Performance and Power in Social Movements: Biko’s Role as a Witness in the SASO/BPC Trial

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Abstract

This article provides a case study of the relationship between performance and power in social movements. It reveals how movements are able to reiterate established cultures of resistance across time and space through performative means. It also shows how – given requisite stage settings and skilful actors – methods of performance allow movements to subvert established structures of domination to their political advantage. It does this through focussing on Steve Biko’s role as a defence witness in an apartheid-era political trial of leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). It demonstrates how, within the courtroom setting, Biko and the defendants improvised upon various pre-established codes, scripts, and dramatic techniques, augmenting the likelihood that their performances would resonate successfully with their audiences. In addition, it shows how Biko and the defendants used social performance to subvert many of apartheid's established culture structures, enabling them not only to explicitly articulate the principles of BC philosophy, but also to implicitly embody and act them out.

Keywords: apartheid, Black Consciousness Movement, Steve Biko, cultural inversion, cultural reiteration, performativity, social movements

Courtrooms are often the place of high drama, intrigue and subtle legal manoeuvrings. The trial of Sathasivan Cooper and Eight Others was no exception. (Millard Arnold, 1979: xxvi)

Even in societies where opposition to government policy is routinely suppressed, courtrooms sometimes become spaces in which cracks of indeterminacy, challenge, and performative subversion appear. If a concern remains with operating on the basis of due legal process (however unjust the laws of the land may themselves be), such cracks can occasionally find themselves prised open by skilful political maneuverers.

Leaving aside the more general performative means through which members of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) enacted forms of citizenship formally denied them under apartheid (Morgan and Baert, 2017), this article focuses on a particular dramatic scene in the biography of the BCM’s most celebrated charismatic leader, and one of its eventual martyrs, Steve Biko. The scene is Biko’s appearance in court in May 1976 as a witness in the case of ‘The State vs. Saths Cooper and 8 Others.’ Through this case study, the article demonstrates the importance of pre-established cultural formations in both enabling and limiting effective political performance. It does this by showing both how established repertoires of resistance can be innovatively reiterated across settings, and how
established codes of domination can be subverted to a movement’s political advantage by dexterous actors working within particular stage settings.

The importance of such stage settings is paramount. Courtrooms are conventionally understood as venues in which individualised narratives of guilt and innocence are publicly enacted, and their truth or falsity determined. Debates within legal scholarship have improved upon this understanding by focusing on the role played by landmark court decisions in enacting widespread social change (e.g. Dahl, 1957; Rosenberg, 1991). This case, however, shows how the formal and informal rules of a courtroom venue can be drawn upon not merely to demonstrate the innocence of the accused or act against established powers via formal rulings, but instead to establish the culpability of the system that brought charges against them via a series of dramatic manoeuvres. To show how such subversive manoeuvres were enacted, the article focusses upon the performative subtext of the courtroom proceedings, rather than its explicit legal content (IUEF, 1977; Lobban, 1996). In other words, it examines how the defence, and Biko’s testimony, manifested and actualised the BCM philosophy through a variety of dramatic techniques. Since such actualisations did things, rather than simply represented things, the article proposes that they ought to be analysed as ‘performative’ acts. This analysis develops Austin’s well-known distinction between ‘constative’ utterances, which simply describe the world in either a true or false way, and ‘performative’ speech acts (e.g. ‘I promise’) that aim to affect that world in either a ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’ manner (Austin, 1962: 1–25). One of the crucial points Austin makes is that performatives frequently masquerade as constatives, therefore requiring analysis to identify their actual nature. Whilst Austin’s concern was with performatives in language, this article identifies comparable processes occurring in a far broader conception of social performance that has developed out of sociological studies of face-to-face interaction (e.g. Goffman, 1990 [1959]).

As well as building upon philosophical work on ‘performativity’, the article also contributes to a diverse body of literature critical of the deficit of cultural analysis in mainstream social movement studies (e.g. Alexander, 1996; Jasper, 1997; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Polletta, 2006; Snow et al., 1986; Swidler, 2001; Touraine, 1981; Williams, 1995). Whilst this literature has criticised the lack of attention paid to such things as values, collective identities, narrativisation, framing, and emotions (all of which were important aspects of the BCM not addressed in great detail here), with certain notable exceptions (e.g. Alexander, 2011), less attention has been paid to the role of social movement performance in manipulating extant cultural codes to bring about movement objectives. Whilst ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) have long been recognised in movement studies, the focus has typically been on tactical diffusion and ‘spill-over’ between movements (Meyer and Whitter, 1994; Soule, 1997). Direct emphasis on the creative reworking of the codes that structure public meaning-making, alongside ‘thickly descriptive’ accounts of how these processes take place, has been dealt with more thoroughly in empirical studies of the performance of dominant power (e.g. Geertz, 1980), often embodied in the form of iconic political leaders (e.g. Alexander and Jaworsky, 2014; Mast, 2012). This article therefore also contributes to this latter literature, both by showing how the BCM – and Biko in particular – effectively improvised upon pre-existent culture structures embedded within South Africa’s resistance movements, and also how they deliberately inverted and transgressed dominant culture structures, themselves invested in maintaining apartheid’s cultural
legitimacy. The argument therefore illustrates Raymond Williams’s contention that culture ‘is always both traditional and creative’ (1989: 4), always torn between conservation and innovation.

After providing some contextual scene-setting and elaborating on the methods used, I introduce the cast in the courtroom scene over the days in which Biko’s witness testimony was heard. I then describe elements of the backstage preparation for the case before turning to the main concern: a direct analysis of the actors’ onstage performances. I conclude by drawing out the importance of pre-established cultural formations in both enabling and limiting effective political performance, noting that the cultural reiteration and subversion practices identified here are ongoing processes.

Setting the Scene

Part of the lesson learnt from the post-Sharpeville crackdown on apartheid opposition was that incriminating political writings invited government reprisal. Also, although African illiteracy and semi-literacy rates had improved during the preceding decade (Charney, 1993), they were still relatively high during the 1970s (Fuller et al., 1996), and in this context, other modes of communicating ideas beyond the written word acquired greater importance. Gerhart discusses how the adoption of Black Power symbolism, for instance, conveyed messages ‘in a nonverbal language that even the most politically uneducated or illiterate person could understand’ (1978: 295; see also Hill, 2015). The Black Power salute in particular functioned as a totemic signal through which individual Blacks identified a sense of communion with Blacks as a group, and Blackness as an ideal. The growing of ‘afro’ hairstyles, the adoption of Africanist iconography, and the shunning of skin lightening creams helped perform similar functions. Public speaking was also important, for, as Biko noted: ‘People can hear—they may not be able to read and write—but they can hear and they can understand the issues when they are put to them’ (1979: 57). As is common in social movements (e.g. Eyerman and Jamison, 1998; Rosenthal and Flacks, 2011), and especially so in South Africa (e.g. Ansell, 2004; Brown, 1997; Coplan, 2008), the BCM had also been using artistic performance to spread their ideas through groups such as the Theatre Council of Natal, the People’s Experimental Theatre, the Black Art Studio, and the Music, Drama, Arts, and Literature Institute. Indeed, as Walshe points out, ‘five of the thirteen brought to trial were from this world of black theatre’ (1983: 150; see also Cooper, 2016; Gerhart, 1978: 298; Moodley L, 2017; Variava, 2017). Poetry, plays, and a satirical song were included in the prosecution’s evidence during the case (AD1719) meaning that performance was not only a medium of resistance within the courtroom, but also a matter over which they were bring tried.

Even though no act of terror had taken place, or been planned, the defendants in this case were nevertheless accused of ‘participation in terroristic activities’ and ‘promoting racial hostility’ (AD1719, D) under Section 2 of the country’s notorious 1967 Terrorism Act. This charge carried a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of death by hanging. Under this Act, ‘terrorism’ was defined in astonishingly malleable terms (Dugard, 1978), including, for instance, any act with ‘intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic’ or ‘cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility between white and other inhabitants of the Republic’ or, without irony, simply any act that ‘embarrasses the administration of the affairs of the state’. A terrorist ‘act’ itself could literally be anything, and once accused – in contravention of the typical
presumption of innocence – the onus was on the defendant to prove that their intention was not to
commit terrorism. The legislation had been introduced in 1967 to crack down on SWAPO (South
West African People’s Organisation) militia, and also functioned retroactively for five years, which
meant that those convicted could be executed for acts that were not in fact crimes when they were
committed (Lobban, 1996: 48f2). The Act itself was draconian in the vagueness of its formulation, but
the terms of the specific indictment were likewise broad and ill-defined, so broad in fact that the court
ordered the state to supply further particulars since the ambiguity of the initial charges made it
impossible to prepare an adequate defence (Wikileaks, 1975b). All this ambiguity allowed on the one
hand, for an alleged conspiracy to be fabricated out of very flimsy evidence, and political and racist
bias to fill the gaps that a lack of legislative clarity left open. On the other hand, however, it opened
up an indeterminacy to the proceedings that the defence and their witnesses could use to their
advantage.

The trial dragged on for over 17 months, constituting the longest Terrorism Act trial to date,
and the accused had already been detained, incommunicado, for almost seven months prior. Over
8000 pages of evidence were collected and the estimated cost for both prosecution and defence
exceeded R120,000 (CISA, 1976: 15). Biko’s appearance as a defence witness – one of 61 witnesses
who would ultimately be called – lasted for five days. Biko had founded and acted as the first
president of the primary organ of the BCM, the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), and at
the time of the trial he was honorary president of the political wing of the movement, the Black
Peoples’ Convention (BPC). He had been under a banning order since 1973, which, amongst a raft
of other prohibitions on his freedom, restricted him to his hometown of King William’s Town in the
Eastern Cape. His banning order also forbade him from speaking in public, so this event, like all the
best performances, was preceded by an apparent hush (apparent, because in actual fact he had
continued writing pseudonymously). Most importantly, it presented a rare opportunity for Biko to
voice his ideas, not only in front of the immediate captive audience in the courtroom, but also, and
perhaps more significantly, to the wider public, both nationally and internationally, via the bridge
provided by the journalists reporting on the case, in spite of official censorship. Inadvertently or not,
the courtroom stage provided Biko, via the gathered journalists, with a powerful ‘means of symbolic
production’ (Alexander, 2004) when he was officially prohibited from engaging in public
communication.

Such a dramatic pause had also preceded the emergence of the BCM itself in the late 1960s,
thanks to the National Party’s ruthless suppression of the two main opposition movements, the ANC
and the PAC, following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre. As Gerhardt writes, ‘silence pervaded African
political life in the 1960s’ to the point that ‘Blacks who spoke out invited martyrdom’ (1978: 257).
Zithulele Cindi recalls that ‘after Mandela and everyone had been arrested, the older generation were
cowed down – the intimidation had really got hold of them’ (Cindi, 2015). A primary goal of the
BCM was to challenge this pervasive fear and timidity directly (e.g. Biko, 1978), and the movement
quickly and energetically went about filling the quiet.

Methods
The argument presented here draws predominantly from two data sources: one is based upon retrospective recollection, the other was recorded at the time of the events. The retrospective data were gathered through in-depth narrative interviews conducted with activists from the trial and their associates, including seven of the 13 initially charged, and five of the eventual nine who were recharged and ultimately sentenced. The majority of these interviews were conducted and recorded by the author, and ranged in length from two to seven hours, with some interviews taking place over several days. Participants were selected on the basis of their proximity to the court proceedings and their availability to be interviewed. In addition, further contextual data were drawn from interviews conducted as part of a broader project into the BCM also conducted by the author. The data recorded at the time of the events were primarily in the form of court transcripts archived in the Historical Papers Collection of the William Cullen Memorial Library at the University of the Witwatersrand. The transcript of Biko’s specific contribution to this trial – which turned out to be his last public appearance before his death – also appeared outside South Africa in a book edited by Millard Arnold (Biko, 1979). Section 11(g) of the Internal Security Act forbade publication of Biko’s evidence within the country, and newspapers had to be granted a special exemption from this rule by the Minister of Justice. Additional data from the time of the events come from documents published by the BCM and allied organisations, media articles on the movement, and some leaked contemporaneous US diplomatic cables which – written with different interests in mind – provide an alternative angle on the events occurring within South Africa at the time. Whilst the epistemological position adopted in this article rejects the notion that such data triangulation is able to provide any ultimate test of the validity of one’s findings, it does defend the notion that interpretive nuance is established through adding additional coordinates to one’s hermeneutic circle.

The data sources selected are not without shortcomings. Unlike other open-ended question–answer format interviews, narrative interviewing aims to avoid imposing the researcher’s own conceptual schema on the interview, aspiring instead to reconstruct an account of an event from an informant’s own perspective, storyline, and terminology (Bauer, 1996: 7). This helps draw out Verstehen, which can be particularly useful when exploring the subjective meanings of particular events held by participants or onlookers. This strength is also a weakness if the aspiration is to determine a less subjective standpoint, since subjective experience is, by definition, differential experience. Once this experience is further mediated, first through subjective memory (in this case of an event that occurred some 40 years earlier), and second through conscious or unconscious subjective positioning of self and others (a particularly salient matter in politically-charged or adversarial contexts such as this court case) narrative accounts can appear to drift even further away from the terra firma of objective empiricism.

Although the gleaning of subjective narrative is my primary concern, the use of the court transcripts – themselves mediated, though to a lesser extent, through their transcription – helps balance out the potential subjectivist shortcomings of the narrative interviews. First, the fact that they were recorded at the time helps overcome the memory mediation issue. Second, the fact that they were produced for legal documentation purposes reduces the influence of bias arising from political positioning. Although it would be naïve to believe in a functioning democratic ‘separation of powers’ under apartheid, a curious element of apartheid courts was their performance of due process, even whilst the laws they enacted were themselves morally corrupt. This concern with appearances meant
that even though courts served as tools for enforcing some of the most iniquitous injustices of apartheid, they could also serve as arenas for resistance.  

Dramatis Personae

_The law is theatre._ (Sartre, 1976: 126)

Whilst a host of secondary actors operated in the background of the main stage, the principal cast in the courtroom on the days that concern us were as follows. Firstly, the lawyers: the senior prosecution lawyer for the state, Kevin Attwell, was on the plaintiff’s table, and the senior defence lawyer, David Soggot, was on the defence table. An American diplomatic cable noted how the ‘defence approached some fifty [sic] senior advocates to undertake trial before success’ since ‘many senior advocates [were] hoping someday to receive judgeship and therefore hesitant about getting involved in a political trial of this nature’ (Wikileaks, 1975a). Schechner discusses how the role of the barrister grew out of the medieval practice of settling disputes by proxy; where the nobility would employ a ‘champion’ to defend their interests through combat (1988: 238). However, during the days that are of interest to us here, it was Biko – rather than the defence lawyers – who adopted the principle ‘champion’ role, performing his act on the witness stand in direct representation of the defendants.

Presiding over the scene, and punctuating the lawyers’ cross-examination and Biko’s testimony with occasional interjections from the bench, was Judge Boshoff. George Bizos describes how ‘in Biko’s time there was not a single black judge ... in South Africa’ (1998: 87) and Karis and Gerhart note that during this period ‘virtually all judges had a predisposition to favour the state in security cases’ (1997: 143). The judge’s role was particularly powerful since jury trials had been abolished in 1969, and he was therefore entirely responsible for rendering the ultimate verdict. Consequently, his role as an audience to be persuaded was critical. Biko’s testimony was under oath, and throughout the trial the participants were expected to address their contributions directly to the judge in the formal manner of ‘my Lord’. This, combined with the architecture of the room and the costumes of court attire – robes, wigs, neck bands, etc. – helped reinforce the established hierarchy of the various actors, illustrating Geertz’s (1980, 1983) insight into how power is routinely dramatised to those over whom it is exercised. As we shall see, Biko and the defendants would later disrupt this spectacle of hierarchy and rank through similar means of dress and address.

Finally, it is worth noting the role played by the audience in co-producing the scene. Whilst the audience were engaged in decoding the various actors’ encodings (Hall, 1973) they also participated in performance themselves. Despite police intimidation (Magaziner, 2010: 153) supporters crowded the courtroom gallery and the steps leading up to the building on a daily basis to chant, sing, in demonstrate their solidarity with the accused (Manchester Guardian, 1976).

Backstage

Social performance usually begins long before actors arrive on the primary stage, and can continue long after they have left it (Goffman, 1990 [1959]: 114–40). In this particular drama, much
backstage activity had occurred in the meetings with the legal teams in preparation for the case, as well as during the informal encounters amongst the accused in the various holding locations prior to the trial commencing (Cooper, 2016; Moodley S, 2002). These included the Fisher Street Special Branch Office in Durban, Pretoria’s notorious Compol Building, where the defendants had been interrogated and from which reports of torture were commonplace, and eventually the Pretoria Central ‘New Lock’ Prison in Potgieter Street (Cooper, 2016).  

Backstage performance typically includes preparation and rehearsal for the main event, and both formal and informal groundwork helped ready the accused for the courtroom scene. Informally, Zithulele Cindi recalls how during this period, trials tended to be sombre, apologetic affairs, but our trial was not like this. Immediately after we left prison and were put into the police vans ... usually what you have is a police convoy with sirens wailing. Not here. We were the sirens in this case! We’d be singing revolutionary songs, fists out, ‘Amandla!’ [power] ‘Ngawethu’ [is ours] – it was like this for two years in Pretoria. Then when we got there, the trial was supposed to start, we began our singing again in the courtroom every day – the [banned] national anthem [Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika] and other struggle songs – and people in the gallery would join in with us ... the judge would have to wait for us to finish, then he’d enter the court ... that was the spirit ... a lot of people were very politicised by the trial. (Cindi, 2015)

Such dramatic ritual activity can jolt participants into states of ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim, 2001 [1912]), helping cement and reaffirm symbolic boundaries of group membership (Ramphele, 1995: 106). It can also generate and spread affect, as Asha Moodley, wife of accused no. 9, described when first encountering the defendants after their arrest, having been denied contact during their detention. She remembers that although they looked ‘quite skinny and lean ... they were, shockingly, in the most amazingly high spirits, and I think this boosted our morale too, because I think prior to that [our mood] had been one of great anxiety and stress’ (Moodley A, 2002). Likewise, Wilson notes how Biko’s performance inside the courtroom ‘revitalised the fearful, restored solidarity, and assured them that they were amongst those pushing forward the struggle’ (2011: 109). In this spreading of affect, performances can implicitly extend invitations to group membership, as Cindi captures in his comment that ‘a lot of people were politicised by the trial’. Cooper (2016) provides further confirmation of this recruitment mechanism through his later encounters with converts on Robben Island.

Backstage preparation also took more substantive and conventional forms, such as studying speeches delivered in previous political trials (Nefolovhodwe, 2017). Some of the accused, for instance, studied Andimba Toivo ya Toivo’s statement from the dock in preparation for their own defence (Lekota, 2016). This Namibian anti-apartheid leader’s speech had also been delivered in Pretoria, was also a response to a terrorism charge, and also came in advance of ya Toivo being ferried off to serve a term on Robben Island. As we shall see, this was but one of the preceding cultural models that influenced the activists’ own courtroom performances.

On Stage
The stage upon which a performance takes place not only provides a focussed setting for a scene; it also suggests certain dominant readings that tacitly structure audience experience and expectation. The stage on which this trial unfolded was a courtroom in the Palace of Justice in Pretoria, a grand and imposing 19th-century Renaissance-style building that was erected on a plot of land where the first president of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, General M. W. Pretorius, once lived.

Stages disable certain activities and the communication of certain meanings, whilst simultaneously enabling others. For instance, the defendants on this particular stage were not at liberty to exit the stage, and Biko was subpoenaed to appear as a witness, yet the courtroom also provided a rare public platform for speaking about political matters, something that Biko had been banned from doing since February 1973.

Historical events had imbued the courtroom ‘space’ with a powerful sense of ‘place’ (Massey, 2005) and consequently the building itself became an effectual actor in the proceedings, exerting ‘particular narrative effects’ (Smith and Howe, 2015: 8). The Palace of Justice was well known in the history of the South African freedom struggle as the setting of many of its most critical legal battles. Even as the SASO/BPC trial was taking place, the famous anti-apartheid writer Breyten Breytenbach was defending himself against a treason charge in the adjacent courtroom (Cooper, 2016).

The most important political trial to have taken place in the building, however, was the Rivonia Trial of 1963–1964. Symbolic parallels with this earlier event have been noted ‘both in terms of the fearlessness of the leadership and the content of the message that both trials sent out to the black community and the world at large’ (Mangcu, 2014: 194). The Rivonia Trial solidified certain resistance motifs in the collective cultural reservoir that could be elaborated and improvised upon by Biko and the accused (Lekota, 2016). It is important to note, however, that Mandela’s extraordinary three-hour speech at that trial had not been composed in a cultural vacuum, but was itself inspired by Fidel Castro’s even longer defence speech at his Santiago Trial. This is not to deny the originality of these speeches, but to stress that no cultural or political product is forged ex nihilo, and that all such products rely for both comprehension and resonance upon the reiteration and innovation of pre-existent cultural forms. In addition, although Biko did not live to finish his law degree, he had also, like Castro and Mandela, been studying the profession, and this training in the art of juridical manoeuvre no doubt demystified legal process and reduced the intimidation that a court appearance might typically generate.

The aesthetics of the drama also reflected previous events. The defendants’ decision to substitute suits for black skull-caps and black t-shirts stencilled with ‘BPC’ echoed Mandela’s famous decision to don traditional Xhosa dress during his earlier 1962 trial. This nonverbal performance not only challenged expectations, but also signalled disdain for the authority indicated by the legal officials’ costumes thereby implying a certain contempt for the law and those who enacted it under apartheid. The singing of freedom songs both within and surrounding the courthouse (Cindi, 2015; Study Commission on US Policy Towards South Africa, 1981: 180) also ritually repeated performances of solidarity and defiance that had by then established themselves in South African legal dramas. Black Review reported how ‘the accused started singing from the cells below the court-
room, up the stairs until they got into the court-room. At the end of the song they bellowed “POWER AMANDLA”\textsuperscript{10}, typically ending their show ‘with the clenched fist Black Solidarity salute’ to which ‘Black spectators from the public gallery responded’ (BCP, 1975: 85–87; Moodley L, 2017). Tragically, such performances – singing, saluting, Toyi-Toyi-ing, and slogan-shouting – which had been widely acted out during the solidarity rally that led to the court case, were to be repeated in Pretoria the following year. That time in the Old Synagogue at the event of the inquest into Biko’s death (Bizos, 1999: 54).

Cultural reiteration did not stop there. Mandela’s performance at the Rivonia Trial and Biko’s at the SASO/BPC trial also shared a defence strategy. The prosecution made clear that the focus of the SASO/BPC trial would be on an idea – Black Consciousness – much more than it would be on particular individuals or their actions (e.g. Biko, 1978: 109; Christenson, 1991: 85; Kane-Berman, 1978: 107; Lobban, 1996: 47; Magaziner, 2010: 153; The Star, 24 July 1976). Therefore, just as Mandela made the earlier decision not to ‘defend ourselves in a legal sense so much as in a moral sense’ (1994: 429), Biko likewise elaborated the predicament of Blacks in South Africa at the time and the moral necessity of BC in confronting that situation. An earlier lawyer who had proposed a defence strategy of contrition had been dismissed by the defendants (Nefolovhodwe, 2017). The strategy they instead chose to adopt involved a genuine effort to convince the audience of the rectitude of BC philosophy. Crucially, this audience included an openly racist white judge who publicly voiced his doubt that Africans were capable of democratic political organisation (Biko, 1979: 51–60). Biko’s friend and posthumous editor, the Anglican priest Aelred Stubbs, described Biko’s contribution to this strategy as springing from his ‘unquenchable optimism in the power of persuasion if your cause was just’ (in Biko, 1978: 120), again reiterating the ‘ANC policy to try to educate all people, even our enemies’ (Mandela, 1994: 497). Communicating BC philosophy in an effort to change hearts and minds was far more important than tactical manoeuvring to ensure the acquittal of the accused. As Biko expressed it in court, ‘ordinarily people who get exposed to Black thinking begin to be aware of the need for change’ (1979: 210, see also 223 and 70). Indeed, Biko provided such a thorough exposition of BC thinking in the courtroom that the book containing the first publication of his witness testimony could quite appropriately take the simple title \textit{Black Consciousness in South Africa} (Biko, 1979).\textsuperscript{11}

Rhetoric was one technique through which Biko sought to fulfil this strategy of persuasion, and since its inception, courtrooms have, alongside public assemblies, served as rhetoric’s model setting. Since rhetoric is persuasive rather than simply demonstrative – providing arguments rather than proofs – it therefore affects an audience on an emotional as well as a cognitive level. Aristotle refused to subordinate and oppose rhetoric to philosophical exposition as his teacher Plato had done, and instead folded enthymemes (rhetorical arguments) into syllogisms (logical arguments), stating that ‘Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic’ (Aristotle, 1991: 1354a). Rhetoric, Aristotle claimed, was intrinsic to good argumentation, and successful rhetoricians needed to be considered trustworthy, capable of affecting the emotions of their audience, and able to demonstrate their case by means of logical argumentation (1356a). Biko excelled at all three, but it was perhaps the second – the capacity to appeal to the emotions of the audience – that most defined his testimony.
Sydney Kentridge, for instance, remembers hearing through legal circles the ‘strong impression’ Biko had made ‘on an initially unsympathetic judge’ (Kentridge, 2012: 159; IUEF, 1977: 14), and in doing so, his rhetoric extended the performative mode into what Stanley Cavell (2005) has described as the ‘passionate’ mode: speech-acts aimed at making moral claims on their audience. Saths Cooper (2016) recalls how until Soweto exploded on 16 June, the judge appeared ready to dismiss the charges altogether, but his mood quickly changed once the uprising began: ‘[he] began to realise that the result of our conscientisation would be events like June 16th – this was where our activities could lead’.12

At one point, the judge unexpectedly stepped in to offer a seemingly empathetic defence against Attwell’s repetitive questioning of Biko on SASO’s envisioned future society:

[Judge]: Are we getting anywhere, Mr. Attwell? ... What would you have done if you were in their position? What would you have done? (Biko, 1979: 304–306)

In spite of the rewards gained through this persuasive approach, it remained necessary to balance the strategic goal of conveying the rectitude of BC philosophy with the immediate imperative of challenging the accused’s convictions, because the stakes in the latter were so high and the spectre of capital punishment loomed over the proceedings. The stakes were not only high for the defendants, but also for the witnesses since assassination was by this point an established tactic of the security police. Indeed, both Biko and an earlier defence witness (the philosopher, Rick Turner) were dead at the hands of the security police within two years of the conclusion of the trial. All this added to the momentousness of Biko’s testimony, and due to the terms under which the indictments were brought, the playing field was far from level.

Strategically, Biko gave voice to the tenets of BC in part through performatively displaying the dignified self-confidence that the philosophy itself espoused. He had previously argued that fear was a central determinant in South African politics (1978: 73–81), and his self-assured performance implicitly communicated the need to confront such fear head on, both within and beyond the courtroom. More immediately, however, he also had to downplay the revolutionary ambitions of the movement (Christenson, 1991; Mangcu, 2014: 195), deny any connection to illegal organisations such as the banned PAC and the ANC when they were in fact secretly negotiating a united front (Mangcu, 2014: 245–247; Wilson, 2011: 101–104), and characterise BC as unequivocally opposed to violence when its actual position was far more ambivalent (Mokoape, 2017; Nolutshungu, 1982: 178–185).13 At the most basic level he had to convince the judge that the BCM’s activities were all conducted within the confines of the law (Pityana, 1991) whilst simultaneously dodging Attwell’s barrage of leading questions and avoiding all the hazardous paths down which he attempted to lead him. Attwell’s manner of questioning, appeared designed to give the impression that Biko himself was on trial. In short, the defence had a Sisyphean task in comparison to the prosecution, who were themselves shooting at a target vastly enlarged by the extraordinarily broad remit of the Terrorism Act.

Biko nevertheless refused to play the apologetic role of what BC pejoratively called the ‘non-white’ – a similar figure to the ‘Uncle Tom’ epithet in North America. Reading the transcript of his
testimony one is struck by the boldness of his performance, a boldness that only becomes meaningful with knowledge of the high-risk stage on which it was enacted. According to BC, acting self-confidently helped free oneself from the damaging inferiority complexes that apartheid had instilled in the minds of Blacks, in the process stripping racial hierarchy of its doxic aura. Emulating another group understood to be essentially superior was identified as psychologically damaging and self-alienating. Biko explained that it condemned the self to eternally imitative performances, which would by definition remain inferior since only members of that elevated group ‘can tell us how good our performance is’ (Biko, 1978: 95). Even one of the BCM’s most dismissive Marxist critics described the trial as their most ‘courageous showing’, acknowledging that neither ‘the accused, nor those called as witnesses for the defence, made any concessions on principled political issues’ (Hirson, 1979: 293; 162). However, if self-confidence is to be accepted by an audience, it needs to be convincingly demonstrated rather than simply asserted, and Biko did so in a variety of ways.

One example is his transgression of a racialised taboo enshrined in the laws of ‘petty apartheid’ when he announced to the court that he had recently used a ‘White’ toilet within the courthouse (Biko, 1979: 142–143). This announcement conveyed his willingness to contravene demeaning racist laws within one of the institutions designed to uphold them. Another instance is identified by Aelred Stubbs who, in introducing a printed extract from his testimony, writes that,

In answer to a question from Counsel for the Prosecution, ‘What do you think of Africans who work for the Security Police?’ came straight and clear, ‘They are traitors’, and this in a courtroom ringed by armed Security Police, black and white! (1978: 121)

Again, such acts reiterated cultural scripts established in forerunning political trials. Mandela’s reflections on the Treason Trial, for instance, are equally applicable to the SASO/BPC 9 trial:

Here, probably for the first time in their lives, the judges were listening not to their domestic servant who said only what they knew their masters would like to hear, but to independent and articulate Africans spelling out their political beliefs and how they hoped to realise them. (Mandela, 1994: 277)

Humour, and the willingness to use it in such a grave situation, was another way that defiant self-confidence was performatively communicated. To the amusement of the court, accused no. 9, Strini Moodley, offered an ‘anniversary cake’ with a single candle to the prosecuting lawyer, Cecil Rees, to mark a year since the rallies had taken place (IUEF, 1977: 10; Magaziner, 2010: 154). During Biko’s evidence, this humour often took the form of bathos: the sudden lightening of mood to evoke an anti-climax and relax a tense atmosphere. At one point the judge asked Biko ‘But now you refer to you people as Blacks? Why not brown people? I mean, you people are more brown than black’ (1979: 26). Ignoring the implicit insult, Biko responded: ‘In the same way as I think White people are more pink and yellow and pale than White’, to which the judge simply responds ‘Quite’. ‘Laughter’ is recorded in the transcript. Biko then elaborated the serious point that ‘historically we have been defined as Black’ (1979: 26), and that acknowledging this allowed BC to reclaim ‘Blackness’ and
expand it to include all those racially oppressed in South Africa, including so-called ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’.

Another moment of taboo-breaking humour was secured at the expense of the prosecuting lawyer, Attwell, who according to Cindi (2015) had ‘short, dark, curly hair’. Biko, searching for an illustration of a broader point, turned to Attwell and declared, ‘for instance, I could look at you and because of your short hair think that you are a Coloured and therefore call you Black’ (Biko, 1979: 145). Again, ‘laughter’ was recorded in the transcript, and again, the humour came from the unexpected and risky symbolic transgression.

Cindi (2015) stresses that these moments of laughter evoked by Biko were not confined to the accused and their supporters, revealing an important sociological role played by humour in such circumstances. Whether it results from a social pressure to appear ‘in on a joke’, or an uncontrollable paroxysm in response to an amusing comment, laughter’s tendency towards contagion renders it a powerful performative way of expanding the size of one’s sympathetic audience. At the very least, successfully evoking laughter can accomplish the appearance of expanding the sympathetic audience, and appearance is what matters in performance.

During a debate on the viability of ‘one-man one-vote’ democracy in Africa, Biko revealed the judge’s own apparent ignorance, extending his performative self-confidence to the limits of what may have been strategically productive. First, Biko corrected the judge’s claim that the Kenyan independence leader Oginga Odinga had been assassinated, adding that he had also confused two other Kenyan political figures (1979: 53–4). Later in the same discussion, after appearing to suggest that Black South Africans were too ill-informed to build a workable democracy, the judge was forced to acknowledge Biko’s own intelligence and in so doing implicitly conceded apartheid’s irrationality in its denial of the universal franchise.

Judge: If we have to debate whether this government should go on the gold standard or go off the gold standard, will you feel that you know enough about it to be able to cast an intelligent vote about that?

Biko: Myself?
Judge: Yes.
Biko: I think probably much better than the average Afrikaner in the street, my Lord. Judge: Yes, well, that may be so. (Biko, 1979: 57)

Biko was playing a dangerous game, and another witness and BC activist, the poet Mandla Langa, ‘feared for Biko’s openness and obvious display of superior intellect, feared his manner would do him harm’ (Wilson, 2011: 109; also Langa, 2017). The further Biko pushed his performance, the more perilous it became.

Much of the implicit information conveyed during such exchanges drew its performative power from ‘dramatic inversion’ – the turning upside-down of an audience’s expectations. These expectations usually derive from the performance’s dominant framing (Goffman, 1974). On the stage
of an apartheid court, it was not a Black witness’s ascribed role to provide a white judge with a lesson in contemporary African politics, nor was it his role to explain Hegelian dialectics to a white prosecuting lawyer, as Biko enthusiastically did at another point in the trial (Biko, 1979: 216). When Attwell pressed Biko on the meaning of a passage in a BC document, Biko returned Attwell’s questioning by asking him ironically, ‘Can’t you read?’ (Biko, 1979: 304). At another point, Biko took the lead in interrogating his inquisitor directly, letting loose a barrage of follow-up questions when what he deemed to be unsatisfactory answers were provided (Biko, 1979: 196). One of the defence lawyers, Navanethem Pillay, recalled how the defendants similarly refused to ‘play by the rules’, deciding not ‘to apply to the magistrate for permission for relief of their banning orders, and the magistrate would phone me to say, “You know, your clients are so discourteous, they refuse to say ‘Your Worship’ or ‘Dear Sir’”’ (Pillay, 2002). These symbolic actions not only inverted the typical power relationships of a courtroom but, more broadly, those of a culturally structured and legally enshrined white supremacist society (Fredrickson, 1981).

Echoing Mandela’s decision in his 1962 trial to ‘put the state itself on trial’ (Mandela, 1994: 376), Biko similarly inverted the ascribed structure of the proceedings by redirecting the charge of terrorism away from the accused and towards the government. Biko asserted that ‘what happens to Black society at the receiving end of the system of oppression ... constitutes much more definite terrorism than what these men here are accused of’ (1979: 316). This appeal to an authority higher than the court in which it is made was a variation of the so-called ‘rupture defence’ made famous by anti-colonialist lawyer Jacques Vergès. On the point of the BCM’s relationship to the issue of violence, Biko reminds the court of the state’s own violence:

I am talking about definite violence ... people being baton-charged by police, beaten up ... police charging on people ... without arms, and I am talking about the indirect violence that you get through starvation in townships ... the squalor that you meet at Winterveld as you go there now ... at Dimbasa ... where there is no food, there is hardly any furniture for people. I think that is, all put together, much more terrorism than what these guys have been saying. Now they stand charged. White society is not charged. (Biko, 1979: 170)

Attwell reminded Biko that the defendants were accused of ‘causing or encouraging or furthering ... feelings of hostility’ (Biko, 1979: 200) and Biko responded that such a description amounted to exactly what

the System does to us ... Black people are subject to daily experiences which do all the things that you are talking about—cause, encourage and further ... Each time they are insulted by a White man, for God’s sake, you must feel like reacting. (Biko, 1979: 200–201)

Again, these ‘dramatic inversions’ drew their performative power from their upturning of assumed power relations. This unsettling of apartheid’s long-established culture structures implicitly communicated to the gathered audience that the internalisation of fear by Black people in South Africa was beginning to come to an end.

Finally, insofar as Biko’s performance addressed a White as well as Black audience, it also aimed to expose the limits of White experience in comprehending the phenomenology of lived
Blackness in a racist society, what Fanon (1967) called the ‘Fact of Blackness’, or Manganyi (1973) termed ‘being-black-in-the-world’. Transforming the predicament of Blackness under apartheid into an experiential and political resource to which White society had no access, Biko reminded Attwell that he ‘hadn’t got the Black experience, unfortunately’, and that he ‘had to be Black to understand’ what he was talking about. When Attwell struggled to explain that he had ‘got the impression the very first time I read this document...’, Biko interrupted him with the simple statement that ‘That is because you are White’ (Biko, 1979: 243).

Conclusion

The symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a cultural closet and arrayed before the public. Nor are new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes of revolt are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres. (Tarrow, 1998: 118)

This article has offered a performative analysis of Biko’s appearance as a witness at the SASO/BPC trial, showing how within a context of severe repression and legally-enshrined racism, techniques of performance opened up opportunities for resistance. When Biko was forbidden from speaking or writing for a public audience, the courtroom stage provided a rare platform both to verbally expound the principles of BC philosophy, and to performatively act them out. Demonstrating the significance of pre-established culture structures in both enabling and limiting effective political performance, this study has revealed, firstly, how conventional repertoires of resistance can be creatively reiterated across various scenes, and secondly, how established codes of domination can be subverted for a movement’s political advantage.

In terms of the first contribution, it is clear that culture is by definition a public affair (Geertz, 1973: 12), and it is this characteristic of culture that allows us to talk about it as a ‘structure’ at all. The paper has shown how many of the courtroom performances could only resonate by virtue of their being publicly available and comprehensible, which itself relied upon their reinterpreting older, established structures of resistance. This meant that the movement was not compelled to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in order for their interventions to have an effect (McAdam & Rucht, 1993: 58). This point should not be taken to suggest that this episode, nor BC as a movement more generally, was merely derivative, as has been implied elsewhere (Mandela, 2001; Sono, 1993). Rather, it suggests that symbolic expressions acquire both their intelligibility and their dramatic efficacy from reworking – typically in creative permutations – pre-established cultural configurations. In terms of the second contribution, confronting established power was achieved by performatively inverting symbolic hierarchies that both the courtroom stage and wider apartheid society relied upon as cultural buttresses to their legitimacy. In a context where formal political engagement was denied to Blacks, and where the preceding generation of anti-apartheid activists had been jailed, killed, pushed into exile, or forced to operate underground, BC’s aboveground performances acted as a continuation of politics by other means. They also demonstrated how the culture structures from which such performances derive their significance both constrain and enable innovation.

The official outcome of the trial was that all of the accused were found guilty of at least one charge brought against them and sentenced to a minimum of five to six years on Robben Island. Its
performative outcome is less easily assessed. Biko gave his evidence at the SASO/BPC trial and was later killed. But since social performance is never so easily bookended (Morgan and Baert, 2015: 80), even by state killings, many of the cultural motifs manifested during the trial have continued to be expressed by resistance movements in South Africa and elsewhere.

The Soweto uprising, for instance, erupted only a month after Biko’s widely-reported testimony and while the trial was still ongoing.15 This uprising was mostly a spontaneous affair, and beyond the immediate precipitating factors of the National Party’s imposition of the Afrikaans language in the so-called ‘Bantu’ schools and the subsequent firing on unarmed protesting school children, there is much debate over its broader political determinants and the specific role played by BC in inspiring the events (e.g. Charney, 2000: 579–653; Hirschmann, 1990; Hirson, 1979; Lodge, 1983: 330; Magaziner, 2010: 154–157; Mandela, 2001: 47; Marx, 1992: 65–70; Mazibuko, 2016; Pohlandt-McCormick, 2005; Wilson, 2011: 110–111). Nevertheless, the high school BC organisation, the South African Student’s Movement (SASM), certainly played a significant role,16 and BC symbolism was ubiquitous in the protesting students’ placards, graffiti, and slogans. BC ideas had acquired much popularity amongst Soweto schoolchildren during this period (e.g. Johnson, 1988: 15; Kane-Berman, 1978), in large part via politically-aware teachers who had either been expelled or voluntarily left the Black universities following their involvement with SASO (Brown, 2016: 128–130; Heffernan, 2015).

Whatever the extent of the BCM’s role in shaping the Soweto events, just as their own performative interventions drew upon cultural forms established in resistance movements earlier and elsewhere (Gerhart, 1978: 270–281), so the Soweto students likewise borrowed and adapted much of the BCM’s and other movements’ symbolic repertoires to meet the challenges of their own predicament. Brown, for instance, discusses how the Soweto radicals translated the models and ideas provided by BC ‘in terms of their own experiences, and—in doing so—catalysed a true insurrection on the streets of the township’ (2016: 154). He points out that although the BCM did not lead the uprising, ‘their ideas and their examples would be reinterpreted and reinvented’ by the Soweto youth (ibid.). As one might expect, the cultural formations of resistance that were crystallised in Soweto have in turn been reiterated in many subsequent movements both in South Africa and beyond (Heffernan and Nieftagodien, 2016; Turner and Alan, 1986), and this paper’s arguments suggest that such inflected cultural reiteration will only continue to occur.

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**Notes**

1. The number of accused was initially 13, but charges against four were later dropped, and the remaining nine – including four of the five members of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO)’s national executive – were recharged.
2. This was alongside, and in addition to, the more basic task of successful performance in communicating explicit symbolic information to its audiences.

3. Most of the charges in the indictments brought against the SASO/BPC nine related to the organisation of rallies in September 1974 to mark the success of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in forming a majority in neighbouring Mozambique’s transitional government, following the 1974 coup in Portugal and a decade-long guerrilla war (Badet, 2009: 86; Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 145–147; MacQueen, 2013: 520–522; Magaziner, 2010: 152–154). Since FRELIMO were socialist, and the apartheid regime was implacably opposed to any form of socialism, the BCM’s solidarity with FRELIMO immediately provoked a state response (Nengwekhulu, 2017). These rallies represented a watershed in the BCM’s embrace of confrontational protest (Brown, 2012) and were banned the evening before their scheduled occurrence by the Minister of Justice, though crucially, this was not published in the Government Gazette (i.e. officially pronounced) until the morning of the rallies (Brown, 2016: 144; Cooper, 2016). A simultaneous anti-FRELIMO rally in Johannesburg took place unabated (IUEF, 1977: 7). The Secretary General of SASO, Muntu Myeze, released a press statement that the solidarity rallies would go ahead, even though it appears that Biko opposed this decision. Disorder also broke out when police dispersed a FRELIMO solidarity meeting on the black campus of the University of the North (Wolfson, 1976). Neither Zithulele Cindi, nor Strini Moodley participated in the rallies, but both were nonetheless charged for their organisational roles in leading the purported conspiracy to bring about revolutionary change and further racial hostility, of which, according to the state, the FRELIMO rallies were an expression.

4. Section 6(1) of The Terrorism Act also permitted indefinite incommunicado detention without trial, during which torture was common (Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 554–559) and a disturbingly large number of detainees died. This was to be Biko’s own fate the year following the trial. When official explanations of such deaths were forthcoming (often there was no explanation at all), the security police often claimed the prisoner had committed ‘suicide by hanging’, ‘slipped in the shower’, or had ‘fallen down the stairwell’. In one case the detainee was said to have fallen from a tenth-floor window.

5. It was in fact during the trial that Biko, again at much risk to himself, publically revealed his identity as ‘Frank Talk’, the author of a widely-read column in the SASO newsletter (a charge that the prosecution was trying to pin on one of the accused – Strini Moodley, SASO’s publicity secretary). Biko had also been writing a column in the Daily Despatch under Mapetla Mohapi’s name, an activist who also died in police custody.

6. The Rand Daily Mail became particularly active in amplifying and disseminating Biko’s courtroom message throughout South Africa after having earlier been criticised by the BCM for failing to use the affirmative self-definition of ‘Black’ instead of the narcissistic negation ‘non-white’ (Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 124). The World newspaper also played a crucial role, and was also banned. Percy Qoboza, the editor, was detained during the final government crackdown on the BCM on so-called ‘Black Wednesday’, 19 October 1977.

7. One anti-apartheid lawyer described this ambivalent role of apartheid law to me in an interview: ‘in order to be good at one’s job and potentially provide a check on state power, one had to think legally, but the danger was always giving the law a respect and importance it shouldn’t have had’ (Budlender, 2017).
8. Some of the defendants alleged they had been tortured by security police during interrogation leading up to this trial (BCP, 1975: 85–86).

9. At his death, Biko had a pending charge of contravening his banning order by entering an educational institution to take a law exam.

10. Toyi-Toyi is a Southern African stomping and marching dance frequently used in protests during the apartheid era. Developed out of a war dance, it is usually accompanied by call-and-response chanting, and continues to be widely used in demonstrations to the present day.

11. This book was published outside South Africa, and immediately banned within (McDonald, 2009).

12. Possibly influenced by memories of Biko’s earlier performances, Boshoff passed judgement in a later case that there was ‘prima facie evidence of improper and disgraceful medical conduct’ by the doctors who had examined Biko’s evidently tortured body before his eventual death (Taitz, 1986: 374).

13. In 1974 Harry Nengwekhulu had called for the BPC to take up arms, and Keith Mokoape had done likewise the following year (Manguc, 2014: 190, 198).


15. Reflecting on the violence of the uprising, Biko in fact later expressed an idea developed in this article – is that in repressive contexts, political performance acts as a substitute for conventional modes of political action: ‘people started burning down buildings, stoning police ... and in their minds, this was the only language that white people would understand’ (1977).

16. The involvement of SASO in ‘conscientising’ (Freire, 1970; Nkrumah, 1964) SASM students was part of the evidence brought by the state in the SASO/BCP trial (Exhibit SASO G4, 163). The BC activist and Soweto school teacher Onkgopotse Tiro, who was murdered by the South African state via parcel bomb in 1974, had been president of SASM. His student, Tsietsi Mashinini, was a senior SASM office-bearer and led the uprising.

Archives

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