But Were They Talking about Emotions? Affectus, affectio and the History of Emotions

It is well recognized that a history of emotions must account for the fact that the term ‘emotions’ is itself a modern construction.¹ The question arises then, if medieval and early modern people talked about a concept that is recognizably similar to our ‘emotions’ (although this itself may be in dispute), what terminology did they use to describe these affective states that were partly volitional, partly cognitive, and (for some at least) necessarily physiological? Attention has centred on the Latin terms affectus (pl. affectūs) and affectio (pl. affectiones), not least because of the emotions connotations of their modern vernacular cognates ‘Affekt’, ‘affect’, ‘affection’, and so forth. As Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy have revealed, this modern usage is the outcome of deliberate terminological choices made by authors discussing emotions from Spinoza through Kant and Freud to Foucault.²

It is tempting, therefore, for emotions researchers to focus on the terms affectus and affectio when searching for premodern Latinate discussions of ‘emotions’, but this will only offer accurate insights into the history of emotions if we have first clarified the nuances that could have been communicated by these terms.³ These nuances could vary according to genre, popular moral norms, changing philosophical positions—including the growing impact of Christian theology on philosophy in late antiquity and the Middle Ages and the renewed impact of Aristotle on Christianized philosophy in the High Middle Ages—as well as the individual emphases of particular authors, which were shaped by the complex, layered, and inconsistent traditions of earlier usages. Indeed, tradition itself did not guarantee stability of definition: later writers necessarily viewed the theoretical work of their forebears through the lens of more recent developments in science and medicine; others might claim consonance with earlier

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³ For the philological approach of ‘word histories’, see N. Kenny, Curiosity in Early Modern Europe: Word Histories, Wiesbaden 1998; I. MacCarthy, Renaissance Keywords, London 2013. It is important that researchers not simply assume at the outset an identity between affectus / affectiones and ‘emotions’; for example, see I. Van’t Spuijer, Exegesis and Emotion: Richard of St Victor’s De quatuor gradibus violentae caritatis, Sacris erudiri, 36, 1996, pp. 147-160 (p. 147) and Ad commovendos affectus: Exegesis and the Affects in Hugh of Saint Victor, in Bibel und Exegese in der Abtei Sankt Viktor zu Paris: Form und Funktion eines Grundtextes im europäischen Rahmen, ed. R. Berndt, Münster 2009, pp. 215-234 (pp. 215, 219).
authorities while travelling a different definitional trajectory entirely. These considerations should make it clear that no simple account can pin down the meaning of such polyvalent terms as *affectus* and *affectio*: there is no substitute for close reading of these terms in their specific context.

Several considerations that impact on the contextual meanings of the terms recur throughout their premodern history. Perhaps the primary of these is the semantic relationship between the them. Are *affectus* and *affectio* synonyms, or do they signify distinctly? An assumption of synonymity has been common amongst modern emotions researchers and lexicographers, not least because the usage of key premodern authorities, such as Augustine, can be read as tending in that direction.\(^4\) Such a reading may not hold, however, across different periods and contexts. We might find, for instance, that a certain overlap between the terms in the classical and patristic eras yields to increased definitional rigour (though not necessarily consistency) in the Middle Ages, before the interchangeability of the terms is reasserted in the eighteenth century. Indeed, even when the terms are read as distinct, their meanings are not necessarily fixed: within a single intellectual community authors might agree that there exists a distinction between *affectus* and *affectio* while assigning these terms opposite poles when defining it.

Also important to consider are the terms that commonly collocate with *affectus* and *affectio* that have the potential to change or nuance their meaning. Significant in this regard are *dispositio* and *passio*, as they can indicate whether *affectus* and *affectio* are being used to express emotions meanings (*passio*) or something different, such as intention or character (*dispositio*), although both can signify terminology of virtues and vices. Similarly, we must account for the way the meanings of *affectus* and *affectio* are potentially altered when they are compounded with other terms signifying part of the body/mind/spirit continuum, such as *animi*, *animae*, *mentis*, and *cordis*. In both cases, chronological and intellectual context will strongly influence meaning. The Cartesian mind moves and influences the body in ways

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unimaginable to Platonic psychology; natural initial emotional movements of the Stoic passions become potential Christian sins.

Our aim in this article, then, is to flag some of the dangers involved in thinking of *affectus* and *affectio* as necessarily coextensive with modern ‘emotions’, while also identifying instances and patterns in their usage that do seem to be related to histories of the passions, affects, sensibilities, and desires. In the process, our survey ranges widely through Latin writings of the classical, medieval, and early modern eras, into the eighteenth century, offering a series of snapshots of usage differentiated by author, period, and genre, rather than attempting to draw a coherent narrative arc.

**Classical and Late-Antique Affectio and Affectus**

We begin with Cicero, who was highly influential in initiating a philosophical vocabulary for the Latin tradition generally and for the emotions in particular.\(^5\) He asks: ‘For what is courage except a disposition of the soul enduring in facing danger both in work and pain and far from all fear?’ (*Quae est enim alia fortitudo nisi animi affectio cum in adeundo periculo et in labore ac dolore patiens tum procul ab omni metu?*) (Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* [Tusc.] 5.41).\(^6\) Cicero (as often) joins *affectio* to *anima* (mind’ or ‘soul’), making theories of mind relevant to interpretation: for example, is an *affectio* a quality of the whole soul or merely of part of it, perhaps the intellect or will? The terms are related to bodily actions and states (*labore ac dolore patiens*), virtues (*fortitudo*), and paradigmatic classical emotions (*metus, dolor*).\(^7\) Therefore decoding them necessitates forays into questions of sensation, volition, and cognition, and moral, medical, and psychological theories. We wonder whether the ‘disposition’ denoted by *affectio* is an inclination, disturbance, passion, or fixed habit (*inclinatio, perturbatio, passio, habitus*), all concepts related to *affectus/affectio* with distinguished

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\(^6\) For all classical texts and editions, see [http://latin.packhum.org/browse](http://latin.packhum.org/browse) [Accessed 24 August, 2015].

philosophical pedigrees. We see that ‘courage’ is an animi affectio, connecting affectio to virtue theory. In the Stoic frame of virtue as apatheia, fortitudo is absence of fear. Since fear is an emotion, Cicero’s animi affectio may not be an emotion term. But if we reject Stoic passionless sages, affectio could return to the emotion fold. If metriopatheia is allowed, patientia might define not simply unemotional endurance but instead moderated emotional engagement, and dolor might admit the possibility of controlled ‘grief’ rather than emotional pain. Different contexts generate varied semantic terrain for affectio/affectus, offering rich and sometimes incommensurable concepts of affectivity.

A glance at the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae begins to map this field. Affectus is primarily passive, commonly glossed as διάθεσις (‘disposition’, as in Tusc. 5.41 above), ἦθος (‘character’) or πάθος (‘quality’). It often denotes some mental, volitional, or psychic movement caused by an external action, moving towards terms like morbus or dolor (‘illness’ or ‘pain’/‘suffering’) and negative near-synonyms vitium and morbus animi (‘defect’ and ‘illness of mind/soul’). The theme of mental or physical movement continues in related terms including impetus, impulsus, motus animi, commotio, perturbatio, and passio (urge, prompting, movement of the mind, agitation, upheaval, passion). It may also denote the effects of these movements, picking out phenomena often understood as emotions, desires, sensibilities, or virtues, e.g. amicitia, pietas, amor, sollicitudo, studium, caritas, and appetitum (friendship, respect, love, disquiet, eagerness, natural affection [στοργή], desire). Such movements are cognitive or volitional but need not involve active rational reasoning; affectus is regularly contrasted with rational judgment, argument, or proof (ratio, iudicium, fides, probatio, argumentum). The semantic range of affectus indicates in nuce how classical and late-antique theories of ‘emotional’ experience join moral, psychological, rhetorical, and medical theories.

Affectio overlaps closely with affectus. Movements of the mind remain prominent: associated terms include commotio animi, motus animi, intentio mentis. When understanding

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8 Cicero, Tusc. 4.38-4.55; Seneca, De Ira 2.1-4.
9 For Stoics on apatheia, see M. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, Chicago 2007.
10 Stoic fear might be an animi affectio, since the disposition could include passionate states and virtuous apathetic ones.
11 See TLL s.v. affectus/affectio. Here we merely summarise the rich detail, highlighting the most significant meanings for histories of ‘emotions’.
such movements as changes, Christian writers argue that God admits no *adfectiones* (e.g. LACTANTIUS, *De Ira Dei* 4.2 INGREMEAU, SC 289). *Affectio* likewise includes the volitional states *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*, *pietas*, *animus*, *cupiditas* and character dispositions, perceptions, and feelings, linking terms such as *sensus*, *consuetudo*, *cultus*, and *constitutio*. Cicero contrasts it with *habitus* and *studium* (*De inventione* [Inv.] 1.36). *Habitus* is a ‘constant and absolute completedness of mind or body...for example perception of virtue, or some art or knowledge’; *affectio* is a ‘temporary change in mind or body due to some cause, for example joy, desire, fear, annoyance, sickness, weakness’; *studium* is ‘the mind ardently and vehemently applied to some subject with great pleasure, for example interest in philosophy, poetry, geometry, or literature’. The Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus later argues that a *studium* may itself be either a *habitus* or an *affectio*, emphasising the temporary and incomplete, if still emotional, nature of the mental or physical change denoted by *affectio* (*Explanationes in Ciceronem Rhetoricam* I,25,95-129 IPPOLITO, CCSL 132).

Generic differences often explain emphases, although different genres cross-fertilise each other. *Affectio/affectus* unsurprisingly denote bodily states and illnesses in medical texts, while philosophical considerations inform these distinctions. Astrological writers use both terms to signify relationships between celestial bodies and their supposed effects, inflecting philosophical discussions of fate. This meaning also appears in rhetorical, philosophical and historiographical texts probing how estimations of value, pleasure or enjoyment shape relationships. Thus the didactic poet Manilius uses *affectus* to speak of music delighting the ears, highlighting how *affectio* and *affectus* are linked to sense perception and the human capacity to relate to physical objects through ethical or affective judgments (MANILIUS, *Astronomica* 2.148). Drama, rhetoric and historiography push *affectio/affectus*

12 *habitum autem [hunc] appellamus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, ut virtutis aut artis aliquid perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam...Affectio est animi aut corporis ex tempore aliqua de causa commutatio, ut laetitia, cupiditas, metus, molestia, morbus, debilitas...studium est autem animi assidua et vehementer ad aliquam rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, ut philosophiae, poëticae, geometricae, litterarum.*

13 OLD s.v. *affectio/affectus* provides another attempt to categorise the texts cited here.


towards ‘desire’, ‘love’ and ‘sympathetic understanding’. Such genres also inform and are coloured by the ethical and rhetorical discourses discussed above (Cicero, Inv. 1.36) that define affectio/affectus as temporary emotional or ethical dispositions.

This connection between emotions and virtues pervades Christian texts. Sorabji has charted the move from Stoic potential emotions (principia prulidentia affectibus which are not yet fully-fledged affectūs: Sen. De ira 2.2.36) to potential vices. Enacting affectiones/affectūs becomes sinfully indulging in passiones. Augustine broadly follows this general move, but repeatedly downplays terminological differences (civ. 9.4-5 Dombart & Kalb, CCSL 47).

Speaking of ‘movements of the mind’ (animi motibus), he equates the Greek παθή, Cicero’s perturbationes, Seneca’s affectiones vel affectūs, and Apuleius’s passiones, which he thinks is closest to the Greek (civ. 9.4). This blurring of terms may partly be explained by his wider polemic harmonisation of Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic differences concerning virtue and apatheia or metriopatheia. Throughout, Augustine understands affectiones as emotional mental movements that everyone experiences and which may be subjugated to reason (civ. 9.4-5).

Emphasising mental movements advances Augustine’s arguments (against Platonists and Manicheans) that sinful passions arise from both the body and the soul (perturbatio, passio, affectibus pravis tamquam morbis et perturbationibusquatitur) (civ. 14.5-10 Dombart & Kalb, CCSL 48). Yet affectūs towards ‘love of the good and holy charity’ are virtues, affectiones that follow rectam rationem (civ. 14.9). These affectiones are contrasted with morbos and vitiosas passiones (civ. 14.9). They are properly human and God-given movements of the mind that impel Christians to God and the good (civ. 14.9). While Augustine can use affectio to refer

17 E.g. Apuleius, Metamorphoses 3.22; Ovid, Tristia 4.5.30; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.2.15; Statius, Silvae 5.pr.1; Tacitus, Agricola 30.5.
18 E.g. Cicero, de Officiis 3.29, Tusc. 5.47; Ovid, Metamorphoses 7.171, Tristia 4.3.32; Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium 59.1, Oedipus 207; Quintilian, Declamationes minores 270, Institutio oratoria 5.12.9, 8.3.4.
to badly directed affects and desires (civ. 14.10), more often passio or perturbatio are used. The piae caritatis affectus remain in paradise (Gn litt 2,21,3 ZYCHA, CSEL 28; civ. 14.10 on the grander gaudium of paradise), and we hear nothing of ‘pious and loving passiones’. Despite Augustine’s repeated insistence that words are not concepts, the stage is set for later attempts to pin down definitions and distinctions more precisely. Throughout his account, we see the inseparability of ideas of emotion from moral theory and theological anthropology. This conjunction informs medieval and early modern uses of affectio and affectus.

The Medieval World
The development in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of affective piety, which initiated the genre of texts of self-formation, and the emergence of scholasticism, attendant upon the rise of the universities, with its new approaches to knowledge helped to generate new meanings and distinctions between affectio and affectus. Authors of texts of self-formation, aiming to provide an understanding of how the human person can be shaped and approach nearer to God, and the scholastics, desiring to explain the universe from the celestial hierarchies down to the functions of the immaterial soul, developed an increasingly elaborate and refined terminology, and the treatment of emotional complexity was a feature of both developments.

Richard of St Victor
One of the key writers of the new affective piety and development of the interior homo in the twelfth century is Richard of St Victor (d. 1173). In his Beniamin minor (also known as De duodecim patriarchis), the terms affectus and affectio recur over fifty times. Exegeting the wives of the Old Testament patriarch Jacob, Rachel and Leah, as equal gifts from God, Richard defines Rachel as ‘ratio qua discernamus’ ([the power of] reason by which we discern) and Leah as ‘affectio qua diligamus’ ([the power of] affection by which we love). Richard argues that while the spiritual senses (‘spirituales sensüs’) arise from reason, the action of affection produces ordered emotions (‘ordinati affectûs’). That these ‘affectûs’ accord with ‘emotions’

23 Richard of St Victor, De duodecim patriarchis siue Beniamin minor, cap. 3, p. 96.
is made clear when Richard numbers the ‘affectūs principales’ as seven, naming them as ‘spes uidelicet et timor, gaudium et dolor, odium, amor et pudor’ (hope and fear, joy and sorrow, hatred, love and shame)—terms we associate with ‘emotions’. Richard’s exegesis of these ‘affectūs’ as the children of Leah (who signified ‘affectio’), indicates that he views affectūs as individual emotions arising from the broader emotional activity made possible by affectio.\footnote{Ibid., cap. 7, p. 108; see also cap. 36, p. 190.}

This usage seems consonant with Richard’s \textit{De statu interioris hominis}, where Richard lists individual emotional states—‘sic amor, sic timor, sic spes vel dolor’ (love, fear, hope and sorrow)—and adds ‘and any such other emotion’ (‘sic ceterorum quilibet affectus’).\footnote{See similarly cap. 7, p. 108: ‘Principales ergo affectus septem sunt, qui ab una animi affectione alternatim surgunt’, and Richard’s exegesis of Adam and Eve in his \textit{Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmo}, CXXI: ‘Per Adam intellige rationem, per Evam accipe affectionem. Duo sunt, intellectus et affectus’ (PL 196, 363B Migne), where affectus appears to be the sub-definition of affectio.} Equally, when Richard suggests that we should actively shape the nature of our affectio by studiously applying ourselves to love what we know ought to be loved and to love less what is less worthy of our love, affectio would appear to signify an overarching emotional capacity.

However, published texts of medieval works can lead us astray when seeking the history of these keywords, as the \textit{apparatus criticus} of Jean Ribaillier’s edition of Richard’s \textit{De statu interioris hominis} reveals. Medieval scribes copying out texts over subsequent centuries seem to have applied their own understanding of Medieval Latin emotions terminology, either through confusion over distinctions between affectus and affectio, or because they viewed the two terms as synonymous. In manuscripts, the title of Cap. IX, ‘De inquietudine humani affectus’ has the variant ‘humane affectionis’,\footnote{J. Ribaillier, \textit{Richard de Saint-Victor}, De statu interioris hominis, \textit{Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Âge}, 42, 1967, pp. 7-128, (p. 72).} while Richard’s discussion in Cap. XXXIV of the ‘quatuor principales affectiones in corde’ (the four principal affective states of the heart, listed as love and hate, joy and sorrow), finds ‘affectiones’ alternatively supplied as ‘affectus affectiones’ and ‘affectus et affectiones’.\footnote{\textit{De statu interioris hominis’}, p. 71.} When Richard lists attributes of which the will is the ‘imperator et dominus’, these being the thoughts, feelings, appetites, and senses (‘tot cogitationum, tot affectionum, appetituum, sensuum’), scribes give the variant reading ‘affectuum’ for ‘affectionum’ in eleven manuscripts and ‘affectuum aut affectionum’ in a
twelfth.\textsuperscript{29} This should remind us that the meanings of these terms were never consistently apprehended across the medieval period, and that medieval scribes had the power, as do modern editors and translators, to ‘create’ the emotions terminology of the Middle Ages.

**John of La Rochelle**

John of La Rochelle (1200-1245) was a Franciscan theologian and earlier contemporary of the Dominican Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). John grappled in his *Summa de anima* (c. 1235-1236)\textsuperscript{30} with the sorts of definitions to which Aquinas, with his intricate categorization of the *passiones animae*, would provide better known solutions.

To John, a *passio* most simply signifies receptivity; for this reason, he argues, species in the soul (which is receptive of grace) are rightly known as its *passiones*.\textsuperscript{31} However, a passion can also be understood as something received with untoward violence (immoderata *ui*), whereby one disposition (*disposicio*) is altered into another, especially its opposite, and John gives as examples the alteration of one thought (*cogitacio*) or one affective state (*affectio*) into another.\textsuperscript{32} Elsewhere in the text, *passio* is used to describe physiological states and processes, such as hunger and thirst, or the dilation and constriction of the heart.\textsuperscript{33}

John then analyses the powers of the soul according to three authorities: Augustine, John Damascene’s seventh-century *De fide orthodoxa*, and the *De anima* of Avicenna (Ibn-Sinā).\textsuperscript{34} Concluding his analysis of Augustine, John argues that Augustine defines four *affectūs* that arise from the concupiscible and irascible powers of the soul, these being joy (*gaudium*), hope (*spes*), sorrow (*tristicia*), and fear (*timor*).\textsuperscript{35} *Affectūs* here would seem to indicate individual emotions. Yet in his discussion of Damascene not long after, John describes as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 81.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid. p. 149, lines 42-46.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p. 149, lines 46-49.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 222, line 47; p. 262, lines 128-130.
\item \textsuperscript{34} The *De anima* comprised the Latin translation of the first part of Avicenna’s eleventh-century *Kitāb Al-Shifā’,* and it circulated in the West from the late twelfth century: see D.N. HASSE, Avicenna’s ‘*De anima’ in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160-1300*, London 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{35} JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE, *Summa de anima*, p. 196, lines 5-8.
\end{itemize}
affectiones a similar division of affective states (concupiscencia, leticia, timor, tristicia) arising from the same affective powers (the concupiscible and irascible).\textsuperscript{36}

A more precise definition of one of our key terms appears in John’s discussion of Avicenna, where he notes that ‘Affectio uero est motus interior consequens secundum apprehensionem boni uel mali’ (An affection is an interior movement consequent upon the apprehension of good or evil). This produces the usual quartet of joy (gaudium seu leticia), sorrow (dolor seu tristicia), hope (cupiditas seu spes), and fear (metus seu timor), indicating that affectio here signifies ‘emotion’.\textsuperscript{37} Yet we also see here the contributing role of apprehension (thought) to the creation of affection.

John had earlier pointed out the role of thought in the creation of an emotional state in Damascene’s approach, in his description of agonia (a species of timor, fear) as ‘suspicio futuri mali, uel affectus ex existimacione futuri mali, aut est existimacio futuri mali secundum disposicionem proximam’.\textsuperscript{38} That is, the emotion (affectio) of agonia arises either because thought (existimacio) of a future evil produces an emotional disposition (affectus) towards it, or because those disposed (having a disposicio) towards fear of future evil are prone to such thoughts. This analysis (which models Peripatetic and Stoic approaches to emotions) underlines the interaction of thought and disposition in the creation of emotion. John’s relation of Avicenna’s discussion of affective aptitude continues this argument, noting that while humans are equally capable of experiencing any given affectio (for example, sorrow or joy), individuals will be more inclined (apciores) to particular ones.\textsuperscript{39} The primary factor influencing this aptitude will be one’s disposicio apprehensionis, that is, one’s imaginative faculty and its impact on the body,\textsuperscript{40} although one’s habitual experience (disposicio uirtutis motiue...ex consuetudine exercicii) and humoral composition (disposicio complexionis secundum spiritus corporeos et sanguinem et humores) also play a part.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 208, lines 21-25.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 263, lines 6-10.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 211, lines 8-10.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p. 265, lines 1-4.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 263, lines 20-22: ‘Cum enim anima ymaginatur speciem aliquam boni uel mali et corroboratur in ea, statim materia corporalis recipit disposicionem habentem comparacionem ad illam’.
From patristic writers such as Augustine and Jerome, the medieval West had inherited the meaning of *affectus* as a ‘disposition’ in a volitional or intentional sense.\(^{41}\) This usage continued, as, for example, in Heloise’s ethic of intention: ‘Non enim rei effectus sed efficientis affectus in crimine est’ (It is not the outcome of the deed, but the disposition / intention of the doer that renders it a sin).\(^{42}\) Yet as seen in the discussion of John’s *Summa de anima*, the terms *disposicio* and *affectus* were increasingly correlated through the Middle Ages in the context of emotions theory. A more precise definition of *affectus* in this context would be forthcoming in the hugely influential *Prima secundae* (c. 1271) of Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*.

**Thomas Aquinas and the *Summa theologiae***

In the *Prima secundae* of the *Summa theologiae*, the terminological discussion about *passio* features in Quaestio 22, articles 1, 2, and 3.\(^{43}\) Article 1 provides the reader with an initial double definition of *passio*. *Passio* is any state that is ‘received’ or endured by an agent—it is an ontological category and the counterpart to action. In its narrowest sense, *passio* involves the subject being drawn by its sensitive appetite to something that contradicts its nature and therefore entails a bodily alteration for the worse.\(^{44}\) A passion proper therefore results in qualitative motion-as-change in a body. In this sense, there is no essential passion of the soul proper, but of man as a composite of body and soul.

Article 2 offers a more general definition of *passio* and *affectio/affectus* by addressing the question: do passions belong to the soul’s appetitive power (sensitive appetite or the will), or to its apprehensive power (cognition)? Augustine’s plurivocal definition of a passion as a

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\(^{41}\) On Augustine’s use of *affectus* in a dispositional sense, see O’Daly and Zümkeller, *Affectus (passio, perturbatio)*, I, col. 179. See van ’t Spuijer, ‘*Ad commovendos affectus*’, pp. 219-220 on Jerome’s understanding of the biblical use of ‘affectus’ (Psalm 72. 7: ‘affectus cordis’) as ‘dispositio’ and his translation of the Greek term for ‘dispositio’ (διάθεσις) as ‘affectus’.


\(^{43}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Prima secundae in Summa theologiae*, in Corpus Thomisticum, ed. E. Alarcon, University of Navarra, 2013 last accessed 14/08/15: [http://www.corpusthomisticum.org](http://www.corpusthomisticum.org). Subsequent references to the *Summa theologiae* will be abbreviated ST1a for *Prima pars*, ST 1a2ae for the *Prima secundae*.

\(^{44}\) In this respect, ‘sadness’ is more a passion than joy.
motion of the soul equated with *affectio* and *affectus* features in the *sed contra*, the refutation of the preliminary objections of this article. Aquinas interprets the Augustinian definition as an argument in favour of the appetitive rather than apprehensive nature of *passio/affectus/affectio*, and agrees with Augustine. *Passio, affectus*, and *affectio* all express the operation of the appetitive power.

But is the appetite underpinning *passio/affectio/affectus* sensitive, or intellectual (that is, volitional)? Article 3 answers by restating the definition from article 1: passions proper involve the sensitive appetite and transmutation in the body. The scriptural ‘passions’ of anger or pity ascribed to God or angels are therefore mere forms of accommodation, allowing human beings to understand disembodied, intellectual volitions.

Yet the *Prima pars* of the *Summa* suggests a possible distinction between *affectus* and *affectiones*, those quasi synonyms for Augustine. The *Prima pars* defines *affectiones* as the acts of the appetitive power, mediated (sensitive appetite) or not (the will). In this respect, *passiones* are a species of the more general *affectiones*. Aquinas relabels *passiones* in embodied creatures as *affectiones* in order to focus on them as results of an intentional process: it is inasmuch as they are the expression of an appetitive power (whose operation is mediated by the body and induces changes in the body) that *passiones* are *affectiones*. For purely spiritual creatures, such as angels, *affectiones* play the role that changes in the body played for embodied creatures: they testify to intentionality-as-process (unfolding in succession), the actualisation of which results in successive *affectiones*.45

There might be a slight difference between *affectio* as the actualisation of the appetitive power, and *affectus*, which seems to be the very ontological disposition that constitutes such appetitive power.46 *Affectus* denotes the (often spiritual, and in any case voluntary in that it engages the will) source of all *affectiones*-as-volitions. The spiritual connotation of *affectus* is noticeable in the *Prima pars* of the *Summa*, where *affectus* often denotes divine intentionality towards creatures—its paradigm is the *affectus dilectionis*, the love of God that created and

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45 ST1a, Q.10, art.5, response.
46 It is mostly in this sense of an original disposition at the source of the appetitive power and that can be subjected to rational will, that *affectus* is used in the *Prima secundae*. The permeability between *affectus* (as initial disposition) and *affectiones* (as its actualization) is important in the *Prima secundae*, so the distinction suggested here is not a hard and fast one.
sustains the world. Affectus also denotes a spiritual form of human intentionality in man’s relation to God. It is this human affectus as natural intentionality towards the good that is the recipient of grace and the site of faith. However, the human affectus as tendency towards the good is often weak and can be hindered by the passiones of the sensitive appetite.

Early Modern Scholasticism: Passio, Affectus, Affectio, and Ethical Concerns

The definitions of affectus, affectio, and passio in early modern scholastic textbooks testifies to growing ethical and theological concerns about human emotions and the best ways to discipline them. The question of their nature was inextricable from debates on free will and lapsarian anthropologies, those battlefields of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The terminologies surveyed here highlight the scholastic effort to define precisely emotions in faculty psychology in order to better include them within the remit of ethics. These terminological debates thus reflect early modern attempts at redefining man as a conscious and morally responsible subject. These debates also illustrate the fusing of the classical tradition with the legacy of scholasticism—particularly that of Aquinas’s Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae.

Fully-fledged philosophical accounts of emotion featured in the Lutheran textbooks of the famous reformer Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), while commentaries on the Summa remained standard scholastic textbooks in systematic theology throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the Catholic side of the religious divide. This article also focuses on the commentary about Aquinas’s Quaestio 22 in the Prima secundae, in the posthumous 1628

47 The fundamental ontological role of love—the very form of divine intentionality—testifies once more to the discrepancy between our modern understanding of love as an ‘emotion’ and its much larger semantic valence in Aquinas’s system. Love is not only the primordial affectus which is the source of all others: it is the very expression of God’s will in the world, and a key concept in Thomas’s account of the Trinity—love is the proper name of the Holy God (ST1a. Q.37, art.1, response).
48 ST2a2ae, Q.5, art 2, response.
49 ST.1a, Q.113, art.1, ad. 1.
50 See P. LÉCROIVAIN, La Somme théologique de Thomas d’Aquin aux xviiie-xviiie siècles in Recherches de Science Religieuse, 3, 2003, pp. 397-427. Aquinas, who was explicitly granted the status of authority alongside Aristotle in the 1599 Jesuit Ratio studiorum, was crucial in the intellectual weaponry of the Counter-Reformation. Thus the Dominican Bartolomeo de Medina, a renowned representative of the Salamanca school of theology and the founding father of probabilism, concludes the very first section of his commentary on the Prima secundae with a refutation of the Reformed view of justification by faith alone: Bartolomeo de Medina, Expositio in primam secundae angelici doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis, Salamanca 1582, pp. 49-52.
Ad primam secundae D. Thomae tractatus quinque theologici by Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), the leading theologian of the Jesuit order whose schools pervaded early modern Europe. Melanchthon’s textbooks and Suárez’s commentary emphasize the moral nature of emotions by consciously replacing passio with affectus or affectio.

**Philip Melanchthon: Dynamic Affectus and Bodily Passio**

Philip Melanchthon, the ‘Preceptor of Germany’, consistently used affectus instead of passio to mean emotions in his textbooks, thus highlighting the dynamism of emotions as acts rather than mere receptiveness.

In his 1547 textbook on dialectic, the *Erotemata dialectics*, Melanchthon classifies affectus under the category of ‘quality’, that is ‘a form by means of which a substance can move the senses’. The main qualities of substance include the three fonts of action: habitus (ἕξις), affectus (πάθη), and naturales potentiae (δύναμις). Melanchthon distinguishes affectus proper from mere sensations of pleasure and pain which are physical passiones occurring in the body’s muscles and nerves. By contrast, the affectus cordi are motions excited by cognition. Melanchthon then distinguishes two types of affectus cordi proper: lasting ones—love, hate, pity, and envy—are similar to habits. Others are sudden motions similar to the physical passiones: the sudden anger of Ajax strikes his heart like a painful blow to the body.

Melanchthon’s textbook on rhetoric, the 1542 *Elementa rhetorices*, introduced this dichotomy. There affectus is one of the sources of dialectical invention: the positive and negative affective responses to moral propriety (honestum) or shamefulness (turpide) from the audience helps the orator find the right arguments to trigger such responses. The two types of affectus identified in the dialectic are labeled as ‘ethical’ (ἠθος) and ‘pathetic’ (πάθος) in the rhetoric.

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51 **Philip Melanchthon**, *Erotemata dialectics*, in *Opera quae supersunt omnia* in *Corpus Reformatorum*, 13, series 1, ed. K.G. Bretschneider and H.E. Bindei, Halle 1834-1860 (1846), pp. 535-536. I adopt the standard abbreviation of CR for subsequent references to the *Corpus Reformatorum*.

52 ‘Passion (...) means the reception of action and its nervous effects in the patient (...). Sudden affects, which are strikes on the heart, belong here’; **Melanchthon**, *Erotemata*, CR 13, pp. 555-56.

53 **Melanchthon**, *Erotemata*, CR 13, p. 543.
Ethical affectus are ‘lighter’ (leniores) and deserve a softer (blandior) expression than pathetic affectus which are more violent (vehementiores) and best suited to a tragic expression.54

Affectus therefore occupies a middle ground between habits (ἕξις in ontological terms, ἦθος in rhetorical ones) and the passions. The good affectus or habits (στοργαί), defined as ‘natural goodwill’ (naturalis benevolentia), instantiate this position. The natural, rather than acquired, love of parents for their offspring, infused in men by God, is one such good affectus for Melanchton, who notes that these affectūs would be purer if human nature was not depraved. That is why good teaching is necessary to regulate and moderate them.55

Ethics provide that very discipline: Melanchthon returns to the definition of affectus in his textbooks on ethics, the 1538 Philosophiae moralis epitome and the 1550 Ethicae doctrinae elementa. Melanchthon repeatedly defines affectūs proper as the appetites or motions of the senses and the will.56 Against the Stoic view that affects are opinions to be altogether uprooted, Melanchthon locates affectus in the heart as the seat of the appetitive power.57 Good affectūs (στοργαί) are God’s gift and foundations of virtues: uprooting them is a sin. However, the definition of affectus in the Ethicae elementa reasserts the role of cognition: affectūs are conscious appetites. Yet the experience of joy or sadness as these appetites are satisfied or not amounts to affectus-as-passio, that is, the physical experience of pain or pleasure which follows from the heart’s constriction and dilatation.58 Melanchthon takes literally the definition of affectus as motion of the heart: affectus is one of the two causes of the heart’s motion, alongside pulse.59 It is also in a physical, medical sense that he uses affectio—very rarely, compared with affectus—to denote the bodily reverberations of emotions.60

Francisco Suárez: Affectus, not Passio—A Lesson in Lexicographical Propriety

54 MELANCHTHON, Elementa rhetorices, CR 13, p. 454.
55 MELANCHTHON, Erotemata, CR 13, p. 540.
56 MELANCHTHON, Philosophiae moralis epitome, CR 17 (1851), pp. 50-11.
57 MELANCHTHON, Epitome, CR 17, p.42; Erotemata, CR 13, p. 712.
59 MELANCHTHON, De partibus et motibus cordis, CR 17, p. 953.
60 See, for example, MELANCHTHON, Declamatio de praeventione in Homerum, CR 11 (1843), p. 402. However, affectus is also used in a medical sense in Declamatio de studiis linguæ graecæ, CR 11, p. 863.
In a somewhat similar fashion, Suárez’s commentary on the Prima secundae provides a clear terminological statement on the respective use of passio and affectus, and posits the greater propriety of the term affectus over passio to describe the action of the sensitive appetite. His Ad primam secundae D. Thomae tractatus quinque theologici (Lyon, 1628) reorganizes the subject-matter of the Prima secundae into a series of treatises and disputations. The terminological discussion features in the first disputation, ‘On the passions’ of the fourth treatise ‘On those acts that we call passions, and also on habits (...)’. In the first section, intended to define the passio animae, Suarez launches his attack against the term passio in favour of affectus. Aquinas’s definition is too wide, according to him, as it includes any change (mutatio), even one that perfects the subject, although passio is often used to denote a change that corrupts the subject. Suarez then cites John Damascene’s definition: ‘passion is the motion in the senses of the appetitive power due to the imagination of good or evil’, and states that while this term and its definition are commonplace among philosophers, yet this definition is not properly that of passio—which stresses the physical change resulting from such a motion (physica alteratio)—but that of affectus, which denotes the immanent act of one’s appetite, and is therefore the rightful Latin term.

Suarez explains that the Apostles (Paul) and Church Fathers (Chrysostom, Augustine, and Jerome) referred to the cause (affectus) when naming its effects (passiones). In so doing, they emphasized the importance of flesh and incarnation in human sin: it is because affectus can move bodily humours and prompt passiones as bodily changes that humans are susceptible to sin. Yet he also rejects the Stoic usurpation of the term passio to denote solely those motions of the sensitive appetite that contradict one’s nature—an usurpation made by Aquinas who followed Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Seneca’s De ira. Any motion of the sensitive appetite resulting in bodily change deserves the label passio: the Aristotelians, Damascene, and Augustine used the word in that sense.

Finally, Suarez also rejects the distinction between the acts and the passiones of the sensitive appetite, according to which the acts would be elicited by the appetite proper, whereas the passiones would be mere affectiones generated by something else and impacting the sensitive appetite, such as pleasure, pain, etc. He ascribes this view to Henry of Ghent and
Duns Scotus, and refutes it by stating that there is no pure passivity or receptiveness in the vital appetite (affectus), whose very acts are the passiones he has just defined. Suárez’s definitions of affectus and passio highlight the dynamism of emotions and lays the foundation for their renewed integration into ethics: all affectūs are vital appetites, whose actualization triggers the bodily changes known as passiones.61

**Affectus/ affectio in the Early Modern Republic of Letters**

While the Republic of Letters was a permeable, supra-confessional, and ‘interdisciplinary’ space, united in its use of Latin, our ‘affect’ terms are fluid in their application across the various learned discourses in different times, places, and genres. But were they talking about ‘emotions’?

**‘Conditions’ of the Body and Mind**

From the late Renaissance and through the seventeenth century, learned physicians fretted over what they perceived to be an epidemic of ‘hypochondriac melancholy’.62 The title page of Munich physician Malachias Geiger’s *Microcosmus hypochondriacus sive de melancholia hypochondriaca tractatus ...* (1652)63 announces that it will explain the ‘treatment of this affectus, to the extent that it is treatable from the triple font of care, hygiene, surgery, and drugs.’ It might be tempting to gloss affectus as ‘mental illness’ but the condition in question was believed to be a complex of bodily as well as emotional and/or psychiatric problems.64 It must be conceded that there is a disproportionately high number of early modern medical dissertations devoted to the ‘atrabilious’/ ‘melancholic’ / ‘hypochondriac’ / ‘mirachial’ affectus or affectio, which might suggest an intensifying emotional colour to these words. However, we

64 In the preface to his posthumous medical work, *De morbis & affectibus mulierum* (Lyon, 1619), on the ‘‘diseases’ and “affects” of women’, Montpellier physician JEAN DE VARANDA says that the morbi of women are properly those that afflict women and men alike, whereas the affectūs are those specific to women (in this instance) by dint of their ‘distinctive temperament’ [proprii temperamenti] or anatomy. It is important to note that these affectūs of women are not limited to mental or emotional conditions.
continue to find others on, for example, the affectus of the eyes, the affectus of rabies, of old age, and of pregnant women. In a medical context, affectus might best be translated ‘condition’, with perhaps an enhanced sense of ‘complaint’ or ‘affliction’.

From ‘Intent’ to ‘Affection’

A distinct sense of affectus and affectio is retained from Roman law in early modern legal dissertations, for example Johann Kaspar Pflaume, De affectione juridica (1668), Ernst Friedrich Schröter, De affectione (1669), and Johann Alexander Schegk, Dissertatio juridica de affectione (1690). Yet the meaning of ‘will’ or ‘intent’ deriving from Ulpian (150-250 CE) had already acquired a more emotional hue in later Roman jurisprudence and could signify brotherly love between soldiers and fatherly love for children in the Middle Ages. In a philosophical dissertation, Konrad Böttner (praeses), David Ebersbach (respondens), De mutuo parentum atque liberorum affectu (1700), the same emotional destination is arrived at via a different linguistic route: affectus is said to encompass all six of Descartes’s basic passions (sc. from OLD affectus (1)), but here the ‘genus is taken for the species, synecdochically’, i.e. as ‘love’, the affectus that moves us most.

Emotion by Any Other Name?

Hendrik de Roy’s De affectibus animi dissertatio (1650) is one of several early modern dissertations bearing this title or variations of it. Philosopher and Professor of medicine at Utrecht, Regius was in dialogue, and in some matters disagreement, with Descartes. In the present work he offers the following definition of affectus: ‘I say [it is] a “thought”, because it is an action we carry out when attending to a thing, and I say “it is connected with a stronger movement of the spirits of the brain, which affects the mind and body more strongly”’ (p. 4).

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65 Such titles occur in the preceding century, too. Definitions of affectus in Renaissance learned medicine are beyond the scope of this essay. See, for example, I. MACLEAN, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine, Cambridge 2007, p. 261, for affectus as diathesis, i.e. predisposition to a condition.
66 Cf. OLD affectus (2): ‘(w. corporis; or alone) A physical state or condition, esp. pathological’.
emphasizing the mental nature of the affectus, Regius demurs from Descartes’ distinction between passions and actions in the Passions de l’âme, a watershed in the genre, but is still essentially talking about ‘emotions’.69 And if Franz Benno Fugger claims in his Disputatio philosophica de affectibus animi (1623) that the passiones, which are also affectūs and perturbationes animae, are treated by theologians, moral philosophers, physicians, orators, poets, each in their different ways’, the core sense of affectus as ‘emotion’ is shared across all these disciplines in the early modern period—with or without the addition of animi or animae. So in the eighth book of De eloquentia sacra et humana (1618), ‘De affectibus’, Nicolas Caussin, S.J.70 tells us that the affectūs are implanted in us by God, with the soul; if he attempted to eradicate them, as the Stoics enjoin, a man would be left ‘without vigour, sensation, and even worse, astorgos [heartless]’. The affectus are like the wings of a bird that carry the soul on its destined path, as ‘helpers and forerunners of the virtues’. While nodding to the taxonomies of Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas, Caussin gives detailed attention here to the affectūs of love, hatred, anger, and pity.

**Special Affects**

While the basic inherited meanings of affectus—‘condition’, ‘intent’, ‘affection’, ‘emotion’—do not change significantly in the early modern Republic of Letters vis-à-vis earlier periods, there are changing understandings of what, exactly, constitutes an affectus qua ‘emotion’. Moreover, competing tendencies to simplification and proliferation of the affectūs may be observed.

In the preface to his wide-ranging and influential musicological treatise, Musurgia Universalis (1650), Jesuit polymath, Athanasius Kircher writes that ‘through the sense of hearing we don’t merely excite all the animi passiones—mildness, love, anger, fear, pity, emulation, happiness, shame, gloominess ... and an almost infinite number of affectūs immediately brought about in us by the sound of the voice—but we also quell and moderate them’ (Preface, p. 2, my emphasis). In Book 7, Chapter 6, he suggests that there are eight

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70 One of the most important seventeenth-century theorists of the passions, especially for his ‘Empire of Reason over the Passions’, the fourth tome of his Cour saincte (Holy Court: Paris, 1638).
affectūs which music can especially express: ‘The first is love [amor]. The second is grief or lamentation [luctus seu planctus]. The third is happiness and exultation [laetitia & exultatio]. The fourth is rage and indignation [furor & indignatio]. The fifth is pity and tears [commiseratio & lacrymae]. The sixth is fear and suffering [timor & affliction]. The seventh is confidence and boldness [praesumptio & audacia]. The eighth is wonder [admiratio]. All the other pathemata may easily be reduced to these’ (Vol. 1, p. 598). In Book 8, Chapter 8, §2, on the ‘various animi affectiones to which music inclines us’, Kircher compares the orator’s use of arguments and reasons to provoke the various ‘emotions’ (affectūs), to compel the audience’s assent, to the way music also, via the weaving of periods and varied arrangement of tones, moves our ‘mind’ (animum) wherever it wants. It moves our ‘soul’ (animam), however, via three ‘chief emotions’ (affectūs generaless), namely ‘happiness’ (laetitia), ‘remission’/‘mildness’ (remissio), and ‘pity’ (misericordia), each subsuming several other affectūs. While shuffling, combining, if not coining new affectūs/‘emotions’ (for example, timor & affliction, remissio), Kircher does not offer new definitions of affectio and affectus per se and apparently uses these terms interchangeably.

The university culture of the Germanic lands spawned an abundant literature on the passions or vices of learning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.71 In this context, Martin Greim produced his Dissertatio philosophica de affectibus eruditorum (1695). Greim’s basic definition of affectus derives, he says, from Descartes, via Vossius, but he explores in this dissertation the special affectus of the learned, such as theologians’ zeal, the desire to broaden one’s studies and undertake journeys, and curiositas. We may detect a slippage, then, between the common early modern sense of affectus as something like ‘emotion’ towards something more like the modern English ‘passion’ as ‘obsession’. Likewise, Professor of theology and Church history at Geneva, Jean Alphonse Turrettin, De affectibus a veristudio abducentibus, oratio academica (1710), reviews the affectus that detract from our pursuit of truth, the proper end of our studies, which include sloth, greed and ambition, admiration and reverence for learned authorities, pride, partiality, and lust. Turrettin’s list has as much of ‘vice’ as (modern) ‘emotion’ about it. New understandings of affectus in the early modern Republic of Letters are

to be sought not in explicit and linear refinements of scholastic definitions but rather in implicit and often idiosyncratic accommodations of older usages to early modern discursive contexts.

Conclusion

This study could not hope to be exhaustive: it remains provisional and preliminary, and we hope it will lay the foundations for more detailed studies of the crucial Latin keywords affectus and affectio in the premodern history of emotions. In general, we can conclude that while these terms need not denote concepts directly related to our modern understanding of emotions, they very often refer to individual states akin to emotions or to emotional capacities. Affectus and affectio also link these states and capacities (and hence the history of emotions) to wider concerns in literary, intellectual, and cultural history. Our survey suggests that while some authors used affectus and affectio largely interchangeably, others defined them separately, and related the terms to each other in ways significant to theology, philosophy, ethics, rhetoric, and medicine. We see no linear development of a concept here; rather, complex interplays between contemporary thought systems and beliefs and earlier aspects of the tradition produce distinctive concepts in different contexts. This points towards a methodological need to reconfigure ‘emotion’ itself in period terms embedded in their rich contexts. Our investigations have also highlighted other concepts that come into play for different authors in their uses of affectus and affectio, including character disposition, bodily sensations, inclinations (physical, mental, or volitional), and disturbances and passions. Since the ways in which emotions are constructed conceptually change over time, we need to (re)expand our vocabulary to capture the range of meanings implicated in the terms affectus and affectio and their associated physical, cognitive, and volitional components. The complex and contingent histories of affectus and affectio allow us an insight into the varied, obsolete, or strikingly modern ways in which human beings made sense of the diversity of human emotional experience before the term ‘emotion’.