossible to assess their degree of homology (an empirical question, after all) and effectively neuters genetic analysis (Mills, 2014; Author, 2017).

**Gender, Class and Taste**

The GBCS also seemed to backtrack on one of the CCSE project’s more interesting insights: that gender played a key role in differentiating taste. Adding to the research already consistently showing that women tend to consume ‘highbrow’ culture at a greater rate than men (Lizardo, 2006; Purhonen et al, 2011; Christin, 2012), the latter, Bennett et al (2008) found, tend to favour practices and activities which are, as they put it, ‘outwardly oriented’, like sports, documentaries and current affairs programmes, while women are inclined towards practices the researchers describe as more ‘inwardly oriented’, like romance novels, television soaps and drama programmes. Of course this raises the question of how class and gender interact in the production of taste and symbolic domination – a question Bourdieu has been accused of sidelining or, at the very least, answering badly (see Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). If gender forms a distinct axis of the symbolic space, could it not form a separate axis of the social space too, defined by a specific ‘gender capital’ (McCall, 1992)? Or might gender even form a field of its own, with relative autonomy from class (Coles, 2007)? More concretely, could it be that the increasing feminisation of work, or at least of certain fields, in the 20th Century and beyond has transformed or blurred gendered dispositions (McNay, 1999; Adkins, 2002)?

In fact Bourdieu’s view in *Distinction* was even more ‘intersectional’ that his feminist critics tend to suppose: the social space is highly gendered, with some class fractions being (increasingly) more female-dominated than others, and this will shape the objective and perceptual association of social positions with lifestyle practices and the way in which they are denigrated or valorised. Specifically, the pole of social space richer in cultural than economic capital tends to be more feminised, though the fractions of the dominant class
richest in cultural capital are the most ‘androgynous’ in their tastes as women and men positioned there are most likely to challenge their respective gender stereotypes (Bourdieu, 1984: 382-3; Rosenlund, 2015). This does not, as some critics might fear (e.g. Anthias, 2001), collapse gender into class, however. As Bourdieu (2001) argued in his later work, the male/female binary is a scheme of perception shaped by and shaping the positioning of those labelled ‘men’ and ‘women’ in a multitude of fields, including the social space, as well as differential participation and strength of libidinal investment in certain fields. The latter – to elaborate a little – include the fields of art, politics, business and so on, but also the familial field as a site of struggle for love (Bourdieu, 1998, 2000), the sexual field as a domain in which individuals struggle to define and embody the legitimate definition of attractiveness (George, 2014), and certain fields in which the physical capital of force – of being tough or intimidating, which can also be channelled into sporting prowess – is at stake, the last of these tending to be monopolised by men (Author, 2016a).

Studies of symbolic spaces inspired by Bourdieu have not always done the intersection with gender justice. Cveticanin and his colleagues (2012), for example, expend just one line on its relationship to cultural consumption in Serbia, principally because it seems very muted in their statistical model, while both Rosenlund (2009) and Prieur et al (2008) noted the patently gendered nature of the social space in Norway and Denmark respectively but opted not to examine how gender complicates or interacts with class fractions in shaping lifestyles. In Coulangeon and Duval’s (2015) collection, moreover, the contributions seeking to map symbolic spaces à la Distinction either side-line gender or, like the CCSE team, distinguish it as a third separate axis, sometimes based on a fact-versus-fiction (or outer-versus-inner) dichotomy of taste, without exploring how femininity and masculinity differentially actually run through, define and are defined by specific class fractions. In the case of the CCSE team this is exacerbated by the measure of class deployed: because the EGP scheme makes no space for capital composition, it could not tap into the gendered character of class fractions. In fact, the reanalysis of their data using different measures already referred to above found instead that gender was inextricably bound up with the capital composition principle in the dispersion of lifestyles, mirroring the social space (Author, 2017), while cautious analysis of British literary tastes using relatively disaggregated genre categories confirmed Bourdieu’s finding that specifically gendered tastes become less pronounced the higher up and further toward the cultural pole of social space.
one goes (Author, 2016b). The question remains, however, as to whether these findings will still stand with newer and broader-ranging data on lifestyles in the UK.

**Data, Technique and Tools**

To test, or rather re-test, the applicability of Bourdieu’s thesis on class, gender and lifestyles to 21st Century Britain, I draw on the latest wave (2012) of the British Cohort Study (BCS), a longitudinal panel survey following 17,000 people born in 1970.² Included in the survey was a self-completion component, filled in by 8,734 respondents, containing a whole raft of questions relating to cultural consumption and participation. Tastes in literature, newspapers, television programmes and sports as well as frequency of visiting a variety of cultural and entertainment establishments or events were all covered. Our attention will zone in on the propensity to frequent those establishments and events, as well as tastes in sport and television programmes – literary taste is to be analysed separately elsewhere. This gives us a total of 43 variables to work with. Of course the data is not without its limits: we get no insight into the mode of consumption of the different practices, for example, and taste in television programmes is, unfortunately, clumped into genres, though these are at least relatively discriminating. There is also something of a bias toward measuring practices and events which one would associate with possession of cultural capital (museums, art galleries, opera etc.) – a telling assumption about what counts as ‘legitimate’ culture in the minds of the researchers who designed the survey. More popular pastimes are also included, but the practices that might be conjectured to correspond with the economically rich (boat ownership, luxury holidays, car value, etc.) are somewhat underrepresented, potentially effecting the capacity to bring out the capital composition principle as fully as one might like. Nevertheless the hypothesis is that the correspondence between class and culture is strong enough that it will still emerge in analysis even with these limitations of the data. We may not get an insight into the different ways in which reality television or a soap opera can be interpreted and used (see Author, 2017), but we should reap a broad picture of the statistical association of certain types of people with watching certain types of programme, or taking part in certain activities and sports, underpinning everyday perception and judgement.

The BCS, being a cohort study, automatically removes physical age from analysis: all respondents were aged forty-two at the time of completing the questionnaire. Differentiation of so-called ‘youth culture’ and ‘traditional culture’ of the kind often found in Bourdieu-influenced studies of cultural consumption nowadays is thus bracketed out (for how it figures,
compare Author, 2017). The same cannot be said, however, for the effects of what Bourdieu (1984) called social age, or the degree to which class fractions, no matter the physical ages of their members, are new or old, emerging or established, ascending or declining, and thus subversive or conservative. Forty-two is, moreover, a particularly apt age for analysis. Trajectories through the social space, class habitus and cultural tastes will be well established, plus the majority of respondents (73 percent) have children of varying ages living at home, yielding food for thought on the effects of any patterns found for everyday, familial, domestic experience and, with it, social reproduction.

The primary technique employed to chart the relationship between class and culture will be multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), the method made famous by Bourdieu and rapidly becoming established among Bourdieusian quantitative researchers nowadays. Specifically, MCA will be deployed to construct the space of lifestyles using 35 of the variables from the self-completion package of the BCS and explicative variables projected into the resulting model as supplementary modalities to check their homology. A little transformation of the sport and cultural activities variables has been necessary to facilitate this, however. In the data they are recorded in terms of frequency of participation/attendance. This is not ideal on conceptual grounds, but neither is it ideal on technical grounds since it tends to produce models in which the key axes are not fully independent: the first axis opposes frequent activity against infrequent activity, the second moderate activity versus frequent and infrequent activity. Of course a line needs to be drawn to ensure we are tapping into a durable taste – we need to distinguish those who go to art galleries because they like going to art galleries from those who might pop in one day out of curiosity, or for something to do with children on a rainy day. The decision taken here, therefore, has been to simply focus on whether the practice is done at all or not, unless over 50 percent of the populace ever do it in which case a criterion of regularity has been applied – at least one or twice a month for some practices, at least once a week for others, depending on the nature of the practice. Going to the theatre or art galleries several times a year might qualify one as a ‘regular’, but to be counted as such when going to the pub or dining out, or to distinguish those who do DIY out of necessity and those who do it because they have a taste for it, a rather more stringent yardstick needs to be applied. This means these variables have been converted into binaries, matching the variables recording television tastes which are logged in the dataset as simply genres ‘mentioned’ or ‘not mentioned’ as watched.
To confirm or confute the homology with the social space various available measures of capital possession can be used. In order to overcome some of the limitations of previous research, however, and as part of a broader endeavour to facilitate consistent statistical analysis across datasets from a Bourdieusian point of view, a class scheme has been designed to approximate maximum similarities and differences in not only capital volume but capital composition in the British social space. The scheme is an aggregation of the unit-level Standard Occupational Classification codes found in government and academic datasets in the UK – the same code which underpins the NS-SEC. Occupations were grouped together to form analytical classes – classes ‘on paper’, as Bourdieu would say – on the basis of an examination of capital profiles in successive government Labour Force Surveys. The method of construction, and corroboration of the scheme’s criterion validity using MCA, is detailed elsewhere (Author 2013, forthcoming a). Its structure and some basic indicators of capital drawn from the BCS are presented in Figure 1. Crucially, the left hand side of the social space, containing the class fractions richer in cultural than economic capital, is highly feminised, the more so the lower one goes down in social space, while the fractions rich in economic capital (as well as technical capital) are the least feminised.

[figure 1]

The structure of correspondences

Such are the preliminaries; now for the analysis. Axis one of the MCA accounts for a considerable 64 percent of the total variance and opposes, on the one hand, taste for almost all cultural activities/venues – the exceptions are DIY, going to the pub and gardening – as well as participation in all sports to, on the other hand, non-participation in a number of these activities, but also watching soaps (Figure 2, Table 1 and 2). Though they do not contribute above average to the axis, reality television and general entertainment shows nestle at this latter pole too. To those erroneously misreading the legitimated definition of culture as culture per se this axis might be construed in terms of ‘engagement’ versus ‘disengagement’, but given the nature of the constructed variables it can just as easily be interpreted as an opposition between the exclusive – whether by dint of education, as with the cultural venues, or money, as in the case of many of the sports and regular participation in activities with an economic price – and the common and accessible, or public versus home-based leisure. The common and accessible may be defined largely in terms of television tastes, moreover, but it
is also interesting to examine the dispersion of the activities along the axis: the most demanding of cultural capital and, to a degree, economic capital are furthest toward the exclusive pole – bookclubs, art galleries, writing, performing arts, photography (not so middlebrow nowadays, obviously), theatre and museums in relation to cultural capital; skiing, watersports, racquet sports, horse riding and regular cinema attendance regarding economic capital. The closer toward the origin one moves, the more accessible the activities might be said to become – textiles/craft work, going to libraries and dancing (which is less demanding of symbolic mastery) vis-à-vis cultural capital; eating out, gym going, DIY and pub visits in relation to economic capital. Those individuals positioned lower down in the symbolic space, then, while more likely to decline from any activity included in the analysis other than television watching, would seem more likely to engage in these practices when they do venture away from ‘the box’.

[Figure 2; Tables 1 and 2]

The second axis accounts for 16 percent of the variance – bringing the total for the two dimensions to 80 percent and making interpretation of further axes unnecessary – but examination of the space of individuals suggests this relatively low figure may be because the differentiation it reveals is more pronounced toward the exclusive pole (figure 3). In any case it polarises, at one end, photography, textiles/crafts, theatre, opera, art galleries, historical sites, libraries, dancing and yoga to, at the other, undertaking regular DIY, cycling, jogging, racquet sports, team sports, watersports, golf, skiing and watching sports programmes.

[figure 3]

Examination of the supplementary variables indicates a slightly skewed homology with the social space (Figure 4). The first axis seems to correspond fairly neatly with volume of capital, though it appears that the white-collar workers have relatively petit-bourgeois tastes – fitting with the position and recent trajectory of this class (see Author, forthcoming a) – and the administrators’ tastes are closer to sections of the dominated class than the rest of the intermediate class. The dominant class fractions are also perhaps a little lower, or less dispersed, than one might have imagined, even if that does not take away from the fact that
the cultural dominant are the most closely associated with the activities demanding high levels of cultural capital, and the business executives and professions with those demanding economic capital. Internal variation plays a part here – as Figure 4 shows, for example, certain sections of the cultural dominant (cultural producers and intellectuals) which are not always numerous enough in samples to warrant disaggregation correspond much more closely with the highbrow cultural activities than do teachers, who make up a large proportion of this class fraction.

One interpretation of the second axis, given the distribution of the class fractions, would be that it represents capital composition, with activities demanding and consolidating symbolic mastery, or catering toward the related dispositions of asceticism and expressivity, being opposed to those demanding economic capital (e.g. paying for equipment and club membership), building social capital (especially in relation to golf and team sports) and/or in synch with the overtly competitive ethos of the economic field (as with the sports and watching sports programmes). However, since it is the most feminised class fractions which correspond with the cultural pole – including the administrators and sales workers, who otherwise have relatively balanced capital composition – and the least with the economic pole – including the technicians, who, like the administrators, have a balanced capital composition – this division could also (or instead) reflect gendered tastes – the outer and the inner, as Bennett et al (2008) had it. Projection of recorded sex into the space seems to confirm this.

[figure 4]

The knot can, in fact, be untangled a little bit by examining the different rates of participation in the key activities on this axis by class fraction for both men and women (Tables 3 and 4). If we do this then the overall pattern which seems to emerge is one of significant interaction or, to use the fashionable term, intersection of capital composition and gender. In relation to sports or physical activities, for example, it can clearly be seen that some are taken up by one sex more than the other across the social space. Dance and yoga are more feminine; golf, skiing, racquet, team and water sports and cycling are favoured more by men. Yet the feminised activities are, among men, undertaken at greater rates by men relatively richer in cultural capital than economic capital – the cultural dominant, the cultural intermediaries and the caring services – while those sports seemingly more masculine overall are (with the exception of cycling) practiced at a greater rate by those in class fractions richer
in economic capital or more balanced in their holdings – the business executives, the professions, LMPs, technicians and skilled trades – to different degrees depending on the relative economic exclusivity of the practice. Among women, however, the same pattern does not really hold: the dominant class, and especially professionals, are most likely to practice both culturally and economically exclusive sports and physical activities, but differences between the two wings of social space are minimal, suggesting that capital composition may be less important than capital volume among women in this regard.

[Tables 3 and 4]

The cultural activities and venues display similar patterns. This time, regularly going to the pub and undertaking DIY are generally more masculine, as is watching sports programmes, while doing crafts/textiles, going to libraries and viewing soaps and (since it corresponds with the cultural/feminine pole of the model) reality television are disproportionately pursued by women across the board. Among men, however, crafts/textiles and libraries are most associated with the class fractions richer in cultural capital, particularly in the dominant and intermediate classes, while going to the pub, doing DIY and watching sport – the latter two in particular reflecting valorisation of practical mastery and certain forms of physical capital – are associated with class fractions richer in economic and/or technical capital, more prominently so lower down in social space. The opposition is, therefore, between the ‘north-west’ and ‘south-east’ poles of the social space. Soaps and reality television are not so clearly associated with cultural capital, but are spurned to the greatest extent by class fractions richer in economic and technical capital in the different classes.

Among women, this time some of the same patterns as found among men can be detected, albeit with some notable differences: libraries are visited most by the culturally rich fractions of the classes, and textiles and crafts are undertaken most by the cultural dominant, cultural intermediate and caring services – but also the skilled workers. This could be because women in this class fraction tend to be in specific trades, especially textiles and upholstery, and may thus be applying their specific species of technical capital. Going to the pub regularly is certainly avoided by the culturally rich, and popular among LMPs as well as white-collar workers, whilst DIY is most popular among skilled workers (and perhaps secondarily technicians) but then indistinguishably so among others. Soaps and reality
television are, once again, less popular within the dominant class as a whole, though the white-collar workers are more partial, and favoured least by skilled workers and technicians within their classes. As with men, administrators and sales workers also seem drawn to soaps and reality television, perhaps suggesting a relationship between an orientation toward affect – since these programmes are all about human relationships and emotional drama – and jobs foregrounding interpersonal skills which, insofar as they are occupied disproportionately by women, are cast as distinctly feminine (‘soft skills’).

**Discussion: The Social Space, Gender and Symbolic Violence**

To summarise, when it comes to the correspondence between the social space and lifestyles in the UK, the prime dimension of difference, homologous with volume of capital, situates practices and tastes vis-à-vis a series of binaries: accessible/exclusive, common/rare, popular/restricted, public/home-based. This appears to be crosscut, however, by a second series of binaries reflecting both capital composition and gendered dispositions: asceticism/materialism, expression/competition, inner/outer, affective/physical. Judging from the class and gender distributions of practices, it might be conjectured that the inner/outer and affective/physical oppositions, and thus overtly gendered dispositions, are more distinguishing lower down in social and symbolic space, while higher reaches are cleft more by capital composition. The result is, therefore, a space of lifestyles organised around four polarities – abstract-expressive, competitive-exclusive, physical-technical and concrete-affective – defined not just by their mutual opposition but, in all likelihood, by mutual antagonism too, undergirding the symbolic struggles and symbolic violence of everyday life manifest not least in all the insulting categorisations and labels hurled at the socially distant and their lifestyles: ‘crass’, ‘brute’, ‘sissy’, ‘flashy’, ‘pretentious’, ‘soppy’, ‘airy fairy’ and so on. Moreover, examination of the data suggests that the gendered division between affect and physicality is not reducible to recorded sex but distinguishes, on one side, women and men in the poorly-paid but increasingly numerous service jobs of the ‘post-industrial’ economy from, on the other, largely male skilled workers and technicians, for whom physical and technical prowess – paired in perception with certain ideals of masculinity – is a source of value.

Taken together with analyses presented elsewhere (Author, 2015, 2016, 2017), therefore, the results not only broadly confirm the applicability of Bourdieu’s general thesis on the correspondence between class and lifestyles to 21st Century Britain. They also confirm, but accentuate and refine, his statement that sex becomes a more salient principle of
taste differentiation the lower and further toward the economic pole one goes in social space since cultural capital inclines both men and women to question and challenge traditional conceptions of ‘what men/women should do’. Yes, affect versus physicality in the dominated class may be homologous with femininity versus masculinity, but the division is not strictly between women and men, as culturally defined by possession of certain physiological properties, but between a version of masculinity – with a long historical pedigree – premised on physical strength or capability and orientations and interests which are defined, in opposition, as feminine (‘soft’, ‘mushy’, ‘wimpy’, ‘gay’), whether they be displayed by someone perceived to be a woman or a man. This refinement of Bourdieu’s findings is likely to be the product of deeper deindustrialisation since Distinction’s day – the decline of traditional skilled male labour and the growth of low-paid service sector jobs emphasising skills and dispositions usually thought of as feminine (care, empathy, self-presentation etc.) to soak up not just increasing amounts of women entering the workforce but young men with a little cultural capital (see Adkins, 2002). In any case the horizontal symbolic struggle within the dominated class tends to mask the greater problem for its warring parties, which is that neither of their orientations are institutionalised and widely defined as legitimate. Vertical domination, and the symbolic power and symbolic violence it produces, ensure that it is education and its symbols, or wealth and its signs, not physical and practical mastery or interest in the concrete-affective, which continue to be misrecognised as definitive of one’s worth in the UK today.

Notes
1. Vandebroeck (2016) offers the exception to the muted or compartmentalised treatment of gender to be found among Bourdieu-inspired analysts of consumption, but he focusses on the narrower field of bodily practices, and with it (though he does not put it as such) the intersection of class practices with the sexual field.
2. For more background information on the BCS and its various waves, see the survey website: http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/BCS70.
3. The remaining lifestyle variables are set as passive in order to maintain balance in the model in two senses: first, following LeRoux and Rouanet’s (2004) advice, to neutralise modalities otherwise registering an excessive contribution on a major axis, usually on account of rarity; and second, transposing Rosenlund’s (2015) guidance on constructing a robust model of social space using MCA, to maintain relative parity between modalities.
hypothesised to correspond with high cultural capital – overrepresented in surveys like the BCS which take them alone to represent ‘culture’ – and those conjectured to correspond more with high economic capital.

4. This is confirmed if the model is rerun excluding the dominated class and again excluding the dominated and intermediate classes. In both cases the general structure of the model is the same as that of the full model, but in the first case the relative strength of the two major axes shifts to 57 percent and 21 percent, and in the second case to 50 percent and 25 percent. The full models cannot be reported here for lack of space but details can be supplied on request.

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