
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document

University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/user-guides/explore-bristol-research/ebr-terms/
Just Deserts? Justice, deservingness & social assistance

Bridget Anderson & Pier-Luc Dupont

This Report was written within the framework of Work Package 5 “Justice as lived experience”

August 2019

Funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union
Acknowledgements

This report builds on national case studies by our ETHOS partners and would not have been possible without these studies and the authors of previous Deliverables, particularly D2.1 and D2.3. We thank the reviewers for their generous and helpful comments.

Want to learn more about what we are working on?

Visit us at:

Website: https://ethos-europe.eu

Facebook: www.facebook.com/ethosjustice/

Blog: www.ethosjustice.wordpress.com

Twitter: www.twitter.com/ethosjustice

Hashtag: #ETHOSjustice

Youtube: www.youtube.com/ethosjustice

European Landscapes of Justice (web) app: http://myjustice.eu/

This publication has been produced with the financial support of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission.

Copyright © 2019, ETHOS consortium – All rights reserved ETHOS project

The ETHOS project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 727112
ETHOS - Towards a European Theory Of justice and fairness, is a European Commission Horizon 2020 research project that seeks to provide building blocks for the development of an empirically informed European theory of justice and fairness. The project seeks to do so by:

a) refining and deepening the knowledge on the European foundations of justice - both historically based and contemporary envisaged;
b) enhancing awareness of mechanisms that impede the realisation of justice ideals as they are lived in contemporary Europe;
c) advancing the understanding of the process of drawing and re-drawing of the boundaries of justice (fault lines); and
d) providing guidance to politicians, policy makers, advocacies and other stakeholders on how to design and implement policies to reserve inequalities and prevent injustice.

ETHOS does not merely understand justice as an abstract moral ideal, that is universal and worth striving for. Rather, it is understood as a re-enacted and re-constructed "lived" experience. The experience is embedded in firm legal, political, moral, social, economic and cultural institutions that are geared to giving members of society what is their due.

In the ETHOS project, justice is studied as an interdependent relationship between the ideal of justice, and its real manifestation – as set in the highly complex institutions of modern European societies. The relationship between the normative and practical, the formal and informal, is acknowledged and critically assessed through a multi-disciplinary approach.

To enhance the formulation of an empirically-based theory of justice and fairness, ETHOS will explore the normative (ideal) underpinnings of justice and its practical realisation in four heuristically defined domains of justice - social justice, economic justice, political justice, and civil and symbolic justice. These domains are revealed in several spheres:

a) philosophical and political tradition,
b) legal framework,
c) daily (bureaucratic) practice,
d) current public debates, and
e) the accounts of the vulnerable populations in six European countries (the Netherlands, the UK, Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Turkey).

The question of drawing boundaries and redrawing the fault-lines of justice permeates the entire investigation.

Alongside Utrecht University in the Netherlands who coordinate the project, five further research institutions cooperate. They are based in Austria (European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy), Hungary (Central European University), Portugal (Centre for Social Studies), Turkey (Boğaziçi University), and the UK (University of Bristol). The research project lasts from January 2017 to December 2019.
Executive Summary

This Deliverable explores the relation between justice and social assistance, a means-tested state benefit that is in principle non-contributory. It is the last of three fieldwork based Deliverables in ETHOS Work Package 5 on justice as lived experience. The experiences foregrounded in this strand of research are those of frequently excluded or oppressed sections of the population. Theories of justice often imply, and in some cases explicitly express, rationales for a welfare state in Europe. D5.5 examines what attention to policy and to stakeholders reveals about the relationship between social assistance and justice. The Deliverable is informed by, and meant to be read alongside, six case studies on Turkey, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom. Prior to analyzing the national case studies, the authors extracted from previous ETHOS Deliverables key theoretical insights to be tested and interrogated through experiences of social assistance, with particular attention to Deliverable 2.1 Report on the European Heritage of Philosophical Theorizing about Justice (Rippon et al, 2018), an introduction to the European heritage of philosophical theorizing about justice, including contemporary debates. The structure of this Deliverable reflects the structure of the previous philosophical Deliverable D2.1 following its headings: 1) What are the grounds of justice? (i.e., how can the existence of claims of justice be explained); 2) What is the shape of justice? (i.e. what are the main concerns of justice, and what kind of principles should regulate these); 3) What is the site of justice? (i.e. is justice a feature of political institutions, personal character and actions, or social relations?); 4) What is the scope of justice? (i.e. who has claims of justice on each other and are there distinctive claims of global and/or domestic justice).

We find that ideas of justice are mobilised, not to support claimants, but to support the ‘taxpayer’ and the citizen working poor who are represented as the losers if the welfare state is too generous. Respondents’ ideas about social assistance call on ideas of appropriateness or fittingness of treatment and might be seen to draw on Aristotelian ideas of moral character or virtue as a desert basis for economic distribution. This is particularly evident when considering the pattern of distribution. Using Van Oorschot’s (2000) ‘CARIN’ criteria: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Neediness we explore how reciprocity trumps deservingness and the implications of this for recognition. While the welfare state is often represented, in both political theory and practice, as one of the pinnacles of achievement of European citizenship, to be in receipt of social assistance is neither experienced nor viewed as the imprimatur of citizenship, but rather it raises serious questions of misrecognition. The emphasis on need means that those in receipt of benefit often feel the weight of social judgement on their personal behaviour, choices and values, or that they are the object of pity; the imposition of symbolic reciprocity, which may also be represented as enhancing capabilities, is undermined by the failure to recognise activities as work, and, in some cases, by imposing activities that are considered socially demeaning. Furthermore, we argue that attention to outcomes is not sufficient for justice concerns, and that in many cases the procedures for claiming were themselves experienced as an injustice even if the outcome was not.

Policy recommendations

Critical theory-building is a necessary but not a sufficient step toward the formulation of policy recommendations, an activity that also requires in-depth knowledge of political institutions, social norms and aspirations, and structural constraints. The following recommendations should therefore be interpreted as a set of promising ideas aiming to overcome what appears to be widespread problems in contemporary European welfare states, and that could be used and adapted by those concerned with manifestations of injustice in the European Union and beyond. In addition to EU legislative, executive and judicial bodies, this could include civil society organizations engaged in
lobbying and global actors such as the International Labour Organization or the United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights. This being said, we leave for a future occasion the problematization of the current allocation of social assistance responsibilities to states rather than international organizations which may be better positioned to address the challenges of a globalized economic order. While the recommendations are pitched at a relatively high level of abstraction, nationally tailored ones can be found in the country reports informing this Deliverable.

- Replace means testing with status testing, whereby anyone who is unemployed would be eligible for social assistance. This could be a first step toward basic income, which should complement rather than replace existing public services.

- Remove benefit sanctions as a first step toward the elimination of work-related conditionality.

- Provide social assistance to anyone who is legally resident.

- Pay social assistance to individual recipients instead of targeting families and households.

- Encourage the formation and diffusion of claimants’ unions. Promote conversations between claimants’ unions and the unions that represent the workers administering benefits. Involve claimants’ unions and front-line service providers in the design of social security policy.

- Provide sufficient training to officials administering the benefits.

- Increase accountability in the social security system and facilitate complaints procedures.

- Educate citizens about the welfare state and the benefits it confers, including to the middle class, in addition to social assistance. Make links between austerity, tax havens and tax avoidance.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

1) Introduction

2) Social Assistance and the Grounds of Justice

3) The Shape of Justice

3.1) Concerns and Kinds of Goods

3.2) Patterns of Distribution: Deservingness and Luck

3.2.1) Need

3.2.2) Reciprocity

3.2.3) Reciprocity, Need and Recognition

3.2.4) Desert, Control and Recognition

3.2.5) Judgement, Desert and the Tragedy of the Commons

4) The Site of Justice: Institutions, Procedures and Individuals

4.1) Procedures and Officials

4.2) Local Authorities and Families as Sites of Justice

5) The Scope of Justice: EU Nationals, Migrants, Asylum Seekers

6) Conclusion: Distribution, Deservingness and Justice

Bibliography

Appendix 1 - D5.5 case study protocol

Appendix 2 – Suggested interview schedules for partners
List of Abbreviations

CA – Capability Approach
ILO – International Labour Organisation
SII – Social Insertion Income
UC – Universal Credit
In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate. In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common benefit. The two principles are a fair way of meeting the arbitrariness of fortune.

1) Introduction

This Deliverable explores the relation between justice and social assistance, a means-tested state benefit that is in principle non-contributory. It is the last of three fieldwork based Deliverables in ETHOS Work Package 5 on justice as lived experience. The experiences foregrounded in this strand of research are those of frequently excluded or oppressed sections of the population, since ‘exploring marginalized standpoints provides an insight in everyday experiences of (in)justices’ (Anderson et al, 2017: 14). The Work Package also draws heavily on interpretivist and critical traditions of social research that empathetically engage with informants’ narratives and bring together empirical analysis and philosophical theory-building (Anderson et al, 2017: 8-9). Deliverable 5.2 Anderson and Dupont, 2018) started from the misrecognition and misrepresentation of those labelled ‘Roma’ to problematise the territorial, centralising and bordered mode of representation embodied in the state. Drawing inspiration from David Goldberg’s critical race theory, it argued that state politics actively produce racialised social categories who are problematised for not sharing the dominant (‘majority’) culture and/or for not being settled (long) enough. Deliverable 5.3 (Anderson, 2019) put centre stage the concerns of disabled users of commodified care in private households. It showed how marketized care brings to light context-specific tensions between self-determination, facilitated by contract-based, bounded and short-term relations, and affiliation, associated to informal, fluid and long-term ones. The relative centrality of these values shaped care relations’ temporal and spatial aspects, with self-determination leading to clear demarcations between working and non-working time and spaces, and affiliation generating a propensity to see them as overlapping and fungible. Yet policies tend to focus on only one of these aspects at the expense of the other, and affiliation is often undermined by a scarcity of care providers that leaves them with no other choice than to whiz from patient to patient without sufficient time to attend their needs.

This Deliverable builds on the experience of social assistance claimants to critically examine the welfare state as a means of inclusion, since in Europe access to its benefits and services is a fundamental feature of national citizenship, and exclusion, in that claiming certain kinds of benefits, particularly social assistance, is associated with social stigma and marginalisation. We understand ‘welfare state’ to be an institution which provides general benefits (income, goods and services) to everyone in a particular society, regardless of whether they have contributed to their cost, but also specific benefits which are seen as meeting needs, rather than sums of money which can be used as the recipient pleases. The institution is funded by mandatory taxation, with tax rates having no deliberate connection to the benefits that people are expected to receive. In short the institution is potentially redistributive, specific in its aims, compulsory, and surveilling. We have chosen to focus on social assistance as the most basic non-contributory benefit in the states studied following the ILO definition:

the provision of social security benefits financed from the general revenue of the government rather than by individual contributions, with benefits adjusted to the person’s needs. Many social assistance programmes are targeted at those individuals and households living under a defined threshold of income or assets. Social assistance programmes can focus on a specific risk (for example, social
Theories of justice often imply, and in some cases explicitly express, rationales for a welfare state in Europe. Ideas about the welfare state and citizenship are intertwined, and the rights of the welfare state have been described as the pinnacle of citizenship, enabling ‘social citizenship’ (Marshall, 1950). The theoretical aim of this report is to interrogate these claims by examining what people understand to be the relation between contemporary welfare states and social justice – if indeed they think that there is a relation at all.

The context of the views and experiences described is the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent policy shift toward austerity that took place in all the countries under study except Turkey. Post-crisis economic governance also formed the backdrop of ETHOS Work Package 6 on struggles for justice (Meneses et al, 2018; Araujo and Meneses, 2018; Araujo, Safradin and Brito, 2019). The original contribution of this Deliverable is to shift the focus from the economic relation between workers and employers to the one that binds states to their residents (see DeVries and Safradin, 2018 for a legal perspective). The dynamic and contested nature of social policy making during austerity proved highly fruitful for our purposes, providing a wealth of data on public perceptions regarding the treatment of different social categories. These perceptions can be inferred from legal and policy changes, but they are also captured in the discourses emanating from the media and political parties. Comparing such institutionalised perceptions with the accounts of individual claimants can reveal important gaps in hegemonic understandings of the welfare state and its impact on structural inequalities.

The Deliverable is informed by, and meant to be read alongside, six case studies on Turkey, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom. The case studies were written between January and June 2019, following common guidelines drawn up by coordinators. The work was divided in two parts. In a first stage, based on desk research, partners were invited to map the retrenchment of the welfare state since 2008. This involved describing the evolution of public policies in different domains, identifying the social categories that had been prioritized or sacrificed, and pinpointing key disputes. To explore the implications of austerity for social stratifications linked to mobility and embodied identities (cf Anderson et al, 2017), the reports also synthesized secondary data on the social position of disabled persons, non-nationals, young adults and women. After consulting these results, coordinators drafted two interview guides, one of them tailored to claimants and advocacy organizations, and the other to the social workers or client managers involved in the administration of benefits. The guides covered informants’ experience of social assistance; their views on the relation between the welfare state, deservingness and justice; and the mobilization of justice ideals in welfare struggles. We had a special interest in knowing who was targeted as deserving and undeserving in political and media debates, not through detailed discourse analysis (cf Lepianka, 2019) but through interviews with claimants, street-level bureaucrats and policy makers. Each partner was asked to conduct three to four semi-structured interviews or one focus group with claimants of mixed genders, two interviews with advocacy organizations and two with social workers or client managers. To facilitate access to vulnerable participants and to build co-ownership between researchers and participants, it was suggested that national coordinators might want to re-contact the individuals and organizations recruited for previous ETHOS studies on employment precarity (Meneses et al, 2018) and Roma representation

---

(Anderson and Dupont, 2018). This suggestion was taken up in some cases. More details on the access and methodologies for the national case studies can be found in individual reports. The methodological guidelines can be found in the appendices. For the case study protocol please see Appendix 1, and for the suggested interview schedules please see Appendix 2.

Prior to analyzing the national case studies, the authors extracted from previous ETHOS Deliverables key theoretical insights to be tested and interrogated through experiences of social assistance. Particular attention was given to Deliverable 2.1 and Deliverable 2.3. Deliverable 2.1, Report on the European Heritage of Philosophical Theorizing about Justice (Rippon et al., 2018), offers an introduction to the European heritage of philosophical theorizing about justice, including contemporary debates. Among other contributions it outlines five major debates about justice that have preoccupied philosophers in the European heritage: 1) What are the grounds of justice? (i.e., how can the existence of claims of justice be explained); 2) What is the shape of justice? (i.e. what are the main concerns of justice, and what kind of principles should regulate these); 3) What is the site of justice? (i.e. is justice a feature of political institutions, personal character and actions, or social relations?); 4) What is the scope of justice? (i.e. who has claims of justice on each other, and are there distinctive claims of global and/or domestic justice); and 5) Should we engage in ideal or non-ideal theorizing about justice? (i.e. do we need a theory of justice that abstracts from the particularities and complexities of reality, and sets out a model of perfection, or would we better focus on the realities of what we see and focus on making things a bit better). Deliverable 2.3, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Justice in Europe (Knijn, Theuns and Zala, 2018) integrates the findings of earlier ETHOS Deliverables on conceptualizations of justice in political philosophy, political theory, legal theory, social theory and economic theory. It uses the lens of Nancy Fraser’s categories of redistribution, recognition and representation. We have referred to other ETHOS Deliverables where we have observed connections and overlaps.

The structure of this Deliverable reflects the structure of the previous philosophical Deliverable D2.1, following its headings of grounds, shape, scope and site of justice. The authors are not social policy experts and recognize that there is an incredibly rich literature on welfare states, welfare regimes and their relations to family and markets, that this report does not do justice to. We hope that in future researchers will bring these into the dialogue, but for the purposes of this Deliverable we have focused on bringing the national case studies into conversation with the philosophical foundations of the ETHOS project and, where appropriate, other ETHOS Deliverables.

2) Social Assistance and the Grounds of Justice

What are the grounds that legitimate people’s claims for social assistance? From what do claims of distributive justice arise? This question about what Rippon et al (2018) designate the ‘grounds of justice’ is highly relevant to practices of justice because the answers reveal the underpinning logic of justice claims – on what grounds can anyone make a legitimate claim on anybody else? If we think that there are no grounds at all, then justice is ‘nothing more than the power of the stronger over the weaker’ (Rippon et al, 2018: 5). Apart from ‘nothing’ and ‘power’, the authors suggest five broad types of grounds of justice: enlightened self-interest; respect for persons as free and equal; human flourishing; interdependence; community values and tradition (ibid: 5). How are these grounds of justice called on to legitimize the welfare state in Europe? To answer this question we suggest it is helpful firstly to
bear in mind the histories of the ways in which communities in Europe have provided for those who cannot provide for themselves and who were excluded from direct access to socially provisioning networks, and secondly to consider the ways in which histories of welfare states are represented in politics and policies as strongly associated with the rights of citizenship.

This is not the place to review the extensive literature on the origins of the welfare state in different European states. Suffice to say that in many areas of Europe poor relief, which pre-dates the modern welfare system, was often organized around Christian parish structures. Both Turkish and Portuguese case studies suggest the influence of institutionalized religion in the management of social assistance. As Brito (2019) explains, in Portugal social assistance was first and foremost the responsibility of the family, and, if this was not possible, the Catholic Church or an association would step in. ‘Mutual help’ was encouraged and humanitarian associations and Catholic worker unions established. The dictatorship (1933-1974) meant that Portugal was not able to take advantage of the period of European post war growth that helped create the basis of the welfare state in Northern European states. The 1974 democratic revolution represented a significant break from this approach and the foundations were laid for a universal welfare state which promoted a principle of equity. The 1976 Constitution explicitly recognized the rights of elders and disabled people. In 1977 the Sistema Unificando de Seguranca Social was introduced: the right to social security was a right for all. Joining the European Union is seen to be another important step in the development of the welfare state, with social policies adapting to the European Union ‘way of thought’, particularly in the creation of a minimum income scheme, later known as Social Insertion Income. Thus, the grounds for social support shifted from charity to equality, firstly through the revolution, and later through European membership. However, despite these changes, the Portuguese welfare state continues to be marked by its religious origins. It has been characterized as a ‘welfare society’ structured around ‘networks of relations of mutual acquaintanceship, mutual recognition and self-help based on kinship and neighbourhood ties, by means of which small social groups exchange goods and services on a non-commercial basis and on a principle of reciprocity’ (Santos, 1995). This is reflected in interviewees’ understandings: ‘Without third sector organizations, both adults and children would have been worse off... The law is restrictive but we [social workers] look to the community to see who can help. If we do not do this we will fall far too short’ (Brito, 2019). Justifications for non-assistance by the state during austerity emphasized these informal networks of solidarity.

Religion is also seen to have played an important role in the history of the welfare state in Turkey. In the Ottoman Empire, providing ‘subsistence to people in need’ was dealt with by charitable foundations (vakıf). These foundations were ‘endowed with vast incomes by the Ottoman sultans, members of the imperial family, and high state officials’ (Özbek 1999: 6) and largely catered to the urban poor. Some political groups in Turkey see these foundations as the embodiment of Ottoman or Islamic welfare stateness. They believe that ‘in Islam, foundations are the backbone of social solidarity’ and that ‘the notions of social justice and of the welfare state, which people try to realize today, are the basis of [Islam]’. The system began to be more formalized and state-centric in the late Ottoman Empire, when the administration of charitable foundations was centralized under the Ministry for

---

2 For example, Article 72º states: 1 The elderly have the right to economic security, housing, family and community and living conditions that respect their personal autonomy and avoid isolation or social marginalization.; 2-The policies for elders include measures of an economic, social and cultural nature aimed to provide opportunities for personal fulfilment through an active participation in the life of the community (Brito, 2019).
Endowments. Under the indigent benefit (muhtacin maası) the state made regular payments to citizens in need who were without relatives and old, disabled or orphans. Local authorities set aside 2.5% of their income to provide for the local poor, following the Islamic rule (zekat) that requires setting aside this proportion to support those in need. The 1923 Republic of Turkey largely continued these arrangements. Social assistance ‘was not a priority policy area of the early Republic’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 14) and was largely outsourced to the voluntary sector. However, in its 1961 Constitution Turkey described itself as a welfare state, and it currently devotes a considerable proportion of its budget to welfare spending. Its long EU candidacy has helped shape its welfare regime (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 9), but, as with Portugal and other familialist systems, social assistance continues to target ‘the deserving poor’ who do not have relatives to support them.

In terms of grounds of justice these calls to the relevance of religion might be seen to fall within the bracket of ‘community values and tradition’, traditions which emphasize the importance of charity. Indeed, some of those tasked with implementing social support seem to prefer the language of ‘helping’ rather than rights, which also tends towards moralizing and benevolence: ‘[I wanted] to help others... I think I had the profile to be a social worker, to be with the other, to help them’ (Brito, 2019: 20). At the same time, some interviewees also referred to what could be called ‘enlightened self-interest’ as related to interdependence, a sense that basic provisioning is a guarantee against a Hobbesian war of all against all: ‘The social state is more than just help in an emergency; it also brought a lot of stability to our state, social peace etc. And with one snap of the fingers, it’s at least partly destroyed’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 44).

The grounds of justice identified by Rippon et al (2018) clearly interact, and different formulations capture different groupings of these grounds. For example, ideals such as ‘human dignity’ capture human flourishing, interdependence and freedom. Recognition of welfare state rights is not only on the grounds of respect for the person, interdependence, enlightened self-interest etc. but it combines all of these and this is most efficiently combined in the rhetoric and status of ‘citizenship’. The welfare state is seen as the culmination of rights acquired through citizenship (Marshall 1950) where citizenship is treated as an inclusive and equalizing status. However, as will be discussed below, when it comes to social assistance, the language of justice is employed, when it is deployed at all, largely with reference to the taxpayer and the working poor, that is it is summoned as a means of restricting rather than supporting the claims of those reliant on social assistance who are positioned as making claims against the (citizen) taxpayer and (citizen) working poor. When seeking to support those claiming social assistance the language used is not that of justice but rather that of deservingness and, relatedly, need and reciprocity.

Desert does not figure in the elucidated grounds of justice being more generally associated with theories of the good rather than the right (Kagan 2012) but many respondents’ ideas about social assistance call on ideas of appropriateness or fittingness of treatment and might be seen to draw on Aristotelian ideas of moral character or virtue as a desert basis for economic distribution. As will be discussed below, according to our informants, justice in relation to social assistance is not necessarily viewed as an entitlement, but as a desert. It should be noted that runs counter to philosophical debates: ‘contemporary desert-based principles are rarely complete distributive principles. They usually are only designed to cover distribution among working adults, leaving basic welfare needs to be met by other principles’. Yet the popular usage is also in a long tradition of social contestation about who are
the poor who merit support\(^3\). Kagan tests the relation between the ‘principle of desert’, according to which, in her formulation ‘the more culpable a given individual is, the less good that is done […] if we aid them a given amount (2012: 37) and the principle of equality. He uses the case of the saint, who is well off but not as well off as she ought to be, versus the sinner, who is badly off but better off than she ought to be. The question is, if we have some funds, should we aid the saint or the sinner? Or, in the context of welfare state policy, should we aid for example, the unemployed person in need of social assistance, or the working poor in need of income supplement? This kind of question leads us to issues related to the shape of justice and illustrate the entanglement in practice of the shape with the grounds of justice.

### 3) The Shape of Justice

According to Rippon et al (2018), questions about the shape or principles of justice comprise the primary concerns of justice, the kinds of goods that are distributed and the pattern of distribution. In this section we first briefly discuss the primary concerns and kinds of goods that are distributed in welfare states, but we focus most of our attention on the pattern of distribution. It is in the pattern of distribution that the principle of desert becomes particularly marked. We also examine how deservingness deals with ‘bad luck’. Moreover, the application of the principle of desert raises the issues of recognition. Indeed, in Fraser’s terms, the welfare state is not only about distribution of goods (or perhaps, given we are not in the ideal world and so starting from a position of injustice, the re-distribution of goods) but it is also (and this is consonant with the grounds of justice discussed above) inextricably also related to recognition, whether that recognition be as a human (which is not necessarily as an equal) or as a fellow citizen. In practice, as discussed in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, social assistance raises rather than resolves acute recognitional issues.

#### 3.1) Concerns and Kinds of Goods

Social assistance mainly has to do with the redistribution of commodified goods which can be purchased with a cash allowance. Sometimes the goods themselves are distributed directly, e.g. in the case of housing (for asylum seekers, reception centres), food and fuel (Akkan and Serim, 2019). Housing and some child or disability benefits steer a middle course between the freedom of cash benefits and the directiveness of in-kind assistance by obliging recipients to spend their money on a certain category of goods but letting them find those most adjusted to their preferences on the market. Increasingly, cash benefits are complemented or replaced with work and training. These include job-focused interviews, vocational training, language courses and work placements. Thus, in terms of the shape of justice, what is distributed are money, material goods such as food, but also (allegedly) opportunities and what would be understood by the Capability Approach (CA) as ‘capabilities’ (Sen, 1999, 2004). The Capability Approach, first developed by economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, begins from the observation that when evaluating well-being and the quality of life that people can attain, looking only at resources – e.g. Rawls’ primary

\(^3\) Martin Luther’s typology of beggars distinguishes between 26 classes of beggars, arguing that only four of these deserve alms.
goods – is not sufficient, because people differ in their ability to convert resources (goods, services and other resources to which they have access) into outcomes. Distribution is not enough, as what matters is how distribution affects well-being and the focus of CA is on a person’s real freedom to achieve outcomes or ‘beings and doings’ that they value: ‘The capability approach is about everyone becoming more able to do and become’ (Hughes, 2010, cited in Norwich, 2014). Each person has a unique profile of ‘conversion factors’ that enable them to convert resources into sets of possibilities or ‘capability sets’ that offer opportunities to achieve ‘functionings’ or the beings and doings that are living a life that one has good reason to value. These conversion factors may be personal/individual, social and environmental. The CA then pays attention not only to inequalities of income but also to inequalities of substantive freedoms to live in the world as one chooses, in this way overcoming the debates on absolute and relative poverty (for a more detailed discussion of the Capability Approach and its relevance to the ETHOS project see Anderson, 2019).

The emphasis of welfare systems on the social value of work as a means of obtaining self-respect, in contrast to passive receipt of ‘handouts’, presents ‘capability sets’ that enable labour market participation as ultimately more desirable than cash benefits. In the treatment of people as equals the emphasis is on treating people as having the equal capacity to find paid work. In this paradigm work is conceived as the quintessential form of social participation, evoking Fraser’s ideal of participatory parity. Authorities tend to present work and training as a source of socio-economic progression and self-fulfillment. Work related activities are constructed as ‘training’ in the broadest sense of the word, meaning they become factors in the claimant’s capability sets. In the Netherlands, the ‘counter-achievement’ is partly based on the assumption that it will discipline beneficiaries’ use of time and help them prepare for a ‘regular’ job, as people on welfare benefits are seen as ‘hesitant or even recalcitrant in returning to the labour market’ (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 12). In the UK, there is a strong discourse that people must be trained away from making poor choices that put them at risk of poverty and unemployment and the newly introduced Universal Credit (UC) system has been designed to mimic work in order to better train people for the labour market. This includes signing a commitment ‘deliberately mirroring a contract of employment’ and which ‘makes clear that welfare is no different from work itself’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015: 5, cited in Millar and Bennett, 2017: 171). Looking for work is an obligation that can be required for 35 hours a week. Whatever the reasoning behind the imposition of training/work related activity/counter achievements they nevertheless can be experienced by claimants as punitive sanctions for claiming benefits (see Section 3.2.3).

3.2) Patterns of Distribution: Deservingness and Luck

It is in relation to the pattern of distribution that desert as a ground of justice begins to become explicit. The role of desert in the general public’s responses to welfare state distribution is scarcely a new finding. Van Oorschot (2000) argues that the basic welfare deservingness question is ‘Who should get what and why’ (i.e. the pattern and grounds of distribution), and that the answers to this question are critical to the social acceptability of welfare schemes. He developed a framework of five ‘CARIN’ criteria for deservingness: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Neediness. This has been the starting point for a significant literature on the subject, which finds that people give greater support to benefits that are directed at groups who are considered more deserving according to these criteria. All national reports described claimants struggling with proving that they were deserving – the
3.2.1) Need

The criterion of need suggests some kind of threshold beneath which it is not just that citizens, as encapsulating the values elucidated in grounds of justice, should fall. This is also in line with the CA. Sen distinguishes capability sets from ‘basic capabilities’, those capabilities associated with basic needs, which describes what is necessary for survival and to avoid serious deprivations. The concept is useful ‘not so much in ranking living standards, but in deciding on a cut-off point for the purpose of assessing poverty and deprivation’ (Sen 1987: 109). Like Sen, Nussbaum distinguishes between advanced capabilities and those capabilities associated with basic needs but she rather uses the term to refer to ‘the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for developing the more advanced capability’ (Nussbaum, 2000: 84). She gives the example of practical reason and imagination, which most newborns have, but cannot exercise without development and education. If social assistance is to foster capabilities sets then one might assume that basic capabilities, in both Sen and Nussbaum’s senses, are enabled. In his defense of need as a ground for moral claims, Wiggins (1998: 29-30) argues that its appeal depends on recognition of the claimant as an equal participant in society, but that what gives it strength is simple compassion or sympathy. Needs claims are pressed from a passion to subsist under tolerable conditions and what is disappointed when they go unheeded is the expectation that the claimant’s survival or minimal well-being will be taken into account.

In practice this raises the question of how to identify the threshold(s) when serious deprivation (Sen), human dignity (Nussbaum), or ‘tolerable conditions’ (Wiggins) are at risk. This is treated as a matter of calculation, and has the procedural advantage that it is definitive – a person is either eligible or not, yes or no. However, those tasked with implementation are clear that this is also a disadvantage:

When you create a law, there is always a line. The question is, who lives in the line. There are always injustices in every case. For more than 1 euro you jump out, and for less than 1 euro you jump into the system [of benefits]. It’s obvious that there must be a line, even for us social workers to check incomes and act accordingly. But this line creates injustice and inequality.

Brito, 2019: 20-21

In social assistance need is sometimes calculated with reference to minimum wage, expressing the assumption that minimum wages are partly reflective of how much money one needs to live. In Turkey the threshold is a total household income divided by number of household members below 2/3 of the minimum wage. In Hungary social assistance is tied to pensions which are regularly indexed. The overall logic is that social assistance should be enough to cover no more than the most basic needs, and the close scrutiny of claimants’ resources is meant to ensure any ‘excess’ is eliminated. Finding out whether a claimant actually needs social assistance entails drilling down into belongings as well as income. The operation is not as simple as appears at first sight. Should all valuable property be sold before someone has a right to claim benefits? This is implied by a number of interviewees who expressed dissatisfaction that people who lived in big houses or had smart cars were not really poor enough. Policy can in fact require people to sell their goods. In Austria it is expected that claimants liquidize assets before claiming. But this
is contested on the ground. In Turkey, a mother claiming for care of her disabled child complained: ‘They check the
TV, the apartment, they ask me if I cannot find a cheaper place to rent... They are like detectives chasing whether
we deserve the money that they provide’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 18).

Aggressive means testing can disrupt people’s lives and multiply long-term insecurity. For instance, taking into
account immovable property effectively obliges house owners to move into rental accommodation before claiming
benefits. Thresholds can change without primary legislation but apparently minor technical changes to the
threshold (sometimes called the ‘cliff edge’) such as the switch in inflation index from the Retail Prices Index to the
Consumer Prices Index (Dupont et al 2019: 10) can have very direct effects on people who are struggling to get by
and for whom small changes have significant impact. When social assistance is the gateway to additional allowances
like housing subsidies, there is considerable concern that thresholds disincentivize people from working, and there
is a generalized objection to policies that result in the non-working poor having a larger income than those who are
working.

3.2.2) Reciprocity

When attention turns to the threshold that demarcates the claimant from the working poor (rather than the
threshold which marks minimum standards or the difference between poverty and destitution), the language used
by policymakers and claimants shifts from need to reciprocity. In this context ideas of justice are mobilised, not in
support of claimants, but in support of the working poor who are represented as the losers if social assistance is
too generous:

For years we’ve had a system that encourages the worst in people – that incites laziness, that excuses
bad behaviour, that erodes self-discipline, that discourages hard work... above all that drains
responsibility away from people. We talk about moral hazard in our financial system – where banks
think they can act recklessly because the state will always bail them out ... well this is moral hazard in
our welfare system – people thinking they can be as irresponsible as they like because the state will
always bail them out... I want us to look at toughening up the conditions for those who are out of work
and receiving benefits and speeding up our efforts to get all those who can work back to work. Work
is at the heart of a responsible society.


In practice however the line between ‘claimant’ and ‘worker’ is being increasingly blurred with the multiplication
of precarious forms of employment (Meneses et al, 2018) and the reliance of many poor workers on social
assistance schemes. In the UK, the aspiration to reconcile need and reciprocity has been at the heart of a broad
reform whereby social assistance is reduced at a ‘tapered’ rate of 63% rather than being withdrawn altogether once
a claimant’s income reaches the threshold. In the Netherlands the Participation Act 2014 also raised the earnings
threshold for beneficiaries of social assistance, and in Turkey a 2012 reform for the first time allowed those in formal
employment to receive social assistance. These changes have significantly expanded the proportion of the
population eligible to receive social assistance and have meant that it is more difficult to distinguish between the
person on social assistance and the worker.
One way of reinscribing this distinction is to assess whether one is a ‘working kind of person’ (Zatz and Boris, 2014). Often a claimant must demonstrate that they are prepared to take up any work available, regardless of their skills and personal circumstances. In Austria recipients of the emergency unemployment benefit, which stands halfway between unemployment benefits and social assistance, are required to accept ‘reasonable’ job offers. ‘Reasonable’ is defined broadly and people must accept jobs below their qualifications, with low salaries and in workplaces within a two-hour commuting distance (or one and a half for part time employment). In the Netherlands too claimants are expected to accept ‘suitable’ work though they can refuse positions that pay less than the benefit.

Increasingly claimants are also required to do some form of work in exchange for social assistance, as a way of ‘giving something back’ to the ‘community’. Work-related conditionality was introduced in Turkey in 2016. In Hungary ‘employment substitute support’ will be terminated if the recipient fails to participate in public work; fails to pursue gainful activity including a work relationship; fails to participate in a labour market programme for at least 30 days; or fails to participate in a training course for at least six months as required by the Work Act. In the Netherlands the 2014 Participation Act has enshrined the principle that ‘everyone should contribute to society on their own behalf and best interest and that of society at large’ (Knijn & Hiah, 2019: 10). The performance of a ‘counter-achievement’ for receiving benefits, which had been a ‘guideline’ since 2012, became an obligation. The political argument has been made that participation in unpaid or volunteer work is necessary to ‘legitimise’ welfare spending, as people on benefits should do something in return. This giving back is usually narrowly understood as working or making an economic contribution (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 12), and the status of family-provided care in this paradigm in a highly contested one (see below).

3.2.3) Reciprocity, Need and Recognition

In the competing tension between reciprocity and need, that reciprocity trumps need is apparent in that it is seen as acceptable for certain groups to receive less than the minimum. Leaving aside the issues raised by asylum seekers, which will be dealt with under the scope of justice section below, it is also seen as acceptable to enforce work-related conditions through sanctions including the suspension of social assistance. In Austria benefits can be sanctioned for up to six weeks. Claimants may be expected to repay the benefits claimed by themselves or their relatives despite the fact that this requirement (making debtor citizens) mitigates against employment (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 11). In the UK sanctions can last for up to three years. There is a sub-safety net of hardship payments for the most desperate who have no other means of support, but this is at an even lower rate and recoverable from non-sanctioned benefits. Sanctions are ‘devastating’ and lead to severe hardship. Their value is debateable, and a UC adviser asserted that they ‘don’t help anybody’. Nevertheless there seems to be little support for the principle of unconditional social assistance on the basis of need. For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has claimed to move from a welfare state to a work-based society, where reward is according to contribution rather than according to need (Veres, 2019). Social assistance was reduced in amount and duration as well as devolved to local authorities. In Austria a draft 2018 law was a turn away from the aim of combating poverty through minimum income and toward labour market integration. This was captured in a reversal of name from ‘minimum benefit’ (which implies a minimum standard of living) to ‘social welfare/assistance’. In the United Kingdom the annual increase of most working-age benefits was limited to 1% (well below inflation) between 2012 and 2015 and frozen between 2016 and 2020. The outcome of these kinds of reforms is that in many contexts the
amount of benefits is no longer sufficient to cover what was previously viewed as basic needs. To return to Kagan’s distinction, policy responses over the last decade have been represented as prioritising those deemed saints, even if it is at the cost of the perceived sinners.

At a minimum to deserve social assistance, recipients must generally demonstrate that they are a ‘working kind of person’. As one Austrian interviewee puts it: ‘The good ones are the Austrians who have worked their whole lives’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 20). Being a working kind of person is consonant with being a good citizen: ‘Between earning some money, and nothing... It all depends on how each one positions himself, with their moral values, their sense of citizenship’ (Brito, 2019: 21). This is the language of ethics rather than justice. Notably it is subject to slippage, as working kind of people become people who must do the right kind of work. One interviewee said of participants in Hungary’s welfare to work programme: ‘It is not that they are bad people, but it is in their heads that they are public workers and won’t do more’ (Veres 2019: 31). In the UK claimants in part-time work and receiving the tapered allowance can be sanctioned for not trying to increase their working hours or pay levels.

The ideal promoted seems to be not a labouring citizen, making a livelihood by piecing together precarious jobs, but a wage earning citizen who may be in precarious work but is on a track out of it. Furthermore, despite the elevation of job search into work, neither this nor compulsory work placements come with the right to the minimum wage or standard labour protections. In Hungary public workers are not protected by the Labour Code. Indeed a special ‘public works minimum wage’ was created at 70% of the national minimum wage and paid weekly rather than monthly, reflecting the remuneration of agricultural day labourers rather than regular labour contracts. Authorities can deduct any due payments from the salary of public workers so that those with debts may receive only a fraction of their salary. This has an impact on broader labour market dynamics, as schools and emergency services have fired employees and taken on public workers instead. In Austria, Netherlands and the UK there was some feeling that work placements are a way for employers to get cheap labour rather than a means of supporting claimants into work. Unlike ‘migrants’ who are regularly accused of taking jobs from ‘citizens’, the replacement of outsourced public service workers with welfare recipients has received little attention.

Imposed work can also be perceived as meaningless and demeaning. In Rotterdam for instance some claimants must pick street waste for 15 hours a week, an activity that is both low status and highly visible. The municipality also requires companies to whom they have outsourced public services to recruit welfare claimants (Knijn and Hiah 2019: 14). In Hungary the work programme is explicitly characterised as ‘punitive’ and thereby opposed to ‘active’ employment policies. In practice however ‘punishment’ and ‘activation’ are hard to disentangle. The harshness of work-related conditionality is such that some claimants feel pushed into employment that they actively do not want to take up: ‘I don’t want to work in Poundland. This is not the job. It’s not my dream job. I’m sorry. And they’re trying to push me to get this kind of job’ (Dupont et al, 2019).

Those who are in receipt of social assistance, even if they are working, often feel misrecognized, stigmatized and policed – particularly because of the means testing element. One young woman in the UK felt that her neighbours looked down on her as a single mother on benefits: ‘They think, “Oh my God, she’s on benefits. We’re not talking with this kind of people.” [...] There is a family, they are plumbers, and they just look down on me, like they are royalty or something, and I’m like nobody’. She resisted the social demands to have the correct ‘Attitude’ (the ‘A’ of CARIN) according to which ‘needy people who are likeable, compliant and conforming to our standards are usually deemed more deserving’ (Van Oorschot, 2000). Like others deemed too assertive or who complain she felt scrutinized and criticized for ‘wrong’ behaviour and being too pushy and difficult. She felt her parenting was
actively policed socially which added another layer of undesirability. This was not simply about claiming legal rights, but asserting herself, and notably, asserting herself as a woman:

OK I want to do my nails. Maybe that makes me happy. But because I’m on benefits, because I’m poor, I shouldn’t be doing that. I shouldn’t be colouring my hair because I’m poor. So... just because I don’t have millions I have to look like a tramp. Sometimes people say, ‘Oh. You don’t look like you’re a single mum.’ [...] How am I supposed to look? Do you want me to cut myself?

3.2.4) Desert, Control and Recognition

Given that work is key to deservingness, what of those who are recognized as incapable of working – the sick, the elderly, the disabled, and children? These conditions might be characterized as a matter of chance in that the people concerned cannot be said to Control (the ‘C’ of the CARIN criteria) their incapacity to work. These are often considered justifiably unemployed, so for example in the Netherlands social assistance claimants must look for a job but can be dispensed from this obligation for reasons of health, disability or old age. Rippon et al (2018) describe how luck egalitarians argue that justice requires we neutralize the effects of bad luck on outcomes but allows for unequal distributions when bad outcomes result from these choices. Some version of this seems to be operating in policies and attitudes to social assistance claimants.

Van Oorschot identifies a ‘pivotal role for deservingness opinions’ in part because welfare institutions often have their roots in identifying certain types of people whom the community has an obligation to support and this continues to have ramifications. ‘There is always another category like disabled, elderly, women that intersects with the situation of poverty which defines the status of deservingness’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 15). The characteristics that are seen as relevant to accommodate in this policy version of luck egalitarianism are largely embodied characteristics and there are many other types of luck, both natural and social, including natural capacities and environment, that are not so accommodated. The criterion of control is manifest in the targeted assistance offered to, for example, disabled people who are seen as not personally responsible for their neediness. However, eligibility on this basis is becoming ever tighter. While the disabled, the elderly and (mostly female) single primary carers of young children are generally entitled to higher benefits or subjected to more lenient conditionality, the boundaries of these categories are strongly disputed: who is too disabled to work? Who is old enough to retire? When should parents return to work, and how many children should poor people have? In the Netherlands the Wajong, introduced in 1997, was a benefit worth 75% of the minimum wage paid to all disabled people over 18 years old. This was replaced with a means-tested disability benefit by the Participation Act 2014, which also introduced a provision aiming to integrate people with disabilities in the labour market through wage subsidies and agreements between the government, employer organisations and trade unions. Evaluations suggest that the Act’s contribution to the labour market integration of disabled persons is below expectations. In the UK the premia for all but the most severely disabled claimants have been reduced, more stringent ‘work capability assessments’ have been imposed on existing and prospective claimants, and work-related conditionality has been stepped up (Dupont et al, 2019: 16-18).

Age is another key dimension of policy and social group making, not only in pension policy, but also in the difference between the age at which one is allowed to work and the age at which one can claim full state benefits.
For reasons of principle or expediency pensioners seem to have been spared by benefit cutbacks in the countries under study, but again this is qualified by the fact that pension age has been rising. In the Netherlands for instance it is moving from 65 to 67 between 2013 and 2021. At the same time there have been several attempts to exclude young people from the welfare system or subject them to stricter conditionality. The Dutch Act Investing in Young People 2009 increased the minimum eligibility age for welfare benefits from 23 to 27 and obliged young people to accept job or training offers from their local social office. The Act was repealed in January 2012 due to implementation problems, the lack of job offers and some fraud cases. Since 2015 those between 23 and 27 are covered by the general Participation Act but they must prove they have been actively looking for a job or education during 4 weeks before applying for social assistance.

There is a considerable literature on the gendering of the welfare state and its reproduction of patriarchal power relations. This gendering is especially visible in the disproportionate representation of women among the claimants of targeted benefits for single primary carers of young children. These benefits express the assumption that parents of very young children will devote most of their time to care, in turn derived from an ideal of personalized and non-commodified care. In Austria single primary carers with children under two do not have to prove ability and readiness to work in order to claim social assistance. In the Netherlands under the Participation Act single primary carers of children under the age of five have work-related obligations but this aspect has been revised by every government in the last 20 years, generating considerable uncertainty (Knijn and Hiah, 2019). Similarly in the UK income support for single primary carers of young children is now withdrawn when the youngest child turns five, down from 16 until 2008, and work-related conditions are progressively imposed on claimants from the time the child turns two.

Children raise dilemmas in respect of control. On the one hand they are not in control of their personal circumstances, but on the other hand, in the highly responsibilized discourse of welfare states, they are the responsibility of their parents. In the UK, child benefit for more than two children has been stopped on the grounds that if one cannot afford to have more than two children one should not have them. Similarly in Hungary according to Szikra (2018) there is a tacit assumption that decreasing or devaluing universal and means-tested benefits would prevent poor families from having more children’ (cited in Veres, 2019: 15). The universal family allowance has not been indexed since 2009, losing about 20% of its value. In addition, under Orban there is a new tax allowance targeting well-off families at the expense of the poor. To benefit from the maximum allowance a gross income of €1600 (twice the average) was needed in 2012. These cuts are based on the tacit assumption that they will discourage the poor from having large families. The increasing imposition of household-level benefit caps, which disproportionately disadvantage large families, also reflects the view that care should only be provided to a limited number of family members.

Those who are recognized as deserving special treatment are, like other recipients of social assistance, also stigmatized. The ‘correct’ attitudes they must prove are helplessness and gratitude, and this can be experienced as

---

4 Economic structures also come into play. Roma participants in the UK study remarked that the position of women as benefit recipients and men as benefit enablers was not a product of Roma culture, but rather of broader economic structures, where an intersection of costly childcare and low female wages make it more economical for the entire family to have men in employment and women as full time carers (Dupont et al 2019: 37).
highly demeaning. One woman in Turkey explained: ‘I wish they did not put me in the position of a beggar, asking from the state all the time. I do not want to be in a victim position all the time because I have a disabled child’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 20). Sometimes adaptation for difference can increase stigmatization, and the price for redistribution often seems to be misrecognition and lack of voice. How to prevent the stigmatisation of groups that are targeted for redistribution? The mandatory victimhood, docility and gratefulness that comes with the receipt of social assistance means that even putatively deserving social categories can end up being stigmatised in the process of claiming it. Being singled out as deserving can also breed resentment among those deemed undeserving, such as younger adults (see below).

Policies can be deployed as a means of intervention in order to encourage ‘good behaviour’ and sound attitudes among the (dis)abled, aged and gendered recipients of social assistance. In Turkey female claimants must have their babies delivered in hospital and go through regular check-ups until they turn six. Gendered care interacts with disability, and administrators claim that receiving benefits mitigates stigma for children with disabilities as it gives them value: ‘The disabled child becomes valuable to the house’ and ‘before they were a matter of embarrassment [but they] became a worth in the family’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 22). A similar logic lies behind the elder care allowance. According to one social worker, its introduction means that now children will ‘fight for the opportunity’ to look after a parent because it is paid. In both examples, the suggestion is that the (implicitly female) relatives do not value disabled children and elders, rather than society more generally. This illustrates how social ideas of deservingness can shape the responses of client managers and policymakers themselves. The (male) social administrator of disabled childcare claims:

This is not something that prevents the family member looking for a job in the labour market. But we do not know if they are employable even if they are not providing care for the disabled family member anyway. I do not think so. In this respect it is an income for the family member. But, of course, if she does not provide the right care it is a reason to terminate it [emphasis added].


The imbrication of social and policy assumptions about deservingness is striking. In this case the speaker betrays a disregard for the gendered care labour that is allegedly being recognised by disability benefit: it is simply assumed, with no attempt at providing evidence, that carers of disabled family members are unemployable, that the speaker and their representatives know what is ‘the right care’ and that they have the capacity to monitor this. In addition, it is assumed that the benefit can be terminated regardless of the consequences for the putatively poorly looked after child.

3.2.5) Judgement, Desert and the Tragedy of the Commons

Put it like this: I don’t find it fair that they all receive money. The fact that I receive money here in Austria by not ever having had to many any effort... that wouldn’t work anywhere else.

Claimant, quoted in Meier and Tiefenbach, 2019: 19.

Thus far we have discussed social and policy attitudes to deservingness, but what about the attitudes of the claimants themselves? Research has found that those who are claiming welfare may be more likely to attribute
causality to structure rather than individual factors (see for example Gordon and Pantazis, 1997), yet other studies suggest that claimants may be more inclined than non-claimants to blame the poor for their condition (Golding and Middleton, 1982). In her exploration of these phenomena Lepianka (2007) finds that personal experience does not necessarily influence attribution of blame but that when it does it can lead to more individual explanations:

The people most inclined to endorse structural poverty explanations are those who identify themselves with (a group of) the poor on some salient dimension. Those who do not identify with the poor are less likely to attribute poverty to situations, despite their personal destitution and membership of the population of the poor by some objective standards.

Lepianka, 2007: 21

Group-making and where an individual positions themselves is critical to whether and how the principle of desert is mobilized, and in the national studies this is reflected in implicit comparisons. This may be empathetic, as one Hungarian claimant expressed: ‘Everybody out of work should be entitled to some support. Even if it is a small sum, those who do not have anything else. How else to survive?! There are people who cannot work either because of their own fault, or not, nobody knows this for sure but them’ (Veres, 2019: 33). The speaker rejects deservingness on practical rather than moral grounds, implying that people should work but suggesting limits to the possibilities even of intrusive investigations to find out whether they are at fault for not working. Notably, she is clearly concerned to make her claim ‘reasonable’ by making it for a ‘small sum’ for people who do not have anything else. While the comparison of some of the other participants was in terms of deservingness and contribution, she focussed on the difficulties that she had in finding employment, from which she deduced that others might share similar issues.

Interviewees who are or have been claimants rarely question their own deservingness, and can make implicit comparisons with those who are less deserving, sometimes through invoking respectability vs criminality, drug dependence etc. Indeed, stories of criminality are often set in the context of anti-welfare arguments with violent or anti-social behaviour, often involving children, being provided as evidence of the poverty trap and problematic lifestyles supported by the welfare state (Pykett, 2014 cited in Dupont et al, 2019). The press and the media play an important role in feedback mechanisms between institutional trends and perceptions of deservingness. As Pykett puts it: ‘We can begin to see how telling welfare stories as a morality play provides a script for welfare state reforms based on selective behavioural interventions targeted at specific social groups’ (Pykett, 2014: 4-5). Analyses of recent media and political discourses in the UK have found these to be hostile to claimants and to social categories that are seen as particularly likely to rely on benefits including young women, disabled persons and migrants (see below). Scarcely surprising then that claimants can feel vulnerable to both decision makers and to the social environment more generally:

If I have mean neighbours they can make a complaint to hurt me, because there are lots of people whose benefits were suspended because they had a complaint. God knows where from. […] Once the complaint is there they just send an on the ground inspection to see, what’s the deal, is this true or is it not true? And they catch you red handed. And that would be a problem, because [the benefits] would be suspended for good, and you couldn’t apply anymore.

Dupont et al, 2019: 40

Thus social distinctions and social policy categories may mutually reinforce each other:
The general undeservingness of the target group of a means-tested benefit may trigger policymakers to make the scheme even more selective and to implement stricter criteria to demarcate more ‘fairly’ the deserving from the undeserving poor. In turn, this institutional adaptation may generate more bureaucracy and higher perceived abuse, and decrease the perceived legitimacy of the benefit scheme even further.

Van Oorschot, 2017: 18

This can be justified by referring to limited resources, and implicitly to a tragedy of the commons. In Portugal, where post-2008 interventions from the austerity-supporting Troika focused on reducing periods of unemployment, socialist governments justified cuts through the need to ‘control the deficit and stimulate economic growth’. Hungarian governments considered the broadening of social inequalities to be a necessary consequence of transition and as economically incentivising, with wages adapting to changing market conditions. In the UK too the stated conflict between the interests of benefit claimants and those of low-paid workers conveyed the idea that the former were siphoning off the latter’s limited resources. The Dutch report describes social housing stocks as scarce in all large cities. While there is no set number of jobs in an economy, some Hungarian municipalities were found to create artificial scarcity in low paid work placements which act as a passport to social assistance. In most cases the resources at hand (money, housing, jobs) are either portrayed as fixed or threatened by the idleness of benefit claimants, and there is little exploration of the relation between social assistance, demand and economic growth.

‘Limited resources and the myths around allocation of all resources to certain groups create tensions among groups who have claims on social assistance schemes’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 17). ‘There are persons who receive the SII [Social Insertion Income – a form of minimum income] for many years and they don’t work. I received unemployment benefits because I paid taxes, I didn’t steal anything from anyone’ (Brito, 2019: 28). This suggests concern at the diminution of a shared pot – hence the moral judgement of ‘stealing’. The fear is that there is not enough to go around, even between citizens. This gives rise to a sense of competition for the necessities of life: ‘Having paid into the pension fund I do think to myself... that people need some money to live off, but I think this should be seen in a more differentiated way’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 19). Because the money is being taken from someone else – implicitly including people like the speaker – even pensioners can be denied support:

When they reach retirement age those who did not [put in] cash should not receive anything. But they will receive anyway. The social security grants them retirement benefits, and these benefits have to come from somewhere, to be taken from someone else.

Brito, 2019: 30

Brito (2019) describes the distinction made in Portugal between ‘Parasites’ – minimum income earners who are often negatively racialized, and ‘Privileged’ – particularly around pensioners who are seen as protected compared to young people. This last also features in UK debates, where pensioners are positioned as cossetted by the state and protected in comparison with young people. Effectively this promotes competition for state resources between populations. What is peculiar about the pensioner/youth divide, which is relatively new in terms of welfare state

---

http://visegradrevue.eu/farewell-to-alms-the-hungarian-welfare-state-that-has-never-been/.
(though of course it has been a feature of public culture since the 1960s) is that young people will become old, and setting them against older people can also be setting them against their future selves. Too much money, some seem to think, goes to Kagan’s sinners: ‘Those who work, who strive to pay their bills, to pay taxes, when they think about social benefits they recognize that they are important to people who have nothing, but there is no equivalent for them. Then I see people feeling wronged’ (Brito, 2019: 22). The assistance paid to those undeserving groups is contrasted with the lack of access of deserving family members, with this being blamed on those who are considered undeserving (ibid).

In sum, the principle of deservingness interacts with that of need and recognition in complex ways, but it also connects distribution and recognition. Social assistance is a safety net against destitution and serious poverty. While not qualifying for social assistance on the basis of exceeding an earnings threshold may be compatible with grounds of justice, to not qualify for it on the basis of desert in itself suggests misrecognition. While the welfare state is often represented, in both political theory and practice, as one of the pinnacles of achievement of European citizenship, to be in receipt of social assistance is neither experienced nor viewed as the imprimatur of citizenship, but rather it raises serious questions of misrecognition. The emphasis on need means that those in receipt of benefit often feel the weight of social judgement on their personal behaviour, choices and values, or that they are the object of pity; the imposition of symbolic reciprocity, which may also be represented as enhancing capabilities, is undermined by the failure to recognise activities as work, and, in some cases, by imposing activities that are considered socially demeaning.

4) The Site of Justice: Institutions, Procedures and Individuals

The site of justice investigates ‘what kinds of objects (institutions, individual actions, etc) principles of justice apply to’ (Rippon et al, 2018: 14). Debates centre around whether principles of justice apply to institutions or whether, following Cohen’s critique of Rawls (Cohen 1997), a just society ‘requires that people develop an ethos of justice that guides their individual choices even within a system of just rules’ (Rippon et al. 2018: 14). One manifestation of this in practice is the procedures instantiated by institutions and the spirit with which they are implemented by institutional actors. So the outcome of a means test might be just, but is the experience of that process experienced as just? In this section we consider this question, and the connections between different sites of justice: the national state, local authorities and the household.

4.1) Procedures and Officials

Aside from the distributive outcome of welfare states, the institution’s way of being, its procedures and processes were often experienced as deeply unfair. Claimants described a lack of dignity in highly intrusive requirements and often experienced the process of claiming itself as if it were a punishment rather than the apogee of social citizenship: ‘In Rotterdam there is a certain culture: “Yes, you come here, we are not going to make it any nicer for you”’ (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 27). Processes are highly intrusive into people’s living arrangements and relationships:

As social workers, we get information more quickly now. When we go to a house and cannot find them, we ask the neighbours... The families know we investigate them. They come to us and say, ‘You asked...”
my neighbour, the local shopkeeper about me’. I tell them ‘Of course. We provide social assistance with people’s tax contributions. We believe it should be distributed fairly’.

Social worker, quoted in Akkan and Serim, 2019: 23

Some claimants felt stigmatized not only by the process, but by those charged with assessing them: ‘The state should be more careful with the persons they hire to work as social workers’ (Brito, 2019: 31). The British trades union officer pointed out that in the UK the system has been privatized, and that this is compounded by means testing which obliges the people administering the system to make judgments about applicants:

A group of low paid exploited people are paying benefits to another group of exploited people [...] and so validate their own position often by treating the people that they’re paying benefits to badly because they’ve got power. That’s means testing. So to get any kind of just system means testing has to go.

Dupont et al. 2019: 41

As the UC adviser put it: ‘Basically what they’re trying to do is they’re trying to get working class people to blame other working class people for issues of austerity. And they’re trying to get some people to blame other people’ (Dupont et al. ibid: 41). This was described by the young mother who said she ‘dressed down’ when she went to the Job Centre for fear of looking too smart and making the staff vindictive. More generally, the tone of communications with benefit claimants, if not hostile, can be patronizing. For example, in the UK the support webpage advises: ‘writing down what you spend each month and working out what you will have left over when your bills are paid’ and ‘get budgeting advice from family or friends’. The ‘civilizing mission’ flavour of these recommendations is somewhat removed from the lives of claimants. Research has found that those in receipt of benefits often develop very effective tools for managing on low incomes, but the monthly payment design runs counter to these strategies (Dupont et al, 2019: 32).

Individual claimant managers can have considerable impact on the experiences of claimants through discretion and demeanour. The extent of discretion over decision-making is, according to the officials concerned, limited. In Netherlands, UK and Austria officials felt the possibilities for them to exercise discretion have been reduced. However, claimants did not necessarily feel this, perhaps because the official can exercise discretion over how the claims process is conducted. In Netherlands for example it is an official requirement to conduct client interviews in Dutch, but one official interviewed explained she sometimes conducted it in English to accommodate the language skills of some refugees. In the UK, the UC adviser pointed out that the number of sanctions has increased since Universal Credit has been introduced and face to face advice sessions limited. He gave the example of someone who hasn’t spent 35 hours a week looking for work: ‘If they tell you, “Well, it’s because my father died” [...] any kind of issues like that you can take that into account and you can use your discretion not to enforce an unfair sanction’. Contracted providers of the Work Programme (terminated in 2017) did not have the power to accept
good reason for failure to comply with conditionality, an approach that was described as ‘a source of injustice and damage to claimants’.  

Discretion can be contrasted with a ‘tick box’ mentality. One Austrian claimant for example made the distinction between those ‘who act according to the law, and not according to humanity’ (Meier, 2019: 38). The latter are people who have a relationship with people. However, discretion can also easily become an exercise of power. A UK housing activist felt that a strictly rule based system was much fairer: ‘Two and two is always four. You can never interpret it in any other way.’ When the interviewer asked whether such an approach could effectively capture people’s needs and lives in practice he was definitive: ‘You’re a single male. It should take X amount for you to live per week. Are you getting that? No. Well, then you should be topped up to that amount’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 42). Managers too may prefer limited discretion because of concerns about criticisms for making unfair decisions or discriminating on the grounds of sex, race, disability and so on. Discretion can facilitate both recognition AND misrecognition, inserting itself into the gap between policy categories and lived experience (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 46). There is a relation between discretion and intrusion – a degree of discretion, assuming it is not arbitrary, requires that the individual who is given the discretion has some sophistication in their understanding of the claimant’s personal circumstances but which can also entail claimants feeling under surveillance.

Discretion can be associated with arbitrariness:

I said to them, I have a physical problem... I have my file to the doctor ... He said, ‘I don’t need your documents, I will check myself’. I said ‘Alright’. He said, ‘Walk’. I walked. He said, ‘Sit’. He said ‘How many fingers are here?’ I said ‘Three’. He said, ‘How many fingers is it now?’ I said, ‘Four’. He said, ‘You can see!’. And I said, ‘Hey man, I have had three knee operations and I have arthrosis. And this is the hospital report.’ And he said, No, he will check it by himself. And he wrote down that I can do everything.

Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 22

However, in some cases arbitrariness may not in fact be a consequence of discretion but of poor decision making resulting from lack of training, pressures of work and time constraints. In the UK research conducted by the relevant government department found that ‘work coaches frequently struggle to identify needs accurately, partly due to a lack of time, knowledge and ability; to a lack of confidence when making adjustments; and to a perception of ‘overwhelming’ volume of claimants who report health problems’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 18). The UC adviser explained that staff were under considerable pressure as a result of cutbacks and numbers of claims, as well as the pressure they put themselves under because of concerns about waiting periods. He described how, when people had gone on training courses they had not received the recommended period of consolidation meaning that ‘we’re scrambling around talking to colleagues trying to find somebody who knows how to do this [...] and it’s really stressful because the claimant’s sitting there thinking ‘Well I want to speak to someone who knows what they’re doing.’ Social workers interviewed were not happy with the extent of their responsibility to investigate the economic circumstances of claimants. In Turkey, social workers complained that they had only been given limited

---

6 Professor David Webster, evidence to House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2018), available from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/955/95509.htm
Digitization can reduce individual discretion but has very uneven consequences. While for some people it can speed up processes and make them more accessible, for others it is remote and makes the system difficult to engage with. In the UK the replacement of telephone and face to face support with digital processes to make budgetary savings is making claiming extremely difficult for some people, particularly those with poor literacy and computer skills and disabled people. One adviser was particularly concerned about those who did not have access to computers or who otherwise struggled with online exchanges, who might miss appointments and important notifications and thereby open themselves to sanctions. An activist claimed that there were unacknowledged problems with the computer system (Dupont et al, 2019: 39).

Procedures can be very challenging for the disabled and those with poor literacy, and there are real problems with people not knowing their rights meaning that they do not access what they are entitled to (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 22). Delays and the demands of procedures can also cause hardship (Dupont et al, 2019). Consider the process in Turkey for obtaining free prescriptions for those with disabled children: ‘I have to go to an orthopaedic doctor, get a prescription, take it to the social services and receive it in three months from the Post Office. For 140 YTL I have to go to three offices. I did not apply for this recently. It is very difficult for me to visit them’ (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 21). The combination of institutional site and problems with bureaucracy and social assistance means that the freedom to move to the region/municipality that you choose to live in can be very limited for those on social assistance. Those dependent on social housing often have little choice about where they live. One British young mother described how she was moved to cheaper accommodation: ‘They dumped me, basically. I didn’t know where the shops were. It was in the middle of nowhere. The closest GP was 40-minutes’ walk. The closest shop was about 20-minutes’ walk’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 40). In Turkey some recipients of disability and elderly allowance cannot even move to a different street in the same district, as any application is immediately terminated and will be treated as a new application, meaning that the benefit is withdrawn for months (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 27). In Hungary you have to be able to prove residence for a year in a local area before being entitled to apply for social housing (Veres 2019: 20), while in Portugal claimants can be required to present at the parish council every two weeks in order to confirm unemployment status (Brito, 2019: 25). In Turkey in order for the parents of disabled children to be able to claim social assistance they must take their child to hospital to receive a medical report and return there every 1-3 years. This requirement is extremely onerous for some who do not necessarily have access to the appropriate transport and for whom getting out of the house is very difficult: ‘It is an agony’.

At the same time as residence must be settled, claimants can be required to travel long distances to work – in Austria applicants must be prepared to make a two-hour one-way commute, and longer if they live in a remote area. This commuting requirement was felt to be unfair. Not only does it cost money, but also

if that’s the worst job you can imagine you also need to ask whether it’s justified to commute in the first place. Then it also depends on my resources, my environment and so on. If I have five children to care for and then also need to commute, then the situation becomes critical.

Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 43
The bureaucratic procedures for claiming benefits are not only demeaning but often also flawed. The stress and hardship associated with this process make it incumbent on the state to have a system that minimises the numbers of appeals, and the rates of success suggest there is a systematic problem that is not being addressed. In Netherlands and UK a significant proportion of decisions are overturned on appeal and there are a large number of legal cases. In the UK several interviewees contrasted the latitude that was given to the system with the harshness of punishments for claimants. Perhaps it is not surprising that these kinds of conditions seem to facilitate a more personalized suspicion of and combativeness toward the people implementing the system:

They were talking about how great [UC] is […] and I’m sitting and I’m thinking, just don’t say anything… basically I’m bursting, I want to say something… So when she finished, I said: ‘Listen, I will tell you this. Go research yourself and I will tell you, most of the time they tell you lies.’ […] ‘Why is this advisor supposed to call me mad or something, all these names?’ […] I should have, I think, called her some names.

Dupont et al, 2019: 42

While the rhetoric around social assistance is often very much about responsibility and independence, what is striking is that people experienced precisely the opposite – that they were out of control of their own lives. The procedures for claiming social assistance are in different ways caught between standardization and personalization as preferred means to deal with difference, understood not only as difference between populations but also difference as individuality. The response can be to either increase discretion or multiply the complexity of standardized procedures. Personalization can be an aspect of recognition, but it is very difficult to replicate. As Knijn and Hiah explain: ‘In social assistance a trade-off between interactional justice, articulated as respect and dignity, and procedural justice appears, although interactional justice depends to a great extent on the personal, thus arbitrary opinion of the client manager’ (2019: 25).

4.2) Local Authorities and Families as Sites of Justice

Path-dependent institutions such as municipalities and the family play a major role in distributive outcomes, and justice principles need to be studied at various governance levels and with attention to their interaction (Knijn et al, 2018). The welfare state is partly decentralized in that the administration of benefits and the interpretation of eligibility criteria is often carried out at the local level. In Turkey most types of social assistance were devolved to local authorities during the 1990s, with the state refunding partly or fully some important benefits. In the Netherlands the Social Support Act 2014 decentralized care policies to municipalities, allegedly to stimulate ‘self-responsibility’. Until 2003 financial responsibility for able-bodied citizens who stopped receiving unemployment benefits was located at the state level, but the Work and Assistance Act 2003 devolved this responsibility to municipalities. The Participation Act expanded local responsibility to mentally and physically disabled residents.

7 In the Netherlands this seems to be interpreted as a breakdown in relation between the individual client managers and claimants, with a mediation system set up to restore relations between them.
In democratic theory, the decentralization of public services to local authorities has been defended based on the value of self-determination or the opportunity for political communities to pursue their own ends. However, theorists have also warned of the risk that smaller jurisdiction may ‘encourage people to disregard some of those with which they stand in relations of justice’ (Young, 2000, cited in Anderson and Dupont, 2018: 20). Focusing on the policy field of social assistance reveals that this can have significant implications on approaches to territorial inequalities and related mobilities. Local governments have far fewer policy options to trade off: their budgets are restricted, they do not control monetary policy, and it is much harder for them to borrow. In both Austria and Netherlands some municipalities fund more generously than do others and the Dutch report points out that localized policies can give rise to inequality between different regions in terms of both cognitive and redistributive justice: ‘But also on a higher scale these differences may lead to a lack of legal certainty and uniformity. In other words, spatial injustice might possibly be a consequence of the localized social assistance system’ (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 42). In an attempt to deal with discrepancies in levels of awards and in conditions in 2010 the Austrian federal state entered into an agreement with the nine provinces to develop common basic standards and minimum benefits across the country. This agreement, which expired on 31 December 2016, may approach Young’s (2000) ideal of ‘relational autonomy’, whereby ‘authorities at different levels would have a right to negotiate their relationships and make claims on each other to the extent that one’s decisions and activities may have adverse effects on others’.

Pettit distinguishes relations of domination concerning the vertical relations between people and the government from the horizontal relations between people (Pettit, 2014, cited in Bugra, 2018: 11). However these types of relations are intertwined to the extent that states shape the rights and obligations that people have toward one another when they get married, have children or share a home. Key to these regulations is the extent to which property rights are seen as individual or collective. When it comes to income and property the threshold is not applied to the individual claimant but to the entire household. Despite the emphasis on individual effort and independence, family relationships are central when it comes to assessing whether or not a person can receive social assistance. In Portugal for example, access to SII, which is the most basic level of subsistence support, depends on the value of the income of the household where one lives. It requires not only the claimant but other household members to allow assessors access to bank accounts for example. While the role of the family has been acknowledged in Southern European welfare states which have been dubbed ‘familiaristic’, thresholds also bring families/households into the heart of social assistance claims and governance in Northern Europe. In all countries under study the income and property of family members and co-habitants is taken into account when assessing need, and in some Austrian provinces family members have to pay back social assistance to relatives when they have the means.

This has far-reaching implications for incentives to commodify one’s labour or to exchange its fruits within long-term, less formal and contractualized relationships. Including household members in means testing can disincentivize cohabitation between parents and children:

In practice parents with children live in one house, those children sometimes earn something, but often do not contribute substantially to the living costs. Parents […] find it difficult to ask the children… Until that cost sharing principle came, those children actually lived well at home… And then suddenly there was a problem because father or mother suddenly had a lower income. And that child… didn’t
have a job that could compensate for that and the result was just that they left home. And the question is: what do you solve with that?

Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 34.

The fact that benefits are normally paid to a single member of the household brings to the fore the question of how to ensure that justice and fairness are upheld in the course of gendered and aged relations that are usually perceived as falling within the ‘private’ sphere:

There are sometimes abusive relationships [...]. I know it happens the other way round sometimes, but the way sexism works in society and the way the role of the family works, the man keeps the money, does what he wants with the money. The woman gets hardly any. Now, I've dealt with cases like that in the past [...] and you could split the payments in those circumstances so that you make sure that all the members of the household get enough [...]. Now the problem is that it’s very difficult for an advisor to find out that they should split the payment because unless somebody’s going to tell directly that they’re experiencing abuse, it’s extremely difficult [...] and a lot of what we do now is online [...] so you’re not having the opportunity to see any sign of abuse.


However, the threat of domination is not limited to the relationship between family members and is highly relevant to other sites of justice, such as the interaction between claimants, local government officials, job centres and other professionals in charge of evaluating claimants’ circumstances. In contrast to the attention lavished on the failures of individual benefit claimants, there has been relatively little attention paid to the injustice of the process of benefit claiming. Despite their broad support for worker citizen principles, participants identified the complexity, impunity and unaccountability of the system as sources of injustice. In this respect, as one interviewee noted, the benefits system is not unlike immigration, and a combination of complexity and permanent rule change subjects people to a ‘multiplicity of problems coming from all different directions’.

This section has explored the institutional processes and the various challenges posed by the intervention of state, municipal and family actors in the governance of social assistance. We argue that attention to outcomes is not sufficient for justice concerns, and that in many cases the procedures for claiming were themselves experienced as an injustice even if the outcome was not. We also highlight the importance of street level bureaucrats and digitization to these experiences. While the problem is frequently cast as one of excessive discretion paving the way to discrimination and other forms of abuse, client managers also signal the limitations posed by exploitative working conditions and inadequate training to the rigorous assessment of claimants’ circumstances and the adequate response to their individual needs. Such approaches are much more difficult to implement through automated forms of decision-making, which also tend to disadvantage a significant proportion of claimants with lesser literacy or computer skills. We find that decentralization to families and households, which usually takes the form of pooling incomes and paying all benefits to a single member, simultaneously provides incentives for the splitting of families and households and opens the door to gendered and aged domination within the family. Decentralisation is related to process: disrespectful, intrusive and unnecessarily burdensome procedures within local authorities simultaneously create forms of forced mobility and obstacles to voluntary inter-municipal mobility.
5) The Scope of Justice: EU Nationals, Migrants, Asylum Seekers

The scope of justice invites us to ask who the principles of justice apply to (Rippon et al, 2018). We have noted at the outset the importance of citizenship as a grounds of justice, and this is reflected in assumptions that the scope of social assistance seems both implicitly and explicitly assumed to be national. ‘We can’t compensate for poverty in other countries. It’s impossible. You need to consider the situation Europe-wide’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 28). The scope of justice, she claims, can only be national. This was reproduced even by some Roma claimants: ‘To be frank… we’re not even getting benefits as we should in our own country. So what demands can you make of London and the UK?’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 38). This assumed national scope of justice is bound up with a lack of historical sensibility. As Richard Drayton, Professor of Imperial History at King’s College London put it:

> When in about 1950 British democracy created a welfare state at home, it too depended on invisible donations from tea-pickers in Ceylon, rubber-tappers in Malaya, goldminers in South Africa, copper-miners in Rhodesia, the oil of Iraq and especially Iran.

Drayton, 2012: 158

As ‘non-citizens’, the children of those tea-pickers, rubber-tappers and copper-miners are unlikely to receive any of the benefits of the British welfare state. Crudely put, nationalized historical and social imaginaries mean that citizens are felt to be within the scope of justice, and migrants not. Indeed in some states certain benefits are explicitly targeted at building the nation in the sense of a certain demographic group. In Hungary under a new programme generous welfare payments are available to families who commit to having three children in ten years and make it possible to have one stay-at-home parent. This is claimed to be implemented to stop ‘population decline’ as ‘the government does not believe in immigration but rather in supporting Hungarian families raising children’.

Nevertheless, who counts as a citizen and who counts as a migrant is context-sensitive and contested. In the EU, citizens of other member states fall within the same scope of justice as nationals of the country where they reside. However, restrictions on welfare benefits have been mobilized as a means of discouraging the entry of non-employed EU nationals who are not subject to immigration control, effectively acting as ‘declaratory obstacles to movement’ (O’Brien, 2015). While it is not possible to measure the numbers of EU citizens who have not moved because of welfare restrictions (suspected to be low as it is work that is the pull rather than benefits), in some countries these policies do seem to have had a significant impact on EU citizens. In the UK between 2009 and 2011 over two thirds of social assistance applications by A8 nationals were rejected. Furthermore, because EU nationals must not be discriminated against vis-à-vis citizens, this has consequences for national claimants of non-contributory benefits who are returning after a period living abroad and must demonstrate a ‘settled intention to reside’. This can come as a surprise: ‘A lot of people are shocked when they find out they’ve got to undergo this test. They’re “Oh, I’ve got a British passport. I can show it to you”’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 37).

---

In the context of immigration, refugees mark an important space in the scope of justice, demonstrating that states do recognize the human rights of non-citizens who are persecuted by their own state of citizenship. Eva, a social assistance client with a refugee background from Pakistan now in the Netherlands described social assistance as ‘grace from the government’, a chance to restart and rebuild her life (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 30). However, many people who are acknowledged as suffering persecution in this way find themselves exempted or with limited access. These exclusions are in part a consequence of the asylum system which has made the status of fully recognized refugees increasingly difficult to access, and the proliferation of different and more limited forms of protection that do not charge states with the same responsibilities. There has been an increase in the proportion of people granted ‘subsidiary protection’ (which recognizes that life is threatened but that holders do not meet the full requirements for asylum) in Austria, the Netherlands and the UK, and both Austria and the UK effectively require people who have been given some form of protection to be subject to confirmatory procedures after a number of years. Those who are in the process of claiming asylum are particularly vulnerable. Even in the Netherlands, which has the most generous access for status holders, those who are in the process of claiming and who fall under the Ministry of Security and Justice do not have access to social assistance. They must reside in reception centres and receive a weekly sum of €50.

In other states, being a Geneva Convention refugee has consequences for welfare state access. For example, in Austria subsidiary protection status holders are excluded from social assistance, and they are only entitled to the core benefits available for asylum seekers. Interestingly, in the Netherlands a distinction is made between citizens and status holders in that, in contrast to the former, the latter's duties regarding social assistance are less focused on re-integration into the labour market and more on 'integration' aimed at immigrants. For their first two years as a status holder they are not supposed to work but instead attend language and other classes about life in the Netherlands (de Lange et al, 2017, cited in Knijn and Hiah, 2019).

We do not deny the usefulness of learning the majority languages of the state in which one resides, but language can therefore also be a barrier to exercising rights, and it seems that this barrier is in some cases being actively mobilized to justify exclusion from national benefits. In the UK, while some visas (such as the working holidaymaker visas) represent employment as a means of learning language and other skills, claimants whose language skills are not strong are expected to take language training (which is not provided free of charge). In Austria and the Netherlands claimants are expected to be interviewed respectively in German and Dutch even if both they and their claim manager speak good English. Furthermore, the ‘employment qualification bonus’ is awarded to those who have characteristics that deem them prima facie employable – most notably, German or English language skills, and an education completed in Austria. At the same time as the imposition of this requirement, the funding available for language courses has been cut by 50%. Despite the terminology, the ‘bonus’ (which is 35% of the award) only brings the total figure up to subsistence levels. This seems to have been devised to serve one of the aims of the system which is to ‘decrease migration into the Austrian social system by introducing more restrictions for new arrivals’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 15). However, it has also negatively impacted other groups including disabled people. One (non-migrant) claimant objected:

---

9 Integration applies to the general group of immigrants, not only immigrants on social assistance.
If someone is willing to work but hasn’t been here for that long yet... then somehow pulling them down with the money issue as opposed to others who maybe do speak German and settle here but don’t want to work and receive more money anyway... I simply don’t find that fair.

Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 25

In the Netherlands in January 2019 Minister van Ark called on municipalities to either sanction welfare recipients or implement the counter achievement, in particular the requirement to speak proper Dutch. Clearly, the target group of her letter are immigrants (Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 14). For several years there was even a requirement that migrants borrow 10,000 euros from a state fund to pay for their language and citizenship training, with the requirement to repay lifted if they passed the tests within three years. However, the quality of the courses was so poor that 70% of refugees did not obtain their diploma within this time limit, meaning they ended up with a significant debt and no qualification to show for it. Proximity to the majority identity is not only reflected formally in policies around citizenship, language, immigration status and length of residence. There are different formulations of national belonging, implicit in references to ‘the taxpayer’ and calls for reciprocity and contribution to (national) society. To receive social assistance it is often necessary to be a normatively ‘good citizen’ who demonstrates belonging to the community of value by displaying the right kinds of behaviour. This is not restricted to being a working kind of person. For example, in the UK and Turkey members of the armed forces or their families may receive special concessions, while in Hungary local governments can exclude unemployed people from the public works programme and related social assistance if they do not properly maintain their homes and gardens (Veres, 2019: 12).

Given the national framing of welfare schemes, migrants or minorities who are racialised by such framings often become benchmarks of undeservingness. In Austria refugees must make and comply with an ‘integration declaration’ (Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019: 13). In the Netherlands, where social assistance is increasingly described as an ‘allochthonous benefit’, some municipalities have identified that migrants’ language and literacy problems can make it difficult for them to navigate the system. They have consequently implemented a ‘living allowance’, a set amount supplemented by municipalities paying housing costs, social insurance etc. This has been criticized for being patronizing and effectively creating second-class welfare recipients. It is notable that while there is professed concern about newcomers having to fill in complicated forms in Dutch, this concern has not been replicated when it comes to applicants with poor literacy despite concerns about the significant decline in literacy rates in the population more generally (ELINET, 2016). The prevalence of these two groups among the users of the system, and its incompatibility with their needs, suggests that the process more generally needs to be adapted. This would avoid singling out particular groups as incompetent users and entrenching stigma.

There are mechanisms through which non-conformity associated with particular ‘out-groups’ is penalized in interrelated and cumulative ways. In Austria, not only are non-citizens more likely than citizens to have more than two children but, because non-German speakers do not receive full benefit, many cannot afford to live alone and therefore opt for shared housing. In a vicious cycle, this living arrangement reduces further their benefit entitlements. One interviewee argues that the erosion of ideas of justice and solidarity has been facilitated by a focus on the exclusion of non-nationals from state services, meaning that there was a lack of protest as the welfare state was retrenched. In this way, far from being an expression of social solidarity, the welfare state is actively undermining solidaristic relations. For instance, a reform that drastically cut social assistance for the third child and more to 5% a head was particularly targeted at non-citizens who are much more likely than Austrians to have large
families. However opposition politicians and NGOs have argued that it also affects ‘native Austrian families’ and is having important consequences for child poverty.

The Austrian, Hungarian, Dutch, Turkish and Portuguese studies, as well as a previous UK study (Anderson et al, 2018), all found that Roma people were singled out by non-Roma claimants, and in some cases by client managers, as being predisposed to fraud and laziness. This may be on the basis of formal non-citizenship, but also on the grounds that, when citizens, Roma do not properly ‘belong’ to the nation (Anderson and Dupont, 2018). ‘Roma are paid by social security. I see things near my house, realities that social workers should look at. Roma who do not deserve anything receive high benefits’ (Brito, 2019: 31). The speaker, like others complaining about money being unfairly disbursed, implicitly makes a claim to special knowledge and access of the underside of life because of her social position: ‘I see things near my house’. This is used to justify a racist statement that the speaker is uneasy with (she prefaces her remark with ‘I am going to say something I should probably not say’) but can defend by talking about her own experience which is removed from that of the social worker. Similarly, a Dutch policymaker confesses:

It is probably not entirely ethical to say [...] but the Roma, the target group of the Roma, that has happened a few times, a benefit is used, but in the meantime there are Mercedes, BMWs, Audis, parked at the gates of their large villas, etc. [...] What I personally find harmful, is that such cases also make a lasting impression on the client managers and after a while you deal with some sort of professional deformation, that client managers almost automatically start to think that anyone can be a fraud. That’s not nice either. You must always be alert to that.

Knijn and Hiah, 2019: 43

Roma in Turkey too are signalled as exploiting the welfare system. This is also a sign that they are not culturally one of ‘us’, a blip in the system that must be accommodated but who should not really be included (Akkan and Serim, 2019: 8).

Scope of justice is also then related to justice as recognition. In a vicious circle, those who claim benefits are stigmatized, and those who are stigmatized are not believed to be eligible for benefits. In Hungary the Roma appear to be particularly susceptible to this kind of conditionality and have found themselves ‘at the whim of the local mayors’ arbitrary decisions with no chance for legal remedy’ (Veres, 2019: 14). Their access to social assistance is blocked by a number of measures aiming to directly exclude them. The rights of citizenship become attached to specifically normative criteria that are no longer about reciprocity but about demonstrating the right kind of values and behavior. The Roma are signalled out as not having the right values, and one respondent made some connection with this and capitalism: ‘He spoke about a general anti-private sector, anti-multinational company attitude among the Roma which he also characterized as a post-socialist attitude’ (Veres, 2019: 30). These normative criteria are akin to the kinds of requirements that are made of persons who want to naturalize into citizenship: some people may be legal citizens, but they do not have the values of the citizen.

The position of migrants and racialized minorities in the social assistance system reveals where the grounds and the scope of justice come together to produce a community of value, that is to say, a community whose members uphold the value of market-oriented reciprocity (a key ground for social assistance claims) and direct their labour to the satisfaction of their mutual interest (thus including themselves within the scope of justice). In policy and discourse the scope of social assistance is generally imagined as national, providing a veneer of legitimacy
to the exclusion of migrants but also many citizens, including those who return from a period of residence abroad. National framings of deservingness can also take the form of language requirements and other dominant social norms, such as the two-child family and small household pattern. These tend to perpetuate the exclusion and stigma of recognized refugees and racialized minorities. Applying the principles of justice to the relation between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘migrant’ entails challenging methodological nationalism (Anderson and Dupont, 2018) and the national framing of social assistance debates.

6) Conclusion: Distribution, Deservingness and Justice

This Deliverable has drawn on Deliverable 2.1 by Rippon et al (2018) to analyze the findings of national case studies on a crucial component of the welfare state, namely the economic support it provides to working-age people on low incomes to engage with ideas of justice. It finds that citizenship is a means of encapsulating different grounds of justice, and that the principle of desert and the virtue of the recipient connects both grounds and shape of justice. The concept of deservingness is an ambiguous one that simultaneously speaks to charity and to justice. In the context of social assistance however the justice it evokes is mainly supportive of the taxpayer whose money must be spent prudently rather than of claimants who must be protected from destitution at the same time as their deservingness is assessed. Matters of deservingness permeate the grounds, shape and site of justice.

With regards to patterns of distribution the judgements that are made rest on two types of assessment. The first demands the application of needs-based thresholds and the second applies the other CARIN criteria on deservingness. In relation to the former we found that the processes of assessing need are themselves a site of injustice. Pulled by the personalizing and moralizing overtones of deservingness toward the particular and the special case, social assistance enables the exercise of significant discretionary power by social workers and claimant managers. When these actors lack the resources or the motivation to positively respond to claimants’ interests and circumstances, this can facilitate cases of discrimination and the imposition of unnecessary procedural burdens. Even setting aside questions of process, the substantive conception of need that underpins social assistance diverges starkly from the one that is deployed in sufficiencyarian philosophy and that aims to guarantee everyone has enough to live a decent life. In policy need is deployed to minimize and tailor state intervention. In other words, it imposes a maximum rather than a minimum income threshold, and therefore allows levels of social assistance to fall below what sufficiencyarians would see as enabling an adequate standard of living. ‘Reciprocity’, ‘contribution’ or ‘counter-achievement’, an idea that has become increasingly central in the political and intellectual climate of austerity, only exacerbates the restrictive tendencies of the deservingness paradigm. Its narrow interpretation in terms of participation in the market economy overlooks many other social contributions and obliges claimants to work or prepare for work while denying them the legal protections (such as a right to the minimum wage) that normally come with work. When used as a measuring rod to allocate scarce resources, deservingness encourages suspicion toward claimants’ purported needs and contributions and the relegation of large sections of the population to the ranks of the undeserving. These explicitly include young adults and migrants who are cast by national and market-oriented conceptions of contribution as not having paid their way into the scope of justice, and therefore excluded from some or all forms of assistance.
The ‘C’ of CARIN – control – allows that some sections of the population (the elderly, the disabled, the young, and, to a limited extent, the carers of young children) more easily find themselves in the deserving category. However, the logic of Control permeates policy more problematically, individualizing responsibility and blame. Consider the rhetoric of ‘pathways to poverty’ (Dupont et al, 2019: 28) suggesting that poverty is something people mistakenly wander into through a series of wrong terms. Despite the mechanisms that push people into debt the pathways identified (family breakdown, educational failure, personal debt, addiction and worklessness) do not include the welfare benefit system. The very representation of people as ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘vulnerable’ links inequality to individual characteristics or attitudes rather than social relations and power. We have seen how even social categories whose perceived needs initially single out as deserving, such as the disabled, the elderly and single primary carers of young children, can become stigmatized through the obligation to prove helplessness and gratefulness when claiming social assistance. The practice of social assistance illustrates that recognition and distribution are deeply intertwined.

We have seen how ideas about ‘luck’ accompany deservingness in order to be able to accommodate people who do not engage in the labour market through no fault of their own. Relatedly, non-citizens may also feel ‘lucky’ to have the opportunity to avail themselves of welfare state benefits – as discussed in Deliverable 5.2 (Anderson and Dupont, 2018). However, individualized attributions of deservingness are not separate from state categories and the language of ‘luck’ distracts from structural factors. Both non-citizens and citizens may genuinely feel, and be described as ‘lucky’ however imperfect these may be. In Deliverables 2.2 (van den Brink et al., 2018) and 5.3 (Anderson, 2019) we discuss the social model of disability that argues that individuals are not disabled, but rather societies are ‘disabling’ and produce ‘disability’ in their lack of accommodation for human difference. Policy categories, including citizenship itself, are productive as well as descriptive. They do not simply sort people into already existing groups but are key to producing populations that can be replicated or stereotyped in the media. State categorisations can become social hierarchies, and social hierarchies can find themselves reflected in state categorisations. Some differences are given legal weight and have consequences for eligibility, conditionality and level of social assistance. Others are overlooked even if they have material consequences: for example, both the Portuguese and Austrian studies mentioned how the non-differentiation between rural and urban residents significantly impacted on the experiences of those in receipt of social assistance (Brito, 2019; Meier and Tiefenbacher, 2019). In addition, the structurally embedded motivation to narrow the meaning of these rights-creating characteristics can lead to their politicization and to accusations of fraudulent identification. The payment of social assistance to adult ‘heads’ of families or households, together with the obligation of family members to repay recipients’ debts in some cases, reinforces gendered and aged power imbalances.

State categories and citizenship bring us to the logic of ‘I’ – Identity – that assumes the national frame and connects grounds, pattern, site and scope of justice. This focusses very much on matters related to migration, asylum and ethnicity, and the treatment of Roma as evidenced in both this Deliverable and Deliverable 5.2 (Anderson and Dupont 2018). However, the decentralization of social assistance to local authorities may also encourage exclusive conceptions of the scope of justice among the residents of wealthy municipalities.

Policy recommendations
Critical theory-building is a necessary but not a sufficient step toward the formulation of policy recommendations, an activity that also requires in-depth knowledge of political institutions, social norms and aspirations, and structural constraints. The following recommendations should therefore be interpreted as a set of promising ideas aiming to overcome what appears to be widespread problems in contemporary European welfare states, and that could be used and adapted by those concerned with manifestations of injustice in the European Union and beyond. In addition to EU legislative, executive and judicial bodies, this could include civil society organizations engaged in lobbying and global actors such as the International Labour Organization or the United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights. This being said, we leave for a future occasion the problematization of the current allocation of social assistance responsibilities to states rather than international organizations which may be better positioned to address the challenges of a globalized economic order. While the recommendations are pitched at a relatively high level of abstraction, nationally tailored ones can be found in the country reports informing this Deliverable.

- Replace means testing with status testing, whereby anyone who is unemployed would be eligible for social assistance, with a ‘top up’ that reflects unemployment contributions. This could be a first step toward basic income, which should complement rather than replace existing public services.

- Remove benefit sanctions as a first step toward the elimination of work-related conditionality.

- Provide social assistance to anyone who is legally resident.

- Pay social assistance to individual recipients instead of targeting families and households.

- Encourage the formation and diffusion of claimants unions. Promote conversations between claimants unions and the unions that represent the workers administering benefits. Involve claimants unions and front-line service providers in the design of social security policy.

- Provide sufficient training to officials administering the benefits.

- Increase transparency and accountability in the social security system and facilitate complaints procedures.

- Educate citizens about the welfare state and the benefits it confers, including to the middle class, in addition to social assistance. Make links between austerity, tax havens and tax avoidance.
Bibliography


Appendix 1 - D5.5 case study protocol

Objectives WP5: Justice as lived experience

Work package 5 is concerned with justice as lived experience. It examines the subjective experiences of those vulnerable to injustice in three spheres of justice: political, economic and social. It is also particularly interested in the welfare state as a means of inclusion (access to the welfare state is a fundamental benefit of national citizenship) and of exclusion (access to some elements of the welfare state, particularly out of work payments, is associated with social stigma, compulsory work-related activities and marginalisation).

D5.5

D5.5 explores justice from the perspective of recipients of unemployment-related state benefits. Theories of justice often imply, and in some cases explicitly express, rationales for a welfare state in Europe. Ideas of public/collective provision pre-date modern states. Today, ideas about the welfare state and citizenship are intertwined. The rights of the welfare state have been described as the pinnacle of the achievements of citizenship, enabling ‘social citizenship’ (T.H. Marshall 1950), yet on the other hand those who claim certain kinds of welfare benefits are often faced with various hurdles. This is particularly true of benefits associated with unemployment.

We understand ‘welfare state’ to be an institution which provides benefits (income, goods and services) to everyone in a particular society, regardless of whether they have contributed to the cost of providing them. Second, it provides specific benefits which are seen as meeting needs, rather than sums of money which can be used as the recipient pleases. Finally, the institution is funded by mandatory taxation, with tax schedules having no deliberate connection with the benefits that various classes of people are expected to receive. In short the institution is potentially redistributive, specific in its aims, compulsory, and surveilling (Miller, 1990: 99-100).

A. Aim

The aim of 5.5 is to examine what people understand to be the relation between contemporary welfare states and social justice – if indeed they think that there is a relation at all. Is the welfare state an expression of social justice or is it an unjust limitation of freedom? Does it promote equality or entrench discrimination?

B. Objectives

1. Map retrenchment of welfare state since 2008
   a. What were the key policy changes, and in what domains of the welfare state?
   b. Who has been prioritised? What has been ringfenced?
   c. Who has been ‘sacrificed’ and on what grounds?
   d. What disputes have emerged?
2. What are the consequences for (unemployed)
   a. disabled people;
b. non-nationals. Please consider: asylum seekers, EU nationals, temporarily resident Third Country Nationals and people with permanent residency. If there is another group that is particularly relevant to your national context then do feel free to include them;

c. young adults;

d. and how are these gendered?

3. How has retrenchment been contested and how have people mobilised ideas of justice?

4. How does the welfare state respond to and shape mobility?

5. What do people understand as the relation between welfare state and justice in theory and in practice?

C. Methodology

Objectives 1 and 2 will be achieved using documentary legal and policy analysis and quantitative data. For 1b and c we are interested in knowing who were targeted as deserving and undeserving in the political and media coverage. We are not requesting discourse analysis but rather an observer’s overview of the debates.

It is anticipated that you will be able to draw on data and material from previous national reports and Deliverables (particularly from WP3.5 on the right to housing, WP5.3-5.4 on commodified care and WP6.2 on austerity). This will be described in the first part of your national report (12-15 pages).

Objectives 3-5 will be addressed through interviews and focus groups with social workers/client managers, claimants and advocacy organisations. We suggest a focus on unemployed claimants. We are open to other forms of benefit but please contact us first to discuss this:

2 interviews with social workers/client managers

3-4 interviews OR one focus group with claimants (must be mixed genders)

2 interviews with advocacy organisations

D. Timeline

7 December 2018 - case study protocol finalised
15 February 2019 - part 1 of national report submitted
22 February 2019 - draft interview/focus group guidelines circulated; draft template for Part 2 of national report circulated
15 April 2019 - 1st draft national reports submitted
Appendix 2 – Suggested interview schedules for partners

Reminder from case study protocol: The aim of 5.5 is to examine what people understand to be the relation between contemporary welfare states and social justice

Objectives

1. Map retrenchment of welfare state since 2008
   a. What were the key policy changes, and in what domains of the welfare state?
   b. Who has been prioritised? What has been ringfenced?
   c. Who has been ‘sacrificed’ and on what grounds?
   d. What disputes have emerged?
2. What are the consequences for (unemployed)
   a. disabled people;
   b. non-nationals. Please consider: asylum seekers, EU nationals, temporarily resident Third Country Nationals and people with permanent residency. If there is another group that is particularly relevant to your national context then do feel free to include them;
   c. young adults;
   d. and how are these gendered?
3. How has retrenchment been contested and how have people mobilised ideas of justice?
4. How does the welfare state respond to and shape mobility?
5. What do people understand as the relation between welfare state and justice in theory and in practice?

The fieldwork will generate data to answer questions 3-5. In Budapest we also discussed ideas of deservingness and their implication for questions 3 and 5. Van Oorschot has five ‘CARIN’ criteria that he argues are used to rank social perceptions of deservingness of welfare recipients (control over neediness, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need). Thanks to Dorota and Trudie for their very helpful suggestions on the literature for this. From materials sent by partners there seem to be two ways in which this is reflected in policy: contribution and belonging which we could reframe as justice as redistribution (contribution) and justice as recognition (belonging).

*A REMINDER THAT THE NATIONAL REPORT DEADLINE IS 1ST MAY*

We know that you’re busy with other country reports and deliverables and this is the last one so we’ve pushed it back as far as we can. As with previous national reports, we will accept bullet points and a detailed outline, but please observe this deadline.
Please note that what follows is not intended to tell you what to do! You know your own national context best. But we hope they might be useful in helping you think through your interview schedules.

We propose three broad fields of questions:

A: Your experience on benefits with a particular focus on mobility (Q4);

B: What you think about the relation between social security/social protection, deservingness and justice (Q5);

C: How have and can ideas of justice be mobilised in welfare struggles, who are involved in the current struggle (client representatives, political parties, trade unions)? (Q3).

For welfare recipients and advocacy organisations

Experience of social assistance

After establishing general personal histories of social assistance claiming and how experiences have changed over time we will focus on the relation between social assistance and mobility.

*How do eligibility requirements, institutions and procedures affect people’s movement including across regional/provincial boundaries? What non-national borders matter?*

The ways you explore this will depend on national context. There are ways in which social assistance can require people to stay in the same place. For example, in Austria, the expiration of the federation agreement on Mindestsicherung presumably must make life very difficult for people who need to move from one province to another. There are also ways in which social assistance demands that people be mobile for the purposes of work, so in the UK for instance you have to be prepared to travel 1.5 hours for a job or else you will be ineligible. It would be really good if you could explore both sedentariness and movement.

*When and how do national borders matter?*

How to deal with this depends on who your interviewees are. Some examples could be:

Citizens: do they have experience of claiming social assistance in another country and what were their experiences and responses? Have they tried to claim social assistance after a period abroad (this potentially important in the UK as if people return to the UK post-Brexit they’re going to find they’re ineligible for lots of benefits)? Have they experienced claiming benefits as non-citizens and can they compare their experiences before and after citizenship?

Migrants/asylum seekers/refugees: what are the obstacles to claiming social assistance as a foreigner? To what extent are these procedural and to what extent are they a result of discretionary behaviour?

Do people have right to legal assistance (from a lawyer) if they disagree with decisions of the social security office, and who pays for that assistance?

What obligations do claimants have in exchange for receiving social assistance (‘voluntary’ work, language courses, trainings) and what are the sanctions if they do not follow up?
Advocacy organisations: does the welfare state have to be a national welfare state? Would they like to see a European welfare state? What about an extra-European welfare state?

For social assistant clients it could be interesting to ask:

How do the demands of social assistance affect their time?

E.g. waiting, feeling you’re wasting time, being dependent on others for time, subordination through time, being made to feel your time is of no value or less value.

B: What is the relation between social security/social protection, deservingness and justice?

Explore whether the interviewee has a hierarchy of deservingness? What should be done with the undeserving in the final instance? Should everyone have access to a social safety net?

You might want to use Van Oorschot and Roosma 2017 ‘The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness’. Our focus on mobility means that matters of belonging are particularly important to explore:

How important is belonging to deservingness? Belonging to what? To a people? To a region? To a ‘hard working culture’?

Here in some cases it might be interesting to refer back to answers in the previous section on their experiences of mobility and how this affected their social assistance claims.

What would a just welfare state look like? Would it need to have deservingness criteria? If so, why? How would it accommodate mobility within and across national borders?

C: How have and can ideas of justice be mobilised in welfare struggles?

How you approach these is likely to depend on whether the interviewee is an individual recipient or a social advocate organisation. If they are a social advocate organisation you might want to explore

What are key events, positive and negative in the struggle for justice in this field?

Who are those who are most vulnerable to injustice? What is it that creates that vulnerability?

Both advocacy organisations and individuals could be asked questions like

What can be learned from everyday struggles of those on social assistance for struggles for justice more generally?

Finally, it would be interesting to ask two kinds of policy questions:

What would your key realistic policy/practical recommendations be? (NB remember that changes in implementation may be very important for recipients and we would want to capture that)

How about being unrealistic? If you were seeking to achieve the just welfare state you described, what would be the recommendation you would make as the major step in achieving that goal?
For social workers and those who are involved in the administration of benefits:

Experience of social assistance

What do they regard as key injustices of social assistance as it is currently functioning? How has the financial crisis been implicated in this? Are there any cases that really stick in their mind? How and why did they happen?

Has their discretionary power been limited or extended since the financial crisis. Do they use that power and if so, can they provide some examples?

How do eligibility requirements, institutions and procedures affect people’s movement including across regional/provincial boundaries? What non-national borders matter?

When and how do national borders matter?

What were their motivations for taking on this role and has it achieved their expectations? Do they have to deal with more objections, court cases or protests than about ten years ago?

B: What is the relation between the welfare state, deservingness and justice?

Explore whether the interviewee has a hierarchy of deservingness? What should be done with the undeserving in the final instance? Should everyone have access to a social safety net?


How important is belonging to deservingness? Belonging to what? To a people? To a region? To a ‘hard working culture’?

Here in some cases it might be interesting to refer back to answers in the previous section.

What would a just welfare state look like? Would it need to have deservingness criteria? If so, why? How would it accommodate mobility within and across national borders?

C: How have and can ideas of justice be mobilised in welfare struggles?

What are key events, positive and negative in the struggle for justice in this field? Do trades unions have a role in this field, other NGO’s (Foodbanks, Refugee organisations)?

Who are those who are most vulnerable to injustice? What is it that creates that vulnerability?

What can be learned from everyday struggles of those on social assistance for struggles for justice more generally?

Finally, it would be interesting to ask two kinds of policy questions:

What would your key realistic policy/practical recommendations be? (NB remember that changes in implementation may be very important for recipients and we would want to capture that)

How about being unrealistic? If you were seeking to achieve the just welfare state you described, what would be the recommendation you would make as the major step in achieving that goal.