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Introduction

This article is inspired by two reflections. First, when a great international judge steps down, we are afforded the opportunity to look back and analyse their work in ways which were not possible during their tenure. In that regard Hegel advises us that the owl of Minerva takes wing only with the onset of dusk.¹ That is taken to mean that it is only after a period has closed that we can engage in academic critique and appraisal making explicit the ideas and beliefs that drove that era but could not be fully articulated until it was over. No doubt such crepuscular reflections would not be in Judge Mahoney’s spirit if they did not allow criticism in addition to approbation.

Second, when individuals from different backgrounds come together in international forums such as the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (‘the Strasbourg Court’), they represent on the one hand their respective national traditions; but on the other hand it is, as Sir Ian Brownlie once said of Sir Humphrey Waldock, a part of the calling of the international lawyer to ‘avoid insisting on some preconceived personal or national

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¹ G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (H.B. Nisbet tr., CUP, 1991) 23.
viewpoint’. That, it can also confidently be said, fairly sums up the work in the Strasbourg Court of Judge Mahoney. He has always understood that the Convention is a part of the larger universe of public international law, or that the Convention, to use a turn of phrase coined in 1980 by the International Court of Justice, ‘does not operate in a vacuum’ but rather ‘in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of which it forms only a part’. Under the tutelage of Registrar Mahoney, these were the exact words used by the Grand Chamber of in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom: ‘the Convention ... cannot be interpreted in a vacuum’. On this approach, even the language in which judicial cooperation is couched is shared as between different international courts.

The article has two parts, the first one of which concerns especially the living instrument approach and the domestic courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe; it asks the question, ‘How special is the living instrument approach?’ The second part moves to the international level, asking the question, ‘Where next for the living instrument?’ This part engages critically with certain decisions of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court, especially Bankovic v. Belgium and Hassan v. United Kingdom, which one suspects, bear the discreet signature of Registrar – as he first was – and Judge – as he later became – Paul Mahoney.

I. The Living Instrument Approach is Not Exclusive to the Strasbourg Court

It is a well-known systemic aspect of the ECHR rights that the rights of the Convention must be analysed in the light of present-day conditions. The meaning and content of the provisions of the Convention will be understood, as Sir Humphrey Waldock once put it, ‘as intended to evolve in response to changes in legal or social concepts’.

In common with the practice of other international courts and tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights will, when the treaty text to be interpreted invites it, rely on evolutionary interpretation or, in its own idiom, the ‘living instrument’ doctrine. The evolutionary interpretation of treaties has been defined in the following way: ‘the parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning’. Thus the words ‘evolutionary interpretation’, the International Court of Justice explained in Navigational and Related Rights, refer to:

‘situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used – or some of them – a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.

Such an approach is not without a mooring in what international law calls the intentions of the parties to the ECHR: it is therefore no more of a threat to State sovereignty than other forms of interpretation. The approach taken by the Strasbourg Court is one which takes seriously the intention on the part of the Contracting States, as set out in the Preamble to the Convention, that not only the ‘maintenance’ but also the ‘further realisation’ of human rights and fundamental freedoms is incumbent upon the states members, and by extension also on the Strasbourg Court. The Strasbourg institutions understood early on the necessity of seeking ‘the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties’.

Increasingly, this requirement is taken seriously by the domestic courts, too. The Swiss Federal Tribunal having already in 1975 taken the same view that ‘[d]urch ihre Aufzählung übernimmt und entwickelt die Konvention Bestimmungen weiter, welche zahlreiche Staatsverfassungen im Abschnitt über die Freiheitsrechte enthalten oder welche die Vertragsstaaten als ungeschriebene Verfassungsrechte anerkennen’. It is against this backdrop that the Strasbourg Court has put such a premium upon the object and purpose of the Convention, that is, on safeguarding ‘not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.

The nexus between the intentions of the parties and the object and purpose of the Convention was given an accurate description by Judge Fitzmaurice, when he pointed out in Belgian Police that ‘the object and purpose of a treaty...
are not something that exist in abstracto: they follow from and are closely bound up with the intentions of the parties.20

This approach is shared by the law of treaties more generally. It is, as Judge Higgins has pointed out, the ‘wider principle – intention of the parties, referred to by reference to the objects and purpose – that guides the law of treaties’.21 Thus the Arbitral Tribunal in Iron Rhine, chaired by Judge Higgins, in making an evolutionary interpretation of the treaty terms of the treaty at issue in the case, observed that ‘an evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and purpose, will be preferred’.22

This interpretative approach has a long pedigree in the domestic jurisprudence of the French, German and UK courts.23 Whilst their approaches differ, as a function of legal culture and history, there is nevertheless a striking degree of similarity, both between the different domestic approaches and between the domestic and international approaches.

First, on the basis of long held views as to the interaction between legislation and the judicial function, the UK courts interpret statutes taking a contemporaneous and purposive approach as opposed to a historical and strictly textual one.24 Lord Bingham in Quintavalle set out the common law’s view of the relation between the intention of Parliament and evolutions subsequent to the passing of the law. There was no inconsistency between the rule that statutory language retains the meaning it had when Parliament used it and the rule that a statute is ‘always speaking’. The words ‘always speaking’ go back to the Victorian draftsman, Lord Thring, who instructed draftsmen to draft legislation so that ‘an Act of Parliament should be deemed to be always speaking’.25 Against this background, Lord Bingham observed that:

If Parliament, however, long ago, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not properly be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to apply to animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was passed but are so regarded now. The meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ has not changed over the years since 1689, but many punishments which were not then thought to fall within that category would now be held to do so.26

The question arising both in connection with evolutionary interpretations by domestic courts both of domestic instruments and instruments which are – or have a connection to – instruments of international law will be closely bound up with the role to be played by the judiciary under the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. Lady Hale made this point in relation to domestic developments of the level of protection that, in respect of the domestic legal order, flows from the ECHR:

If we are confronted with a question which has not yet arisen in the European Court, we have to work out the answer for ourselves, taking into account, not only the principles which have been developed in Strasbourg but also the principles of our own law and constitution.27

New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General28 offers another instructive common law example, which blends domestic and international sources in an attractive manner. In this case, from the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the court made an evolutionary interpretation of provisions contained in the Treaty of Waitangi, a convention signed in 1840 between the Maori and Great Britain. President Sir Robin Cooke, later to be ennobled as Lord Cooke and take up his seat in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, observed that ‘the treaty has to be seen as an embryo rather than a fully developed and integrated set of ideas’; the correct approach would be to interpret the treaty ‘widely and effectively and as a living instrument taking account of the subsequent developments of international human rights norms’.29

In France, the courts have taken much the same approach. A classic examples is the line of cases from the Cour de cassation, in which it made an evolutionary interpretation of Article 2279 of the Civil Code. Article 2279 provides that: ‘En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre’. When the article was drafted, in 1804, non-corporeal property was not considered, as that did not at the time exist in the way in which it would come into existence in the nineteenth century. Thus the question arose as to whether such movables were to be seen as being covered by the terms of the article. The Cour de cassation determined that these latter phenomena were in fact covered, and that taking possession was of itself capable of generalization and thus applicable to all types of movables.30 Similarly, in Jand’heur the Cour de cassation interpreted Article 1384(1) of the Civil Code

20 Separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, National Union of Belgian Police, no. 4464/70, 27 October 1975, at l. 9. (i).


23 See E. Björne, Domestic Application of the ECHR: Courts as Faithful Trustees, (OUP 2015) 18-22 and 131-154, which analyses this domestic case-law in greater detail.


in the light of is broader object and in accordance with latter-day developments.\(^3\) What **avocat général** Matter said in his conclusions applies to the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État as much as to the Cour de cassation: *la jurisprudence opère une œuvre créatrice : qu’en présence de tous les changements opérés dans les idées, dans les mœurs, dans les institutions, dans l’état économique de la France, on doit adapter librement, humainement, le texte aux réalités et aux exigences de la vie moderne.*

The Conseil d’État takes a similarly evolutionary and teleologic approach to interpretation.\(^4\) This is true not least where the human element invoked by Matter is in play. Thus **commissaire du gouvernement** Ronny Abraham (later to take up his seat as Judge and then President of the International Court of Justice) in his conclusions in *GISTI*\(^5\), adopted by the Conseil d’État,\(^6\) argued that the term ‘minor’ in a 1985 French-Algerian extradition treaty must not to be constructed according to a ‘strictly literal interpretation’ as this would be ‘contrary to the objectives sought by the negotiators of the 1985 convention’.\(^7\)

The same is the case in German law, where for example the Federal Constitutional Court in a line of authorities beginning in the early 1950s developed German constitutional law by reliance upon a doctrine of constitutional change, ‘Verfassungswandel’,\(^8\) according to which terms in the Basic Law were interpreted evolutionarily:

> a constitutional provision can undergo a change of meaning, if in its scope of application new facts appear or known facts by way of development appear in new constellations or take on a new meaning. [Author’s translation].\(^9\)

Nonetheless the fact that the Strasbourg Court has taken this approach might suggest that the national courts would have trouble keeping up, insofar as they are bound to apply a set of rights which are, on the Strasbourg Court’s own admission, ‘dynamic and evolutive’.\(^10\) Some problems will always arise, as might also be the case domestically, as between lower courts and a supreme court. As Bernard Stirn, President of the Section of the contentieux (the Judicial Section) of the Conseil d’État, has put it, ‘the evolutionary and progressive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the role of which has been gradually asserted to the point that it is now quite extensive, has given rise to a solid system of collective protection of fundamental rights, which has become one of the key components of the European legal order’.\(^11\)

Lord Bingham’s dictum in *Ullah*, that the national courts must ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’,\(^12\) for a long time set the tone for the UK courts’ approach to the matter. The approach was called the mirror principle.\(^13\) Its operation was well summarised by Lady Hale in *McCaughey*,\(^14\) where her Ladyship stated that it could not have been Parliament’s intention that the Convention rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 were to remain set in stone as they were when the act was passed or when it came into force. Rather, it must have been intended, she continued, *that the national courts would, at the very least, ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time’. If the evolutive interpretation of the Convention rights means that they now mean something different from what they meant when the 1998 Act was passed, then it is our duty to give effect to their current meaning, rather than to the one they had before.*\(^15\)

As the *Ullah* approach has developed over time, there is at present room for the UK courts to go beyond the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court: but they must not fall short of its standards.\(^16\)

The question has not really come to a head in the same way before the German courts. This is due to the high (and in no way static) standards of the protection which follow from the Basic Law,\(^17\) *Boussouar* and *Planchenault* are examples of the approach taken by the French courts in this regard.\(^18\) In his conclusions, adopted by the Assemblée of the Conseil d’État in its judgment, *commissaire du gouvernement* Mattias Guyomar held that taking into account the European jurisprudence to a certain measure would mean going beyond what the Court requires in the scope of its control *a posteriori* and *in concreto*: ‘To refuse to overturn the decisions which are attacked today would be tantamount to accepting to close one’s eyes and to waiting for Strasbourg to open them for one.’\(^19\) Thus, the Conseil d’État, in the context of Article 13 and the right of prisoners to an effective remedy in contesting administrative decisions against them, developed its understanding of the Convention rights beyond what the Strasbourg Court had done.\(^20\)

As will be seen, therefore, the domestic courts of France, Germany and the UK have been quite prepared to follow the Strasbourg Court’s lead as regards the ‘living’ character of the Convention rights.\(^21\) As is clear not least from the French and UK approach, the domestic courts seem to have done so on the assumption that *not* to do so would have meant not taking seriously the underlying tenets of the system of the ECHR.

\(^{32}\) Cour de cassation, 13 March 1930, *Jund heur c. Les Galeries belfortaises.*


\(^{34}\) Conseil d’État, 29 June 1990, *GISTI.*

\(^{35}\) Conclusions of *commissaire du gouvernement* Abraham, in *GISTI,* (1990) 94 RGDIP 882, 906-907.


\(^{38}\) BVerfGE 3, 407 (422).

\(^{39}\) *Goodwin v. United Kingdom* [GC], no. 28957/95, 11 July 2002 at ¶ 74 = 23 *HR LJ 72* (2002); *Stafford v. United Kingdom* [GC], no. 46295/99, 28 May 2002 at ¶ 68.


\(^{43}\) McCaughy & Another, [2011] UKSC 20, [2012].

\(^{44}\) Ibid. 757 (Lady Hale). Also: 769 (Lord Dyson).


The question of evolutionary interpretation bleeds into another important question, one which has come to the fore especially in French and UK law. Evolutionary interpretation may at times segue into what is no more than taking seriously the underlying principles of the ECHR in a type of case which has not hitherto come before the Strasbourg Court. It is clear enough that to shelter behind the fact that, on a particular Convention issue, the Strasbourg Court has not so far spoken would not be a satisfactory approach to the ECHR. That would mean potentially tempering the impact of ECHR law in all those cases which had not, on identical or similar facts to those of which a domestic court is seized, come up before the Strasbourg Court. By applying a principled approach, the courts avoid using any dearth of Strasbourg authority on an issue as a pretext for refusing to give effect to a right which otherwise seems undeniable.50

Even if the content of an ECHR right must, in terms of its international meaning, be determined by the Strasbourg Court, that does not mean that there can be no variation in the manner in which it finds expression in the jurisprudence of national courts.51 While it is true that the national courts are at pains to keep pace with Strasbourg, it is not so that all national courts in France, Germany and the United Kingdom choose to remain stationary in situations where the Strasbourg Court has not taken a pace which would allow national courts to fall into step beside it.52 In part this is because the national courts take seriously the responsibility resting upon them, according to the principle of subsidiarity,53 to be the first-line defenders of the Convention rights, or as commissaire du gouvernement Mattias Guyomar put it in Boussouar & Planchenaud, it means simply that the courts aim to ‘give full effect to the subsidiary character of the control of the Strasbourg Court, taking charge of giving full effect before national authorities to Convention rights’.54

This is an area in which the development of domestic standards (which may well take colour from those of the ECHR and indeed other international law) and the standards of the ECHR (which may well take colour from the legal culture of the court applying it and adding to its development) tends to become elided.55

Lord Kerr has said about the UK courts that ‘even if a case can be made that in the past we were excessively deferential to Strasbourg, there are recently clear and vigorous signals that we are no longer’.56 The approach taken by the Supreme Court seems to bear this proposition out.57 Lord Bingham in JJ held that the task of the national courts in applying the ECHR is ‘to give fair effect, on the facts of this case, to the principles which the Strasbourg court has laid down’.58 To the extent that these words are in need of any gloss, that was provided by Lord Bingham when he, in his final article, said of JJ specifically, and the way in which the UK courts will rely on the ECHR as set out in the Strasbourg jurisprudence generally, that what the courts will do is ‘to ascertain the true governing principle and apply it’. Lord Bingham did not see JJ as falling foul of his own Ullah principle; nor did he see the case as an outlier: ‘this is not an example cherry-picked to make this point: it is an example repeated over and over’.59 That must be right: it is even arguable that already in Ullah the House of Lords followed just this approach.60

If once they did so in the past, the national courts do not anymore hesitate to resolve the question of whether a claim to a Convention right is viable where there is no clear current view from Strasbourg to be seen. They choose the interpretation that most closely accords with their reasoned view of the content of the Convention right; the national courts do not rely on themselves as remaining stationary with regard to the question of the content of a claimed right. It seems that one can conclude from the jurisprudence of the national courts that the absence of clear jurisprudence from the Strasbourg Court on an issue will not alone supply the answer to whether a claimed Convention right has the content contended for.61 By taking such a principled approach to the ECHR as a floor, the national courts in reality also provide an answer to the questions which have been posited as to whether the ECHR rights ought to be seen as a ceiling too.62

An additional aspect of this theme merits mention. The Permanent Court of International Justice held in Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia that when the Court made an interpretation of a treaty provisions, ‘in accordance with the rules of law, the interpretation given by the Court to the terms of the Convention has retrospective effect—in the sense that the terms of the Convention must be held to have always borne the meaning placed upon them by this interpretation’.63 Or as Alain Pellet has put it, when a court gives an interpretation to a treaty, that treaty ‘est réputé avoir toujours eu la signification fournie par cette interprétation’.64 A similar approach has been taken by the Norwegian Supreme Court, in a case where Justice Møse (who later became a Judge of the Strasbourg Court) gave the judgment of the court. Confronted with the question of whether companies are covered by protections regarding self-incrimination contained in Article 6, the court had been told by counsel for the government that,


51 R. (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v. Ministry of Justice, [2014] UKSC 38 at para. 69 (Lord Neuberger); Re P (Adoption: Unmarried Couple), [2008] UKHL 38 at paras 33-36 (Lord Hoffmann).


56 Kerr (supra note 52) at p. 1.


58 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45 at para. 19 (Lord Bingham).


61 See for example Ambrose v. Harris, [2011] UKSC 43; Kerr (supra note 52) at p. 17.


63 Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, (1931) PCIJ Ser A/B No. 40, 19.

64 A. Pellet et al., Droit international public, (8th edn., LGDJ, 2009) 276.
were it to reach such a conclusion, it would leap ahead of the Strasbourg Court, whose case-law on this particular question was sparse. Justice Møse, correctly it would seem, took the view that this was not necessarily a matter of evolutionary or dynamic interpretation: it was simply a matter of straight down the line operation of the various means of interpretation.66 Not everything that glimmers is gold: not everything that is new is evolutionary or dynamic.

II. Where Next for the Living Instrument?

On the basis of the Strasbourg Court’s past jurisprudence regarding the forward-looking ‘living instrument’ approach, the question could well be asked, Where might the living instrument doctrine take the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court in the future? This part of the article tests a number of hypotheses as to where the living instrument approach could take the Court in future years.

I. Systemic Integration and the Living Instrument Approach

One aspect of the living instrument approach is, as the International Court of Justice observed in Namibia, that ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’.67

This, of course, has not been lost on the Strasbourg Court, which in numerous cases has been prepared to take seriously Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).68 There is certainly scope in the text of the ECHR for such an approach, even apart from the general exhortation in its Preamble towards the ‘further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.69 One general and one specific example could be given.

A general licence given by the text of the Convention for such an approach is set out in Article 53, which provides, in pertinent part, that: “[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured ... under any other agreement to which it is a Party’.70 This clause, together with cognate clauses in other human rights treaties, has been called an example of ‘mobile priority’: Examples of mobile priority can be found in article 53 of the ECHR. It provides for the priority of the human rights instrument offering the wider protection. The ECHR would thus prevail for the parties when it offers a greater protection.71 It provides an attractive and as yet largely untapped textual resource for the further realisation of the rights of the ECHR.

A more specific licence could be thought to have been given by the text of the ECHR in those four provisions of the Convention text which explicitly incorporate general international law, that is, the first sentence of Article 7(1) on no punishment without law;72 Article 15, on derogation in time of emergency;73 Article 35, on the Court’s admissibility criteria;74 and Article 1 of Protocol No 1, on the protection of property. The final of those four provisions relates to a field of law which has, over the last few decades, undergone considerable development, and it is, according to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, as a conduit into the Convention of developments of what the provision terms ‘general principles of international law’ one which holds out great promise.

The text of Article 1(1) of Protocol No 1 provides that: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’ In James v. United Kingdom and Lithgow v. United Kingdom, both of which concerned UK nationals,75 the Strasbourg Court, sitting in its Plenary formation, observed that ‘the general principles of international law’, to which Article 1 of Protocol 1 makes explicit reference, whilst they could not apply in respect of nationals, ‘are incorporated into that Article ... as regards those acts to which they are normally applicable, that is to say acts of a State in relation to non-nationals’.76 The fact that these general principles do indeed apply to non-nationals was also emphasised (in a document available only in French) by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe when it opened the Protocol for signature: ‘Reconnaissant, en ce qui concerne l’article Ier du Protocole, que les principes généraux du droit international, dans leur acceptation actuelle, comprennent l’obligation de verser aux non-nationaux une indemnité en cas d’expropriation’.77

For the applicants in James and Lithgow that meant that they could find no succour in general international law; but the Strasbourg Court made it clear that the general principles of international law do indeed apply to acts of a State in relation to non-nationals. Whilst one might quibble with the conclusion in relation to nationals, there can be no cavil with the Court’s conclusion in relation to non-nationals: there is no doubt, according to the clear wording of Article 1, that the article does incorporate general international law into its scope and that non-nationals must be able to benefit from that incorporation. Going back to the point mentioned about Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention above, such an incorporation would have been there even in the absence of the textual conduit of Article 1. Thus, even in cases which have concerned expropriation of the property of nationals, the Court has ...
held that, 'in this connection, international case-law, of courts or arbitration tribunals, affords the Court a precious source of inspiration'.77 The fact that Article 1 actually sets this out in its text makes the point a fortiori.

The Strasbourg Court in James v. United Kingdom explained why it would be correct as a matter of principle to treat non-nationals and nationals differently in the context of expropriation. The Court determined that Article 14 of the Convention and its prohibition of discrimination did not pose a problem in this connection: 'the Court has consistently held that differences of treatment do not constitute discrimination if they have an "objective and reasonable justification"',78 which the Court held to be the case with difference of treatment in connection with compensation for expropriation. The Court went on to say: 'Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election of designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals.'79

The same point has been made in more recent cases in the context of investor-State arbitrations, such as in Lemire v. Ukraine, where a Tribunal set up under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) observed that: 'this unequal treatment is not without justification: justice is not to grant everyone the same, but solum cuique tribuere. Foreigners, who lack political rights, are more exposed than domestic investors to arbitrary actions of the host State and may thus, as a matter of legitimate policy, be granted a wider scope of protection.'80

But how might those principles contribute to the development and further realisation of the rights of the Convention? Two aspects of the matter will be dealt with here.

First, there can be no doubt whatever that, in respect of expropriation of the property of non-nationals, these principles require full compensation, not just the 'appropriate' compensation that the Strasbourg Court has been content to demand in relation to expropriation of the property of nationals. As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal observed in Sedco v. Iran, there is overwhelming support for the conclusion 'that under customary international law in a case such as here presented – a discrete expropriation of alien property – full compensation would be awarded for the property taken': '[t]his is true whether or not the expropriation was otherwise lawful'.81 In Bilonuoe v. Ghana an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal chaired by Stephen Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, held that '[u]nder the principles of customary international law, a claimant whose property has been expropriated by a foreign State is entitled to full ... compensation'.82 Indeed, this is the position customary international law has taken since the 1920s, going back to the Award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Norwegian Shipowners' claim83 and the famous Factory at Chorzów judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice,84 but also numerous other awards.85

In 1958 Lord McNair, who was the following year to become President of the Strasbourg Court, took the view that according to the principles of international law a State may lawfully take the property of non-nationals only when, amongst other things, it makes 'full compensation' to the alien thereby affected.86 Posing the question whether it was possible, under general international law, even to argue that a non-national who had had his or her property expropriated could be given anything 'less than full compensation', he concluded that he was 'aware of no judicial or arbitral authority whatever for the view that a State is entitled to nationalise the property of foreigners on condition of paying only partial compensation'.87

The principles of international law in relation to non-nationals differ from those of the ECHR in relation to nationals in so far as, regardless of how important the reasons for the expropriation are, there can be no diminution of the compensation that is due to the non-national. As the ICSID Tribunal held in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, concerning expropriation for a weighty environmental reason: 'the fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking'.88 Similarly, the margin of appreciation which the Strasbourg Court relies on in connection with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 claims of nationals is 'not found in customary international law' in respect of expropriation of non-nationals.89

There can be little doubt that State practice supports this position. The USA in 1976 announced that with regard to expropriations of property of US nationals 'the Department of State wishes to place on record its view that foreign investors are entitled to the fair market value of their interests'.90 Occasioned by certain statements by Portugal in relation to the protection of property under the ECHR, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in 1979 all made public statements to the effect that 'the general principles of international law require the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation of the expropriation of foreign property'.91

78 James v. United Kingdom, no. 8793/79, 21 February 1986, § 63. See also ibid.
79 Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/86/18, Award, 28 March 2011, para. 57.
82 Norwegian Shipowners' claims (Norway v. USA), (1922) 1 RIAA 307, 338.
87 Compañía de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, 17 February 2000, para. 71.
88 Sedco v. Iran, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, 28 March 2011, para. 57.
That full market value means no less than the ‘fair market value’ requirement\(^9\) is clear from an abundant jurisprudence, such as Sedco v. Iran (‘fair market value’)^\(^{10}\) and Italian Republic v. Federal Republic of Germany (Plenary Judgment 131), where the Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany held that full compensation meant that it was ‘the market price at the place of dispossession to which the dispossession is entitled’.\(^\text{14}\) Crucially, in international law this has been taken to mean that one has to think away those measures taken by the public authorities of the host State – the measures which in the aggregate make up the nationalization, the expropriation, the dispossession – such that ‘fair market value’ means ‘the amount which a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the [property], disregarding any diminution of value due to the [taking] itself or the anticipation thereof, and excluding consideration of events thereafter that might have increased or decreased the value’.\(^\text{15}\)

There is, as the Court explicitly recognised in James and Lithgow, a great difference as between the level of compensation the Strasbourg Court affords nationals and the level of compensation the general principles of international law afforded non-nationals. As one distinguished Arbitral Tribunal (Reisman, President; Frowein, Kraft, Lagarde and van den Berg) put it, in Bank for International Settlements; it is true that the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court has adopted a flexible standard, described as one of “appropriate” compensation for taking by a State of the property of its nationals; but ‘the general relevance of human rights law aside, the mainstream of general international law’, the Tribunal observed, ‘has required full compensation’.\(^\text{16}\)

That must be correct. It could be added that the European jurisprudence in this regard has thus far related only to nationals,\(^\text{17}\) whereas the international jurisprudence in principle concerns non-nationals. For the reasons given by the Strasbourg Court in James, the general principles of international law give a higher level of protection to non-nationals than the ECHR gives to nationals. This could be thought to mean that there is no disconnect or conflict whatever between the international jurisprudence demanding full compensation for non-nationals and the Strasbourg jurisprudence that gives less than full compensation for nationals. The two sets of case-law complement each other, as James acknowledges, each legal system taking the correct approach within its respective sphere.

Secondly, the question of who is to be deemed a national and who is a non-national is of interest. Article 1 of Protocol 1 is the only article of the Convention to set out on the face of its text that it applies to ‘every natural or legal person’; there can thus be no cavil with the proposition, long recognised by the Court, that Article 1 ‘provides specific recognition of the general position that corporate bodies have rights under the Convention’.\(^\text{18}\) It is germane in that connection that, according to general international law, non-nationals who have set up companies in the host State, instead of operating through a company incorporated abroad, will in certain situations enjoy the same protection as they would have done had they been incorporated abroad. This is clear from the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (USA v. Italy), where the International Court observed that the US American investors Raytheon and Machlett, who owned parts of ELSI, according to international law enjoyed protection in Italy as non-nationals although their company, ELSI, was incorporated in Italy and not abroad.\(^\text{19}\)

Sir Arthur Watts explained the decision in the following way: whilst, up until the 1980s, it was not clear that non-nationals who have set up a company in the host State, instead of electing to operate through a company based abroad, fall under the scope of protection of international law, ‘the Court proceeded on this basis in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI); the United States claimed against Italy for loss and damage allegedly suffered by two US companies as a result of action taken by the Italian authorities against an Italian company the shares of which were wholly owned by the US companies whose direct rights as shareholders were thereby affected’.\(^\text{20}\) This approach has been taken up by other international tribunals, such as the Tribunal in Azturix, which observed that, in ELSI, ‘the ICJ accepted the protection of foreign shareholders by the State of their nationality against the State of incorporation’\(^\text{21}\) and CMS, where the Tribunal observed that ‘the Elettronica Sicula decision evidences that the International Court of Justice itself accepted ... the protection of shareholders of a corporation by the State of their nationality in spite of the fact that the affected corporation had a corporate personality under the defendant State’s legislation’.\(^\text{22}\)

There can be no doubt that, in respect of non-nationals, there is much work to be done before it can be said that the Strasbourg Court has given ‘the general principles of international law’ their fair due in connection with the protection of property. As more applications are directed to the Court in relation to the expropriation of non-nationals, the Court will, on the basis of its approach in

\(^9\) See to this effect e.g. the views of two eminent international lawyers who were both Judges of the Strasbourg Court: S. Petren, “La confiscation des biens étrangers et les réclamations internationales”, (1963) 109 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international p. 542; A. Verdross, “Die Nationalisierung niederländischer Unternehmungen in Indonesien im Lichte des Völkerrechts”, (1959) 3 Netherlands International Law Review 278, 286.

\(^10\) Sedco v. Iran (supra note 81), p. 533.


\(^12\) INA Corp v. Iran, Award, 12 August 1985, (1985) 75 ILR 595, 603. Also: Santa Elena, (supra note 88), para. 71; Sempra Energy Int. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 Award, 28 September 2007, para. 405; El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, paras. 702-703.


\(^14\) See note 74 supra regarding the non-national initially involved in Lithgow whose application was declared inadmissible.


\(^18\) Azturix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 2003, para. 71.

\(^19\) CMS Gas Transmission Co v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, para. 44.

James and Lithgow, indubitably give full effect to these
general principles of international law as developed by
international courts and tribunals.

2. European Consensus

The nexus between the living instrument approach and the
interpretative technique codified in Article 31(3)(b) of
the VCLT is a close one. As the Court observed in A, B & C v. Ireland, the existence of a consensus has long played a
role in the evolution of the Convention provisions from
Tyrell v. United Kingdom onwards. For this reason, the Convention being considered a ‘living instrument’ to be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions: ‘Consensus has therefore been
invoked to justify a dynamic interpretation of the
Convention’.108 Similarly, as the Special Rapporteur of
the International Law Commission (ILC) Georg Nolte has observed, the Strasbourg Court ‘frequently relies on
subsequent practice when it identifies a “consensus”, “vast majority”, “generally recognised rules” or a “distinct
tendency”’, although it does not explicitly advert to Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b) in that regard.109

Furthermore, the general approach of the Strasbourg
Court in this connection seems to be in line with Draft
Conclusion 3 of the ILC106 on subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of
treaties, which stipulates: ‘Subsequent agreements or
subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist
in determining whether or not the presumed intention of
the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give
a terms used a meaning which is capable of evolving over
time.’ As the ILC here brings out, there is nothing special
about treaty terms being interpreted as having evolved;
the issue of evolutionary interpretation of treaties is one
of the correct application of Articles 31-33 VCLT.107 The
possibility, raised by Judge Ziemele in Mangouras v. Czech
Republic, that a better way of conceptuallizing “consensus”,
in connection with the living instrument approach, is as a
matter of ‘particular’ or ‘regional’ customary international
law, will not be developed any further here, although
it seems to this author a promising avenue for further
analysis.108

But what is the line that divides what is and what is
not capable of interpretation under the living instrument
doctrine, or in other words, what could be termed to be
living and dead in the European Convention?
In Hassan the Strasbourg Court found that ‘a consistent
practice on the part of the High Contracting Parties,
subsequent to their ratification of the Convention, could
be taken as establishing their agreement not only as
regards interpretation but even to modify the text of the
Convention’.109

This interpretation was, according to the Court,
based on the interpretative techniques codified in Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b)-(c). These considerations did not lead to
an evolutionary interpretation that heightened the level of
protection afforded by the Convention; rather, they
limited or restricted that level of protection. As a matter
of treaty interpretation under the rules set out in Ar-
ticles 31-33 VCLT, i.e. the ‘gold standard’ of treaty
interpretation which the Strasbourg Court itself explicitly
follows, this interpretation was not necessarily wrong in
principle but was inappropriate by reason of the subsequent
practice which existed in the case. Before addressing that
question squarely, however, it is necessary first to touch on
three other points: first, that Hassan is not the first case
in which the Grand Chamber has taken an approach which,
by way of evolution, restricted Convention rights rather
than expanding them; second, the issue of extraterritorial
demarcation; and, third, the issue of the fundamental principle of
treaty interpretation which is not always applicable.

3. Restricting the Convention’s Protection through
Evolutionary Interpretation?

As adumbrated above, Hassan was not the first case in
which the Court arguably has watered down the level of
protection flowing from Article 5. Perhaps the most
important example is Mangouras v. Spain,110 where, it seems,
the Grand Chamber (by a majority of 10 to 7) decided to
lower the protection offered by Article 5 of the Convention
to the individual claimant, who had caused great harm to
the environment in the form of an oil spill. The Spanish
courts had set a bail of three million euros, a sum which
was, according to the minority of the Grand Chamber, ‘far
beyond the means of the applicant, with the consequence
that he continued to be detained on remand for a total of
eighty-three days’.111 Whilst the case is different in many
ways, one could see Mangouras as lowering the standards
of protection in Article 5 of the Convention concerning
the setting of bail against the applicant. Certainly, Judge
Tulkens has characterised the judgment as an example of
how evolutionary interpretation can ‘in some cases, have as
an effect the restriction of the scope of the rights protected
by the Convention’.112

The Grand Chamber stated that in principle ‘the
increasingly high standard being required in the area of
the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic
societies’.113 But this did not lead the Grand Chamber to the
conclusion that the applicant’s rights under Article 5
had evolved towards a higher level of protection for
individuals in the applicant’s situation. Instead the Grand
Chamber stated that it could not ‘overlook the growing
and legitimate concern both in Europe and internationally
in relation to environmental offences’.114 The subsequent
practice in Mangouras was evidenced in particular by
States’ powers and obligations regarding the prevention
of maritime pollution and the unanimous determination
by European States to identify those responsible and to
impose sanctions on them, sometimes using criminal law
as a means of enforcing environmental law obligations.
The Grand Chamber’s analysis in Mangouras fell short of
the exacting test as to what is subsequent practice
drawn up by the International Court of Justice: according
to the International Court, in Kasikili/Sedudu Island, a
subsequent practice is established only when the parties
to a treaty, through their authorities, engage in common
conduct, and that they acted wilfully and with awareness of
the consequences of their actions.115

106 A, B & C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, 16 December 2010, § 234.
109 See generally E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, (OUP 2014).
111 Hassan (supra note 5), § 101.
112 Mangouras v. Spain [GC], no. 12050/04, 28 September 2010.
113 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Bratza, Bonello, Cabral Barreto, Björgvinsson, Nicolau, and Biafuku.
114 F. Tulkens, What are the limits to the evolutive interpretation of the Convention?, (Council of Europe, 2011) 8.
115 Mangouras v. Spain (supra note 110), § 87.
116 Ibid. § 86.
It seems fair to analyse Mangouras as an example of an international court shying away from giving to a treaty provision an evolutionary interpretation that would have gone with the grain of the object and purpose of the treaty, and instead found guidance in the subsequent agreements and practice of the States, which seemed in the event to go in the other direction. In Mangouras, in other words, the Grand Chamber gave precedence to subsequent practice over the object and purpose, thus avoiding a divergence between its own jurisprudence and the practice of States Parties.

4. Extraterritorial Derogations?

Second, can it be right for the Strasbourg Court to expand jurisdiction without a consonant enlargement of the potential for derogation? To state the question differently, is it tenable to hold a State accountable because it exercises jurisdiction abroad all the while denying it the possibility to derogate extraterritorially?

The UK Supreme Court in Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed & Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence recently took the view that it can scarcely be possible to derogate extraterritorially, and so did the minority of the Grand Chamber in Hassan. Simply stated, the obligation to afford human rights protection in the context of the external exercise of State power is not likely to be amenable to derogation. This is so because Article 15 lays down as a condition for express derogation that the emergency in issue be one which ‘threatening the life of the nation’, The Strasbourg Court in Lawless v. Ireland determined that the words ‘refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed.’ Lord Bingham, delivering the lead judgment in Al-Jedda, observed that ‘[i]f it is hard to think that these conditions could ever be met when a State had chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation, however dangerous the conditions, from which it could withdraw’, Lord Hope, delivering the lead judgment in Smith v. Ministry of Defence, observed about the power to derogate that ‘[t]he circumstances in which that power can properly be exercised are far removed from those where operations are undertaken overseas.’ Before Al-Waheed & Serdar Mohammed, Campbell McLachlan summarised the legal position thus: ‘[e]ngaging in an overseas military or peacekeeping operation, undertaken at the State’s initiative, that one can derogate out of all extraterritorial military activity undertaken by armed forces; derogation is not an on-off switch for human rights obligations. The provision provides that the State may take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention only ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; as is clear from Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, 2007 UKHL 58, para. 38. Smith et al. v. The Ministry of Defence, 2013 UKSC 41 at para. 60.

The Strasbourg Court were to go against the views of the leading writers and of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court in Al-Jedda & Serdar Mohammed.

If the Strasbourg Court were to go against the views of the leading writers and of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court and allow derogations in such circumstances, the acceptability of the derogation is likely to depend heavily on the impugned facts. One might say that there is a difference between the interventions in Libya in recent years, and interventions that, if nothing else, came rather closer to being prompted by the life of the nation being threatened at home. It is certainly not possible to say, ex ante, that one can derogate out of all extraterritorial military activity undertaken by armed forces; derogation is not an on-off switch for human rights obligations. The provision provides that the State may take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention only ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; as is clear from A. v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009 = 30 HRLJ 83 (2009–2010). A. Sari & N. Quénivet, “Barking up the Wrong Tree: How Not to Save the British Armed Forces from Legal Defeat”, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/04/barking-up-the-wrong-tree-how-not-to-save-the-british-armed-forces-from-legal-defeat/.

In any case, derogations in circumstances such as those prevailing in Hassan would, as pointed out by Sari and Quénivet, come with a series of ‘important limitations, including the fact that derogations are incapable of displacing the applicability of the Convention as a whole, that they are subject to scrutiny by the Strasbourg Court and are without prejudice to other applicable rules of international law, including other applicable human rights norms, and that the rules of the ECHR overlap with those of the law of armed conflict in a number of respects’. Derogations therefore should not be regarded as a ‘magical panacea’.

5. Are there Special Rules for the Interpretation of Issues of Jurisdiction?

A question that was addressed by both parties in Hassan but which did not come to a head directly in the judgment is the correctness or otherwise of what the Court observed in Bankovic about evolutionary interpretation and Article 1 of the Convention. As the Court stated in that case, ‘[i]t is true that the notion of the Convention being a living instrument to be interpreted in light of present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case-law’. It continued by pointing out that it had ‘applied that approach not only to the Convention’s substantive provisions ... but more relevantly to its interpretation of former Articles 25 and 46 concerning the recognition by a Contracting State of the competence of the Convention organs’. Given, however, that ‘the scope of Article 1 ... is determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties’ obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention system of human rights’ protection as opposed to the question ... of the competence of the Convention organs to examine a case’, the Court in Bankovic declined to apply the living instrument doctrine to the jurisdictional use of Article 1. The Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court in Bankovic held that the living instrument doctrine (or ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutionary interpretation’) did not apply to Article 1, as that Article pertains to jurisdiction.

It is difficult to accept this conclusion on its face. There is, as a matter of principle, no reason why special doctrines of interpretation should apply to issues of jurisdiction. As a matter of international law, Article 1, like any other provision of the European Convention, has to be interpreted in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 31-33 VCLT. No special rules of interpretation apply to jurisdictional provisions. As the senior Arbitral Tribunal (Stephen, President; Crawford; Schwebel) in Mondev determined: there is no principle either of extensive or restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties. In the end the question is what the relevant provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable
rules of interpretation of treaties. These are set out in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\textsuperscript{131}

The Tribunal added: ‘Neither the International Court nor other tribunals in the modern period apply any principle of restrictive interpretation to issues of jurisdiction.’\textsuperscript{126}

The main point in this connection, however, is a very simple one: whilst it must be incorrect to say, as the Court did in Banković, that special rules of treaty interpretation should apply to Article 1, it is also wrong to think that the concept of jurisdiction that the Court now relies on has somehow evolved since the Convention’s inception. Rather, what is at issue here is the straight-forward application of a concept that, although it was confused in \textit{Banković},\textsuperscript{127} has always been there and is not so much evolving as finally being allowed fully to apply.

6. Was the Interpretative Result in Hassan Supported by the Subsequent Practice of States?

Turning, then, to the main issue to which \textit{Hassan} gives rise, how convincing is the claim of consistency of the interpretative result in \textit{Hassan} with the VCLT?

First, it is worth pointing out that the result in \textit{Hassan} was in no way a novel one: the Commission had already reached it in 1976 in \textit{Cyprus v. Turkey}, where the Commission had taken account of the fact that both Cyprus and Turkey are Parties to the (Third) Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949... Having regard to the above, the Commission has not found it necessary to examine the question of a breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{128}

It is worth recalling, however, as Judge Greenwood has done, that the Strasbourg Court has no more than ‘a restricted jurisdiction and cannot directly enforce rules drawn from outside the body of law which created it’.\textsuperscript{129}

This coheres with the conventional basis of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisdiction. Article 19 ECHR establishes the Strasbourg Court ‘[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’. Its jurisdiction, according to Article 32(1), ‘shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto’, Article 32(2) adding that ‘[i]n the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide’. In recent times, other international courts and tribunals have taken a similar stance to Judge Greenwood’s point.

The \textit{Kishenganga}\textsuperscript{130} Tribunal, in its interpretation of the Indian-Pakistani Indus Waters Treaty and Annexures, underscored that, in interpreting the treaty, ‘principles of international environmental law must be taken into account’.\textsuperscript{131} Paragraph 29 of Annexure G to the Indus Waters Treaty, however, made it clear that: \textit{the law to be applied by the Court shall be this Treaty and, whenever necessary for its interpretation or application, but only to the extent necessary for that purpose, the following in the order in which they are listed: (a) international conventions establishing rules which are expressly recognized by the Parties; (b) customary international law.}

Thus the Tribunal noted that ‘the place of customary international law in the interpretation and application of the Indus Waters Treaty remains subject to Paragraph 29’; ‘this Treaty expressly limits the extent to which the Court may have recourse to, and apply, sources of law beyond the Treaty itself’.\textsuperscript{132} In an important passage, the Tribunal concluded that: \textit{if customary international law were applied not to circumscribe, but to negate rights expressly granted in the Treaty, this would no longer be ‘interpretation or application’ of the Treaty but the substitution of customary law in place of the Treaty.}\textsuperscript{133}

That is the danger that other international law is ‘applied not to circumscribe, but to negate rights expressly granted in the Treaty’ which the court in question is entitled to interpret and apply. Then the court is no longer engaging, to use the wording of Article 32(1) ECHR, in the ‘interpretation or application of the Convention and the protocols thereto’, but, to use the words of the \textit{Kishenganga} Tribunal, in ‘the substitution’ of international humanitarian law ‘in place of’ the ECHR. As was seen above, the ECHR does not include the kind of clause that the Indian-Pakistani Indus Waters Treaty and Annexures included; instead the relationship between the Convention and other international law is regulated through Articles 31-32 VCLT.

On the basis of those rules of interpretation, the Arbitral Tribunal, chaired by Alain Pellet, in \textit{RREEF v. Spain}, created by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),\textsuperscript{134} and whose competence was challenged on the grounds that the EU Treaties ousted the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, observed: ‘[I]n case of any contradiction between the ECT and EU law, the Tribunal would have to insure full application of its “constitutional” instrument, upon which its jurisdiction is founded. ... It follows from this that, if there must be a “hierarchy” between the norms to be applied by the Tribunal, it must be determined from the perspective of public international law, not of EU law. Therefore, the ECT prevails over any other norm (apart from those of \textit{ius cogens} – but this is not an issue in the present case).’\textsuperscript{135}

Thus, in \textit{Hassan}, the Court set out the ‘criterion contained in Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, in respect of which the ‘Court has made it clear on many occasions that the Convention must be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part’.\textsuperscript{136} The Court noted that it had already held that Article 2 should be interpreted ‘so far as possible in light of the general principles of international law, including the rules of international humanitarian law which play an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of armed conflict’.\textsuperscript{137}

In addition to the criterion contained in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT came the fact that no Contracting State has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{127} See C. McLachlan, \textit{Foreign Relations Law}, (CUP, 2014) 319-345.
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Cyprus v. Turkey}, nos. 6780/74 et al. (Report of the Commission, 10 July 1976), § 313.
\item \textsuperscript{129} C. Greenwood, “Rights at the frontier: protecting the individual in time of war”, in: B.A.K. Rider (ed.), \textit{Law at the Centre}, (Kluwer, 1999) 278.
\item \textsuperscript{130} \textit{Kishenganga} (Final Award), (2013) 157 ILR 362.
\item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{Kishenganga} (Partial Award), (2013) 154 ILR 1, 173 at para. 452.
\item \textsuperscript{132} \textit{Kishenganga}, Final Award, para. 111.
\item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95.
\item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain}, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, para. 75.
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Hassan} (supra note 8), § 102.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, § 102.
\end{itemize}
purported to derogate from its obligations under Article 5 ECHR in order to detain, during international armed conflicts, persons on the basis of Geneva Convention III and IV. Although, as the Court noted both in Banković and Hassan, there have been a number of military missions involving Contracting States acting extra-territorially since their ratification of the Convention, none of these States has ever made a derogation pursuant to Article 15 in respect of these activities. The practice of not lodging derogations in respect of detention under Geneva Conventions III and IV during international armed conflicts, the Court pointed out in Hassan, is mirrored by State practice in relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Under this instrument no State has explicitly derogated under Article 4 in respect of such detention, even subsequent to the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinions and DRC v. Uganda Judgment, where the International Court made it clear that States’ obligations under the international human rights instruments to which they were parties continued to apply in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, particularly in occupied territories.

If it would have been wrong to rely only on extraneous rules of law such as the Geneva Conventions, the interpretation that the Strasbourg Court made was supported too by the subsequent practice of the parties. That takes one dangerously close to the situation described by the Kishenganga and RREEF tribunals, i.e. one in which the court or tribunal engages not in the interpretation or application of the treaty of which it is the arbiter, and which gave it its jurisdiction, but instead in the ‘substitution’ of other rules of international law ‘in place of the Treaty’. Perhaps that would have been the case if other rules of international law had been the only means of interpretation in favour of the interpretation that the Court made in Hassan. As seen above, however, that was not the case, as another means of interpretation favouring the result was, according to the Court, the subsequent practice on the part of all the States Parties.

This approach was sound in principle. As the ILC has recently confirmed, a subsequent practice is ‘an authentic means of interpretation’ consisting ‘of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty’. The importance of such subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as an element of interpretation, is obvious, as ‘it constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty’. On the other hand, as the ILC pointed out both in 1964 and in 2013, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(a)-(b) are not the only “authentic means of interpretation”. In particular the ordinary meaning of the text of the treaty is also such a means “the text of the treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties”. By describing subsequent practice as an: “authentic” means of interpretation the Commission recognizes that the common will of the parties, from which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the meaning of the treaty, even after the conclusions of the treaty. The Vienna Convention thereby accords the parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal instruments in some domestic legal systems. In 1964 Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock was prepared in certain circumstances to accord particular – even decisive – weight to subsequent practice which is consistent and which embraces all the parties:

Subsequent practice when it is consistent and embraces all the parties would appear to be decisive of the meaning to be attached to the treaty, at any rate when it indicates that the parties consider the interpretation to be binding upon them. In these cases, subsequent practice as an element of treaty interpretation and as an element in the formation of a tacit agreement overlap and the meaning derived from the practice becomes an authentic interpretation established by agreement.

The ILC in 2013 confirmed this approach to the extent that it observed that: ‘subsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such interpretation when “the parties consider the interpretation to be binding upon them”.

That, according to the Strasbourg Court’s description of the practice of the States Parties, was the case in Hassan. In the Court’s view, all the States Parties seemed to consider the interpretation to be binding upon them. The subsequent practice in question in Hassan was, the Court held, consistent and embraced all the parties to the Convention, as ‘no Contracting State has purported to derogate from its obligations under Article 5 in order to detain, during international armed conflicts, persons on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions’. Arguably, in such case, to use Sir Humphrey Waldock’s words, ‘subsequent practice as an element of treaty interpretation and as an element in the formation of a tacit agreement overlap and the meaning derived from the practice becomes an authentic interpretation established by agreement’.

As a matter of treaty interpretation the approach the Court took in Hassan is possible in principle, but only if one accepts that the failure of the Member States to derogate extra-territorially met the threshold as regards subsequent practice – a point that can certainly be doubted. Could it not be that some States failed to derogate because they thought – à tort ou à raison – the Convention would not apply in Hassan type cases? Could others, equally, have felt that purporting to derogate could have amounted to agreement that the Convention ought to bind in this type of case? Did the States in this regard act willfully and with awareness of the consequences of their actions?

Another issue is that some States, Germany being one, refrained from detaining any individuals in Afghanistan.

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138 Banković (supra note 7), § 62; Hassan (supra note 8), § 101.
141 Kishenganga, Final Award, para. 112.
142 ILC 2013 Report, Chapter IV, A/68/10, Draft Conclusion 4(2).
143 ILC Yearbook 1964 II, pp. 221-222.
147 ILC 2013 Report, Chapter IV, A/68/10 p. 22.
148 Hassan (supra note 8), § 101.
149 Declaration in the Seventh Report by the Federal Government on its Human Rights Policy in the Context of Foreign Relations and in Other Policy Areas (BT-Drs. 15/5800 ...). In the ICRCs Customary IHL database, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule99SectionA, under “Germany. Practice Relating to Rule 99. Deprivation of Liberty. Section A. General” it is stated that: “Since April 2007 German forces have detained no individuals in Afghanistan.”
as they in fact assumed that they were bound by human rights obligations in situations such as those at issue in Hassan.150

Whilst, in principle, subsequent practice could legitimately lead to the kind of extreme interpretative results which was the outcome in Hassan – an interpretation that is plainly contra legem – it is far from clear that the requisite practice actually obtained in Hassan.151

There are other limits to such an approach, too, such as the one set out in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Whaling in the Antarctic. There the International Court found that the functions which the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling152 conferred on the International Whaling Commission (IWC) had ‘made the Convention an evolving instrument’.153 The Court observed that ‘amendments to the Schedule and recommendations by the IWC may put an emphasis on one or the other objectives pursued by the Convention, but cannot alter its object and purpose’.154 In line with this approach, the subsequent practice of the Contracting States to the ECHR may put an emphasis on one or other of the objectives pursued by the ECHR; but it cannot be allowed to alter the Convention’s object and purpose. Whilst it would seem that Hassan is within the outer bounds drawn up by the International Court, in that it scarcely altered the very object and purpose of the Convention, the interpretation that the Strasbourg Court made might nevertheless be thought to have been an unsatisfactory one.

III. Conclusion

If one compares with the approaches taken to legal interpretation by European domestic courts and other international courts and tribunals, there is little that is special about the living instrument approach of the Strasbourg Court. As the Court continues to develop its living instrument approach, and its interpretation of the Convention more broadly, it should do so in a way that is closely wedded to the text of the Convention. For the purposes of the development of the Convention through interpretation and application, there is much interpretative mileage in the text of the Convention’s Preamble, in Article 53 and in specific material provisions such as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The recitals in the Preamble and the provisions referred to open up for a living instrument approach that is firmly rooted in the text of the Convention. The real danger for the development of the interpretation of the Convention lies in contra legem interpretations such as the one the Strasbourg Court made in Hassan and Banković. In that regard the Strasbourg Court should take to heart the classic dictum of the International Court, which can apply no less to the European Court than to the International: ‘It is the duty of the Court to interpret’, ‘not to revise’, the Convention.155

Appendix: Abbreviations (selection)

AC: Appeals Cases
BVerfGE: Official collection of judgments,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Entscheidungssammlung
CLJ: The Cambridge Law Journal
CUP: Cambridge University Press
EHRRL: European Human Rights Law Review
EWCA Civ: England and Wales Court of Appeal
(Civil Division)
GISTI: Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés
ICSID: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Washington, D.C.
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
ILC: International Law Commission
ILM: International Legal Materials
ILR: International Law Reports
LGDJ: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence
LQR: Law Quarterly Review
NZLR: New Zealand Law Reports
OUP: Oxford University Press
PCIJ: Permanent Court of International Justice
QB: Queen’s Bench
RGDIP: Revue générale de droit international public
RIAA: Reports of International Arbitral Awards (United Nations)
RFDA: Revue française de droit administratif
UKHL: United Kingdom House of Lords
UKSC: United Kingdom Supreme Court
UNTS: United Nations Treaty Series
WLR: Weekly Law Reports
Ybk: Yearbook

150 For example, “Germany accepts the recommendation and already submitted the following declaration to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2004: Pursuant to Article 2(1) CCPR, Germany ensures the rights recognized in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when participating in peace missions, Germany ensures to all persons that they will be granted the rights recognized in the Covenant, insofar as they are subject to its jurisdiction”. Germany’s replies in the Universal Periodic Review 2009: Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Germany. Addendum. Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the States under review, A/HRC/11/15/Add. 1, 2-3.


153 Ibid. para. 56 (italics added).